Hypnotic experience and the autism spectrum disorder. A phenomenological investigation

In recent decades, the focus in autism research progressively expanded. It presently offers extensive material on sensorimotor disturbances as well as on perceptive-cognitive preferences of people with autism. The present article proposes not only a critical interpretation of the common theoretical framework in autism research but also focuses on certain experiences common to some people with autism and which can be appropriately understood by phenomenology. What I will call “hypnotic experiences” in autism are moments in which some individuals withdraw into intense sensorial and perceptive experiences. Following their examples, I use the term “hypnosis” primarily to describe a trance state in which the individuals become highly alert to and awake for an experience of a totally new kind. Through a close analysis of autobiographical writings from people with autism I defend the idea that the particularity of hypnotic experiences in autism consists in a certain qualitative shift within experience itself: what changes, in the hypnotic moments, is the way a person with autism relates to his/her own bodily experiences. If this qualitative shift is indeed difficult to account for within a reifying and intellectualist research perspective, phenomenology offers a large conceptual framework for understanding it. Phenomenology, and precisely, phenomenological psychopathology, will thus emerge as a major device in accounting for such “hypnotic experiences”. The argument mainly draws on the twofold structure of experience which is traditionally used in phenomenological research: it claims that in hypnotic experience people with autism are inclined to focus on non-reified “sensings”, “perceivings” and “movings”, and thus leave aside the object itself and any intentional reification of it. Finally, I will claim that this restriction to mere non-reified sensings might lead to a completely new conception of self and world. In the hypnotic experiences of autism, neither the subject nor the object come to a full-blown and independent existence. A thorough phenomenological analysis of hypnotic experience in autism therefore also has to face the question of a corresponding ontology of these experiences.     

THE CONCEPT OF PHILOSOPHICAL EXPERIENCE

Abstract: We often speak about religious experience, and sometimes we speak about metaphysical experience. Yet we seldom hear about philosophical experience. Is philosophy purely a matter of theories and theses, or does it have an experiential aspect? In this article, I argue for the following three claims. First, there is something we might call philosophical experience, and there is nothing mystical about it. Second, philosophical experiences are expressed in something quite similar to what Kant called “aesthetic judgements.” Third, philosophical experiences are expressed by using words in what Wittgenstein called “secondary sense.” Finally, I try to show the educational significance of pursing philosophical experiences. Through articulating them one might find one's ground, and through articulating them in a less private and more universal form one might raise oneself to universality. Thus, in expressing philosophical experiences one aspires to speak in a universal voice.     

Injustice in the Spaces between Concepts

I argue that epistemic injustice manifests not only in the content of our concepts, but in the spaces between them. Others have shown that epistemic injustice arises in the form of “testimonial injustice,” where an agent is harmed because her credibility is undervalued, and “hermeneutical injustice,” where an agent is harmed because some community lacks the conceptual resources that would allow her to render her experience intelligible. I think that epistemic injustice also arises as a result of prejudiced and harmful defects in the inferential architecture of both scientific practice and everyday thinking. Drawing on lessons from the philosophy of science, I argue that the inferential architecture of our epistemic practices can be prejudiced and wrongful, leading to a variety of epistemic injustice that I am calling “inferential injustice.” This type of injustice is fully structural; it inheres in our epistemic practices themselves rather than as a direct result of an individual's action. For this reason, cases of inferential injustice are importantly different from extant cases of epistemic injustice and are especially hard to track. We need a better understanding of inferential injustice so that we can avoid and ameliorate cases such as the ones I present here.     

Two Kinds of Unknowing

Miranda Fricker claims that a “gap” in collective hermeneutical resources with respect to the social experiences of marginalized groups prevents members of those groups from understanding their own experiences (Fricker 2007). I argue that because Fricker misdescribes dominant hermeneutical resources as collective, she fails to locate the ethically bad epistemic practices that maintain gaps in dominant hermeneutical resources even while alternative interpretations are in fact offered by non‐dominant discourses. Fricker's analysis of hermeneutical injustice does not account for the possibility that marginalized groups can be silenced relative to dominant discourses without being prevented from understanding or expressing their own social experiences. I suggest that a gap in dominant hermeneutical resources is ambiguous between two kinds of unknowing: hermeneutical injustice suffered by members of marginalized groups, and epistemically and ethically blameworthy ignorance perpetrated by members of dominant groups.     

