Moral Disagreement and Moral Semantics

When speakers utter conflicting moral sentences (“X is wrong”/“X is not wrong”), it seems clear that they disagree. It has often been suggested that the fact that the speakers disagree gives us evidence for a claim about the semantics of the sentences they are uttering. Specifically, it has been suggested that the existence of the disagreement gives us reason to infer that there must be an incompatibility between the contents of these sentences (i.e., that it has to be the case that at least one of them is incorrect). This inference then plays a key role in a now‐standard argument against certain theories in moral semantics. In this paper, we introduce new evidence that bears on this debate. We show that there are moral conflict cases in which people are inclined to say both (a) that the two speakers disagree and (b) that it is not the case at least one of them must be saying something incorrect. We then explore how we might understand such disagreements. As a proof of concept, we sketch an account of the concept of disagreement and an independently motivated theory of moral semantics which, together, explain the possibility of such cases.     

Concepts and Conceptual Analysis

Conceptual analysis is undergoing a revival in philosophy, and much of the credit goes to Frank Jackson. Jackson argues that conceptual analysis is needed as an integral component of so-called serious metaphysics and that it also does explanatory work in accounting for such phenomena as categorization, meaning change, communication, and linguistic understanding. He even goes so far as to argue that opponents of conceptual analysis are implicitly committed to it in practice. We show that he is wrong on all of these points and that his case for conceptual analysis doesn't succeed. At the same time, we argue that the sorts of intuitions that figure in conceptual analysis may still have a significant role to play in philosophy. So naturalists needn't disregard intuitions altogether.     

Validity Concepts in Proof-theoretic Semantics

The standard approach to what I call “proof-theoretic semantics”, which is mainly due to Dummett and Prawitz, attempts to give a semantics of proofs by defining what counts as a valid proof. After a discussion of the general aims of proof-theoretic semantics, this paper investigates in detail various notions of proof-theoretic validity and offers certain improvements of the definitions given by Prawitz. Particular emphasis is placed on the relationship between semantic validity concepts and validity concepts used in normalization theory. It is argued that these two sorts of concepts must be kept strictly apart.     

Concepts of Moral Management and Moral Maximization

This article introduces two new concepts into the business ethics literature, moral management and moral maximization, and explains the ways to measure and implement these concepts using four major subcomponents of human rights, human freedoms, human equity, and human development. Each of these subcomponents is subdivided into eight factors or items, resulting in 32 specific and tangible measures of the morality of human behavior. Figures are provided to illustrate the relationships between moral management and moral maximization and their 32 submeasures.     

Concepts,Conceptual Schemes and Grammar

This paper considers the connection between concepts, conceptual schemes and grammar in Wittgenstein’s last writings. It lists eight claims about concepts that one can garner from these writings. It then focuses on one of them, namely that there is an important difference between conceptual and factual problems and investigations. That claim draws in its wake other claims, all of them revolving around the idea of a conceptual scheme, what Wittgenstein calls a ‘grammar’. I explain why Wittgenstein’s account does not fall prey to Davidson’s animadversions against the idea of a conceptual scheme as a force operating on a pre-conceptual content. In the sequel I deny that the distinction between grammatical and empirical propositions disappears in the last writings: it is neither deliberately abandoned, nor willy-nilly undermined by the admission of hinge propositions in On Certainty or by the role accorded to agreement in judgement.     

Possessing Moral Concepts

Moral discourse allows for speakers to disagree in many ways: about right and wrong acts, about moral theory, about the rational and conative significance of moral failings. Yet speakers’ eccentricities do not prevent them from engaging in moral conversation or from having (genuine, not equivocal) moral disagreement. Thus differences between speakers are compatible with possession of moral concepts. This paper examines various kinds of moral disagreements and argues that they provide evidence against conceptual-role and informational atomist approaches to understanding our moral concepts. Conceptual role approaches fail because they cannot account for shared concepts among speakers with different commitments to the practical and conative ramifications of moral judgments. Informational atomist views fail because speakers need not be locked on to the same moral properties to share moral concepts.

