Fringe consciousness in sequence learning: the influence of individual differences

We first describe how the concept of “fringe consciousness” ([Mangan, 1993a], [Mangan, 1993b], [Mangan, 2001] and [Mangan, 2003]) can characterise gradations of consciousness between the extremes of implicit and explicit learning. We then show that the NEO-PI-R personality measure of openness to feelings, chosen to reflect the ability to introspect on fringe feelings, influences both learning and awareness in the serial reaction time (SRT) task under conditions that have previously been associated with implicit learning ([Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2001] and [Destrebecqz and Cleeremans, 2003]). This provides empirical evidence for the proposed phenomenology and functional role of fringe consciousness in so-called implicit learning paradigms (Mangan, 1993b). Introducing an individual difference variable also helped to identify possible limitations of the exclusion task as a measure of conscious sequence knowledge. Further exploration of individual differences in fringe awareness may help to avoid polarity in the implicit learning debate, and to resolve apparent inconsistencies between previous SRT studies.     

Ethnic Consciousness and Its Relationship to Conservatism and Blame Among African Americans1

Ethnic consciousness is “a set of political beliefs and action orientations arising out of the awareness of similarity” (Gurin, Miller, & Gurin, 1980, p. 30). We suggest that these beliefs relate to political values and views among African Americans. Correlational data revealed that ethnic consciousness is negatively correlated with conservative values. Experimental data revealed that students high in ethnic consciousness blamed a White firm for the termination of an African American employee more than a Black firm for terminating a European American employee. Those low in ethnic consciousness did not discriminate between the Black firm versus the White firm. Consciousness may operate as a means of connecting ethnic identity and political views.     

Is conscious perception gradual or dichotomous? A comparison of report methodologies during a visual task

In a recent article, [Sergent, C. &; Dehaene, S. (2004). Is consciousness a gradual phenomenon? Evidence for an all-or-none bifurcation during the attentional blink, Psychological Science, 15(11), 720–729] claim to give experimental support to the thesis that there is a clear transition between conscious and unconscious perception. This idea is opposed to theoretical arguments that we should think of conscious perception as a continuum of clarity, with e.g., fringe conscious states [Mangan, B. (2001). Sensation’s ghost—the non-sensory “fringe” of consciousness, Psyche, 7, 18]. In the experimental study described in this article, we find support for this opposite notion that we should have a parsimonious account of conscious perception. Our reported finding relates to the hypothesis that there is more than one perceptual threshold [Merikle, P.M., Smilek, D. &; Eastwood, J.D. (2001). Perception without awareness: perspectives from cognitive psychology, Cognition, 79, 115–134], but goes further to argue that there are different “levels” of conscious perception.     

Beyond perception: Testing for implicit conceptual traces in high-load tasks

The present commentary addresses the main results obtained in the Butler and Klein [Butler, B. C., & Klein, R. (2009). Inattentional blindness for ignored words: Comparison of explicit and implicit memory tasks. Consciousness and Cognition, 18, 811–819.] study and discusses them in relation to the Perceptual Load Theory of Lavie [Lavie, N. (1995). Perceptual load as a necessary condition for selective attention. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance, 21, 451–68.]. The authors claim that the use of implicit indexes of conceptual distractor processing in high-load situations would be an important addition to the load literature, which would benefit the research field regardless of their positive or negative findings.     

Dennett’s Rhetorical Strategies in <Emphasis Type="Italic">Consciousness Explained</Emphasis>

Dennett’s Consciousness Explained (1991) is an inspiring but also a highly frustrating book. The line of the argument seems to be clear, but then at second sight it fades away. It turns out that Dennett uses six of the seven strategies which I discuss in my “The Seven Strategies of the Sophisticated Pseudo-Scientist: A Look into Freud’s Rhetorical Tool Box” (J. Gen. Phil. Sci., 2001) Discussing important examples of these strategies I show why Consciousness Explained is such a frustrating book. As the examples used do not reflect minor problems but go to the heart of the matter and concern the book’s main areas of contention, it turns out that, in spite of the valuable and insightful details, Dennett’s materialistic view of consciousness is supported mainly by rhetorical sleights of hand.     

Different Realities: What Is Reality and What Difference Does It Make?

