Towards a theory of communicative competence

In this, the second of two articles outlining a theory of communicative competence, the author questions the ability of Chomsky's account of linguistic competence to fulfil the requirements of such a theory. ‘Linguistic competence’ for Chomsky means the mastery of an abstract system of rules, based on an innate language apparatus. The model by which communication is understood on this account contains three implicit assumptions, here called ‘monologism’, ‘a priorism’, and ‘elementarism’. The author offers an outline of a theory of communicative competence that is based on the negations of these assumptions. In opposing the first two assumptions he introduces distinctions, respectively, between semantic universals which process experiences and those that make such processing possible, and between semantic universals which precede all socialization and those that are linked to the conditions of potential socialization. Against elementarism, he argues that the semantic content of all possible natural languages does not consist of combinations of a finite number of meaning components. Differences in systems of classification preclude this, and such differences can be seen to infect all respects of intercultural comparison. Using the notion of ‘performative utterance’, the author elucidates the role of dialogue‐constitutive universals as part of the formal apparatus required of a”; speaker's capacity to communicate. He then notes what would be required of a general semantics based on a theory of communicative competence; and finally points out how this theory might be used for social analysis.     

Toward a dialectic theory of concepts

The article spells out some guidelines for a dialectic theory of concepts. Concept formation is treated in terms of polemic and polar reference. The main thesis is that opposite references structure concepts by way of advocacy. On polar dimensions of comparison, (e. g., light versus dark), people select and advocate objects of comparison in agreement with the context of comparison (i.e., what is light depends on what is dark, and vice versa). In principle, any concept is subject to polemics because polarity enables opposite comparisons, (e.g., an object as dark and light with reference to lighter and darker objects, respectively). When opposite comparisons apply to the same object, reference becomes anomalous which will motivate conceptual change, (e.g., twilight accounts for a reference in between). Consequently, meaning is not secured by general rules but concepts presuppose advocated references; concepts are intentional constructs. The dialectic theory is illustrated by a case study of the environmental discourse on forest management. Conflicting references fuelled by industrial and environmental values demonstrate how opposite comparisons motivate revisions.Dialectic is a convenient technical name for the kind of thinking which takes place when human beings enter into dispute, or when they carry on in reflection the polemical consideration of some theory or idea. Adler, 1927, p. V     

Interaction of visual information,verbal information,and linguistic competence in the preschool-aged child

Carol Chomsky found evidence to support the notion that children have not mastered the syntactic form of the sentence John is easy to see until after the age of 8 years. However, she failed to control for the effects the visual stimulus might have had on the child's understanding of the stimulus question. This study reexamined Chomsky's conclusions by using two experimental conditions. The first condition was an exact replication of Chomsky's method, while the second included a control for the biasing effects produced by the visual stimulus. The results confirmed the authors' suspicions that the visual stimulus was indeed distorting Chomsky's findings and that, on the average, children were able to decode this particular syntactic form by the age of 67 months. These findings are discussed from the perspective of Bruner's theory, which states that cognitive processes of children under 8 years of age are dominated by the iconic mode of representation.     

Children's understanding of linguistic reference to past and future

Young children's comprehension of linguistic reference to past and future times was investigated in two experiments. The children were 2, 3, and 4 years old. The linguistic forms considered were verb tense and the termsbefore andafter; each linguistic form was used in both experiments. The two experimental contexts were (1) actions which either had just occurred or were just about to occur, immediate past and future, and (2) events which either had occurred on the preceding day or were to occur on the following day, more remote past and future. Understanding of linguistic reference to past and future events varied, depending on the situation in which the particular form was applied. Future verb tense was better understood in reference to immediate than to more remote future. Past tense was understood equally well in reference to immediate past action and to more remote past events.Before andafter, both of which would be used to refer to either past or future time, were each better understood when used to refer to the next event or action following the present.This report is based on a dissertation submitted to Teachers College, Columbia University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D.     

Individual differences in the linguistic competence of referential and expressive subjects

The aim of this work was to examine individual differences in referential and expressive style through a longitudinal study. The composition of the first 50 words, communicative gestures, the conversational style of dyads and the percentage of vocabulary produced from 12 to 24 month-olds were analyzed. The vocabulary was collected through interviews to parents and sessions of mother-infant interaction in the laboratory. Significant differences in the proportion of common nouns and frozen phrases between referential and expressive children in the frequency of communicative gestures and style conversation were found. Thus, referential children and their mothers used more pointing gestures than the expressive children and their mothers. Additionally, mothers of referential children used completing more frequently.