Narrative perspective shift at retrieval: The psychological-distance-mediated-effect on emotional intensity of positive and negative autobiographical memory

The present study manipulated participants’ narrative perspectives (1st-personal pronoun “I” and 3rd-personal pronoun “He/She”) to vary their field and observer visual perspectives that they took to retrieve autobiographical events and examine how the shifts in narrative perspective could influence the self-rated emotional intensity of autobiographical memory. Results showed that when narrative perspectives effectively shifted participants’ visual perspectives from field to observer, they felt attenuated emotional intensities of positive and negative autobiographical memories. However, this did not occur when narrative perspectives effectively shifted the visual perspectives from observer to field. Multiple mediator models further showed that the changes in psychological distance and imagery vividness (a distance-related construct) of autobiographical memory mediated the relationship between the narrative perspective shift from the 1st- to 3rd-person and the reduction in the intensities of negative and positive emotion. This provides support for the role of psychological distancing in reducing the emotional intensity of autobiographical memory.     

Einstein’s jacket: Evidence for long-term perceptual specificity in mental imagery

To what extent are visual fantasies constrained by our perceptual experience of the real world? Our study exploits the fact that people’s knowledge of the appearance of individuals from the early 20th Century (e.g., Albert Einstein, Winston Churchill) derives predominantly from viewing black-and-white media images. An initial experiment shows that mental imagery for individuals from this period are experienced as significantly less colourful than imagery for individuals from the era of colour media. A second experiment manipulated whether participants were instructed to explicitly imagine using colour or not (i.e., “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a green jacket” vs. “imagine Albert Einstein wearing a jacket”). Results show that colour manipulation only influences imagery for black-and-white era individuals, with no comparable effect on imagery for colour era individuals. This finding is replicated in a third experiment that includes an additional control condition of imagining generic characters (i.e., “Imagine a knight wearing a cloak” vs. “imagine a knight wearing a red cloak”). Again, only imagery for black-and-white era individuals is affected by the colour manipulation. Overall these results provide evidence for long-term perceptual specificity effects in mental imagery. We argue that visual fantasies can be constrained by surface features of underlying representations in memory, even when imagining something we have never directly perceived.     

Social priming of hemispatial neglect affects spatial coding: Evidence from the Simon task

In the Simon effect (SE), choice reactions are fast if the location of the stimulus and the response correspond when stimulus location is task-irrelevant; therefore, the SE reflects the automatic processing of space. Priming of social concepts was found to affect automatic processing in the Stroop effect. We investigated whether spatial coding measured by the SE can be affected by the observer’s mental state. We used two social priming manipulations of impairments: one involving spatial processing - hemispatial neglect (HN) and another involving color perception - achromatopsia (ACHM). In two experiments the SE was reduced in the “neglected” visual field (VF) under the HN, but not under the ACHM manipulation. Our results show that spatial coding is sensitive to spatial representations that are not derived from task-relevant parameters, but from the observer’s cognitive state. These findings dispute stimulus-response interference models grounded on the idea of the automaticity of spatial processing.     

Vantage perspective during encoding: The effects on phenomenological memory characteristics

The vantage perspective from which a memory is retrieved influences the memory’s emotional impact, intrusiveness, and phenomenological characteristics. This study tested whether similar effects are observed when participants were instructed to imagine the events from a specific perspective. Fifty student participants listened to a verbal report of car-accidents and visualized the scenery from either a field or observer perspective. There were no between-condition differences in emotionality of memories and the number of intrusions, but imagery experienced from a relative observer perspective was rated as less self-relevant. In contrast to earlier studies on memory retrieval, vantage perspective influenced phenomenological memory characteristics of the memory representation such as sensory details, and ratings of vividness and distancing of the memory. However, vantage perspective is most likely not a stable phenomenological characteristic itself. Implications and suggestions for future research are discussed.     