Consciousness does not exist apart from psyche; it reflects it. Different realities are not interchangeable with other manifestations of psychic reality. “Borderland consciousness” is the term I have conceived for people who, in one way or another, have a living dynamic connection to and relationship with nature. Given this understanding, the oral traditional and Native American cultures manifest a reciprocity psyche, and are today the closest manifestation of the psychic reality in Genesis, pre-expulsion from Eden. Navajo language contains no words for religion, guilt, human, inanimate, psyche, or ego. The Western psyche manifests a dominion psyche; that is, a binary consciousness borne as a result of the expulsion in Genesis, and wedded to logic as an uncompromising characteristic of sanity and health. This kind of consciousness too often crushes the spirit dimension, which is transrational. An awareness of borderland consciousness is entering into the Western cultural collective. This is the telos of the Garden of Eden expulsion, and itself represents the dominion psyche and the reciprocity psyche in dialogue. This dialogue offers a critical counterbalance to the rogue behavior of the overspecialized Western ego of the dominion psyche. This article urges Jungians to develop new methods of connecting with borderland consciousness since the dominion psyche and its technology alone cannot save our species in the face of the threat of a global climate change disaster.     

The nature and varieties of felt presence experiences: A reply to Nielsen

Nielsen [Nielsen, T. (2007). Felt presence: Paranoid delusion or hallucinatory social imagery? Consciousness and Cognition, 16(4), 975–983.] raises a number of issues and presents several provocative arguments worthy of discussion regarding the experience of the felt presence (FP) during sleep paralysis (SP). We consider these issues beginning with the nature of FP and its relation to affective-motivational systems and provide an alternative to Nielsen’s reduction of FP to a purely spatial hallucination. We then consider implications of the “normal social imagery” model. We can find only one specific empirical hypothesis articulated within this framework and it turns out to be one that we explicitly addressed in our original paper. We also review our position regarding the possible relation of FP during SP to a number of related anomalous experiences and contrast FP to anomalous vestibular-motor (V-M) phenomena. We review our position that the neuromatrix concept, in the light of available evidence, is more appropriately applied to V-M experiences than FP. Finally, we pursue speculations, raised in Nielsen’s commentary, on the wider implications of FP.     

Social understanding through direct perception? Yes,by interacting

This paper comments on Gallagher’s recently published direct perception proposal about social cognition [Gallagher, S. (2008a). Direct perception in the intersubjective context. Consciousness and Cognition, 17(2), 535–543]. I show that direct perception is in danger of being appropriated by the very cognitivist accounts criticised by Gallagher (theory theory and simulation theory). Then I argue that the experiential directness of perception in social situations can be understood only in the context of the role of the interaction process in social cognition. I elaborate on the role of social interaction with a discussion of participatory sense-making to show that direct perception, rather than being a perception enriched by mainly individual capacities, can be best understood as an interactional phenomenon.     

Unconscious odour conditioning 25 years later: Revisiting and extending ‘Kirk-Smith, Van Toller and Dodd’

The pioneering work by Kirk-Smith, Van Toller, and Dodd [Kirk-Smith, M. D., Van Toller, C., & Dodd, G. H. (1983). Unconscious odour conditioning in human subjects. Biological Psychology, 17, 221–231], established that an unnoticed odorant paired with an emotionally meaningful task can influence mood and attitudes when the odorant alone is re-encountered subsequently. This study was particularly important in highlighting unconscious odour learning processes as they may happen in everyday life. However, it was severely criticized by Black and Smith [Black, S. L., & Smith, D. G. (1994). Has odor conditioning been demonstrated? A critique of “Unconscious odour conditioning in human subjects”. Biological Psychology, 37, 265–267] on methodological grounds. In the present paper, we replicated and extended Kirk-Smith et al.’s investigation taking into account Black and Smith’s criticisms and carrying out additional controls to improve the validity of the study. The results confirm the initial findings of Kirk-Smith and colleagues by demonstrating the effectiveness of olfactory stimuli in inducing conditioned hedonic reactions even when presented below the level of awareness.     