Murdoch,Moral Concepts,and the Universalizability of Moral Reasons

It is widely held that moral reasons are universalizable. On this view, when I give a moral reason for my action, I take this reason to apply with equal normative force to anyone placed in a relevantly similar situation. Here, I offer an interpretation and defense of Iris Murdoch's critique of the universalizability thesis, distinguishing her position from the contemporary versions of particularism with which she has often been mistakenly associated. Murdoch's argument relies upon the idea that moral concepts may take on idiosyncratic meanings that are unique to a particular individual. Consequently, an agent may conceptualize her situation in such a way that it would not make sense to imagine anyone else facing it. For such an agent, it would be meaningless to say that she took her reasons to apply to anyone other than herself. I defend Murdoch’s argument through an extended analysis of a literary example, and consider and reject four possible lines of objection. Finally, I consider the consequences of the argument for our understanding of the nature of moral reasoning and what Murdoch describes as the ‘endless task’ of love.     

Reference in Conceptual Realism

A conceptual theory of the referential and predicable concepts used in basic speech and mental acts is described in which singular and general, complex and simple, and pronominal and nonpronominal, referential concepts are given a uniform account. The theory includes an intensional realism in which the intensional contents of predicable and referential concepts are represented through nominalized forms of the predicate and quantifier phrases that stand for those concepts. A central part of the theory distinguishes between active and deactivated referential concepts, where the latter are represented by nominalized quantifier phrases that occur as parts of complex predicates. Peter Geach's arguments against theories of general reference in Reference and Generality are used as a foil to test the adequacy of the theory. Geach's arguments are shown to either beg the question of general as opposed to singular reference or to be inapplicable because of the distinction between active and deactivated referential concepts.     

Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics

In order to defend the Cornell variety of naturalistic moral realism from Horgan and Timmons’ Moral Twin Earth objection, several philosophers have proposed what I call Normatively Enriched Moral Meta‐Semantics (NEMMS). According to NEMMS, the natural properties that serve as the contents of moral predicates are fixed (at least in part) by non‐moral normative facts. In this paper, I elucidate two versions of NEMMS: one proposed by David Brink, and the other proposed by Mark van Roojen. I show what these meta‐semantics have in common, and how each one promises the Cornell realist a response to the Moral Twin Earth objection. I then argue that Cornell realists ought to be wary of adopting NEMMS. A naturalist realist who adopts this meta‐semantics confronts a trilemma. The proponent of NEMMS owes a meta‐ethical account of the relevant content‐fixing normative facts. Such facts are either reducible to recognizably natural facts or they are not. If they are not reducible, then NEMMS entails the denial of ethical naturalism (and so, the denial of Cornell realism). If such facts are taken to be reducible to facts about agents’ actual or hypothetical attitudes, then (among other problems) the account renders moral facts stance‐dependent. Consequently, moral realism is false. Alternatively, one might propose that the content‐fixing normative facts are reducible to attitude‐independent natural facts. However, such a proposal is refuted by its own Twin Earth objection.     

无效治疗的概念与道德的争论

现代教学治疗的有效、无效的争论越来越引起社会的关注。随之而引发对医患关系、资源分配、医患对话、自主、知情同意、家长主义等问题的大讨论。现重点对无效治疗判断的四个基本方面进行探讨：（１）建立在医学科学的基础上;（２）价值的判断和有效性的预测;（３）无用与有益的边界区域问题;（４）生理、心理的经济的负担。并就谁来决定和判断无效治疗进行讨论。     

