The wall and the shield K-K reconsidered

With apologies to Professor Sosa. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Eastern Division Meetings of the APA held in Washington, D.C., December 27 through December 30, 1988. I would like to thank my commentator Professor Gary Gleb of Rutgers University for his thoughtful comments, I also wish to thank Glenn Ross, Steven Davis and Arthur Ripstein for their sound advice.     

Kripke & the existential complaint

I would like to thank W. R. Carter, Charles Chihara, Karel J. Lambert, Kirk Ludwig, Stephen Neale, Herman Cappelan, and an anonymous referee for this Journal, for helpful discussion on this topic, as well as for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. A version of the paper was read at the 1993 Pacific Division meeting of the APA in San Francisco. I wish to thank especially David Cowles and Mark Richard for their thoughtful contributions in that session.     

Extending Compatibilism: Control,Responsibility, And Blame

In this paper, I argue that ‹moral responsibility’ refers to two concepts, not to one. In the first place, we are not ultimately morally responsible or, therefore, unqualifiedly blameworthy, due to the fact that we lack ultimate forms of control. But, second, it is legitimate to consider us to be morally responsible in another sense, and therefore qualifiedly blameworthy, once we have certain forms of control. Consequently, I argue that our normal practice of blaming is unjust, since it requires that we are ultimately morally responsible. I contend that this practice must, on grounds of justice, be tempered by adequate consideration of the fact that we are not ultimately morally responsible. My proposal in this regard is that blaming be replaced by admonishment. I would like to thank Dr. Cara Nine and Dr. David Hemp (University College Cork), and the two anonymous referees at Res Publica for their helpful comments on this paper.     

Psychological empowerment: Issues and illustrations

Discussed several issues related to psychological empowerment. The thesis of this paper is that the development of a universal and global measure of psychological empowerment may not be a feasible or appropriate goal. I begin by distinguishing between empowerment processes and outcomes. Underlying assumptions are discussed including the notion that empowerment differs across people, contexts, and times. A nomological network that includes intrapersonal, interactional, and behavioral components is also presented. Two examples of psychological empowerment for voluntary service organization members and members of a mutual help organization are described to help illustrate differences in the specific variables that may be used to measure psychological empowerment in different populations and settings. I thank Deborah A. Salem for her thoughtful comments on earlier drafts of this paper and for her persistence in pushing me to strengthen the ideas presented. I also thank Douglas Perkins, Julian Rappaport, David Altman, and James G. Kelly for their very helpful comments. They helped me articulate my ideas more carefully and clearly.     

A future for community psychology practice

Community psychology has never really looked at its practice as a profession, though many of us as students came to the field with high expectations that we could learn how to make a difference in communities. This article discussed what I think about community psychology practice and how I have tried to approach it. I thank and recognize several people: Paul Florin for his colleagueship, friendship and his contributions to what I have done in the field; Tom Wolff for never letting me give up on the field; Bob Newbrough for his consistent support, encouragement and as my teacher; and Julian Rappaport for his comments on an earlier draft. I thank my colleagues at Rutgers for helping make the dream come true. This article is dedicated to students, past, present, and future.     

Moral education: An act-utilitarian view1

In this essay, I distinguish two significant act-utilitarian theories of moral education: the traditional rule of thumb view and the Harian intuition view. I argue that there are problems with the traditional view and that an act-utilitarian ought to adopt a version of the Harian view. I then explain and respond to a major objection to the intuition view given by Bernard Williams. Williams argues that the system of moral thought which the Harian view advocates we teach is inherently unstable and is certain to undermine itself. I argue that there is reason to expect a great deal of stability in this system.I wish to thank Richard Brandt, William Frankena and R.M. Hare for their conversation on this and other topics and for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper. I would also like to thank the Association for the Philosophy of Education and the Northwest Philosophy conference for the opportunity to read and discuss versions of the essay.     

The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.I would like to thank Michael Wrigley (UNICAMP) and Gottfried Gabriel (Universität Konstanz) as well as an anonymous journal referee for their valuable comments on a previous version of this paper.     

Vacuous truth

Special thanks go to Paul Humphreys for his criticisms and helpful comments. Also Richard Gale, Gerald Massey, Nicholas Rescher, David Blumenfeld, James Humber, Richard Ketchum, and Wolfgang Dietel made helpful comments on an earlier version. Each found something in need of repair. Finally, I would like to thank the Hambidge Center and the Center for the Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh for providing in 1988 the setting and the resources that made this paper possible.     

