Practical Reasons, Practical Rationality, Practical Wisdom

There are a number of proposals as to exactly how reasons, ends and rationality are related. It is often thought that practical reasons can be analyzed in terms of practical rationality, which, in turn, has something to do with the pursuit of ends. I want to argue against the conceptual priority of rationality and the pursuit of ends, and in favor of the conceptual priority of reasons. This case comes in two parts. I first argue for a new conception of ends by which all ends are had under the guise of reasons. I then articulate a sense of rationality, procedural rationality, that is connected with the pursuit of ends so conceived, where one is rational to the extent that one is motivated to act in accordance with reasons as they appear to be. Unfortunately, these conceptions of ends and procedural rationality are inadequate for building an account of practical reasons, though I try to explain why it is that the rational pursuit of ends generates intuitive but misleading accounts of genuine normative reasons. The crux of the problem is an insensitivity to an is-seems distinction, where procedural rationality concerns reasons as they appear, and what we are after is a substantive sense of rationality that concerns reasons as they are. Based on these distinct senses of rationality, and some disambiguation of what it is to have a reason, I offer a critique of internalist analyses of one’s reasons in terms of the motivational states of one’s ideal, procedurally rational self, and I offer an alternative analysis of one’s practical reasons in terms of practical wisdom that overcomes objections to related reasons externalist views. The resulting theory is roughly Humean about procedural rationality and roughly Aristotelian about reasons, capturing the core truths of both camps.

实践智慧与实践思维中的范畴错误——从杨国荣教授的实践智慧理论谈起

杨国荣教授在新作《人类行动与实践智慧》中提出一种形而上的实践智慧理论,将事实与价值、理论与实践、实然与应然等概念统一起来。尽管实践智慧的实际运作会综合地涉及诸多方面,但要清晰呈现其内在结构,须首先详尽分析每个方面在实践中的意义和作用。实践活动针对的是复杂异质的经验对象,根据对象的不同可将其大致分为三个最高范畴和六个次级范畴或类型。实践智慧的洞察与判断力就在于分析和判断实践对象应属哪个或哪些范畴,进而以适合该类型的方式筹划实践活动。范畴归属不当便是实践思维中的范畴错误,也就是实践判断的错误。只有以确切的经验分析和判断为前提,杨国荣教授所倡导的形而上的综合性实践智慧才有可能。     

Practical Wisdom: Aristotle meets Positive Psychology

The strengths and virtues identified by positive psychology are treated as logically independent, and it is recommended that people identify their “signature” strengths and cultivate them, because more of a strength is better [Peterson and Seligman: 2004, Character Strengths and Virtues: A Handbook and Classification (Oxford University Press, New York); Seligman: 2002, Authentic Happiness (Free Press, New York)]. The present paper contrasts that view with the Aristotelian view that virtues are interdependent, that happiness (eudaimonia) requires all the virtues, and that more of a virtue is not always better than less. We argue that practical wisdom is the master virtue essential to solving problems of specificity, relevance, and conflict that inevitably arise whenever character strengths must be translated into action in concrete situations. We also argue that practical wisdom is becoming increasingly difficult to nurture and display in modern society, so that attention must be paid to reshaping social institutions to encourage the use of practical wisdom rather than inhibiting it.     

Sizing Things Up: Colloquial Reflection as Practical Wisdom

This essay reintroduces Rhetoric as the principle art for giving emphasis and importance to contested matters; in other words, for making things matter. In a speculative reading of the Aristotelian rhetorical tradition, Aristotle's interpretations of magnitude, contengency and practical wisdom are critically examined from both an aesthetic and an ethical-political point of view. The concluding discussion attempts to apply these same concepts to a growing dilemma in the present age. The dilemma is that monumental changes in scale have all but eroded the prospects for engaged encounters with contemporary contingency. It remains the challenge of rhetorical practice to reframe actions and events so that they and we may hold some hope for an engaged civic life.     

技艺与德性中的实践智慧——基于亚里士多德伦理学与当代伦理学自然主义的比较

亚里士多德在其古典伦理学中讨论了作为制作活动的技艺与作为实践活动的德性以及二者所依赖的实践智慧的联系与区别。基于亚里士多德的思想以及当代认知科学,这一类比研究延续到当代自然主义伦理学及其反思中。自然主义伦理学主张技艺与德性及其实践智慧之间存在着某种类同关系,源于亚里士多德德性伦理学的辩护者则主张技艺行为与德性行为的实践智慧在诸多方面存在区别。更进一步的研究表明,技艺行为和德性行为的实践智慧应当有效地整合,即技艺行为的实践智慧可能使人们对整体生活目标的反思更为正确,同时,技艺行为的实践智慧也同时应当遵从基于"好的人类生活"的更高规范标准。     

Moral Virtue and Practical Wisdom: Theme Comprehension in Children,Youth, and Adults

The authors tested 3 hypotheses about the relation of moral comprehension to prudential comprehension by contrasting comprehension of themes in moral stories with comprehension of themes in prudential stories among third-grade, fifth-grade, and college students (n = 168) in Study 1, and among college students, young and middle-aged adults, and older adults (n = 96) in Study 2. In both studies, all groups were statistically significantly better at moral theme comprehension than prudential theme comprehension, suggesting that moral comprehension may develop prior to prudential comprehension. In Study 2, all groups performed equally on moral theme generation whereas both adult groups were significantly better than college students on prudential theme generation. Overall, the findings of these studies provide modest evidence that moral and prudential comprehension each develop separately, and that the latter may develop more slowly.     