Did You Say He Has a Hitler Mustache?: Analytic Vulnerability and Destabilization in the Face of Trauma

This paper looks at analytic vulnerability and destabilization through a detailed clinical example. There are different ways in which we may be vulnerable with our patients. In this paper I describe the raw and sudden vulnerability of allowing ourselves to be in a place of not knowing when both patient and analyst are unable “to see.” I describe an experience in which I lose my ability “to see,” both literally and metaphorically, while in session with a patient who is unable “to see” because she has dissociated her experience of loss and her experience of a sense of danger when in the presence of her stepfather. I link this clinical experience to the patient’s dissociated feelings and to my history of intergenerational trauma as well to current cultural violence and hate.     

Spiritual Transformation: A Phenomenological Study Among Recovering Substance Abusers

As a complement to an earlier quantitative investigation, this qualitative study was concerned with describing the lived experience of spiritual transformation within the context of a 12-month resident substance abuse recovery program called the Lazarus Project, which is sponsored by a southern U.S. Pentecostal-based congregation. We conducted phenomenological interviews with 10 participants (eight European-Americans; two African-Americans) who had been in the program from six to nine?months and asked that they describe their most important spiritual experiences that brought about change. A hermeneutical analysis found that a pattern of five overlapping themes emerged consistently across all 10 protocols to describe the meaning of the experience of spiritual transformation for these participants. The themes were: (1) “Sick and Tired”, (2) Unmerited Love, (3) “I’m Changing,” (4) Fast/Gradual, and (5) Destiny. The themes are discussed from an existential perspective and related to the literature on spiritual transformation as well as the earlier quantitative study at the Lazarus Project.     

Presupposition Failure and the Assertive Enterprise

I outline a discourse-based account of presuppositions that relies on insights from the writings of Peter Strawson, as well as on insights from more recent work by Robert Stalnaker and Barbara Abbott. One of the key elements of my account is the idea that presuppositions are “assertorically inert”, in the sense that they are background propositions, rather than being part of the “at issue” or asserted content. Strawson is often assumed to have defended the view that the falsity of a presupposition leads to catastrophe, in the sense that a false presupposition “wrecks the assertive enterprise”. I argue that the discourse-based account in terms of assertoric inertia can explain how cases of presupposition failure can sometimes be non-catastrophic; there are cases in which the assertive enterprise operates smoothly, despite presupposition failure. The chief problem facing this line of argument is to account for cases in which presupposition failure is catastrophic. If presuppositions are assertorically inert, then how can their falsity ever wreck the assertive enterprise? I offer a principled account that delineates the circumstances in which false presuppositions are, and those in which they are not, catastrophic.     

Living in the “space of reasons”: The “rationality debate” revisited

Two questions are central to the “rationality debate” in the philosophy of social science. First, should we acknowledge differences in basic norms of epistemic and agential rationality, or in the content of perceptual experience, as the “best explanation” of radical differences in belief and practice? Second, can genuine understanding be achieved between cultures and research traditions that so differ in their beliefs and practices? I survey a number of responses to these questions, and suggest that one of these, “dialogical optimism”, while attractive, is in need of further clarification. Such clarification may be forthcoming if we attend to recent work by John McDowell. McDowell claims that perceptual experience, as our primary mode of epistemic access to the world, must be located within what Sellars termed the “space of reasons” if we are to make sense of our conception of ourselves as thinking creatures. I develop a reading of this claim in terms of a fundamental duality in human perceptual experience, and use this conception of experience to illuminate the dialogical optimist strategy in the rationality debate.     

“ONCE UPON A TIME THERE WAS AN S.S. OFFICER”: THE HOLOCAUST BETWEEN HISTORY AND FICTION IN ELSA MORANTE'S LA STORIA

The twentieth-century Italian Jewish novelist Elsa Morante's La Storia, published in 1974, is rarely included in the canon of Holocaust literature today, yet contains considerable content regarding the Italian experience of the Holocaust. In this essay I examine how Morante's proclaimed artistic principles, in particular her notion of “verità poetica”, “poetic truth”, and “storia”, “history” or “story”, affect her depiction of the Holocaust. I also trace what I term an “anxiety of absence” in La Storia, which I believe explains not only Morante's use of characters who are unreliable witnesses to the Holocaust as it unfolds in Rome, but also explains her ultimate swerve away from her artistic ideals and her problematic use of historical sources.     

