Presidential greatness and performance: Can we predict leadership in the White House?1

Two related questions regarding presidential leadership are addressed. First, what are the principal determinants of the rated greatness of American presidents? Second, can presidential performance be predicted using preelection biographical variables? Reliable measures of greatness and performance were operationalized for the 38 presidents of the United States, along with numerous potential predictors suggested by past literature on leadership, achieved eminence, and presidential popularity and greatness. About 75% of the variance in presidential greatness can be predicted using administration duration, number of war years, unsuccessful assassination attempts, scandals, and prepresidential publication record. Family background, personal characteristics, education, occupation, and political experiences provided few if any viable predictors of presidential performance, although succession to office through the vice-presidency exerted a rather general negative impact.     

Effects of Reasons Analysis on the Accuracy of Predicting Basketball Games1

It is argued that analyzing and listing reasons can lead to poorer predictions because reasoners either access information inappropriate to the task or have difficulty integrating the information they do bring to mind. To test this hypothesis, self-described basketball experts predicted the outcomes of actual basketball games in a national tournament. Half of the participants were asked to analyze and list reasons for their predictions before making them, and half were told explicitly not to analyze their reasons. Compared to nonreasoners, reasoners predicted fewer winners of the games and predicted margins of victory that differed more from both the actual margins of victory and the margins of victory predicted by experts. The relationship between expertise and reasons analysis, and the implications of the results for other domains of prediction are discussed.     

Making Americans Feel Great Again? Personal Significance Predicts Political Intentions of Losers and Winners of the 2016 U.S. Election

Reactions of losers and winners of political elections have important consequences for the political system during times of power transition. In four studies conducted immediately before and after the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, we investigated how personal significance induced by success or failure of one's candidate is related to hostile versus benevolent intentions toward political adversaries. We found that the less significant supporters of Hillary Clinton and supporters of Donald Trump felt after an imagined (Study 1A) or actual (Study 2) electoral failure the more they were willing to engage in peaceful actions against the elected president and the less they were willing to accept the results of the elections. However, while significance gain due to an imagined or actual electoral success was related to more benevolent intentions among Clinton supporters (Study 1B), it was related to more hostile intentions among Trump supporters (Studies 1B, 2, and 3).     

On the Subjectivity of the Experience of Victory: Who Are the Election Winners?

Elections represent key moments in democratic countries, and an established finding from the existing literature is that winners of elections display higher levels of satisfaction with democracy. Yet we know almost nothing about the times when voters feel like winners of an election. Using panel data in four countries, this article finds that while the objective performance of the supported party—measured using vote share and changes in vote share from the previous election—has a very important effect on feeling like an election winner, prior expectations regarding the election’s outcome as well as preferences for the supported party significantly moderate the effect of party performance on voter feelings. It seems also that the identification of the winners and losers of elections are clearer in majoritarian‐style democracies than in proportional systems with coalition governments. Ultimately, the findings indicate that measuring who are the winners of an election using exclusively objective measures of party performance may provide a distorted view of public opinion following the elections.     

Attributions for Presidential Elections: The Situational Shift Over Time

Two investigations examined attributions for the outcomes of presidential elections. The first experiment examined attributions made by editorial writers for presidential elections from 1964 to 1984. The writers tended to make personal attributions for the causes of the election outcome a few days after the election, but shifted to primarily situational attributions 2 to 3 years later. Subjects in the second experiment were surveyed through a random-digit dialing procedure either a few days after the 1988 presidential election or 1 year later and asked why the election turned out the way it did. A shift toward more situational explanations over time was found, but not among those who had voted for the winning candidate. This latter finding illustrates a limitation of the situational shift effect.     

