Repeated checking causes distrust in memory but not in attention and perception

Repeated checking to reduce memory distrust seems to be counterproductive: it increases memory distrust. Obsessive-compulsive (OC) patients tend to be uncertain about other cognitive domains as well, like attention and perception. In an experiment with 70 healthy participants, we tested whether perseverative checking induces distrust not only in memory, but also in attention and perception. Participants were administered a computer task in which they had to activate, deactivate, and check threat-irrelevant stimuli, and rate their confidence in memory, attention, and perception in a pre-test and post-test. In between these tests, the relevant checking group performed 20 checks of the same stimuli used in the pre- and post-test. The irrelevant checking group performed 20 checks of different stimuli. Although memory accuracy improved in both groups, repeated checking reduced confidence in memory, vividness, and detail in the relevant checking group, but not in the irrelevant checking group. A trend was found towards a decline in attentional confidence in the relevant checking group only. Perception was not affected by repetitive checking. A replication study revealed similar results of relevant checking on meta-memory, however, the trend for attentional distrust was not confirmed. The results suggest that perseveration may be domain specific, i.e., only the cognitive processes that are subject to perseveration are affected.     

Cognitive confidence in obsessive-compulsive disorder: distrusting perception, attention and memory

Previous studies have established that obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is characterised by significant levels of distrust in memory (e.g. for actions). Ironically, this lowered confidence is at least in part due to repeated checking, which is assumed to lower perceptual processing and thereby reduces vividness and detail of the recollections. In a previous study, Hermans, D., Martens, K., De Cort, K., Pieters, G., and Eelen, P. [(2003). Reality monitoring and metacognitive beliefs related to cognitive confidence in OCD. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 41, 383-401] observed that OCD is not only characterised by reduced confidence in memory, but also by a similar distrust in attention (Hermans et al., 2003). The present study aimed at replicating and extending this finding. It was observed (a) that patients suffering from OCD showed less confidence in attention and memory than a clinical and a nonclinical control group; (b) that confidence in attention was uniquely related to checking behaviour, and (c) that repeated checking caused increased levels of distrust in attention. In addition, it was observed that cognitive distrust while performing OCD-related actions not only extends to attention, but also to perception. It is argued that research on metacognition in OCD should move beyond the study of memory.     

Alerting attention and time perception in children

This experiment investigated the effect of a signal (i.e., a click) warning of the arrival of a stimulus to be timed on temporal discrimination in children aged 3, 5, and 8 years (N=86), using a bisection task with visual stimuli ranging from 0.5 to 2s or 1 to 4s. In all groups, the psychophysical functions were orderly with the proportion of long responses increasing with the stimulus duration, although the steepness of functions increased with age. Stimulus durations were judged to be longer with than without the click in all age groups. With the click, time sensitivity also improved and more particularly in the younger children. The statistical results suggest, within the framework of the scalar timing theory, that the click reduces the closing latency of the switch that connects the pacemaker to the accumulator in the internal clock and also reduces its trial-by-trial variability.     

How subtyping shapes perception: Predictable exceptions to the rule reduce attention to stereotype-associated dimensions

Two experiments examined the relation between stereotype disconfirmation and attentional processes. Using an instrumental learning-paradigm, we successfully simulated stereotype acquisition and the subsequent subtyping of disconfirming exemplars. While replicating established markers of subtyping, the present research demonstrates a hitherto neglected cognitive consequence of subtyping: Predictable stereotype disconfirmation increased attention to features that facilitated discriminating between confirming and disconfirming exemplars, and reduced attention to features associated with the original stereotype. These effects were not observed when stereotype disconfirmation was not easily predictable and, hence, subtyping proved difficult. The discussion focuses on implications for research on subtyping and stereotype change.     

