Task switching across the life span: effects of age on general and specific switch costs

The authors investigated age-related changes in executive control using an Internet-based task-switching experiment with 5,271 participants between the ages of 10 and 66 years. Speeded face categorization was required on the basis of gender (G) or emotion (E) in single task blocks (GGG... and EEE...) or switching blocks (GGEEGGEE...). General switch costs, the difference between switching block and single task block performance, decreased during development and then increased approximately linearly from age 18. In contrast, specific switch costs, the difference between switch trial and nonswitch trial performance in the switching block, were more stable across the same age range. These results demonstrate differential age effects in task-switching performance and provide a fine-grained analysis of switch costs from puberty to retirement.     

Age differences in the selection of mental sets: the role of inhibition, stimulus ambiguity, and response-set overlap

Switching between tasks leads to response-time (RT) costs at switch points (local switch costs) and often to RT costs at no-switch transitions that occur in the context of a task-switching block (global set-selection costs). With trial-to-trial cuing of tasks, moderate age effects were obtained for local switch costs, but large age effects were obtained for global selection costs. In Experiment 1, set-specific inhibition was found to be at least as large in old as in young adults, thus ruling out an inhibition deficit as a reason for age differences in global costs. In Experiment 2, large age differences in global costs were limited to conditions of ambiguous stimuli and full response-set overlap. This pattern of results suggests a greater reliance on set-updating processes in old than in young adults. The role of these processes is to ensure unambiguos internal control settings when ambiguity arises from stimuli and response specifications.     

Age-related changes in task-switching components: the role of task uncertainty

The present study examined age differences in executive functioning, using an externally cued task-switching paradigm. Two components of task switching were assessed: the ability to maintain and select among task sets (general switch costs) and the ability to switch between task sets (specific switch costs). In contrast to previous findings, we found large age-related differences in specific switch costs, especially when the number of potentially relevant task sets is increased from two to four. Age-related differences in general switch costs were absent when external task cues subserved executive processing in task switching. Generally, the findings suggest that age-related impairments in task-switching components vary as a function of task uncertainty, such as the presence of environmental prompts to behavior.     

Outsourcing control to the environment: effects of stimulus/response locations on task selection

Response-time and accuracy costs as assessed in the context of the task-switching paradigm are usually thought to represent processes involved in the selection of abstract task sets. However, task sets are also applied to specific stimulus and response constellations, which in turn may become associated with task-set representations. To explore the consequence of such associations, we used a task-switching paradigm in which subjects had to select between two tasks (color or orientation discrimination) that were either associated with shared or unique stimulus/response locations on a touchscreen. When each task was associated with unique locations, error switch costs, stimulus-response congruency effects, as well as the characteristic task-switch x repetition-priming interaction were eliminated, and global selection costs were substantially reduced. These results demonstrate that to understand standard task-switching phenomena it is critical to consider links between lower level stimulus/response parameters and task sets.     

Extensive practice does not eliminate human switch costs

Numerous human task-switching studies have shown that decision making that follows a task switch is slower and less accurate than that which follows a task repetition. Stoet and Snyder (2003a) tested humans and rhesus monkeys on a task-switching paradigm, but found, surprisingly, no switch costs in the monkeys. We hypothesized that the exceptional monkey behavior may have been due to the more extensive practice the monkeys received in comparison with human subjects. In the present study, we tested the hypothesis that extensive practice can abolish switch costs in humans. Four human subjects each performed 23,000 trials in a task-switching paradigm. We found that this amount of practice does not abolish switch costs.     

认知控制的层级性：来自任务切换的脑电证据*

认知控制的主要研究范式之一是任务切换。以往研究发现切换代价受到认知控制层级性的调节, 但鲜有研究探索这一调节过程的动态神经机制。本研究通过嵌套的线索-任务切换范式考察不同层级任务切换代价的差异及其神经机制。在实验中, 要求被试完成高低两种层级任务, 低层级任务要求被试判断数字大小(或奇偶); 高层级任务则须先加工数字的某一语义特征(如当前数字是否是偶数), 然后进行大小判断。行为结果表明, 高层级任务切换代价显著大于低层级任务切换代价。线索锁时的脑电结果表明, 层级效应最早出现于P2成分, 切换效应(切换与重复之差)在CNV成分上受到任务层级的调控, 反映了在任务目标重构阶段给予高层级任务更多的选择性注意以及更高的主动性控制。目标锁时的脑电结果表明, 在N2及慢波(SP)成分上, 高层级任务切换与重复的波幅差异相比低层级任务显著更大, 反映了在抑制旧任务集与重构新反应集的过程中增强的反应性控制。这些结果为任务设置重构论和认知控制的层级性提供了新的证据。     

Task-switching performance with 1:1 and 2:1 cue-task mappings: not so different after all

