Has 60 Years of Research in Psychology Really Gone Astray?

The author presents several arguments against Toomela’s (Culture of science: Strange history of the methodological thinking in psychology. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007a, doi:, History of methodology in psychology: Starting point, not the goal. Integrative Psychological and Behavioral Science, 2007b, doi:) pessimistic thesis: “The last 60 years of research in psychology seems to have gone astray.” Nevertheless he admits that Toomela’s article despite the excessively categorical assessments contained in it and the undue pessimism crowing its conclusion, represents a substantial contribution to the highlighting of socio-cultural impact on various models of psychological cognition, which lurks behind the international unification of globalizing science.

Variables and Quantity: What Else?

The article aims to comment Toomela’s (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 42(3):245–265, 2008) paper on variables and quantitative psychology. Topics as the choice of variables, their measurement and statistical analysis, the deductions based on data, are briefly reviewed. All variables can be misleading if used in a misleading way, but the Author contends that the psychology based on the variables has not the possibility to represent selected samples of inner processes and contents. Quantitative analyses based on linear causality and probabilistic inference pose many problems, but some alternative approaches devised to cope with these problems are indicated. An hermeneutic approach aware of the constructivist ground of the scientific knowledge is proposed.

Westernalization in the Mirror: On the Cultural Reception of Western Psychology

Miki Takasuna’s paper on “Proliferation of Western Methodological Thought in Psychology in Japan: Ways of Objectification” offers many significant clues for reconsidering the history and unity of psychology. Its treatment of the reception of psychology in Japan hints at the relevance of the models of the subject for psychology—including the allegedly “official” psychology. The aim of this paper is to suggest such reconsideration, on the basis of a distinction between psychology-importing and psychology-exporting countries, and provide a reflection on the cultural problems of assimilation by the latter of a discipline advanced by the former. This perspective leads us to acknowledge the existence of a variety of psychological programs corresponding to the transformation and modernization of different social realities. Also, an indication is offered of several possible levels of analysis of such programs, which are seen to be related with the emergence of psychology as the science of modernity.

The Finite-Dimensional Freeman Thesis

I suggest a modification—and mathematization—of Freeman’s thesis on the relations among “perception”, “the finite brain”, and “the world”, based on my recent proposal that the theory of finite topological spaces is both an adequate and a natural mathematical foundation for human psychology.

The perils of Perrin,in the hands of philosophers

The story of how Perrin’s experimental work established the reality of atoms and molecules has been a staple in (realist) philosophy of science writings (Wesley Salmon, Clark Glymour, Peter Achinstein, Penelope Maddy, …). I’ll argue that how this story is told distorts both what the work was and its significance, and draw morals for the understanding of how theories can be or fail to be empirically grounded.

Psychology is About Processes

Out of the eight points of methodological criticism against contemporary psychology formulated by Watson (Psychological Bulletin 31:755–776, 1934) and put forward by Toomela in this issue, the overemphasis on prediction, the neglect of individual differences, the habit of the differences between the mental states of subjects in objective experimental conditions are particularly important. Modern cognitive psychology has began to remedy those problems, in part by proposing broad, integrative theories. It is not useful to subdivide psychology into “schools of thought” defined by their methodological practices.

A Defence of Weighted Lotteries in Life Saving Cases

The three most common responses to Taurek’s ‘numbers problem’ are saving the greater number, equal chance lotteries and weighted lotteries. Weighted lotteries have perhaps received the least support, having been criticized by Scanlon What We Owe to Each Other (1998) and Hirose ‘Fairness in Life and Death Cases’ (2007). This article considers these objections in turn, and argues that they do not succeed in refuting the fairness of a weighted lottery, which remains a potential solution to cases of conflict. Moreover, it shows how these responses actually lead to a new argument for weighted lotteries, appealing to fairness and Pareto-optimality.

“Der Weisheits letzter Schluss”? Wisdom’s Last Conclusion?

Unexpected empirical findings lead Schwarz (2009) to question current methodological approaches within psychology. He claims that distribution anomalies, which cannot be explained by independent variables, actually prove an error in classical test theory, which then leads him to criticize current scientific conventionalism. In this commentary, it is shown that the current university system not only uses, but often reproduces conventionalism. It is, of course, necessary to teach certain techniques and tools to future psychologists, but using these critically seem to be essential in preventing scientific approaches turn into ideologies that are or must not be questioned—even if this is sometimes less threatening to one’s identity as a scientist/psychologist. This is true for all sciences, but understanding the bio-psycho-social interdependencies of human nature (ambiguities), as Schwarz describes it, seems to be a particular challenge that is in many ways different from other disciplines. Instead of striving to be like them, it is suggested we establish an ambiguity-accepting and critical environment in psychology in which theories and approaches are not considered final but temporary to foster change and progress.

On Hatzimoysis on Sentimental Value

Despite its apparent ubiquity, philosophers have not talked much about sentimental value. One exception is Anthony Hatzimoysis (The Philosophical Quarterly 53:373–379, 2003). Those who wish to take sentimental value seriously are likely to make use of Christine Korsgaard’s ideas on two distinctions in value. In this paper I show that Hatzimoysis has misrendered Korsgaard’s insight in his discussion of sentimental value. I begin by briefly summarising Korsgaard’s idea before showing how Hatzimoysis’ treatment of it is mistaken.