Flexible cue combination in the guidance of attention in visual search

Hodsoll and Humphreys (2001) have assessed the relative contributions of stimulus-driven and user-driven knowledge on linearly- and nonlinearly separable searches. However, the target feature used to determine linear separability in their task (i.e., target size) was required to locate the target. In the present work, we investigated the contributions of stimulus-driven and user-driven knowledge when a linearly- or a nonlinearly-separable feature is available but not required for target identification. We asked observers to complete a series of standard color × orientation conjunction searches in which target size was either linearly- or nonlinearly separable from the size of the distractors. When guidance by color × orientation and guidance by size information are both available, observers rely on whichever information results in the best search efficiency. This is the case irrespective of whether we provide target foreknowledge by blocking stimulus conditions, suggesting that feature information is used in both a stimulus-driven and a user-driven fashion.     

Eye movements and attention in reading,scene perception,and visual search

Eye movements are now widely used to investigate cognitive processes during reading, scene perception, and visual search. In this article, research on the following topics is reviewed with respect to reading: (a) the perceptual span (or span of effective vision), (b) preview benefit, (c) eye movement control, and (d) models of eye movements. Related issues with respect to eye movements during scene perception and visual search are also reviewed. It is argued that research on eye movements during reading has been somewhat advanced over research on eye movements in scene perception and visual search and that some of the paradigms developed to study reading should be more widely adopted in the study of scene perception and visual search. Research dealing with “real-world” tasks and research utilizing the visual-world paradigm are also briefly discussed.     

Beauty captures the attention of the beholder

Humans are exquisitely sensitive to beauty: it plays a primary role in impression formation and influences subsequent judgements, favouring the beautiful. Why? This paper examines the factors underlying beauty's effect on the mind of the beholder. First we review the evolutionary importance of beauty, including its role as reward, before focusing on the impact of beauty on attention and the influence of motivational state. The research reviewed demonstrates the evolutionary importance of beauty as an implicit cue indexing genotypic and phenotypic quality: as a preference for beauty is highly adaptive, the brain has evolved to activate neural networks associated with reward in response to beautiful faces (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex, nucleus accumbens, ventral striatum). Not surprisingly then, beauty holds privileged attentional status: even when attention is consciously engaged elsewhere, beauty alters attentional deployment rapidly, effortlessly and unconsciously, capturing attention even when beauty falls outside the focus of conscious attention or a region of high visual acuity. Motivational context also influences attentional adhesion to beauty, with perceiver gender, relationship status and sociosexual orientation all influencing attentional capture. Overall, the research confirms that beauty holds privileged attentional status, in keeping with its evolutionary importance; beauty truly does capture the mind of the beholder.     

Simultaneous attentional guidance by working-memory and selection history reveals two distinct sources of attention

Recent theories of attention have proposed that selection history is a separate, dissociable source of information that influences attention. The current study sought to investigate the simultaneous involvement of selection history and working-memory on attention during visual search. Experiments 1 and 2 used target feature probability to manipulate selection history and found significant effects of both working-memory and selection history, although working-memory dominated selection history when they cued different locations. Experiment 3 eliminated the contribution of voluntary refreshing of working-memory and replicated the main effects, although selection history became dominant. Using the same methodology, but with reduced probability cue validity, both effects were present in Experiment 4 and did not significantly differ in their contribution to attention. Effects of selection history and working-memory never interacted. These results suggest that selection history and working-memory are separate influences on attention and have little impact on each other. Theoretical implications for models of attention are discussed.     

Selective attention,diffused attention,and the development of categorization

How do people learn categories and what changes with development? The current study attempts to address these questions by focusing on the role of attention in the development of categorization. In Experiment 1, participants (adults, 7-year-olds, and 4-year-olds) were trained with novel categories consisting of deterministic and probabilistic features, and their categorization and memory for features were tested. In Experiment 2, participants’ attention was directed to the deterministic feature, and in Experiment 3 it was directed to the probabilistic features. Attentional cueing affected categorization and memory in adults and 7-year-olds: these participants relied on the cued features in their categorization and exhibited better memory of cued than of non-cued features. In contrast, in 4-year-olds attentional cueing affected only categorization, but not memory: these participants exhibited equally good memory for both cued and non-cued features. Furthermore, across the experiments, 4-year-olds remembered non-cued features better than adults. These results coupled with computational simulations provide novel evidence (1) pointing to differences in category representation and mechanisms of categorization across development, (2) elucidating the role of attention in the development of categorization, and (3) suggesting an important distinction between representation and decision factors in categorization early in development. These issues are discussed with respect to theories of categorization and its development.     