When task-switching studies use the task-cuing procedure with a 1:1 cue-task mapping, task switching and cue switching are confounded, which is problematic for interpreting switch costs. The use of a 2:1 cue-task mapping is a potential solution to this problem, but it is possible that introducing more cues may also introduce marked changes in task-switching performance. In 5 experiments involving 160 subjects, the authors compared performance with 1:1 and 2:1 mappings across several methodological changes. Differences in switch costs between mappings were small and, in most analyses, nonsignificant. In all experiments, both mappings yielded significant reductions in switch cost across cue-target interval, and there were significant cue-switching effects with the 2:1 mapping. A model of cue encoding fit the data from both mappings about equally well. Overall, task-switching performance was more similar than it was different between mappings, leading the authors to suggest that the use of a 2:1 mapping is a viable solution to the problem associated with a 1:1 mapping.     

Differential effects of cue changes and task changes on task-set selection costs

A task-switching paradigm with a 2:1 mapping between cues and tasks was used to separate cue-switching processes (indexed through pure cue-switch costs) from actual task-switching processes (indexed through additional costs in case of cue and task changes). A large portion of total switch costs was due to cue changes (Experiments 1 and 2), and cue-switch costs but not task-switch costs were sensitive to effects of practice (Experiment 1) and preparation (Experiment 2). In contrast, task-switch costs were particularly sensitive to response-priming effects (Experiments 1 and 2) and task-set inhibition (Experiment 3). Results suggest two processing stages relevant during task-set selection: cue-driven retrieval of task rules from long-term memory and the automatic application of rules to a particular stimulus situation.     

Age differences in switching the relevant stimulus dimensions in a speeded same-different judgment paradigm

The present study employed a same-different judgment task-switching paradigm to re-examine the effects of age on switch costs. We manipulated perceptual and conceptual dimensions to serve as the criteria for making a same-different judgment. We also manipulated a short versus long cue-stimulus interval, while keeping the response-stimulus interval constant in order to examine whether older adults can benefit from longer preparatory intervals. The results indicate that older adults exhibited larger switch costs. In contrast to this impairment, older adults maintained the ability to prepare for an upcoming task switch. Nevertheless, even with a long preparatory interval, older adults still exhibited larger switch costs than younger adults. A more detailed analysis using a mixture model technique suggests that older adults' elevated residual costs in performing perceptual-judgment switches might be attributable to an increased probabilistic failure to complete advance preparation, whereas older adults' elevated residual costs in performing conceptual-judgment switches might be attributable to an intrinsic limitation in their ability to attain a complete task-set reconfiguration during a preparatory interval.     

Task switching: effects of practice on switch and mixing costs

In the task-switching paradigm, mixing costs indicate the performance costs to mix two different tasks, while switch costs indicate the performance costs to switch between two sequentially presented tasks. Applying tasks with bivalent stimuli and responses, many studies demonstrated substantial mixing and switch costs and a reduction of these costs as a result of practice. The present study investigates whether extensive practice of a task-switching situation including tasks with univalent stimuli eliminates these costs. Participants practiced switching between a visual and an auditory task. These tasks were chosen because they had shown eliminated performance costs in a comparable dual-task practice study (Schumacher et al. Psychol Sci 12:101–108, 2001). Participants either performed the tasks with univalent responses (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-verbal stimulus–response mappings) or bivalent responses (i.e., visual-manual and auditory-manual stimulus–response mappings). Both valence conditions revealed substantial mixing and switch costs at the beginning of practice, yet, mixing costs were largely eliminated after eight practice sessions while switch costs were still existent.     

Age equivalence in switch costs for prosaccade and antisaccade tasks

This study examined age differences in task switching using prosaccade and antisaccade tasks. Significant specific and general switch costs were found for both young and old adults, suggesting the existence of 2 types of processes: those responsible for activation of the currently relevant task set and deactivation of the previously relevant task set and those responsible for maintaining more than 1 task active in working memory. Contrary to the findings of previous research, which used manual response tasks with arbitrary stimulus-response mappings to study task-switching performance, no age-related deficits in either type of switch costs were found. These data suggest age-related sparing of task-switching processes in situations in which memory load is low and stimulus-response mappings are well learned.     

The surface structure and the deep structure of sequential control: What can we learn from task span switch costs?

A large component of response time switch costs in the cued task-switching paradigm is linked to cue changes without task changes, suggesting costs might reflect passive priming rather than endogenous control. In contrast, the task span procedure requires subjects to guide task selection via sequences of memorized task cues and therefore may be better suited to reflect endogenous switch processes (Logan, 2004). The present experiments combined the task span procedure with a 2:1 mapping between cues and tasks, allowing separation of cue-switch costs from true task-switch costs. Replicating findings with the cued task-switching paradigm, results showed both substantial cue-switch costs and actual task-switch costs (Experiments 1 and 2) as well as sensitivity of cue-switch costs, but not of task-switch costs, to opportunity for preparation (Experiment 2). Apparently, simple action plans use “surface level” phonological or articulatory codes that contain no task information. These results suggest that the distinction between cue-related and task-related processes is critical no matter whether tasks are cued exogenously or endogenously.     