Forecasting Elections from Voters' Perceptions of Candidates' Ability to Handle Issues

When deciding for whom to vote, voters should select the candidate they expect to best handle issues, all other things equal. A simple heuristic predicted that the candidate who is rated more favorably on a larger number of issues would win the popular vote. This was correct for nine out of ten U.S. presidential elections from 1972 to 2008. We then used simple linear regression to relate the incumbent's relative issue ratings to the actual two‐party popular vote shares. The resulting model yielded out‐of‐sample forecasts that were competitive with those from the Iowa Electronic Markets and established quantitative models. The issue‐index model has implications for political decision makers, as it can help to track campaigns and to decide which issues to focus on. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Coming to Terms with Modernity: Iranian intellectuals and the emerging public sphere

Almost two decades after the Islamic revolution of 1979, the quest of Iranians for a distinct religious identity produced a new socio-political movement, which incorporated a pluralistic rhetoric in the name of reform. Since the presidential elections of May 1997, an intensifying fascination has emerged with exposing the internal diversities of the Islamic nation via a language of critique. The June 2001 elections confirmed the popular desire for reform. This reform movement has given voice to the needs and desires of so-far peripheral groups (youth, women, intellectuals, artists and ethnic minorities, etc.), who tend to appropriate Islam in order to come into public life as active protagonists. Recent discursive developments in Iran demonstrate the real possibility of the public expression of dissent within the constraints of Islamic politics. This paper is meant to offer an overview of how new intellectual interpretations of Islamic tradition in Iran since 1997 are contributing to cultural, social and political critique, within a public sphere defined by Islam.     

Popular Perceptions of Shari‘a Law in Nigeria

After years of brutal authoritarian rule, a window of opportunity opened and Nigeria successfully held democratic elections in 1999. The election forced leaders of the Hausa ethnic group to relinquish power after nearly twenty years at the helm. In an attempt to demonstrate their political power and influence, some states in the northern part of the country implemented Shari'a in the months following the national election that witnessed the victory of Olusegun Obasanjo. Although there have been several works that examine the issue of Shari‘a, such studies have not examined the subject taking public opinion data into account. Afrobarometer data collected in Nigeria in 2001 and 2007 give unparalleled insight into how Nigerians view Shari‘a law and how these views have changed over time.     

Stolen elections: How conspiracy beliefs during the 2020 American presidential elections changed over time

Conspiracy beliefs have been studied mostly through cross-sectional designs. We conducted a five-wave longitudinal study (N = 376; two waves before and three waves after the 2020 American presidential elections) to examine if the election results influenced specific conspiracy beliefs and conspiracy mentality, and whether effects differ between election winners (i.e., Biden voters) versus losers (i.e., Trump voters) at the individual level. Results revealed that conspiracy mentality kept unchanged over 2 months, providing first evidence that this indeed is a relatively stable trait. Specific conspiracy beliefs (outgroup and ingroup conspiracy beliefs) did change over time, however. In terms of group-level change, outgroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time for Biden voters but increased for Trump voters. Ingroup conspiracy beliefs decreased over time across all voters, although those of Trump voters decreased faster. These findings illuminate how specific conspiracy beliefs are, and conspiracy mentality is not, influenced by an election event.     

Predicting elections from the most important issue: A test of the take‐the‐best heuristic

We used the take‐the‐best heuristic to develop a model to forecast the popular two‐party vote shares in U.S. presidential elections. The model draws upon information about how voters expect the candidates to deal with the most important issue facing the country. We used cross‐validation to calculate a total of 1000 out‐of‐sample forecasts, one for each of the last 100 days of the ten U.S. presidential elections from 1972 to 2008. Ninety‐seven per cent of forecasts correctly predicted the winner of the popular vote. The model forecasts were competitive compared to forecasts from methods that incorporate substantially more information (e.g., econometric models and the Iowa Electronic Markets). The purpose of the model is to provide fast advice on which issues candidates should stress in their campaign. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Political Islam in Secular Turkey

In recent years Islam has become more visible in Turkish public space. For over half a century the Kemalist establishment had succeeded in keeping Islam out of politics and public discourse. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, a new political Islam challenged the Kemalist principles of the Republic more than ever before. In 1996 the Islamist veteran, Erbakan, became for one year the first Islamist Prime Minister of Turkey, and in 2000 the Justice and Development Party (AKP), a party with Islamist roots, won a landslide victory in the elections. The AKP presents itself, however, as a party of the conservative mainstream. It could be argued that traditional political Islam had been losing ground from the mid-1990s onwards. Since then, the Islamist movement has split and the moderate wing has become more mature.     