道德赏罚:现象与概念

自道德现象产生时起 ,人类的道德生活就与一定形式的制裁或赏罚紧密联系在一起。道德赏罚是道德功能的重要表现。基于当前人们对道德赏罚这一概念的混乱认识 ,本文陈述了道德生活中赏善罚恶这一普遍存在的事实 ,并在对历史上有关思想分析的基础上 ,对这一概念进行了深入的剖析。文章给出了道德赏罚的一般定义 ,即道德赏罚是缘于行为主体道德行为或道德品质好坏的奖赏或惩罚 ,同时初步确定了道德赏罚的主客体、内容、方式和目的。     

概念变化的语义学：解放概念的出现

作者运用概念历史的方法，分析了阿伦特、科斯莱克、哈贝马斯对具体概念，如民主、国家、解放等谱系中概念的转换、变形和创新。她认为这三个概念具有一种携带能力，并能通过其语义的激烈变化而彼此相互关联。通过分析这些概念的语义学演变，作者揭示了政治行为主体如何通过使用显示政治互动新领域的专门词汇，来表达他们的新期望和历史经历。     

道德概念净脏隐喻及其对道德判断的影响

通过3个实验考察道德概念净脏隐喻的心理现实性以及道德概念净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻对道德判断的影响及其差异。结果表明：（1）道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,即被试在洁净背景上判断道德词的反应时更快,在肮脏背景上判断不道德词的反应时更快。（2）当将道德两难故事呈现在肮脏背景上时,相比于呈现在洁净背景上,被试更容易将故事主人公的行为判断为不道德,表现出隐喻一致性效应。（3）相比于肮脏自身启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事主人公的行为判断为更加不道德,表现出隐喻补偿性效应。（4）相比于洁净背景启动,被试在洁净自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加严厉;相比于肮脏背景启动,被试在肮脏自身启动下对道德两难故事的判断更加宽松。研究结果证明,道德概念净脏隐喻具有心理现实性,净脏背景和净脏自身隐喻均影响个体的道德判断,并且二者对道德判断的影响不同。     

Too Much Reference: Semantics for Multiply Signifying Terms

The logic of singular terms that refer to nothing, such as ‘Santa Claus,’ has been studied extensively under the heading of free logic. The present essay examines expressions whose reference is defective in a different way: they signify more than one entity. The bulk of the effort aims to develop an acceptable formal semantics based upon an intuitive idea introduced informally by Hartry Field and discussed by Joseph Camp; the basic strategy is to use supervaluations. This idea, as it stands, encounters difficulties, but with suitable refinements it can be salvaged. Two other options for a formal semantics of multiply signifying terms are also presented, and I discuss the relative merits of the three semantics briefly. Finally, possible modifications to the standard logical regimentation of the notion of existence are considered.     

Conceptual Locations and Pronominal Reference in American Sign Language

We report the results of an experiment investigating the ramifications of using space to express coreference in American Sign Language (ASL). Nominals in ASL can be associated with locations in signing space, and pronouns are directed toward those locations to convey coreference. A probe recognition technique was used to investigate the case of "locus doubling" in which a single referent is associated with two distinct spatial locations. The experiment explored whether an ASL pronoun activates both its antecedent referent and the location associated with that referent. An introductory discourse associated a referent (e.g, MOTHER) with two distinct locations (eg., STOREleft, KITCHENright), and a continuation sentence followed that either contained a pronoun referring to the referent in one location or contained no anaphora (the control sentence). Twenty-four deaf participants made lexical decisions to probe signs presented during the continuation sentences. The probe signs were either the referent of the pronoun, the referent-location determined by the pronoun, or the most recently mentioned location (not referenced by the pronoun). The results indicated that response times to referent nouns were faster in the pronoun than in the no-pronoun control condition and that response times to the location signs did not differ across conditions. Thus, the spatial nature of coreference in ASL does not alter the processing mechanism underlying the on-line interpretation of pronouns. Pronouns activate only referent nouns, not spatial location nouns associated with the referent.     