Parameters in the theory of sentence processing: Minimal Commitment theory goes east

This paper introduces the Minimal Commitment theory. This theory is a subspecies of deterministic parsers. The theory builds representations where immediate dominance and precedence relations are unspecified. Justification that this approach is psycholinguistically justified comes from its ability to provide a cross-linguistically valid theory of Garden path sentences in English and Japanese.I would lide to thank audiences at CUNY (1990) and (1991) for valuable comments and the chance to present this work. Parts of this paper were also presented at the Duke Symposium on Natural Language Processing, and at the Workshop on Japanese Sentence Processing held at Waseda University, Tokyo, Japan. I thank these audiences for valuable comments as well. Robert Berwick, Janet Fodor, Ted Gibson, Paul Gorrell, Norbert Hornstein, David Lightfoot, and Juan Uriagereka along with the University of Maryland NLP working group provided valuable assistance on this and earlier drafts.This work was supported by BNS902154-02 from the NSF.     

Coercion and ‘voluntary’ admission: An examination of psychiatric patient views

This article examines coercion in voluntary psychiatric patients. Three main themes are highlighted using qualitative and quantitative data from a sample of 412 psychiatric patients surveyed in 1990 who had experienced at least one period of hospitalisation. The themes are: the extent to which the label of ‘voluntary’ was an indicator of the patients' experience of being in hospital of their own volition; aspects of admission which patients considered to be coercive; and the impact that coercion might have on patients' views about their problem, professionals and treatment. The findings suggest that a substantial number of nominally voluntary patients reported coercive aspects of their hospitalisation. The impact of feeling coerced was found to produce a more rejecting attitude towards psychiatric services. The findings are discussed in relation to British mental health legislation and care. I particularly want to thank David Pilgrim for his collaboration with the research which made this article possible and for his useful and supportive comments. I am also indebted to John Monahan for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Stalnaker's conditional and Bell's problem

In his (1981) paper, Stalnaker has revised his old theory of conditionals and has given the revision an interesting defense. Indeed, Stalnaker shows that this new theory meets the standard objections put to the old. However, I argue that the revision runs into difficulties in the context of quantum mechanics: If Stalnaker's theory of the conditional is assumed, then from plausible assumptions certain Bell-like conflicts with experiment can be derived. This result, I go on to argue, is a good reason to reject Stalnaker's theory, at least for the quantum mechanical context.I wish to thank Arthur Fine, Paul Teller, Dorothy Grover, and Anil Gupta for their helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts of this paper.     

Adorno vs. Levinas: Evaluating points of contention

Although Adorno and Levinas share many arguments, I attempt to sharpen and evaluate their disagreements. Both held extreme and seemingly opposite views of art, with Adorno arguing that art presents modernity’s highest order of truth and Levinas denouncing it as shameful idolatry. Considering this striking difference brings to light fundamental substantive and methodological incompatibilities between them. Levinas’ assertion of the transcendence of the face should be understood as the most telling point of departure between his and Adorno’s critiques of instrumental reason. I attempt to explain why Levinas believed this move was justifiable and how Adorno would understand Levinas’ notion of illeity as a cultural byproduct and a form of dogmatism. Adorno’s historical and sociological account of the disenchantment of the world and the destruction of aura within a culture fully administered by scientific rationality and economic reductionism sharply contrasts to Levinas’ transcendental phenomenology, and I argue that Adorno’s thoroughgoing refusal to constrain dialectical reflection is ultimately more compelling. This paper benefited from exchanges with Jay Bernstein, Bob Scharff, Gregg Horowitz, David Wood, Max Pensky, Scott Bakker, and critics of the earlier version of this argument presented at the 2004 meeting of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy. I also thank unnamed reviewers from Continental Philosophy Review for their generous and thoughtful comments and the members of the University of New Hampshire Center for Humanities for their financial support.     

Antigone's Dilemma: A Problem in Political Membership

I would like to thank Donna Haraway, Barrie Thome, Daniel Scripture and, especially, Peter Euben for their many helpful comments and suggestions on various drafts of this article. I would also like to thank Thelma Francis for her generous support and encouragement.     