Emotional content of true and false memories

Many people believe that emotional memories (including those that arise in therapy) are particularly likely to represent true events because of their emotional content. But is emotional content a reliable indicator of memory accuracy? The current research assessed the emotional content of participants’ pre-existing (true) and manipulated (false) memories for childhood events. False memories for one of three emotional childhood events were planted using a suggestive manipulation and then compared, along several subjective dimensions, with other participants’ true memories. On most emotional dimensions (e.g., how emotional was this event for you?), true and false memories were indistinguishable. On a few measures (e.g., intensity of feelings at the time of the event), true memories were more emotional than false memories in the aggregate, yet true and false memories were equally likely to be rated as uniformly emotional. These results suggest that even substantial emotional content may not reliably indicate memory accuracy.     

Vantage perspective in analogue trauma memories: an experimental study

Vantage perspective during recall is thought to affect the emotionality and accessibility of distressing memories. This study aimed to test the effects of vantage perspective during recall on memory associated distress and intrusion development. An adapted version of the trauma film paradigm was used in an experimental design with three conditions. Participants were asked to listen to eyewitness reports of car accidents (e.g. Trauma Analogue Induction) and imagine the scenes vividly using mental imagery. Afterwards, they were asked to recall the most distressing scene from field perspective, observer perspective, or to recall a neutral image from observer perspective (control condition) (e.g. Trauma Analogue Recall). Recall from field perspective resulted in higher negative mood, state-anxiety, and a higher number of short-term intrusions compared to the observer perspective condition and control condition. Negative mood and state-anxiety were mediators in the relationship between vantage perspective and intrusions. In comparison to observer perspective, field perspective increased the amount of short-term intrusions as a result of higher levels of negative mood and state-anxiety after memory retrieval. Future research on the interaction between vantage perspective at recall and negative mood and anxiety effects is warranted.     

The role of visual imagery in autobiographical memory

Visual imagery plays a fundamental role in autobiographical memory, but several aspects of this role remain unclear. We conducted three experiments to explore this relationship. In the first experiment, we examined the relation between the phenomenological properties of autobiographical memory and several measures of visual-imagery ability. We found no significant positive relation between imagery ability and autobiographical memory, except on a measure of cognitive style. In a second experiment, we examined the autobiographical memories of people with different cognitive styles—namely, visualizers and verbalizers. We found that, for both kinds of participant, visual imagery was correlated with the feeling that they were reliving their memories, but auditory imagery played a greater role in verbalizers. In a third experiment, we examined the memories of individuals who had a congenital absence of visual imagery. We found that they had a deficit of auditory imagery, as well; moreover, they were much less likely than controls to feel as though they were reliving their memories. The results support the idea that visual imagery plays a vital and irreplaceable role in autobiographical recall.     

Individual differences in spatial mental imagery

In this article, we report a new image-scanning paradigm that allowed us to measure objectively individual differences in spatial mental imagery—specifically, imagery for location. Participants were asked to determine whether an arrow was pointing at a dot using a visual mental image of an array of dots. The degree of precision required to discriminate “yes” from “no” trials was varied. In Experiment 1, the time to scan increasing distances, as well as the number of errors, increased when greater precision was required to make a judgement. The results in Experiment 2 replicated those results while controlling for possible biases. When greater precision is required, the accuracy of the spatial image becomes increasingly important—and hence the effect of precision in the task reflects the accuracy of the image. In Experiment 3, this measure was shown to be related to scores on the Paper Folding test, on the Paper Form Board test, and on the visuospatial items on Raven's Advanced Progressive Matrices—but not to scores on questionnaires measuring object–based mental imagery. Thus, we provide evidence that classical standardized spatial tests rely on spatial mental imagery but not object mental imagery.     

Switching memory perspective

The perspective in which memories were spontaneously recalled, field (original perspective) or observer (see oneself in the memory), was examined for both recent and remote memories. Recent memories were dominated by field perspective whilst remote memories were dominated by observer perspective. Further, field memories contained reliably more episodic detail than observer memories. After a 1-week interval, the same memories were recalled again but with a switched memory perspective. Switching from an observer to a field perspective did not reliably increase the amount of episodic details in a memory. Switching from field to observer perspective did, however, reliably reduce the number of episodic details. These findings suggest that memories may be represented in long-term memory with a fixed perspective, either field or observer, which can be temporarily altered sometimes changing the nature of a memory, i.e. how much detail remains accessible.     

