Nietzsche’s account of self-conscious agency

This essay is an overview of Nietzsche’s philosophy of action. I discuss the central features of Nietzsche’s account and the ways in which it departs from standard accounts. Section 1 discusses Nietzsche’s view of the opacity of human action. I focus on the way in which the agent’s experience of the world is shaped by unnoticed and unconscious factors. Section 2 asks what role self-consciousness has in the production of action. Section 3 turns to the way in which Nietzsche understands the action/behavior distinction. Finally, Section 4 analyzes Nietzsche’s account of freedom. What emerges is a view that is not just one more entry into the standard debates, but an attempt at rethinking the terms in which the debate is cast.     

Reconsidering the will to power in Heidegger's ‘Nietzsche’

In this paper, I reconsider Martin Heidegger's well-known interpretation of the Nietzschean conception of the will to power that emerges during the 1930s and 40s, focusing specifically on his conception of the will to power as the principle that suspends (or to use Heidegger's word, ‘permanentises’) becoming. After revealing the difficulties that this reading presents, I provide my own tentative interpretation of the doctrine. Specifically, I argue that Heidegger's opposition of the will to power and becoming cannot be sustained, and provide a so-called ‘strong’ reading of the will to power as an alternative.     

Friedrich Nietzsche’s Twilight of the Idols

This review essay of Nietzsche’s “Twilight of the Idols” (1888) is part of the journal TOPOI’s “Untimely Reviews” series of classic works of philosophy. Themes dealt with are Nietzsche’s attacks on morality, on free will, on mental causation, on Socrates, and on Kant. Connections are drawn with contemporary work by Mark Johnston, David Rosenthal, and Daniel Wegner, among others.     

Irrationality and egoism in Hegel’s account of right

ABSTRACT

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel – even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being.     

Politics,Friendship and Solitude in Nietzsche (Confronting Derrida’s reading of Nietzsche in ‘Politics of Friendship’)

The paper offers a counter-reading to Derrida’s “utopian” reading of Nietzsche, focussing instead on Nietzsche’s cynical view of friendship, based on the impossibility of being a friend to oneself. Unlike Aristotle, who sees the basis of human political nature in their shared rationality and mutual friendship, Nietzsche sees not only politics, but human beings themselves as being constituted by a violent act of submission, and characterised by an ongoing struggle for power.

The paper further examines two intellectual traditions about friendship and politics, one (primarily associated with Aristotle) according to which the two are positively related and no real tension could exist between them. Another tradition (primarily associated with Montaigne) holds friendship to be irreconcilable with politics.

Elements of both traditions can be recognised in Nietzsche who, finding the radical deceptive nature of friendship unacceptable, moves to a solitude which is equally unbearable. For it is precisely the hermit that knows that his solitude makes him into an other to himself; which turns out to be a motive for real friendship, the third element which prevents the lonely hermit from sinking into the depth of self-interrogation. The paper concludes with the recognition that friendship, for Nietzsche, can only have an intermediary function on the way to full realisation of friendship, which will be a friendship of an inner difference or plurality, i.e. on our way to what is ultimately beyond the human condition, to the “overman”.     

Faith and belief in The Anti-Christ: A re-evaluation of Nietzsche’s relation to Jesus

This paper re-evaluates the significance of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at The Anti-Christ. Specifically we will ask whether a re-evaluation of this relation can shed new light on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity. And we will do this first by surveying the standard interpretations of this issue, as well as the existing literature on The Anti-Christ. Arguing that the latter picks out nothing new regarding a critique of Christianity, we nonetheless suggest that a new criticism can be developed via the discussion of Jesus there. Further, this can be done by looking at the account given of faith and belief in that text. That is, we will explore the status of Jesus for Nietzsche by looking at the origins and development of “faith” as a mode of belief. In particular, we trace the former’s development as a type from a basic mode of faith. As such, we begin by looking at the psychological origins of this kind of belief in “decadence”, and why Nietzsche is critical of this. However, we will then discuss the emergence of a more positive faith in the form of Buddhism, and see how this represents an analogue for Jesus’s faith. Continuing, we will see how Jesus signifies a similar problematic development, but also “overcoming”, of initial decadence faith. And we will argue, also, that this overcoming is rooted in his emphasis on the immediacy of lived experience. Finally though, we will look at how Christianity returns Jesus’s more productive relation to the world again to a primitive mode of faith. In other words, we will see how Christianity converts the fluid, lived, “faith” of Jesus into something again based on transcendent belief. And lastly, we will ask what new light this point sheds on Nietzsche’s critique of Christianity, and his affinity with Jesus the man.     