Hierarchical control of cognitive processes: switching tasks in sequences

Hierarchical control of cognitive processes was studied by examining the relationship between sequence- and task-level processing in the performance of explicit, memorized task sequences. In 4 experiments, switch costs in task-switching performance were perturbed by sequence initiation times that varied with sequence complexity, preparation time, and type of sequence transition (repetition or switch). Hierarchical control was inferred from these sequence initiation time effects and the recurrent finding of no switch cost at the first serial position across sequences, the point at which sequence-level processes are likely active in maintaining or instantiating a hierarchical control structure in working memory. These findings resonate with past research on motor programs and serial memory and provide new insights into the concepts of task set and control.     

Reward enhances backward inhibition in task switching

Recently, effects of reward incentives on interference-induced cognitive adjustments have drawn much attention. It has been demonstrated that reward can reduce or eliminate switch costs which occurred when alternating between different tasks. However, it still remains a question how reward affects inhibitory processes underlying task switching. The present study examined this issue by combining a task-switching paradigm with performance-contingent reward. Results showed that the inhibitory processes were modulated by reward, with n-2 repetition costs incremented after reward delivery. Data suggest that reward-triggered reduction or elimination of switch costs may reflect enhancing inhibitory processes which are motivated by reward signals and targeted at the irrelevant task set. These findings shed new light on the role of reward in cognitive control.     

Exercise mode and executive function in older adults: An ERP study of task-switching

The purpose of this study was to investigate the relationship between exercise mode and executive function and its effect on behavior and neuroelectric activity. Forty-eight older adults were classified into open-skill, closed-skill, and irregular exercise groups based on their experience of exercise participation. Executive function was measured via a task-switching paradigm, in which the behavioral indices and event-related potentials elicited by task-switching were assessed. The results revealed that the exercise groups, regardless of the exercise mode, exhibited faster reaction times in both global and local switches than the irregular exercise group, regardless of the within-task conditions. Similarly, larger P3 amplitudes were observed in both exercise groups compared to the irregular exercise group. Moreover, additional facilitation effects of open-skill exercises on global switch costs were observed, whereas no differences in local switch costs were found among the three groups. The results replicate previous studies that have reported generally improved executive function after participation in exercises; additionally, they extend the current knowledge by indicating that these cognitive improvements in specific aspects of executive function could also be obtained from open-skill exercises.     

Trading off switch costs and stimulus availability benefits: An investigation of voluntary task-switching behavior in a predictable dynamic multitasking environment

In the present study, we introduce a novel, self-organized task-switching paradigm that can be used to study more directly the determinants of switching. Instead of instructing participants to randomly switch between tasks, as in the classic voluntary task-switching paradigm (Arrington & Logan, 2004), we instructed participants to optimize their task performance in a voluntary task-switching environment in which the stimulus associated with the previously selected task appeared in each trial after a delay. Importantly, the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) increased further with each additional repetition of this task, whereas the stimulus needed for a task switch was always immediately available. We conducted two experiments with different SOA increments (i.e., Exp. 1a = 50 ms, Exp. 1b = 33 ms) to see whether this procedure would induce switching behavior, and we explored how people trade off switch costs against the increasing availability of the stimulus needed for a task repetition. We observed that participants adapted their behavior to the different task environments (i.e., SOA increments) and that participants switched tasks when the SOA in task switches approximately matched the switch costs. Moreover, correlational analyses indicated relations between individual switch costs and individual switch rates across participants. Together, these results demonstrate that participants were sensitive to the increased availability of switch stimuli in deciding whether to switch or to repeat, which in turn demonstrates flexible adaptive task selection behavior. We suggest that performance limitations in task switching interact with the task environment to influence switching behavior.     

An integrated model of cognitive control in task switching

A model of cognitive control in task switching is developed in which controlled performance depends on the system maintaining access to a code in episodic memory representing the most recently cued task. The main constraint on access to the current task code is proactive interference from old task codes. This interference and the mechanisms that contend with it reproduce a wide range of behavioral phenomena when simulated, including well-known task-switching effects, such as latency and error switch costs, and effects on which other theories are silent, such as with-run slowing and within-run error increase. The model generalizes across multiple task-switching procedures, suggesting that episodic task codes play an important role in keeping the cognitive system focused under a variety of performance constraints.     