The phantom limb in dreams

Mulder and colleagues [Mulder, T., Hochstenbach, J., Dijkstra, P. U., Geertzen, J. H. B. (2008). Born to adapt, but not in your dreams. Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 1266–1271.] report that a majority of amputees continue to experience a normally-limbed body during their night dreams. They interprete this observation as a failure of the body schema to adapt to the new body shape. The present note does not question this interpretation, but points to the already existing literature on the phenomenology of the phantom limb in dreams. A summary of published investigations is complemented by a note on phantom phenomena in the dreams of paraplegic patients and persons born without a limb. Integration of the available data allows the recommendation for prospective studies to consider dream content in more detail. For instance, “adaptation” to the loss of a limb can also manifest itself by seeing oneself surrounded by amputees. Such projective types of anosognosia (“transitivism”) in nocturnal dreams should also be experimentally induced in normally-limbed individuals, and some relevant techniques are mentioned.     

Variability in response criteria affects estimates of conscious identification and unconscious semantic priming

Three experiments examined the role of response criteria in a masked semantic priming paradigm using an exclusion task. Experiment 1 used on-line prime-report (“report the prime if you saw it”) and exclusion instructions in which participants were told to avoid completing a word stem (e.g. mo—) with a word related to a prime (e.g. cash) flashed for 0, 38 or 212 ms. Semantic priming (i.e. exclusion failure) was significant in the items analysis, but was moderated by peoples’ ability to report the prime in the participant analysis. Prime-report thresholds in Experiment 2 were made more liberal by instructing participants to guess on every trial. Prime-report increased from Experiment 1 as exclusion failures were eliminated. Experiment 3 clarified the relationship between awareness and prime identification using an on-line measure of confidence and different liberal prime report instructions. The current findings suggest that the ability to act upon (via exclusion performance) and report information in a masked prime is determined by a variable response criterion, which can be manipulated as an independent variable.     

Consciousness: The transcendentalist manifesto

Phenomenal consciousness, what it is like to have or undergo an experience, is typically understood as an empirical item – an actual or possible object of consciousness. Accordingly, the problem posed by phenomenal consciousness for materialist accounts of the mind is usually understood as an empirical problem: a problem of showing how one sort of empirical item – a conscious state – is produced or constituted by another – a neural process. The development of this problem, therefore, has usually consisted in the articulation of an intuition: no matter how much we know about the brain, this will not allow us to see how it produces or constitutes phenomenal consciousness. Developing a theme first explored by Kant, and then later by Sartre, this paper argues that the real problem posed by phenomenal consciousness is quite different. Consciousness, it will be argued, is not an empirical but a transcendental feature of the world. That is, what it is like to have an experience is not something of which we are aware in the having of that experience, but an item in virtue of which the genuine (non-phenomenal) objects of our consciousness are revealed as being the way they are. Phenomenal consciousness, that is, is not an empirical object of awareness but a transcendental condition of the possibility of there being empirical objects of awareness.     

Similarities and differences in dream content at the cross-cultural, gender, and individual levels

The similarities and differences in dream content at the cross-cultural, gender, and individual levels provide one starting point for carrying out studies that attempt to discover correspondences between dream content and various types of waking cognition. Hobson and Kahn’s (Hobson, J. A., & Kahn, D. (2007). Dream content: Individual and generic aspects. Consciousness and Cognition, 16, 850–858.) conclusion that dream content may be more generic than most researchers realize, and that individual differences are less salient than usually thought, provides the occasion for a review of findings based on the Hall and Van de Castle (Hall, C., & Van de Castle, R. (1966). The content analysis of dreams. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts.) coding system for the study of dream content. Then new findings based on a computationally intensive randomization strategy are presented to show the minimum sample sizes needed to detect gender and individual differences in dream content. Generally speaking, sample sizes of 100–125 dream reports are needed because most dream elements appear in less than 50% of dream reports and the magnitude of the differences usually is not large.     

Conscious and unconscious proportion effects in masked priming

The global neuronal workspace theory [Dehaene, S., & Naccache, L. (2001). Towards a cognitive neuroscience of consciousness: basic evidence and a workspace framework. Cognition, 79, 1–37.] proposes that it is impossible for an unconscious stimulus to be used strategically to enhance task performance (bottom–up effect), while a fully consciously perceived stimulus can be used to improve task performance (top–down effect). Two experiments were designed to investigate these hypotheses. In a first experiment we investigated whether a manipulation of the proportion of Arabic/number word targets had a top–down effect. Since the subjects were fully aware of the target, we expected that this manipulation could be used to enhance task performance. In a second experiment we determined whether a manipulation of the proportion of Arabic/number word primes had a bottom–up effect. Since the subjects were unaware of the prime, we hypothesized that they would be unable to use the manipulation to enhance task performance and therefore the manipulation would have no effect. Both hypotheses were largely confirmed.     