The reductionist ideal in cognitive psychology

I offer support for the view that physicalist theories of cognition don't reduce to neurophysiological theories. On my view, the mind-brain relationship is to be explained in terms of evolutionary forces, some of which tug in the direction of a reductionistic mind-brain relationship, and some of which which tug in the opposite direction. This theory of forces makes possible an anti-reductionist account of the cognitive mind-brain relationship which avoids psychophysical anomalism. This theory thus also responds to the complaint which arguably lies behind the Churchlands' strongest criticisms of anti-reductionism — namely the complaint that anti-reductionists fail to supply principled explanations for the character of the mind-brain relationship. While lending support to anti-reductionism, the view defended here also insures a permanent place for mind-brain reduction as an explanatory ideal analogous to Newtonian inertial motion or Aristotelian natural motion.I wish to thank the Synthese referees for their comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank Steve Bowen, Elise Brenner, and Arthur Fine for helpful discussions and Joseph Owens for his comments on a version of this paper read at the Central Division Meetings of the American Philosophical Association held in Cincinnati in April 1988.     

The Dialectics of Relational Psychoanalysis and Group Psychotherapy: Commentary on Paper by Robert Grossmark

In this commentary, I address the question of why so few psychoanalysts become group therapists as I respond to the thoughtful and impressive paper written by Robert Grossmark on his work with a psychotherapy group, now in its 10th year of meeting. Prior to discussing the clinical material, and to set the stage for a discussion of Grossmark's work, I comment on my sense of the prevailing attitudes on group affiliations and group therapy within our culture and field as they have progressed over time. I then discuss my reactions to Grossmark's handling of his group session. Many of his conceptualizations of group treatment are in accordance with my own beliefs. There are some differences, however, in how I view my role as a leader and some ideas I have about group treatment that Grossmark did not address.     

Causality and things in themselves

In this paper I examine Kant's use of causal language to characterize things in themselves. Following Nicholas Rescher, I contend that Kant's use of such causal language can only be understood by first coming to grips with the relation of things in themselves to appearances. Unlike Rescher, however, I argue that things in themselves and appearances are not numerically distinct entities. Rather, I claim that it is things in themselves that we are intentionally related to in veridical experience, though of course we know them only as they appear to us via our subjective experiential faculties. In light of this account of the role of things in themselves in Kant's account of experience, I argue that his use of causal locutions to describe things in themselves is simply his attempt to capture the fact that as the objects that we are related to in experience, the existence of things in themselves is presupposed by any account of the nature of our experienceof them.Substantial work on this paper was done while I attended the National Endowment for the Humanities 1986 Summer Seminar given by Hector-Neri Castañeda at Indiana University. I would like to thank the National Endowment for the Humanities for their support, and Professor Castañeda and the other members of the seminar for their many invaluable comments, suggestions, and criticisms.     

The Limits of Evil and the Role of Moral Address: A Defense of Strawsonian Compatibilism

P.F. Strawson defends compatibilism by appeal to our natural commitment to the interpersonal community and the reactive attitudes. While Strawson's compatibilist project has much to recommend it, his account of moral agency appears incomplete. Gary Watson has attempted to fortify Strawson's theory by appeal to the notion of moral address. Watson then proceeds to argue, however, that Strawson's theory of moral responsibility (so fortified) would commit Strawson to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. Watson also argues that the reactive attitudes do not lend unequivocal support to Strawsonian compatibilism and that the reactive attitudes are sometimes sensitive to considerations which suggest an incompatibilist or skeptical diagnosis. Watson attempts to provide a Strawsonian defense against these difficulties, but he ultimately concludes that the skeptical threats raised against Strawsonian compatibilism cannot be sufficiently silenced. I believe that Watson has done Strawsonian compatibilism a great service by drawing upon the notion of moral address. In this paper I attempt to defend the Strawsonian compatibilist position, as Watson has cast it, against the problems raised by Watson. I argue against Watson that Strawson's theory of responsibility, as well as the notion of moral address, does not commit the Strawsonian to treating extreme evil as its own excuse. I also argue that Watson misinterprets the point of certain reactive attitudes and thereby wrongly assumes that these attitudes are evidence against Strawsonian compatibilism.