Alternatives to switch-cost scoring in the task-switching paradigm: Their reliability and increased validity

In the task-switching paradigm, the latency switch-cost score—the difference in mean reaction time between switch and nonswitch trials—is the traditional measure of task-switching ability. However, this score does not reflect accuracy, where switch costs may also emerge. In two experiments that varied in response deadlines (unlimited vs. limited time), we evaluated the measurement properties of two traditional switch-cost scoring methods (the latency switch-cost score and the accuracy switch-cost score) and three alternatives (a rate residual score, a bin score, and an inverse efficiency score). Scores from the rate residual, bin score, and inverse efficiency methods had comparable reliability for latency switch-cost scores without response deadlines but were more reliable than latency switch-cost scores when higher error rates were induced with a response deadline. All three alternative scoring methods appropriately accounted for differences in accuracy switch costs when higher error rates were induced, whereas pure latency switch-cost scores did not. Critically, only the rate residual and bin score methods were more valid indicators of task-switching ability; they demonstrated stronger relationships with performance on an independent measure of executive functioning (the antisaccade analogue task), and they allowed the detection of larger effect sizes when examining within-task congruency effects. All of the three alternative scoring methods provide researchers with a better measure of task-switching ability than do traditional scoring methods, because they each simultaneously account for latency and accuracy costs. Overall, the three alternative scoring methods were all superior to the traditional latency switch-cost scoring method, but the strongest methods were the rate residual and bin score methods.     

Task switching and the measurement of “switch costs”

The measurement of “switch costs” is held to be of interest because, as is widely believed, they may reflect the control processes that are engaged when subjects switch between two (or more) competing tasks. [In task-switching experiments, the reaction time (RT) switch cost is typically measured as the difference in RT between switch and non-switch (repeat) trials.] In this report we focus on the RT switch costs that remain even after the subject has had some time to prepare for the shift of task, when the switch cost may be approximately asymptotic (so-called residual switch costs). Three experiments are presented. All three experiments used Stroop colour/word, and neutral stimuli. Participants performed the two tasks of word-reading and colour-naming in a regular, double alternation, using the “alternating runs” paradigm (R. D. Rogers & S. Monsell, 1995). The experiments were designed to test the hypothesis that RT switch costs depend on a form of proactive interference (PI) arising from the performance of a prior, competing task. A. Allport, E. A. Styles and S. Hsieh (1994) suggested that these PI effects resulted from “task-set inertia”, that is, the persisting activation-suppression of competing task-sets, or competing task-processing pathways. The results confirmed the existence of long-lasting PI from the competing task as a major contributor to switch costs. Non-switch trials, used as the baseline in the measurement of switch costs, were also shown to be strongly affected by similar PI effects. However, task-set inertia was not sufficient to account for these results. The results appeared inconsistent also with all other previous models of task switching. A new hypothesis to explain these between-task interference effects was developed, based on the stimulus-triggered retrieval of competing stimulus-response (S-R) associations, acquired (or strengthened) in earlier trials. Consistent with this retrieval hypothesis, switch costs were shown to depend primarily on the S-R characteristics of the preceding task (the task that was switched from) rather than the upcoming task. Further, the effects of the other, competing task were found to persist over many successive switching trials, affecting switch costs long after the stimulus overlap (and hence the principal S-R competition) between the current tasks had been removed. Switch costs were also found to be affected by recent, item-specific experience with a given stimulus, in either the same or the competing task. Finally, the results showed that switch costs were massively affected by the ratio of the number of prior trials, in response to the same stimuli, that had implemented either the currently intended or the competing S-R mappings. None of these effects are predicted by current models of residual switch costs, which appeal to the differences in control processes assumed to be engaged in switch versus non-switch trials. Received: 31 March 1999 / Accepted: 23 July 1999     

Self-regulatory strategy and executive control: implementation intentions modulate task switching and Simon task performance

Two tasks where failures of cognitive control are especially prevalent are task-switching and spatial Simon task paradigms. Both tasks require considerable strategic control for the participant to avoid the costs associated with switching tasks (task-switching paradigm) and to minimize the influence of spatial location (Simon task). In the current study, we assessed whether the use of a self-regulatory strategy known as "implementation intentions" would have any beneficial effects on performance in each of these task domains. Forming an implementation intention (i.e., an if-then plan) is a self-regulatory strategy in which a mental link is created between a pre-specified future cue and a desired goal-directed response, resulting in facilitated goal attainment (Gollwitzer in European Review of Social Psychology, 4, 141-185, 1993, American Psychologist, 54, 493-503, 1999). In Experiment 1, forming implementation intentions in the context of a task-switching paradigm led to a reduction in switch costs. In Experiment 2, forming implementation intentions reduced the effects of spatial location in a Simon task for the stimulus specified in the implementation intention. Results supported the prediction that the need for high levels of cognitive control can be alleviated to some degree by making if-then plans that specify how one responds to that critical stimuli.