Object-based attention: sensory enhancement or scanning prioritization

The three experiments reported here test whether object-modulated attentional spreading can be obtained when the target location is 100% certain. Experiment 1 uses the reaction time (RT)-based flanker task similar to Shomstein and Yantis (2002), and replicates the null result of the object-modulated attentional spreading. RT and accuracy (ACC) have been shown to reflect different processes: postperceptual decision vs. perceptual process (Santee & Egeth, 1982). Experiment 2 adopts the data-limited ACC-based measure and reports that attention could spread within the attended object. To avoid ceiling effects, Experiment 3 adjusts the presentation time based on the trials where the target and flankers were compatible and on the same objects, and provides the convergent evidence supporting the object-modulated attentional spreading. These results suggest that because the RT-based measure is less sensitive in reflecting the quality of perceptual representations, it is not sufficiently a strong evidence to distinguish between sensory enhancement and scanning prioritization accounts.     

Unintended embodiment of concepts into percepts: Sensory activation boosts attention for same-modality concepts in the attentional blink paradigm

This study shows that sensory priming facilitates reports of same-modality concepts in an attentional blink paradigm. Participants had to detect and report two target words (T1 and T2) presented for 53 ms each among a series of nonwords distractors at a frequency of up to 19 items per second. SOA between target words was set to 53 ms or 213 ms, with reduced attention expected for T2 under the longer SOA (attentional blink) and for T1 under the shorter SOA (lag-1 sparing). These effects were found but reduced when the sensory modality of the concepts matched that of a sensory stimulation occurring prior to the detection trial. Hence, sensory activation increased report for same-modality concepts. This finding reveals that grounded cognition effects (1) are involved in conceptual processing as soon as a word has reached the point of lexical identification and (2) occur independent of intentional access to sensory properties of concepts.     

Distractor interference in focused attention tasks is not mediated by attention capture

Distractor stimuli possessing information that is relevant for a task (henceforth, task-relevant distractors) often interfere with task performance. The interference by task-relevant distractors is observed even when distractors are positioned outside the main attentional focus. We investigated whether such interference is due to an attention capture by the distractors. Participants responded to a target colour while ignoring word distractors positioned within (Experiment 1) or outside (Experiments 2 and 3) the attentional focus. The words carried task-relevant information in their colour and personally significant information in their content. Because personally significant information affects performance only when positioned in an attended region, it was used as a marker for the locus of the attentional focus. As expected, when distractors were attended, both task-relevant and personally significant information affected performance. However, when distractors were unattended, only task-relevant information caused interference, suggesting that attention did not shift to the distractors’ location. We discuss possible accounts for interference effects in focused-attention tasks.     

Parallel averaging of size is possible but range-limited: A reply to Marchant,Simons, and De Fockert

In their recent paper, Marchant, Simons, and De Fockert (2013) claimed that the ability to average between multiple items of different sizes is limited by small samples of arbitrarily attended members of a set. This claim is based on a finding that observers are good at representing the average when an ensemble includes only two sizes distributed among all items (regular sets), but their performance gets worse when the number of sizes increases with the number of items (irregular sets). We argue that an important factor not considered by Marchant et al. (2013) is the range of size variation that was much bigger in their irregular sets. We manipulated this factor across our experiments and found almost the same efficiency of averaging for both regular and irregular sets when the range was stabilized. Moreover, highly regular sets consisting only of small and large items (two-peaks distributions) were averaged with greater error than sets with small, large, and intermediate items, suggesting a segmentation threshold determining whether all variable items are perceived as a single ensemble or distinct subsets. Our results demonstrate that averaging can actually be parallel but the visual system has some difficulties with it when some items differ too much from others.     