A Narrative Inquiry into a Female Athlete’s Experiences with Protracted Concussion Symptoms

This article explores a female university volleyball student-athlete’s experience with protracted concussion symptoms. Through the methodology of narrative inquiry, four salient themes became apparent related to Daphnée’s experiences: (a) “I felt so alone,” (b) “I had to make one of the hardest decisions of my life,” (c) “I feel like I’m in prison,” and (d) “There’s no light at the end of the tunnel.” Overall, this study offers a rare look into the impact of concussion on an individual’s athletic and academic identities, career progression, and in turn, her imagined stories of who she was and who she was becoming.     

From “Einfühlung” to empathy: exploring the relationship between aesthetic and interpersonal experience

Is there a relationship between aesthetic and interpersonal experience? This question is motivated not only by the fact that historically experiences of both kinds have often been accounted for in terms of “empathy”, the English translation of the German term “Einfühlung”, but also by the fact that some contemporary theories refer to mechanisms underlying both aesthetic and interpersonal experience. In this Editorial introducing the special section titled “From ‘Einfühlung’ to empathy: exploring the relationship between aesthetic and interpersonal experience”, we briefly sketch these two motivations and the relationship between the different mechanisms that have been associated with both aesthetic and interpersonal experience.     

Healing presence in the psychotherapist

Abstract

Throughout graduate school I felt compelled to become a fine psychotherapist. Implicit in that motivation was my curiosity about what makes a psychotherapist effective. My curiosity was inspired by my experience with one therapist who helped me activate profound transformation. After identifying intuitive inquiry (Anderson, 1998, 2000, 2004) as my research method, I explored that experience through meditation, reading, and conversation and eventually identified her healing presence as the core quality that differentiated her from other therapists I had known. Though technique and experience are important, I sensed that it was her healing presence that allowed her to use technique and experience skillfully. Throughout Cycle 1 of intuitive inquiry, the “text” that claimed me was my personal experience of her healing presence, her ability to be present, to connect with me, to see me, and even, to love me. Through intuitive inquiry, I was able to expand my understanding of the healing presence of a psychotherapist to incorporate the experiences of many others.     

On Seeing to the Horses: Issues in Teaching and Learning in Theology and Religious Studies After Bonino and Lindbeck

This article re-examines so-called “experiential approaches” to theology and religious studies. In affirming the need of the educator to attend to both cognitive and affective aspects within teaching and learning, and in using many concrete examples from classroom practice, the article critically engages with Latin American liberation theology and post-liberalism in an attempt to clarify what “experience” is being referenced when “experiential methods” are used. The importance of the concrete worlds of individual students, the responsibility of educators to be conscious of their own power in shaping the educational experience, and the desirability of attending to issues surrounding economic disadvantage within theology and religious studies feature prominently in the study. We conclude that, though no experience is neutral, educational contexts in theology and religious studies can offer exemplary settings for profound self-discovery, exploration, and personal development through the “hermeneutical friction” created by critical examination of the narrative worlds within which we live.     

Hermeneutics and historical consciousness: An appraisal of the contribution of Hans-Georg Gadamer

Abstract

In this introductory article to the volume of the South African Journal of Philosophy in tribute of Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author, first, makes a few remarks about the nature of hermeneutics and Gadamer’s views on the universality of the hermeneutical experience. This universality is, in particular, explained from the perspective of the “linguistic turn” in Gadamer’s thought. Secondly, there is a brief discussion of certain particular aspects of Gadamer’s contribution. Aspects of that contribution that are emphasized are: Gadamer’s reevaluation of prejudice, authority and tradition, his idea of “Wirkungsgeschichte”, his idea of meaning as a process rather than a given entity, his analogy between game-playing and the interpretation of art, and his dialogical conception of interpretation. The author concludes by developing his own estimate of the main thrust of Gadamer’s contribution. This contribution consists of the way in which Gadamer’s thought, on the one hand, represents a demonstration and embodiment of the kind of historical consciousness so typical of our times, but, on the other hand, also accomplishes this exemplification of historical consciousness while imaginatively avoiding the kind of relativistic historicism so typical of many other manifestations of the same trend.     