The Effects of US Presidential Elections on Work Engagement and Job Performance

We predicted that presidential election results would spill over to influence the work domain. Individuals who voted for the winning candidate were expected to experience increased engagement, whereas individuals who voted for the losing candidate were expected to experience decreased engagement. We tested these predictions within the context of the 2016 US presidential election. Using a sample of 232 working Americans, work engagement and job performance were assessed one week prior to the election, the day after the election, and one week after the election. Contrary to our prediction, individuals who voted for Trump (the winning candidate) did not report increased work engagement, thereby providing no evidence of positive spillover. However, individuals who voted for Clinton (the losing candidate) were less engaged on the day after the election compared to baseline, demonstrating negative spillover. Downstream, work engagement was positively related to job performance. However, these effects were relatively short-lived, as engagement returned to baseline levels within one week following the election. Our results suggest that elections can have important implications for work-related outcomes. From a practical perspective we suggest that to the extent possible it may be prudent to avoid scheduling important work tasks for the days following presidential elections.     

Does Complex or Simple Rhetoric Win Elections? An Integrative Complexity Analysis of U.S. Presidential Campaigns

Research suggests that the integrative complexity of political rhetoric tends to drop during election season, but little research to date directly addresses if this drop in complexity serves to increase or decrease electoral success. The two present studies help fill this gap. Study 1 demonstrates that, during the Democratic Party primary debates in 2003–2004, the eventual winners of the party nomination showed a steeper drop in integrative complexity as the election season progressed than nonwinning candidates. Study 2 presents laboratory evidence from the most recent presidential campaign demonstrating that, while the complexity of Obama's rhetoric had little impact on college students' subsequent intentions to vote for him, the complexity of McCain's rhetoric was significantly positively correlated with their likelihood of voting for him. Taken together, this research is inconsistent with an unqualified simple is effective view of the complexity‐success relationship. Rather, it is more consistent with a compensatory view: Effective use of complexity (or simplicity) may compensate for perceived weaknesses. Thus, appropriately timed shifts in complexity levels, and/or violations of negative expectations relevant to complexity, may be an effective means of winning elections. Surprisingly, mere simplicity as such seems largely ineffective.     

An analysis of employee voting behavior in multi-union certification elections among unaffiliated unions

Unions experience higher success rates in multi-union certification elections than in single-union elections. In multi-union elections, unions have the highest victory rate when the two unions competing against each other are unaffiliated unions. The outcomes of the multi-union election process involving unaffiliated unions are examined with respect to election type and type of competition among unions.     

Neither Here nor There,I Do Not Vote and I Do Not Care: The External Electoral Participation of Mexican Migrants in New Zealand

In 2006, an estimated 4.2 million Mexican emigrants were entitled to vote in presidential elections in Mexico, making this country the highest potential recipient of external votes around the world. Despite this fact, during the 2006 and 2012 presidential elections, less than 1 % of that estimated population actually casted their external votes raising questions about how previous patterns of political behavior can transcend borders and accompany migrants to their new countries. In this work, I argue that Mexican migrants’ interaction with an established democracy such as New Zealand is not a fundamental reason to encourage political participation through external voting. Through a qualitative lens, the paper attempts to analyze sentiments, attitudes, and behaviors of Mexican migrants toward the political arena and their effect in preventing or encouraging formal participation in Mexican elections. I conclude that cultural patterns of electoral behavior that originated in Mexico play a decisive role in the way Mexicans relate to their native country, regardless of the intensity of political integration to New Zealand democracy.     