Predictions,precision, and agentive attention

Ransom, Fazelpour, and Mole (this journal - 2017) raise an important puzzle for the ‘prediction error minimization’ account of cognitive processing. That account depicts all cognitive processing as fundamentally in the business of minimizing prediction errors concerning the evolving flow of sensory information. One of the cornerstones of these highly ambitious, would-be unifying accounts is their depiction of attention as nothing other than the process of optimizing the precision (inverse variance) of critical prediction error signals. But that story, Ransom et al. suggest, cannot accommodate voluntary shifts of attention. In this paper, I show why this challenge to the grand unifying project fails. It fails because it locates the origins of voluntary attention in complexes of unanalyzed desire rather than in changing complexes of beliefs.     

Emergent features, attention, and object perception

The perceptual processing of arrows and triangles and of their component angles and lines was explored in a number of different tasks. The results suggest that some analysis of shapes into simpler parts occurs preattentively, because these parts can recombine to form illusory conjunctions when attention is divided. The presence of "emergent features," such as closure or arrow junctions, was inferred from predicted correlations in the pattern of performance across tasks and across individual subjects. Thus triangles (for most subjects) and arrows (for some subjects) behave as if they had a perceptual feature that is absent from their parts and that mediates parallel detection in search and easy texture segregation. For some subjects, circles could apparently supply the additional feature (presumably closure) required to form illusory triangles from their component lines, whereas for other subjects circles had no effect. The fact that triangle lines can form illusory conjunctions with another shape makes it unlikely that triangles are perceived holistically and strengthens the interpretation that relies on emergent features.     

Seeing and believing: perception,belief formation and the divided mind

On many of the idealized models of human cognition and behavior in use by philosophers, agents are represented as having a single corpus of beliefs which (a) is consistent and deductively closed, and (b) guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all the time. In graded-belief frameworks, agents are represented as having a single, coherent distribution of credences, which guides all of their (rational, deliberate, intentional) actions all of the time. It’s clear that actual human beings don’t live up to this idealization. The systems of belief that we in fact have are fragmented. Rather than having a single system of beliefs that guides all of our behavior all of the time, we have a number of distinct, compartmentalized systems of belief, different ones of which drive different aspects of our behavior in different contexts. It’s tempting to think that, while of course people are fragmented, it would be better (from the perspective of rationality) if they weren’t, and the only reason why our fragmentation is excusable is that we have limited cognitive resources, which prevents us from holding too much information before our minds at a time. Give us enough additional processing capacity, and there’d be no justification for any continued fragmentation. I argue that this is not so. There are good reasons to be fragmented rather than unified, independent of the limitations on our available processing power. In particular, there are ways our belief-forming mechanisms—including our perceptual systems—could be constructed that would make it better to be fragmented than to be unified. And there are reasons to think that some of our belief-forming mechanisms really are constructed that way.

Attachment, attention, and cognitive control: Attachment style and performance on general attention tasks

Three studies examined the effects of attachment style on performance in non-attachment-related attention tasks; one study also assessed the effect of priming memories of experiences of attachment security or insecurity on attentional performance in a flanker task. In Study 1, participants performed a psychological refractory period (PRP) task assessing their ability to switch attention rapidly from one decision to another; in Studies 2 and 3 they performed a flanker task assessing their ability to resist distracters. Avoidant attachment predicted better performance on both tasks, and the effects remained even after controlling for neuroticism, general anxiety, and BIS/BAS scores. Study 3 showed that thinking in detail about a past experience of insecurity eliminated avoidant participants’ superior performance. In sum, avoidant people are generally skilled at regulating their attention, even on non-attachment-related tasks, but their performance is hampered by reminders of experiences of insecurity.     