实践智慧:中国本土心理学理论的知识形态

中国本土心理学理论追求能够体现价值规定与行为策略之统一性的实践智慧,其核心在于如何在自然与社会、他人与自己的整体关系场域中,通过自身的心理建设成为一个理想的人,与外界达成理想的和谐关系,即如何在具体的社会情境中如何用心去做人和做事的学问,并可建立对应的本土认知心理学、本土积极心理学和本土社会心理学三大中层理论体系。判断实践智慧是否产生,可使用是否能够转识成智和是否能够知行合一这两个标准。中国本土心理学理论提倡建构一种面向生活世界的常识心理学,以贴近日常生活的方式进行理论术语的提炼和理论体系的建立,并在社会生活中检验理论的有效性。     

A Response to Monica Mookherjee

This response discusses Mookherjee’s views on plural autonomy and autonomy-promoting education, and her recognition that different cultural value systems can lead to varied responses and strategies across cultures. It considers mechanisms to counter forced marriage and argues from the standpoint of grassroots work within the Muslim community for the importance of the distinction between traditional culture and religion. It raises the issues of racism, islamophobia, and stereotyping in silencing Muslim women’s voices and reducing the space for them to argue for change within communities.

牟宗三"实践的智慧学"探求诠论

对哲学作为“实践的智慧学”的探求是牟宗三后期哲学思考的核心。这一探索,开启了牟宗三中国哲学与康德哲学双向诠释的基本视域,也拓出了道德形而上学体系建构的理论地平。“实践的智慧学”诠释具有独特的理论内涵,也隐含了牟氏道德形上学自我批判与超越的思想线索。     

Rethinking the Priority of Practical Reason in Kant

Throughout the critical period Kant enigmatically insists that reason is a ‘unity’, thereby suggesting that both our theoretical and practical endeavors are grounded in one and the same rational capacity. How Kant's unity thesis ought to be interpreted and whether it can be substantiated remain sources of controversy in the literature. According to the strong reading of this claim, reason is a ‘unity’ because all our reasoning, including our theoretical reasoning, functions practically. Although several prominent commentators endorse this view, it is widely thought to lack exegetical support. This paper seeks to strengthen the case for this reading by showing how theoretical reason's positive function, as Kant presents it in the Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic, may be construed as fundamentally practical. I argue that reason's supreme regulative principle ought to be understood as a categorical practical imperative. This interpretation, I suggest, resolves the apparent inconsistencies that blight Kant's account of the principle in the Appendix, while bringing greater overall coherence to his account of theoretical reason's regulative function.     

智慧:结构、类型、测量及与相关变量的关系

智慧是个体在其智力与知识的基础上,经由经验与练习习得的一种德才兼备的综合心理素质,包括聪明才智与良好品德两大成份.智慧可分为常规智慧与应变智慧、群体智慧与组织智慧、个人智慧与一般智慧、德慧与物慧等,可用三维智慧量表、自我评估智慧量表以及智慧发展量表等进行测量,并与年龄、性别、文化、教育、人格、思维方式、智力等存在重要关联.今后应该深入探究智慧的概念与结构,拓展其研究方法、测量工具与教育策略以及开展中国化研究.     

Politicians and Trustworthiness: Acting Contrary to Self-Interest Enhances Trustworthiness

Trustworthiness is an important characteristic for politicians to possess. However, politicians are perceived as manifestly untrustworthy. One way politicians might build trustworthiness is to behave in a manner that seems contrary to self-interest. Three studies examined whether acting contrary to self-interest can help build trustworthiness. In each study, participants reacted to political content in which a politician acted contrary to self-interest (praised an opponent) or acted in a more common and self-serving manner (e.g., attacked opponent or praised the self). Participants perceived the candidate who acted contrary to self-interest as more trustworthy than candidates who acted in a more self-serving manner. Participants were also more willing to consider voting for such a candidate. These results were not constrained by party affiliation.     

Rethinking our Maxims: Perceptual Salience and Practical Judgment in Kantian Ethics

Some contemporary Kantians have argued that one could not be virtuous without having internalized certain patterns of awareness that permit one to identify and respond reliably to moral reasons for action. I agree, but I argue that this insight requires unrecognized, farreaching, and thoroughly welcome changes in the traditional Kantian understanding of maxims and virtues. In particular, it implies that one's characteristic emotions and desires will partly determine one's maxims, and hence the praiseworthiness of one's actions. I try to show this by pointing out an instability in the Kantian understanding of maxims. On the one hand, maxims are thought of as consciously affirmed, subjective principles of action. On the other hand, Kantians claim that nothing counts as an action, nor as morally assessable, unless it has a maxim. One cannot take both thoughts seriously without implausibly constricting the range of behavior that counts as action, hence as morally assessable. This difficulty can be overcome, I suggest, by jettisoning the idea that maxims must be consciously affirmed, and by stressing the way in which maxims are grounded in the pruning and shaping of one's emotions and desires during socialization. This opens the door to a rich Kantian theory of virtue. It also raises questions about the scope and ground of our moral responsibility, which I address at the end of the paper.