The casuistic method of practical ethics

This essay concerns itself with the methodology of practical ethics. There are a variety of methods employed in ethics. Although none have been firmly established as dominant, it is generally agreed that casuistry, or the case-based method, is one important strategy commonly used for resolving ethical issues. Casuists compare the case under consideration to a relevantly similar (analogous) precedent case in which judgements have already been made, and they use these earlier judgements to determine the proper resolution of the present case. In this article, I try to provide a better understanding of the nature of contemporary casuistry. To accomplish this, I explain (in the first section) the basic features of casuistic reasoning. The second section focuses on the logic of casuistry. By assessing casuistic reasoning from the logical viewpoint, casuistry can be reconstructed as a logically correct method of reasoning. The third section looks at casuistry from the epistemic point of view and investigates the justificatory force of casuistic reasoning. Finally, in the fourth section, I show the usefulness of formal casuistry.     

The question of method in ethics consultation

This paper offers an exposition of what the question of method in ethics consultation involves under two conditions: when ethics consultation is regarded as a practice and when the question of method is treated systematically. It discusses the concept of the practice and the importance of rules in constituting the actions, cognition, and perceptions of practitioners. The main body of the paper focuses on three elements of the question of method: canon, discipline, and history, which are treated heuristically to outline what the question of method in ethics consultation fully involves.     

Phenomenological method and contemporary ethics

Continental Philosophy Review - Following a brief summation of the phenomenological method, the paper considers three metaethical positions adopted by phenomenologists and the implications of those...     

The ethics of complexity and the complexity of ethics

Abstract

In this paper, we investigate the implications that a general view of complexity - i.e. the view that complex phenomena are irreducible - hold for our understanding of ethics. In this view, ethics should be conceived of as constitutive of knowledge and identity, rather than as a normative system that dictates right action. Using this understanding, we elaborate on the ethics of complexity and the complexity of ethics. Whilst the former concerns the nature and the status of our modelling choices, the latter denotes a contingent and recursive understanding of ethics. Although the complexity of ethics cannot be captured in a substantive normative model, we argue that this view of ethics nevertheless commits one to, what we term, ‘the provisional imperative’. Like Kant’s categorical imperative, the provisional imperative is sub-stantively-empty; however, unlike Kant’s imperative, our imperative cannot be used to generate universal ethical principles. As such, the provisional imperative simultaneously demands that we must be guided by it, whilst drawing attention to the exclusionary nature of all imperatives. We further argue that the provisional imperative urges us to adopt a certain attitude with regard to ethical decision-making, and that this attitude is supported and nurtured by provisionality, transgressivity, irony, and imagination.     

The development of computer ethics: Contributions from business ethics and medical ethics

In this essay, we demonstrate that the field of computer ethics shares many core similarities with two other areas of applied ethics, Academicians writing and teaching in the area of computer ethics, along with practitioners, must address ethical issues that are qualitatively similar in nature to those raised in medicine and business. In addition, as academic disciplines, these three fields also share some similar concerns. For example, all face the difficult challenge of maintaining a credible dialogue with diverse constituents such as academicians of various disciplines, professionals, policymakers, and the general public, Given these similarities, the fields of bioethics and business ethics can serve as useful models for the development of computer ethics. A version of this paper was presented at ETHICOMP98, the Fourth International Conference on Ethical Issues of Information Technology, March 25–27, 1998, Erasmus University, the Netherlands. Kenman Wong, Ph.D., is an Associate Professor of Business Ethics; Gerhard Steinke, Ph.D., is Professor of Management and Information Systems. Both authors are at Seattle Pacific University's School of Business and Economics.     

The ethics of morphing

Here’s one piece of practical reasoning: “If I do this then a person will reap some benefits and suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits outweigh the costs. So I ought to do it.” Here’s another: “If I do this then one person will reap some benefits and another will suffer some costs. On balance, the benefits to the one person outweigh the costs to the other. So I ought to do it.” Many influential philosophers say that there is something dubious about the second piece of reasoning. They say that it makes sense to trade-off costs and benefits within lives, but not across lives. In this paper I make a case for the second piece of reasoning. My case turns on the existence of morphing sequences—sequences of possible states of affairs across which people transform smoothly into other people.

The ethics of poverty

Conclusions The conclusions set forth in this paper are of a highly tentative and even exploratory nature. I am willing to be demonstrated to be wrong at any point and excited by the realization that some of my hunches have been sufficiently far out to prompt confirmatory or invalidating research of a more precise variety. Yet I am willing to stand by my observations as to the relationship between the ethical perspective of the poor to the following seemingly unrelated events: (1) the implosion of these ethical perspectives into the middle classes, (2) through contemporary political uses of the poor by the upper classes, (3) professional interaction with the poverty community, (4) the unconscious moral identification of the middle classes with the ethics of the poor, (5) the transformation of thekinds of emotional disorder from one level of affluence to another by reason of the criterion of work as an indication of mental health, and (6) the ethical issue involved in economic determination of the use of medical and ministerial time in the care of the emotionally disturbed.     

The ethics of earthquake prediction

Scientists’ responsibility to inform the public about their results may conflict with their responsibility not to cause social disturbance by the communication of these results. A study of the well-known Brady-Spence and Iben Browning earthquake predictions illustrates this conflict in the publication of scientifically unwarranted predictions. Furthermore, a public policy that considers public sensitivity caused by such publications as an opportunity to promote public awareness is ethically problematic from (i) a refined consequentialist point of view that any means cannot be justified by any ends, and (ii) a rights view according to which individuals should never be treated as a mere means to ends. The Parkfield experiment, the so-called paradigm case of cooperation between natural and social scientists and the political authorities in hazard management and risk communication, is also open to similar ethical criticism. For the people in the Parkfield area were not informed that the whole experiment was based on a contested seismological paradigm.     

The ethics of natural assets

Two principles, concerning (1) custodianship and (2) no retrospective right of ownership, will be fundamental to the just management of natural assets in future. Because natural assets are not man-made, the rights of ownership are not confined to the present generation that controls their exploitation. I have proposed an ethical requirement of custodianship towards future generations in which the present generation compensates future generations for the exploitation of natural assets by bequeathing the equivalent value of man-made assets. Because natural assets are discovered through a geological lottery, prior to search there is a natural veil of ignorance as to which locations will be endowed favourably and unfavourably. This creates a useful role for a polity to secure a just distribution of resource rents for all citizens rather than let them be dissipated through search and accrue highly unequally. But justice requires that ex post, well-endowed regions forfeit the right of ownership over those natural assets which have been discovered. Justice requires the rule of no retrospective right of ownership.     

The scope of business ethics

Abstract

Due to its multi-disciplinary nature, there are a variety of conceptions about the scope of Business Ethics as academic field. Confusion about the scope of business ethics can impact detrimentally upon the further development of this field of study. The purpose of this article is to distinguish between various notions of the scope of business ethics and then to determine whether these notions are reconcilable or not. In order to achieve this purpose a definition of the term ’scope‘ is first provided. In this definition two distinct meanings of the term emerges. It can either refer to the field that is being studied, or it can refer to the purpose of studying a specific field. The field of business ethics is then explored in terms of both these meanings of the concept ’scope’. In this process some tensions within the field of business ethics is exposed. The article concludes with an attempt to reconcile these tensions.