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I applaud Ruffman for cautioning us against interpreting early sensitivity to others’ beliefs as evidence for an innate theory of mind and for making room for learning. In turn, however, I caution against his claim that all infants need is to understand that people act depending on what they perceive. Instead, infants may keep experiential records (Perner & Roessler, 2010) for other people or records of what they have registered (Apperly & Butterfill, 2009), which makes it less obvious that all required knowledge can be acquired by statistical learning. As a general criticism I remonstrate with current theory of mind research on its lack of concern that we understand people as acting for reasons which goes beyond detecting lawful regularities in behaviour. 相似文献
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纳西族和汉族儿童情绪理解能力的发展 总被引:6,自引:0,他引:6
选取3~5岁的纳西族儿童107人,3~5岁的汉族儿童90人,使用情绪理解任务系统地考察了他们情绪理解的发展,同时还测量了两个民族儿童的错误信念理解和语言能力。结果表明,两个民族儿童情绪理解能力具有相似的发展规律,但完成各任务的成绩有显著差异,提示了两个民族儿童情绪理解能力发展的不同步性。研究还发现,心理理论社会知觉成分与认知成分随年龄的增长相互促进和相互制约,并且都与语言能力有关。 相似文献
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5~8岁儿童对模糊信息具有多重解释的理解 总被引:5,自引:1,他引:5
参照Carpendale和Chandler的实验范式,研究儿童对于“人们可能对同样信息给出不同解释”这一现象的理解,考察5~8岁儿童的解释性心理理论的发展。结果表明,5岁儿童不能理解心理过程的解释性,认为同样的信息只有一种合理的解释。从6岁开始,儿童才认识到,模糊信息可以有多种解释,但6、7岁时的这种理解并不完善,成绩随着任务要求而变化。8岁儿童才有比较稳定的解释性心理理论。 相似文献
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儿童心理理论能力中的情绪理解 总被引:19,自引:1,他引:18
情绪理解是儿童心理理论能力中的一个重要组成部分,它在人们的社会交往中具有不容忽视的作用。按Tager-Flusber和Sullivan提出的心理理论两成分模型,它属于心理理论的社会知觉成分,先于社会认知成分出现;但是随着儿童年龄的增长,社会知觉成分与社会认知成分越来越难以分离。情绪理解可分为几个不同的层次:简单情绪的理解;和愿望、信念有关的情绪理解;复杂情绪的理解;情绪调节。该文综述了近20年来心理理论中有关儿童情绪理解的研究,对该领域的研究在方法上和内容上提出了可能的发展方向。 相似文献
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该研究将错误信念任务中主人公加上\"聪明\"或\"笨\"的标签,以考察特质标签是否会影响儿童对错误信念的理解。360名5~8岁儿童参加实验,每个年龄组儿童随机分配到\"聪明\"标签组、无标签组和\"笨\"标签组。结果表明:(1)\"聪明\"标签会极大地阻碍67、岁儿童理解他人错误信念,对5、8岁儿童没有影响;(2)\"笨\"标签对所有年龄组儿童错误信念的理解都没有产生影响。 相似文献
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We investigated relationship between Chinese children's imaginary companions (ICs) and their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions in 180 children, aged 5–6 years old. We examined the potential differences in second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding between children with and without ICs, children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships, as well as children with invisible friends and personified objects. The results revealed that children with ICs had better second-order false belief understanding and emotion understanding than children without ICs. Compared with children with hierarchical relationships, children with egalitarian relationships had better second-order false belief understanding. However, children with invisible friends and personified objects did not differ on their understanding of second-order false beliefs and emotions. The results suggest that compared with IC types, IC status and child-IC relationship qualities may be more relevant to children's theory of mind. It will be interesting for the future researchers to investigate the underlying mechanism of the differences between children with egalitarian IC relationships and hierarchical IC relationships. 相似文献
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Joane Deneault 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2013,174(6):386-407
The author addressed the issue of the simultaneity of false belief and knowledge understanding by investigating children's ability to predict the behavioral consequences of knowledge, ignorance, and false belief. The second aim of the study was to explore the role of counterfactuals in knowledge understanding. Ninety-nine (99) children, age 3–7 years old, completed the unexpected transfer task and a newly designed task in which a protagonist experienced 1 of the following 4 situations: knowing a fact, not knowing a fact, knowing a procedure, and not knowing a procedure. The results showed that factual ignorance was as difficult as false belief for the children, whereas the other conditions were all easier than false belief, suggesting that the well-known lag between ignorance and false belief may be partly methodologically based. The results provide support for a common underlying conceptual system for both knowing and believing, and evidence of the role of counterfactual reasoning in the development of epistemic state understanding. Methodological variations of the new task are proposed for future research. 相似文献
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A. H. Maslow 《The Journal of genetic psychology》2013,174(1):43-66
Two samples, one gifted, the other “normal,” of 30 children each (11 to 13 years of age) were matched on age, sex, race, and father's occupation. A parent of each child completed the Children's Behavioral Classification Project instrument, and a profile of 30 scaled scores was obtained for each protocol. A discriminant analysis on the basis of the profiles classified 50 of the 60 Ss correctly into their respective sample category, either gifted or normal. Though the results of a multivariate analysis of variance showed no significant differences between the groups when the 30 profile factors were viewed as a whole, univariate analyses on the separate factors yielded significant group differences on several related factors. These were interpreted with caution. Additional factors displayed significant sex differences and one demonstrated a group-by-sex interaction effect. Coefficients of pattern similarity (the rp ) were computed among all pairs of the 60 Ss. An unweighted average linkage cluster analysis grouped 34 of the 60 Ss into six clusters which accounted for 26 of 30 possible gifted children. After an item analysis was performed on the original data, a 42 item subscale of the CBCP questionnaire was constructed which correctly classified 31 of 40 individuals in a cross-validation sample. 相似文献