Counterfactual Production and Achievement Orientation in Competitive Athletic Settings1

Two studies examined the impact of achievement orientation on counterfactual production in competitive sporting situations. In Study 1, participants created counterfactuals after reading 4 vignettes. Results indicated that participants reading about winners created more subtractive and downward counterfactuals than did participants reading about losers, while participants reading about losers created more additive and upward counterfactuals than did participants reading about winners. In Study 2, using participants in 3-on-3 basketball games, achievement orientation interacted with game outcome to produce adaptive responses for participants who held a mastery orientation and maladaptive responses for participants who held an outcome orientation. In addition to achievement orientation, the margin of victory played an important role in determining the type of counterfactual produced. The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Cognitive Dissonance and Post-Decision Attitude Change in Six Presidential Elections

Data from the National Election Studies were examined in an effort to isolate cognitive dissonance of two kinds: dissonance arising from a behavioral commitment in the form of voting, and dissonance arising from inconsistencies associated with having supported the losing candidate. Feeling thermometer ratings of the two principal presidential candidates obtained before and immediately after six elections (1972, 1980, 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996) were analyzed. Regression estimates supported a dissonance reduction explanation of observed attitude changes. Voters, as compared to nonvoters, tended to increase the evaluative distance between candidates after an election, whereas supporters of the losing candidate were more likely than supporters of the winning candidate to decrease such evaluative distances. An additional examination of voters yielded results consistent with dissonance theory: After the election, respondents reporting favorable evaluations of both candidates (a difficult choice) tended to spread comparative candidate evaluations compared to respondents who were favorable toward only one candidate (an easy choice). The results both support and cast doubt on prior studies.     

Effects of implicit power motivation on men's and women's implicit learning and testosterone changes after social victory or defeat

Two studies examined interactions of implicit power motivation and experimentally varied victory or defeat in a contest on implicit learning of a visuomotor sequence associated with the contest outcome and changes in testosterone and self-reported affect. In men and women, power motivation predicted enhanced learning (sequence-execution accuracy) after a victory and impaired learning after a defeat. In men, power motivation predicted testosterone increases among winners and decreases among losers, and testosterone decreases mediated the negative effect of power motivation on learning in losers. In women, power motivation predicted postcontest testosterone increases, particularly among losers. In both men and women, self-reported affective states were influenced only by contest outcome and were unrelated to participants' testosterone changes or implicit learning.     

Public and private self-consciousness and social phobia

The relationship between public and private self-consciousness and self-report questionnaires, clinician ratings, and various measures derived from an individualized simulation of an anxiety-provoking situation was examined in a sample of men and women seeking treatment for social phobia. As predicted, public, not private, self-consciousness was generally related to self-report and naive observer ratings of anxiety and to behavioral disruption during the simulation. The predicted relationship between public self-consciousness and how accurately subjects evaluated their performance in the anxiety-provoking situation was marginally supported. Hypotheses regarding the relationship between private self-consciousness and self-reported anxiety during an anxiety-provoking situation, and between private self-consciousness and the correspondence between physiological assessment and self-report, were not supported. The discussion focuses on methodological issues and the theoretical implications of the relationship between self-consciousness and social anxiety.     

Emotions,Public Opinion,and U.S. Presidential Approval Rates: A 5‐Year Analysis of Online Political Discussions

This article examines how emotional reactions to political events shape public opinion. We analyze political discussions in which people voluntarily engage online to approximate the public agenda: Online discussions offer a natural approach to the salience of political issues and the means to analyze emotional reactions as political events take place in real time. We measure shifts in emotions of the public over a period that includes 2 U.S. presidential elections, the 9/11 attacks, and the start of military action in Afghanistan and Iraq. Our findings show that emotional reactions to political events help explain approval rates for the same period, which casts novel light on the mechanisms that mediate the association between agenda setting and political evaluations.