Field and observer viewpoint in remember-know memories of personal childhood events

This experiment examined the viewpoint and other phenomenal characteristics of childhood memories based on both personal recollections and self-knowledge. Participants were asked to provide examples of remember, know, and uncertain memories, and to rate each memory on a number of dimensions. Remembered events were generally viewed from a field perspective, while known-about events were generally viewed from an observer perspective. In line with earlier research, remembered events received the highest ratings for sensory and contextual detail, emotional content, and memory accuracy, while known-about events were given the lowest ratings. The results are discussed with reference to their possible implications for memory recovery or enhancement techniques that ask people to adopt a different viewpoint. Consideration is given as to whether a switch to a field perspective might encourage the acceptance of suggested details or events.     

Memory lane and morality: how childhood memories promote prosocial behavior

Although research has established that autobiographical memory affects one's self-concept, little is known about how it affects moral behavior. We focus on a specific type of autobiographical memory: childhood memories. Drawing on research on memory and moral psychology, we propose that childhood memories elicit moral purity, which we define as a psychological state of feeling morally clean and innocent. In turn, heightened moral purity leads to greater prosocial behavior. In Experiment 1, participants instructed to recall childhood memories were more likely to help the experimenter with a supplementary task than were participants in a control condition, and this effect was mediated by moral purity. In Experiment 2, the same manipulation increased the amount of money participants donated to a good cause, and both implicit and explicit measures of moral purity mediated the effect. Experiment 3 provides further support for the process linking childhood memories and prosocial behavior through moderation. In Experiment 4, we found that childhood memories led to punishment of others' ethically questionable actions. Finally, in Experiment 5, both positively valenced and negatively valenced childhood memories increased helping compared to a control condition.     

The organisation of spatial and temporal relations in memory

Episodic memories are comprised of details of “where” and “when”; spatial and temporal relations, respectively. However, evidence from behavioural, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies has provided mixed interpretations about how memories for spatial and temporal relations are organised—they may be hierarchical, fully interactive, or independent. In the current study, we examined the interaction of memory for spatial and temporal relations. Using explicit reports and eye-tracking, we assessed younger and older adults’ memory for spatial and temporal relations of objects that were presented singly across time in unique spatial locations. Explicit change detection of spatial relations was affected by a change in temporal relations, but explicit change detection of temporal relations was not affected by a change in spatial relations. Younger and older adults showed eye movement evidence of incidental memory for temporal relations, but only younger adults showed eye movement evidence of incidental memory for spatial relations. Together, these findings point towards a hierarchical organisation of relational memory. The implications of these findings are discussed in the context of the neural mechanisms that may support such a hierarchical organisation of memory.     

Field and observer viewpoint in remember-know memories of personal childhood events

This experiment examined the viewpoint and other phenomenal characteristics of childhood memories based on both personal recollections and self-knowledge. Participants were asked to provide examples of remember, know, and uncertain memories, and to rate each memory on a number of dimensions. Remembered events were generally viewed from a field perspective, while known-about events were generally viewed from an observer perspective. In line with earlier research, remembered events received the highest ratings for sensory and contextual detail, emotional content, and memory accuracy, while known-about events were given the lowest ratings. The results are discussed with reference to their possible implications for memory recovery or enhancement techniques that ask people to adopt a different viewpoint. Consideration is given as to whether a switch to a field perspective might encourage the acceptance of suggested details or events.     

When plausibility manipulations work: An examination of their role in the development of false beliefs and memories

In the current study we examined whether prevalence information and imagery encoding influence participants' general plausibility, personal plausibility, belief, and memory ratings for suggested childhood events. Results showed decreases in general and personal plausibility ratings for low prevalence events when encoding instructions were not elaborate; however, instructions to repeatedly imagine suggested events elicited personal plausibility increases for low-prevalence events, evidence that elaborate imagery negated the effect of our prevalence manipulation. We found no evidence of imagination inflation or false memory construction. We discuss critical differences in researchers' manipulations of plausibility and imagery that may influence results of false memory studies in the literature. In future research investigators should focus on the specific nature of encoding instructions when examining the development of false memories.     

