黑格尔对道德的批判

黑格尔的伦理思想以他关于“道德法”和“伦理法”的区分以及对康德道德理论的批判而著名.本文的作者Mlen W.伍德从黑格尔早期关于道德问题的思考切入,以《自然法论文》、《精神现象学》以及《法哲学原理》为主要文本,较为系统地阐发了黑格尔对道德的批判.作者认为,黑格尔虽然批判了道德观点的空洞性、抽象性,但是赞同道德是伦理生活的一个方面和现代文化的组成部分.对于黑格尔而言,道德不是形而上学的假设,它要在伦理生活中获得实现.黑格尔与康德的伦理思想并不完全对立,他们共享着同样的伦理价值、理性自治,只是黑格尔试图在康德伦理思想的基础上使道德走出主观性的应该、把伦理价值与社会和历史现实联系起来.     

Kantian Schemata: A Critique Consistent with the Critique

Kant posits the schema as a hybrid bridging the generality of pure concepts and the particularity of sensible intuitions. However, I argue that countenancing such schemata leads to a third‐man regress. Siding with those who think that the mid‐way posit of the Critique of Pure Reason's schematism section is untenable, my diagnosis is that Kant's transcendental inquiry goes awry because it attempts to analyse a form/matter union that is primitive. I therefore sketch a nonrepresentational stance aimed at respecting this primitivity.     

科耶夫对黑格尔辩证法的批判及其存在论本质辨析——兼论如何理解科耶夫的"哲学人类学"

科耶夫对黑格尔辩证法的解读集中于对其否定性和思辨性的强调,在他看来,辩证法不是单纯的思维运动,而是对存在本身的揭示.科耶夫实现了辩证法由方法论向生存论的转向.通过对黑格尔辩证法的改造,科耶夫完成了两个任务:其一,将原本仅仅具有逻辑思辨性的辩证法转变为一种对真实"存在"的描述;其二,将辩证法对真实"存在"的描述变成一个不断趋向真理的过程.科耶夫将真实"存在"解读为人的生存,辩证法的结构最终成为对人的生存本身的展现.     

Critique of the unconscious: Kantian influences in the works of Lucian Blaga

Lucian Blaga was the creator of a speculative and metaphoric philosophical system that placed mystery at its very core. Mystery, according to Blaga, veils existence and represents both a stimulus and a brake for human knowledge. His articulation of this view is strongly indebted to Kant, whose transcendental philosophy he sought to extend by critically examining the forms of sensibility and categories of the understanding, not so much in relation to consciousness, but as they are duplicated, or doubled, in the unconscious. The result is Blaga's stylistic apriorism, according to which the unconscious always manages consciousness through abyssal categories in terms of which different regions and peoples at once reveal and remain isolated from mystery.     

Categorical and Agent-neutral Reasons in Kantian Justifications of Morality

The dispute between Kantians and Humeans over whether practical reason can justify moral reasons for all agents is often characterized as a debate over whether reasons are hypothetical or categorical. Instead, this debate must be understood in terms of the distinction between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. This paper considers Alan Gewirth’s Reason and Morality as a case study of a Kantian justification of morality focused on deriving categorical reasons from hypothetical reasons. The case study demonstrates first, the possibility of categorical agent-relative reasons, and second, that inattention to this possibility has caused considerable confusion in the debate between Kantians and Humeans.

Kantian Moral Retributivism: Punishment,Suffering, and the Highest Good

Against the view of some contemporary Kantians who wish to downplay Kant's retributivist commitments, I argue that Kant's theory of practical of reason implies a retributive conception of punishment. I trace this view to Kant's distinction between morality and well‐being and his attempt to synthesize these two concerns in the idea of the highest good. Well‐being is morally valuable only insofar as it is proportional to virtue, and the suffering inflicted on wrongdoers as punishment for wrongdoing is morally good so long as it is proportional to the wrongdoing. According to Kantian retributivism, punishment is warranted as a means to promote proportionality between well‐being and virtue.     

Hegel's Critique of Fichte in the 1802/3 Essay on Natural Right

This paper provides a reconstruction and critical assessment of Hegel's critique of Fichte's political philosophy in his 1802/3 essay On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Right. I argue that Hegel's critique, while not entirely successful, raises a serious problem for Fichte's political philosophy as presented in the 1796/7 Foundations of Natural Right.     

The Social Creation of Morality and Complicity in Collective Harms: A Kantian Account

This article considers the charge that citizens of developed societies are complicit in large‐scale harms, using climate destabilisation as its central example. It contends that we have yet to create a lived morality – a fabric of practices and institutions – that is adequate to our situation. As a result, we participate in systematic injustice, despite all good efforts and intentions. To make this case, the article draws on recent discussions of Kant's ethics and politics. Section 2 considers Tamar Schapiro's account of how otherwise decent actions can be corrupted by others’ betrayals, and hence fall into complicity. Section 3 turns to discussions by Christine Korsgaard and Lucy Allais, which highlight how people can be left without innocent choices if shared frameworks of interaction do not instantiate core ideals. Section 4 brings these ideas together in order to make sense of the charge of complicity in grave collective harms, and addresses some worries that the idea of unavoidable complicity may raise.     

道德的功利性与返本归真

在经济主义成为强势话语的时代语境中,道德的外在功利性价值受到重视。它迎应了人的物质欲望,却导致道德的工具化和消解。道德的价值只有回到德性伦理的框架和视野中,才是真实的返本归真。在以经济成就为导向的当代中国社会中,需要关切对道德内在性价值的认同,化规范为德性。     

Designing a Good Life: A Matrix for the Technological Mediation of Morality

Technologies fulfill a social role in the sense that they influence the moral actions of people, often in unintended and unforeseen ways. Scientists and engineers are already accepting much responsibility for the technological, economical and environmental aspects of their work. This article asks them to take an extra step, and now also consider the social role of their products. The aim is to enable engineers to take a prospective responsibility for the future social roles of their technologies by providing them with a matrix that helps to explore in advance how emerging technologies might plausibly affect the reasons behind people’s (moral) actions. On the horizontal axis of the matrix, we distinguished the three basic types of reasons that play a role in practical judgment: what is the case, what can be done and what should be done. On the vertical axis we distinguished the morally relevant classes of issues: stakeholders, consequences and the good life. To illustrate how this matrix may work in practice, the final section applies the matrix to the case of the Google PowerMeter.     

How the Good Obligates in Hegel's Conception of Sittlichkeit: A Response to Robert Stern's Understanding Moral Obligation

Abstract

In Understanding Moral Obligation: Kant, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Robert Stern argues that Hegel has a social command view of obligation. On this view, there is an element of social command or social sanction that must be added to a judgment of the good in order to bring about an obligation. I argue to the contrary that Hegel's conception of conscience, and thus the individual's role in obligation, is more central to his account than the social dimension. While agreeing with Stern that Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit does preserve a role for obligation, and that the social plays an important part in that account, I argue that there is no extra social component that converts the morally good into obligation. Rather, Hegel's conception of Sittlichkeit as the “living good” means that judgments of the moral facts are simultaneously judgments of obligation.     

Negative Politics of the Good: A Critique of the Politics of Rights and of Recognition

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Contemporary democratic political culture prioritizes the right over the good. The right is imagined as a non-controversial, universally...     

Commonsense Morality and Not Being Required to Maximize the Overall Good

Philosophical Studies -