Conservatives and Racists: Inferential Role Semantics and Pejoratives

According to inferential role semantics (IRS), for any given expression to possess a particular meaning one must be disposed to make or, alternatively, acknowledge as correct certain inferential transitions involving it. As Williamson points out, pejoratives such as ‘Boche’ seem to provide a counter-example to IRS. Many speakers are neither disposed to use such expressions nor consider it proper to do so. But it does not follow, as IRS appears to entail, that such speakers do not understand pejoratives or that they lack meaning. In this paper, I examine recent responses to this problem by Boghossian and Brandom and argue that their proposed construal of the kind of inferential rules governing a pejorative such as ‘Boche’ is to be ruled out on the grounds that it is non-conservative. I defend the appeal to conservatism in this instance against criticism and, in doing so, propose an alternative approach to pejoratives on behalf of IRS that resolves the problem Williamson poses.

道德概念的黑白隐喻表征及其对道德认知的影响

采用不同的研究方法在不同水平上考察道德概念的黑白隐喻表征, 探讨了黑白视知觉对道德认知的影响。实验1a发现, 在词汇选择任务中被试倾向于判断白色希腊文词汇具有道德意义, 判断黑色希腊文词汇具有不道德意义。实验1b通过词性判断任务表明, 当道德词以白色呈现、不道德词以黑色呈现时被试的判断反应更快。实验2显示, 当将道德两难故事呈现在黑色背景上时, 相比于呈现在白色背景上, 被试会在道德评判任务中将故事中人物的行为判断为更加不道德。实验3通过情境实验发现, 相比明亮环境, 在黑暗环境中完成实验的被试会更倾向于认为他人会不公正地对待自己。研究证明, 黑白颜色概念与道德概念的隐喻联结存在心理现实性, 黑白颜色刺激知觉会对道德判断产生影响作用, 且环境的亮度也会影响到人们对道德相关问题的认知判断。     

论法官的角色伦理

法官的角色伦理研究是一个有别于法官职业道德研究的理论视角。法官是一个角色丛 ,包括了官员和司法者二重基本角色 ,所以 ,法官的角色伦理不只是对其作为一个职业者的规范 ,而是二重角色规范的综合体 ,它反映了社会对法官的综合道德评价。作为“官”的角色 ,它被赋予的特殊道德要求是公仆意识、廉洁和公正 ;作为司法者 ,其特殊的职业伦理是刚毅、谨慎和勤勉。法官角色伦理建设是以理性人与经验人的统一为人性假设前提的 ,其基本思路是立足于制度道德建设 ,加强思想道德教育 ,适度进行奖惩。总之 ,一个有别于法官职业道德的理论视角 ,对于法官的道德建设具有重大的理论意义和实践价值。     

Interpersonal Sameness of Meaning for Inferential Role Semantics

Inferential Role Semantics is often criticized for being incompatible with the platitude that words of different speakers can mean the same thing. While many assume that this platitude can be accommodated by understanding sameness of meaning in terms of similarity of meaning, no worked out proposal has ever been produced for Inferential Role Semantics. I rectify this important omission by giving a detailed structural account of meaning similarity in terms of graph theory. I go on to argue that this account has a number of attractive features, prominent among them that it makes sameness of meaning probabilistically determine co-reference.     

儿童道德概念垂直空间隐喻的认知发展

本研究考察了不同年龄阶段儿童道德概念垂直空间隐喻的认知发展。实验1采用图片迫选法,要求学前儿童将道德人物图片和不道德人物图片分别放到垂直空间的上方或下方;实验2采用词汇迫选法,要求学龄儿童将道德词和不道德词分别放到垂直空间的上方或下方。结果发现,儿童均倾向于把道德材料放到上方而把不道德材料放到下方;而且这种趋势随着年龄增长愈发明显。研究结果证明幼儿阶段已开始出现“道德是上,不道德是下”的空间隐喻,其发展规律为：4~5 岁初步形成,7~9 岁基本形成,11~13 岁已接近成人水平。