The relationship between social anxiety and the perception of depth-ambiguous biological motion stimuli is mediated by inhibitory ability

Orthographically projected biological motion stimuli are depth-ambiguous. Consequently, their projection when oriented towards the viewer is the same as when oriented away. Despite this, observers tend to interpret such stimuli as facing the viewer more often. Some have speculated that this facing-the-viewer bias may exist for sociobiological reasons: Mistaking another human as retreating when they are actually approaching could have more severe consequences than the opposite error. An implication of this theory is that the facing-towards percept may be perceived as more threatening than the facing-away percept. Given this, as well as the finding that anxious individuals have been found to display an attentional bias towards threatening stimuli, we reasoned that more anxious individuals might have stronger facing-the-viewer biases. Furthermore, since anxious individuals have been found to perform poorer on inhibition tasks, we hypothesized that inhibitory ability would mediate the relationship between anxiety and the facing-the-viewer bias (i.e., difficulty inhibiting the threatening percept). Exploring individual differences, we asked participants to complete anxiety questionnaires, to perform a Go/No-Go task, and then to complete a perceptual task that allowed us to assess their facing-the-viewer biases. As hypothesized, we found that both greater anxiety and weaker inhibitory ability were associated with greater facing-the-viewer biases. In addition, we found that inhibitory ability significantly mediated the relationship between anxiety and facing-the-viewer biases. Our results provide further support that the facing-the-viewer bias is sensitive to the sociobiological relevance of biological motion stimuli, and that the threat bias for ambiguous visual stimuli is mediated by inhibitory ability.     

Attention and suppression affect tactile perception in reach-to-grasp movements

Reaching with the hand is characterized by a decrease in sensitivity to tactile stimuli presented to the moving hand. Here, we investigated whether tactile suppression can be canceled by attentional orienting. In a first experiment, participants performed a dual-task involving a goal-directed movement paired with the speeded detection of a tactile pulse. The pulse was either delivered to the moving or stationary hand, during movement preparation, execution, or the post-movement phase. Furthermore, stimulation was delivered with equal probability to either hand, or with a higher probability to either the moving or resting hand. The results highlighted faster RTs under conditions of higher probability of stimulation delivery to both moving and resting hands, thus indicating an attentional effect. For the motor preparation period, RTs were faster only at the resting hand under conditions where tactile stimulation was more likely to be delivered there. In a second experiment, a non-speeded perceptual task was used as a secondary task and tactile discrimination thresholds were recorded. Tactile stimulation was delivered concomitantly at both index fingers either in the movement preparation period (both before and after the selection of the movement effector had taken place), in the motor execution period, or, in a control condition, in the time-window of motor execution, but the movement of the hand was restrained. In the preparation period, tactile thresholds were comparable for the two timings of stimulation delivery; i.e., before and after the selection of the movement effector had taken place. These results therefore suggest that shortly prior to, and during, the execution of goal-directed movements, a combined facilitatory and inhibitory influence acts on tactile perception.     

Defensive self-esteem impacts attention, attitude strength, and self-affirmation processes

Individuals with defensive self-esteem score low on implicit measures of self-esteem (ISE) and high on explicit measures of self-esteem (ESE). Although there is some evidence about the consequences of defensive self-esteem, much of it is indirect and open to alternative explanations. Here, we offer direct and novel evidence regarding the implications of defensive self-esteem. Using a standard visual attention paradigm, Study 1 revealed that defensive self-esteem is associated with enhanced attention to defensiveness-related words. Building upon these results, Study 2 found that defensive self-esteem individuals reported particularly strong attitudes, across different operationalizations of attitude strength as well as different attitude objects. Study 3 examined the sensitivity of defensive self-esteem individuals to self-affirmation effects. The results revealed that self-affirmation was particularly effective for defensive self-esteem individuals in reducing actual-ideal self-discrepancies. Overall, the results provide novel and firm evidence that the combination of simultaneously low ISE and high ESE elicits defensiveness.