Tooley’s account of the necessary connection between law and regularity

Fred Dretske, Michael Tooley, and David Armstrong accept a theory of governing laws of nature according to which laws are atomic states of affairs that necessitate corresponding natural regularities. Some philosophers object to the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong theory on the grounds that there is no illuminating account of the necessary connection between governing law and natural regularity. In response, Michael Tooley has provided a reductive account of this necessary connection in his book Causation (1987). In this essay, I discuss an improved version of his account and argue that it fails. First, the account cannot be extended to explain the necessary connection between certain sorts of laws—namely, probabilistic laws and laws relating structural universals—and their corresponding regularities. Second, Tooley’s account succeeds only by (very subtly) incorporating primitive necessity elsewhere, so the problem of avoiding primitive necessity is merely relocated.     

An Ethos of Affirmative Laughter in Nietzsche’s Zarathustra

In Thus Spoke Zarathustra (2006), Nietzsche presents Zarathustra as a sage and parodic prophet, who acquires and offers insight over the narrated journey of his spiritual development. Nietzsche’s conception of Zarathustra as a gift (to “all and none”) endorses learning as the kind of emulation condensed into Zarathustra’s complex formulation: rather than “corpses that I carry with me wherever I want . . . I need living companions who follow me because they want to follow themselves—wherever I want.” Thus I aim, firstly, to follow the text closely to see what is given. However, noting that Zarathustra is deeply imbued with figures of laughter, I also impose an interpretation. “Repeating differently,” as demanded by Zarathustra, I outline a practicable, spiral-shaped “learning curve” of traversal and return to various “shades of laughter,” advancing from the worst laughters to “golden laughter,” which embraces complexity. This represents what it means to laugh well. In so doing, I hope to demonstrate that the complex ethos of affirmative laughter in Zarathustra remains strikingly pertinent for a contemporary era urgently tasked with embracing complexity.     

Nietzsche’s pragmatic genealogy of justice

This paper analyses the connection between Nietzsche’s early employment of the genealogical method and contemporary neo-pragmatism. The paper has two goals. On the one hand, by viewing Nietzsche’s writings in the light of neo-pragmatist ideas and reconstructing his approach to justice as a pragmatic genealogy, it seeks to bring out an under-appreciated aspect of his genealogical method which illustrates how genealogy can be used to vindicate rather than to subvert, and accounts for Nietzsche’s lack of historical references. On the other hand, by highlighting what Nietzsche has to offer neo-pragmatism, it seeks to contribute to neo-pragmatism’s conception of genealogy. The paper argues that Nietzsche and the neo-pragmatists share a naturalistic concern and a pragmatist strategy in responding to it. The paper then shows that Nietzsche avoids a reductive form of functionalism by introducing a temporal axis, but that this axis should be understood as a developmental model rather than as historical time. This explains Nietzsche’s failure to engage with history. The paper concludes that pragmatic genealogy can claim a genuinely Nietzschean pedigree.     

Ambivalent subjects: Psychoanalysis,women’s sexuality in India and the writings of Sudhir Kakar

Indian women’s sexuality shares an intimate relationship with the regulatory forces of Hindu religious law. This paper explores the writings of psychoanalyst Sudhir Kakar and the narratives of women interviewees, along with clinical experiences with women, to paint a picture of women’s sexuality’s interlocked with cultural misogyny. Noting the creative adaptations that women make to enjoy sex in this polis, the paper also asks questions about how the insights of psychoanalytic feminism may serve as a ‘third’ in this interlocking.     

Supernatural power,sexuality, and the paradigm of “women's space” in religion and culture

Many traditional social scientists still hold to the analytical view that dichotomizes magic and religion. By placing magic and religion in discrete categories we underdetermine the extent of women's space in religion and culture. In religion women were dipicted as subordinate ritually and spiritually. In magic, things feminine were usually identified with evil and witchcraft. The paradigm of women's space transcends the traditional dichotomy of magic and religion in a way that enhances feminine attributes in magicoreligious systems. Women are unique sources of supernatural power which emanates from their sexuality and reproductive capacities. This study examines several categories of supernatural power that are uniquely feminine and help delimit the paradigm of espace feminine or women's space in religion and culture. It takes the view that, as sources of supernatural power, women constitute a unique spiritual resource vital to religion and culture.     