Structural equations and causation: six counterexamples

Hall [(2007), Philosophical Studies, 132, 109–136] offers a critique of structural equations accounts of actual causation, and then offers a new theory of his own. In this paper, I respond to Hall’s critique, and present some counterexamples to his new theory. These counterexamples are then diagnosed.

When Stereotypes Become ‘Scientific’ Statements: Dealing with Gender Issues

The theoretical analysis by Watzlawik (Integrative Psychological & Behavioral Science 2009) demonstrates the scientific fragility of the constructs of masculinity and femininity based on the oversimplification and overlapping between three levels of analysis: group differences, inter-individual differences and intra-individual differences. Watzlawik presents fresh and relevant contributions in terms of methodological issues, especially about the construction of scientific generalizations. Here I focus on issues related to the transformation of stereotypes in statements about gender differences that claim to be ‘scientific’—outlining the socio-political agendas of such statements.

The Ethics of Academic Journal Editing

This paper amounts to a reply to Professor Donald G. Brown’s thoughtful comment on my “Ethical Issues in Journal Peer-Review”, which appeared in this journal.

Mother, Melancholia, and Play in Erik H. Erikson’s Childhood and Society

In an earlier article on Erik H. Erikson’s earliest writings (Capps, 2007), I focused on the relationship between the child’s melancholia and conflict with maternal authority, and drew attention to the restorative role of humor. In this article, I discuss two of the three chapters in part three, “The Growth of the Ego,” of Erikson’s first major book, Childhood and Society [Erikson, Childhood and society. New York: W. W. Norton, 1950, Childhood and society (rev. edition). New York: W. W. Norton, 1963]. I explore the same theme of the relationship of melancholia and the mother, but focus on the restorative role of play. I interpret the differences between the two cases in light of Sigmund Freud’s essay, “Mourning and Melancholia” [Freud, Mourning and melancholia. In S. Freud, General psychological theory (pp. 164–179). P. Rieff (ed.). New York: Collier Books. 1963].

Remarks on Grandi’s Comments

This note is a reply to some of Giovanni Grandi’s comments on my paper “Berkeley’s Contingent Necessities.”

Philosophy, Psychology, and Public Policy Aspects of Well-Being All Wrapped in One Book Designed to Ruffle Your Feathers

This is a book review of Daniel M. Haybron’s book titled The Pursuit of Unhappiness: The Elusive Psychology of Well-Being, published by Oxford University Press, 2008.

Keeping the collectivity in mind?

The key question in this three way debate is the role of the collectivity and of agency. Collins and Shrager debate whether cognitive psychology has, like the sociology of knowledge, always taken the mind to extend beyond the individual. They agree that irrespective of the history, socialization is key to understanding the mind and that this is compatible with Clark’s position; the novelty in Clark’s “extended mind” position appears to be the role of the material rather than the role of other minds. Collins and Clark debate the relationship between self, agency, and the human collectivity. Collins argues that the Clark’s extended mind fails to stress the asymmetry of the relationship between the self and its material “scaffolding.” Clark accepts that there is asymmetry but that an asymmetrical ensemble is sufficient to explain the self. Collins says that we know too little about the material world to pursue such a model to the exclusion of other approaches including that both the collectivity and language have agency. The collectivity must be kept in mind! (Though what follows is a robust exchange of views it is also a cooperative effort, authors communicating “backstage” with each other to try to make the disagreements as clear and to the point as possible.)

HISTORICAL ASPECTS OF MINDFULNESS AND SELF-ACCEPTANCE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

We describe some of the historical conditions that made possible Kabat-Zinn’s [(1990). Full catastrophe living: Using the wisdom of your body and mind to face stress, pain, and illness. New York: Delacorte] very successful use of mindfulness in his stress management program. The ground had been prepared by the nonjudgmental acceptance of people and symptoms by Humanistic psychotherapists, and by the increasing assimilation of Buddhist ideas into Western psychology and psychotherapy. In addition the word “mindfulness,” as the translation of the Pali sati, came to refer to both the manualized practice that provides the evidence for its efficacy in the hands of Kabat-Zinn and others, and the more complex process of clear comprehension and recollection that is described in his more discursive writings, and is similar to Ellen Langer’s use of “mindfulness” in her book of that name.

Making global news: “Freedom of speech” and “Muslim rage” in U.S. journalism

The American press began to take notice of the Danish cartoons after they began to circulate outside of Europe. The press primarily framed the events as a single problem of global interaction: an issue of ‘freedom of speech’ opposed to ‘religious sensitivity.’ Much of the coverage permitted, within limits, a plurality of voices. Drawing on a case study of stories about the ‘cartoon controversy’ in the Boston Globe, I argue that U.S. journalism is organized by a logic of objectivity that seeks to produce a ‘perspectiveless perspective on all perspectives’ (Bourdieu, On television. New York: The New Press, 1998), showing voices on ‘both sides,’ simultaneously masked and contributed to the press’s reifying a series of events into a single global ‘event,’ one that reflected a clash of Western and Islamic values.