The Functional Neuroanatomy of Awareness: With a Focus on the Role of Various Anatomical Systems in the Control of Intermodal Attention

This review considers a number of recent theories on the neural basis of consciousness, with particular attention to the theories of Bogen, Crick, Llinás, Newman, and Changeux. These theories allot different roles to various key brain areas, in particular the reticular and intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus and the cortex. Crick's hypothesis is that awareness is a function of reverberating corticothalamic loops and that the spotlight ofintramodalattention is controlled by the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. He also proposed different mechanisms for attention and intention (“will”). The current review presents a new hypothesis, based on elements from these hypotheses, includingintermodalattention and olfaction and pain, which may pose problems for Crick's original theory. This work reviews the possible role in awareness and intermodal attention and intention of the cholinergic system in the basal forebrain and the tegmentum; the reticular, the intralaminar, and the dorsomedial thalamic nuclei; the raphe and locus coeruleus; the reticular formation; the ventral striatum and extended amygdala; insula cortex, and other selected cortical areas. Both clinical and basic research data are covered. The conclusion is reached that the brain may work by largely nonlinear parallel processing and much intramodal shifts of attention may be effected by intracortical, or multiple corticothalamic mechanisms (small local “flashlights” rather than one major “searchlight”). But this is constrained by the functional anatomy of the circuits concerned and waking “awareness” is modulated by the many “nonspecific” systems (cholinergic from the basal forebrain, noradrenergic from the locus coeruleus, dopaminergic from the substantia nigra and ventral tegmentum, and serotoninergic from the raphe). But the principal agents for intermodal attention shifts, the “searchlight,” may be two key nuclei of the cholinergic system in the mesencephalon. Clinical loss of consciousness results from damage to these nuclei but not from damage to the cholinergic nucleus basalis of the basal forebrain.     

Implicit Memory and the Formation of New Associations in Nondemented Parkinson′s Disease Individuals and Individuals with Senile Dementia of the Alzheimer Type: A Serial Reaction Time (SRT) Investigation

Using the serial reaction time (SRT) task developed by Nissen and Bullemer (1987, Cognitive Psychology, 19, 1–32), implicit memory performance was examined in four groups of subjects: nondemented healthy aged individuals; nondemented Parkinson"s disease individuals; very mildly demented senile dementia of the Alzheimer type (SDAT) individuals; and mildly demented SDAT individuals. The SRT task involved four blocks of a repeated 10-item keypress sequence that tapped general skill development along with a fifth block of a nonrepeated sequence that presumably reflected the impact of switching from a learned set of associations (developed during the first four blocks) to a novel sequence. The increase in response latency from the fourth repeated block to the fifth nonrepeated block was used as the reflection of implicit learning. The results revealed preserved implicit memory performance in the very mildly demented individuals compared to that of the age-matched control individuals. However, the mildly demented SDAT individuals and the nondemented Parkinson"s disease individuals showed reliably less implicit learning, compared to the age-matched control individuals. Differences between the past studies using the SRT task to tap implicit memory performance in SDAT individuals and the present study are discussed in some detail. We conclude that nondemented Parkinson"s disease individuals and mildly demented SDAT individuals produce some deficit in the formation of new associations in implicit memory, as measured by the SRT task.     