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Yusuke Moriguchi Midori Ban Hidekazu Osanai Ichiro Uchiyama 《European Journal of Developmental Psychology》2018,15(2):172-183
Pretend play is one of the earliest forms of children’s imagination. While social pretend play (role play) may facilitate the development of theory of mind – including false belief understanding – theoretically, the reverse may be true; theory of mind may facilitate the development of role play. To clarify this relationship, the present longitudinal study examined whether toddler’s implicit understanding of false beliefs predicted their role play during preschool years. We examined 18-month-old toddlers’ looking time in an implicit false-belief task (Time 1). When the children were 4/5 years old (Time 2), children’s parents answered a questionnaire on their child’s engagement in role play, such as playing with an imaginary companion and impersonating an imagined character. Toddlers’ looking time in the false-belief task at Time 1 predicted impersonation scores at Time 2. The results suggest that early theory of mind skills can facilitate children’s role play. 相似文献
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儿童理解误信念的心理机制假设 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
儿童心理理论是近20年来发展心理学研究热点,对其研究主要是在误信念实验范式之下进行的。儿童理解误信念的心理机制问题是误信念研究的核心问题之一,研究者从不同的角度出发,采用不同的方法,提出了儿童如何理解误信念的几个重要假设,包括:元表征假设、事实掩盖假设、心理理论机制假设、计算资源假设。此文综述了这些假设,以期借鉴使用。 相似文献
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研究探究假装情境及假装认识对幼儿心理理论(Theory of mind)发展的影响。实验一考察60名3~4岁幼儿在假装情境下的信念认识任务中的表现,发现幼儿对假装的早期认识的出现要早于对信念的认识的出现,假装情境对幼儿的信念认识没有直接促进作用。实验二对42名在信念认识任务上表现不佳的幼儿进行假装认识训练,结果发现假装认识训练促进了幼儿的信念认识,促进效应须经历一段时间才显现。研究支持假装认识在心理理论发展中具有重要作用的假设,但潜在作用机制仍有待进一步探究。 相似文献
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考察了72名3~5岁儿童在三个改造过的经典错误信念任务中的表现,结果显示,大部分4岁儿童能够正确认识自我错误信念;大部分5岁儿童能够正确认识他人错误信念;大部分3~4岁儿童的自我错误信念认识显著好于他人(真人和玩偶)错误信念认识,5岁时这两种认识才没有显著差异;学前儿童对真人与玩偶错误信念的认识没有显著差异;学前儿童对“意外地点”任务和“意外内容”任务中错误信念问题回答的一致性较高,而对“外表—真实”任务的回答与前两种任务的一致性较低。 相似文献
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关于幼儿开始理解错误信念的年龄,一直存在激烈的争论。目前颇具影响力的观点认为,幼儿只有在4岁左右才能理解错误信念,3岁幼儿至多只能隐性理解错误信念。支持这种观点的证据主要来自于对幼儿的错误信念的言语实验。由于这些实验结果被认为与言语测试范式相关,越来越多的实验采用非言语测试方法,结果发现3岁,甚至3岁之前幼儿就能够理解错误信念。同时,这一观点也获得了一些理论证据的支持。 相似文献
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For more than 30 years, researchers have focused on the important transition that children undergo between the ages of 3 and 5, when they start to solve mind‐reading problems that require reasoning about complex mental states, such as beliefs. The main question for debate has been whether, during that transition, children acquire new concepts about how the mind works (i.e. a more sophisticated ‘theory of mind’) or whether their more general cognitive abilities improve and help them deal with the general task demands. Recently, researchers have started to explore mind‐reading abilities in individuals outside of the classic 3–5 age span, showing early theory of mind abilities in ever‐younger children and infants, but also far from flawless performance in adults. In this article, we show how the results of these two new lines of research converge on the idea that there is more to mind reading than having theory of mind concepts: there are various processes required to efficiently implement theory of mind concepts in our reasoning, and there may be, in fact, multiple mind‐reading routes available. We then highlight the emergent new directions for future research. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
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The ability to both identify and explain others’ intentional acts is fundamental for successful social interaction. In two cross-sectional studies, we investigated 3- to 9-year-olds’ (n = 148) understanding of the folk concept of intentionality, using three types of intentionality measures. The relationship between this type of reasoning and false belief and interpretive mind understanding was also examined. Judgment of the appropriateness of an explanation was based on adult responses (n = 20). Overall, the results indicated that the ability to both identify and appropriately explain a range of intentional acts does not fully emerge until 7 years of age or later. The pattern of explanations revealed the gradual development of a folk concept of intentionality. Preschool- and early school-age children focused on the protagonists’ desires and actions, whereas 8- and 9-year-olds and adults were more likely to reference the protagonists’ awareness and skills. 相似文献
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西方关于自闭症研究的新进展——与心理理论的关系研究 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
自闭症是一种罕见的身体机能失调的综合病症。本文阐述了西方关于自闭症研究的新进展,其中分别介绍了自闭症的重要症状、自闭症起因的理论假设以及自闭症与心理理论的关系研究。在阐述的过程中强调了心理理论的缺失是自闭症产生的重要原因。 相似文献