A postcolonial Pannenberg? Mimicry,the law,and the cross of love

This paper employs the postcolonial concepts of mimicry and hybridity to interpret Wolfhart Pannenberg's understanding of the violence done to Jesus on the cross and the subversive reconciliatory love that it engenders. According to Pannenberg, although the man Jesus was crucified as blasphemer of the Jewish law, the resurrection vindicated Jesus so that the ones accusing Jesus were retroactively deemed to be the actual blasphemers. As a result, Jesus ended up dying not for his own alleged breaking of the law, but as an inclusive substitute for all blasphemers of God (through amour propre) deserving death. Thus, the resurrection confirmed Jesus’ divine identity and his earthly teaching that love supersedes and transforms the law. Applying the concept of mimicry to Pannenberg, on the cross the symbolic and semiotic are held together in tension for in mimicry the “not-quite sameness” menaces the colonizer. The cross, ostensibly a symbolic sign of abjection, is mimicked by the suffering of Jesus and subverted through a practice of inclusive semiotic love which recapitulates sinful human life toward a life of transformed autonomy. Pannenberg displays a pseudo postcolonial understanding of subverting oppressive law into love. However, on account of his futurist ontology, the eschatological totality is underscored relative to formative experiences, leaving him vulnerable to postcolonial critiques of essentialism, which can reinscribe colonialism. I contend that Pannenberg employs a strategy of “strategic particularism” in which concepts such as mimicry and hybridity are helpful as hermeneutical tools but ultimately provisional and temporary relative to the whole.     

Phenomenology as a Form of Empathy

This paper proposes that adopting a “phenomenological stance” enables a distinctive kind of empathy, which is required in order to understand forms of experience that occur in psychiatric illness and elsewhere. For the most part, we interpret other people's experiences against the backdrop of a shared world. Hence our attempts to appreciate interpersonal differences do not call into question a deeper level of commonality. A phenomenological stance involves suspending our habitual acceptance of that world. It thus allows us to contemplate the possibility of structurally different ways of “finding oneself in the world”. Such a stance, I suggest, can be incorporated into an empathetic appreciation of others' experiences, amounting to what we might call “radical empathy”.     

Internalism and the snapshot conception of phenomenal experience: A reply to Fisher

Justin Fisher (2007) has presented a novel argument designed to prove that all forms of mental internalism are false. I aim to show that the argument fails with regard to internalism about phenomenal experiences. The argument tacitly assumes a certain view about the ontology of phenomenal experience, which (inspired by Alva Noë) I call the “snapshot conception of phenomenal experience.” After clarifying what the snapshot conception involves, I present Fisher with a dilemma. If he rejects the snapshot conception, then his argument against phenomenal internalism collapses. But if he embraces the snapshot conception, then internalists may argue that in light of the snapshot conception, their view is not so implausible—and that if Fisher still disagrees, he owes us an argument that shows why phenomenal internalism is false even given the snapshot conception. I conclude the paper by showing that Fisher cannot escape my criticism by adjusting his argument so that it no longer depends on the snapshot conception.     

Seeking the Pathos of God in a Secular Age: Theological Reflections on Mystical Experience in the Twentieth Century

Our current context is a “moving” and unstable one. We are facing not only a time of change, but what Pope Benedict XVI terms “an epochal change.” The impact of this transformation upon religion is unmistakable. In this article I reflect on one aspect of this impact: the one that affects and transforms the experience of God, also called mystical experience. I explore the concept of experience, trying to give a more precise idea of what we understand by mystical experience. I then reflect on the importance of mystical biographies and narratives to theology, including the particular characteristics that emerge when this narrative is about the mystical experiences of twentieth‐century people of faith. I present the specific “case” of Dorothy Day as an exemplification of mystical experience. I conclude with several reflections about how human beings find the way towards God in our secular.