Emotional Mental Imagery as Simulation of Reality: Fear and Beyond—A Tribute to Peter Lang

This article pays tribute to the seminal paper by Peter J. Lang (1977; this journal), “Imagery in Therapy: Information Processing Analysis of Fear.” We review research and clinical practice developments in the past five decades with reference to key insights from Lang’s theory and experimental work on emotional mental imagery. First, we summarize and recontextualize Lang’s bio-informational theory of emotional mental imagery (1977, 1979) within contemporary theoretical developments on the function of mental imagery. Second, Lang’s proposal that mental imagery can evoke emotional responses is evaluated by reviewing empirical evidence that mental imagery has a powerful impact on negative as well as positive emotions at neurophysiological and subjective levels. Third, we review contemporary cognitive and behavioral therapeutic practices that use mental imagery, and consider points of extension and departure from Lang’s original investigation of mental imagery in fear-extinction behavior change. Fourth, Lang’s experimental work on emotional imagery is revisited in light of contemporary research on emotional psychopathology-linked individual differences in mental imagery. Finally, key insights from Lang’s experiments on training emotional response during imagery are discussed in relation to how specific techniques may be harnessed to enhance adaptive emotional mental imagery training in future research.     

Origins of adolescents’ earliest memories

ABSTRACT

This prospective longitudinal study traced changes and individual differences in childhood amnesia over adolescence. A sample of 58 adolescents were followed from age 1-1/2 to age 16 years across 8 timepoints. At ages 12 (n?=?46) and 16 (n?=?51), adolescents completed an early memory interview. Early childhood measures included children’s self-awareness, attachment security, nonverbal memory, verbal memory, language, theory of mind, narrative, and the early reminiscing environment (mothers’ elaborative reminiscing). Adolescents continued to forget their earliest memories over adolescence, such that the age of first memory increased from 40 to 52 months from ages 12 to 16. The sole unique contributor to individual differences in age of earliest memory at both 12 and 16 years was mothers’ elaborative reminiscing, with adolescents recalling earlier memories if their mothers had reminisced more elaboratively with them during early childhood. At age 16, the role of maternal reminiscing was moderated by self-awareness at age 1-1/2. Mothers’ elaborative reminiscing mattered for the age of adolescents’ earliest memories only for children who showed lower levels of self-awareness as toddlers. This pattern suggests a buffering effect for the role of maternal reminiscing in children’s earliest memories, and supports integrated theories of childhood amnesia.     

Imagery perspective and source monitoring in imagination inflation

The present experiments suggest that imagery perspective—first person (own) versus third person (observer’s)—influences source-monitoring judgments. Imagination inflation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, &; Sherman, 1996) occurs when imaginary experience with events is mistaken for real experience. In Experiment 1, the perspective used to visualize real past events depended on memory test wording (“remember doing?” vs. “happened to you?”). Experiment 2 manipulated the perspective used to visually imagine counterfactual events and showed that the effect on imagination inflation depended on memory test wording. Imagination inflation was most likely when memory test wording encouraged participants to visualize real events from the same perspective as they had used to imagine counterfactual ones. Imagination inflation may result not simply from having created imaginary representations of events, but also from having created representations that match the decision criteria used in source monitoring.     

Saving for your future self: The role of imaginary experiences

Despite increased longevity, many people fail to save the funds necessary to support their retirement. In an attempt both to elucidate and remedy this failing, research exploring the “future-self continuity” hypothesis has revealed that temporal discounting is decreased and saving increased when connections between one’s current and future self are strengthened. Here, we explored the possibility that a basic component of mental imagery – spatial visual perspective – may be an important determinant of people’s decisions to spend now or save for the future. The results of two experiments supported this prediction. Rates of saving were enhanced when a distant-future event was generated from a third-person vs. first-person vantage point, an effect that was mediated by visual bodily awareness during mental imagery.