The relationship between child-report, parent self-report, and partner report of perceived parental rearing behaviors and anxiety in children and parents

This study investigated the relationship between child anxiety, parental anxiety, and perceived current parental rearing practices, using a multiple informants approach, that is, by aggregating the perception of the child, parent and partner on parental rearing behaviors. Unselected children aged 9–12 (n=75) and both their biological parents filled in the SCARED-C to measure child anxiety, and parents completed the SCARED-A to measure parental anxiety. In addition, child report, parental self-report, and partner report of the rearing dimensions “autonomy-encouragement versus overprotection”, “acceptance versus rejection”, and “psychological control” of both parents was assessed. Results showed that the homogeneity of some rearing dimensions using a single informant was insufficient, but sufficient when using multiple informants. Inter-informant agreement was low (M=0.29). Three-informants' aggregates yielded good generalizability (M=0.54), and the generalizability of six-informants' aggregates (combining both parents) was impressive (M=0.76). Using multiple informants, parental autonomy granting versus overprotection was substantially related to child anxiety (r=−0.41, p<0.001), as well as to parental anxiety (r=−0.45, p<0.001). More precisely, paternal autonomy–overprotection was predominantly related to child anxiety, whereas maternal autonomy–overprotection was predominantly related to maternal anxiety. Acceptance versus rejection and psychological control were only modestly related to child and parental anxiety.     

Social intuition as a form of implicit learning: Sequences of body movements are learned less explicitly than letter sequences

In the current paper, we first evaluate the suitability of traditional serial reaction time (SRT) and artificial grammar learning (AGL) experiments for measuring implicit learning of social signals. We then report the results of a novel sequence learning task which combines aspects of the SRT and AGL paradigms to meet our suggested criteria for how implicit learning experiments can be adapted to increase their relevance to situations of social intuition. The sequences followed standard finite-state grammars. Sequence learning and consciousness of acquired knowledge were compared between 2 groups of 24 participants viewing either sequences of individually presented letters or sequences of body-posture pictures, which were described as series of yoga movements. Participants in both conditions showed above-chance classification accuracy, indicating that sequence learning had occurred in both stimulus conditions. This shows that sequence learning can still be found when learning procedures reflect the characteristics of social intuition. Rule awareness was measured using trial-by-trial evaluation of decision strategy (Dienes & Scott, 2005; Scott & Dienes, 2008). For letters, sequence classification was best on trials where participants reported responding on the basis of explicit rules or memory, indicating some explicit learning in this condition. For body-posture, classification was not above chance on these types of trial, but instead showed a trend to be best on those trials where participants reported that their responses were based on intuition, familiarity, or random choice, suggesting that learning was more implicit. Results therefore indicate that the use of traditional stimuli in research on sequence learning might underestimate the extent to which learning is implicit in domains such as social learning, contributing to ongoing debate about levels of conscious awareness in implicit learning.     

Time stamp in conditioned place avoidance can be set to different circadian phases

We have reported that the expression of conditioned place avoidance (CPA) in the golden hamster is regulated in a circadian pattern such that the preference is exhibited strongly at the circadian time of prior training but not at other circadian times [Cain, S. W., Chou, T., & Ralph, M. R. (2004a). Circadian modulation of performance on an aversion-based place learning task in hamsters. Behavioural Brain Research, 150(1–2), 201–205]. In that study, animals that were trained at a specific circadian time to discriminate between a “safe” context and one paired with foot shock, showed strong avoidance of the paired context at 24 and 48 h following the last training session, and showed no avoidance at 32 and 40 h following training. In the present study, we hypothesized that this “time stamp” effect is settable to any circadian phase. This was tested by training animals at one of two times of day (ZT13 or ZT4) and testing whether a time stamp would be observed, with avoidance occurring only when training and testing times match. Results confirmed our hypothesis, suggesting that the time stamp in the performance of learned tasks can be set to any circadian phase. Such an ability may allow animals in nature to predict the recurrence of 24 h events, regardless of the time of day the event was encountered.     

Concepts of Consciousness,Kinds of Consciousness,Meanings of `Consciousness'

The use of expressions like `concepts of consciousness', `kinds ofconsciousness', and `meanings of `consciousness' ' interchangeablyis ubiquitous within the consciousness literature. It is arguedthat this practice can be made sense of in only two ways. The firstinvolves interpreting `concepts of consciousness' and `kinds ofconsciousness' metalinguistically to mean, roughly, conceptsexpressed by `consciousness' and kinds expressed by`consciousness'; and the second involves certain literal,though semantically deviant, interpretations of those expressions.The trouble is that researchers frequently use the above expressionsinterchangeably without satisfying either way of doing so coherently.The result is considerable error and confusion, which is demonstratedin the works of philosophers currently writing on consciousness.