Facing the Lively Unity of Difference: Heidegger’s Thoughts on Nietzsche’s Philosophy of Eternal Return and the Self-Overcoming Power of Thinking

Human Studies - This article examines Heidegger’s thoughts on Nietzsche’s philosophy of eternal return and the self-overcoming power of thinking. Scholarly commentators argue that...     

A very obscure definition: Descartes’s account of love in the Passions of the Soul and its scholastic background

The definition of love given by Descartes in the Passions of the Soul (art. 79–84) has never stopped puzzling commentators. If the first Cartesian textbooks discreetly evoke or even fail to discuss Descartes’s account of love, Spinoza harshly criticizes it, pointing out that it is ‘on all hands admitted to be very obscure’. More recently several scholars have noticed the puzzling (or even paradoxical) character of the articles of the Passions of the Soul on love and hate. In this paper, I would like to propose a reassessment of the definition of love provided by the Passions of the Soul and the Letters to Elisabeth and Chanut. By tracing back Descartes’s scholastic sources (namely Aquinas’s treatises on the passions and charity in the Summa Theologiae), I will demonstrate how Descartes builds up his definition of love by displacing or subverting the meaning of several major elements of the thomistic vulgata on love. Hence, a significant part of the obscurity of the definition given by the Passions of the Soul possibly finds its ultimate rationale in this attempt to recover some traditional questions of the scholastic debate on love, while advancing new answers to them.     

The history,origin, and meaning of Nietzsche’s slave revolt in morality

Abstract

While it is uncontroversial that the slave revolt in morality consists in a denial of the nobles as objects of value, Nietzsche’s account in the Genealogy’s first essay invites ambiguities concerning its origin, ressentiment’s relationship to value creation, and its meaning. In this paper, I address these ambiguities by analyzing the morality of good and evil as an historical artifact of Judeo-Christian tradition, and I argue for a two-stage, non-strategic interpretation of the slave revolt, according to which Judaism and Christianity each made essential and different contributions. The inversion of values began with the Jewish prophets, who claimed the poor were holy and ‘good’ and the rich ‘evil’ (BGE 195), and it was sustained throughout the Second Temple period by the Jewish priests in relation to a ‘priestly-noble’ (GM I 7) conception of the virtuous person as holy and pure. Christ, through his espousal of egalitarianism (A 27), negated the pathos of distance essential to noble values, thus beginning the second phase of the slave revolt where goodness became associated with a distinctly slavish conception of virtue.     

Nietzsche as ‘Europe’s Buddha’ and ‘Asia’s Superman’

Nietzsche represents in an interesting way the well-worn Western approach to Asian philosophical and religious thinking: initial excitement, then neglect by appropriation, and swift rejection when found to be incompatible with one’s own tradition, whose roots are inexorably traced back to the ‘ancient’ Greeks. Yet, Nietzsche’s philosophical critique and methods - such as ‘perspectivism’ - offer an instructive route through which to better understand another tradition even if the sole purpose of this exercise is to perceive one’s own limitations through the eyes of the other: a self-destruktion of sorts. To help correct this shortcoming and begin the long overdue task of even-handed dialogue - or contemporary comparative philosophy - we will be served well by looking at Nietzsche’s mistakes, which in turn informed the tragic critic of the West of the last century, Martin Heidegger. We may learn here not to cast others in one’s own troubled image; and not to reverse cultural icons: Europe’s Superman, and Asia’s Buddha.

Nietzsche and the Empirical: through the eyes of the term ‘Empfindung’

Abstract

This paper examines Nietzsche’s attitude to the empirical by concentrating on his concept of Empfindung (sensation, perception, feeling). In Section 1, five distinctive features of his use of ‘Empfmdung’ are described in relation to the philosophical tradition and some of his sources in 19^th Century physiology. All five features, I argue, point to Nietzsche’s philosophical concern to stake out the limits of ‘Empfmdung’ as an aspect of human finitude. In Section 2, my attention turns from the term ‘Empfmdung’ to Nietzsche’s actual argumentation. The bewildering variety of perspectives and arguments concerning ‘Empfmdung’ in his writings are broken down into three basic types of argument or discourse with radically different, incompatible presuppositions: a critical, epistemological discourse serving anti-metaphysical ends; a quasi-scientific discourse serving critical-epistemological ends; and a quasi-ontological discourse of life that looks to explain the results of Nietzsche’s critical epistemology. The value of this ‘contradictory’ practice, I contend, is twofold: Nietzsche makes epistemology fruitful for the philosophical problem of life; at the same time he offers a performative critique of epistemology by the manner in which he exceeds it.