First‐Person Authority and Self‐Knowledge as an Achievement

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Some questions concerning states of fragmentation: unintegration,under-integration,disintegration, and the nature of early integrations

The paper attempts some clarifications and differentiations concerning (1) Bick's classic distinction between states of helpless unintegration and states of defensive disintegration; (2) the difference between a state and a phase, and Bick's apparent challenge to some aspects of object relations thinking. The paper then lists some types of early pre-depressive and pre-Oedipal integrations and integrators: these include, as well as various kinds of containment, the role of the interested, interesting, and occasionally reclaiming object.     

The Perennial Freud: Method versus Myth and the Mischief of Freud Bashers

Nowadays Freud bashing is not only à la mode, in certain circles it has become de rigueur. Once a name of respect, Freud has become a name of ridicule. But like any scientific method, body of knowledge, and therapeutic procedure, psychoanalysis should be subjected to critical scrutiny. The recent crop of hostile Freud critics may have filled a vacuum left for decades by a psychoanalytic establishment which, like the Church of yesteryear, shunned all forms of criticism intramural and extramural. A central guiding idea of this essay is the distinction between the psychoanalytic method and psychoanalytic doctrines, hypotheses, and theories. This distinction has been invariably confused by both Freud's adherents and Freud's attackers. Moreover, arguments ad rem have been conflated with arguments ad hominem. A socially responsible criticism must seek to be constructive and not merely destructive. It is the latter course that was taken by the various hostile critics that came to be labeled as Freud bashers. The time has come to take a stand against the more egregious attacks on Freud and the psychoanalytic method.     

Metaphysics of Pain; Semantics of ‘Pain’

Functionalism is often used to identify mental states with physical states. A particularly powerful case is Lewis's analytical functionalism. Kripke's view seriously challenges any such identification. The dispute between Kripke and Lewis's views boils down to whether the term ‘pain’ is rigid or nonrigid. It is a strong intuition of ours that if it feels like pain it is pain, and vice versa, so that ‘pain’ should designate, with respect to every possible world, all and only states felt as pain. Hence, in order to settle the dispute, we need to check which of the two – Kripke's use of ‘pain’ as rigid, or Lewis's use of ‘pain’ as nonrigid – better meets this intuition. I show that, despite crucial differences in both their semantic and metaphysical assumptions, surprisingly, both views meet this intuition equally well. Thus it appears that this question of rigidity cannot, in principle, be solved, and so, at least with respect to this particular dispute, the jury is still out on whether mental states are identical to physical states. 1     

CLINICAL WINNICOTT: TRAVELING A REVOLUTIONARY ROAD

The author contends that, contrary to the usual perception that Winnicott followed a linear progression “through pediatrics to psychoanalysis,” Winnicott's vision was always a psychoanalytic one, even during his early pediatric work. His place in the development of psychoanalytic theory is highlighted, and the author discusses such key Winnicottian concepts as transitional space, the false self, and the use of the object. Winnicott's unique approach to the form and value of analytic interpretation is particularly emphasized, and his thoughts on the treatment of depression are also addressed, as well as his distinction between regression and withdrawal. Included is a summary of convergences and divergences between Winnicott's thinking and that of Bion.     

Mentalism and Epistemic Transparency

Questions about the transparency of evidence are central to debates between factive and non-factive versions of mentalism about evidence. If all evidence is transparent, then factive mentalism is false, since no factive mental states are transparent. However, Timothy Williamson has argued that transparency is a myth and that no conditions are transparent except trivial ones. This paper responds by drawing a distinction between doxastic and epistemic notions of transparency. Williamson's argument may show that no conditions are doxastically transparent, but it fails to show that no conditions are epistemically transparent. Moreover, this reinstates the argument from the transparency of evidence against factive mentalism.     

‘Pre‐discursive’ racism

This paper makes the case that discourse analytic approaches in social psychology are not adequate to the task of apprehending racism in its bodily, affective and pre‐symbolic dimensions. We are hence faced with a dilemma: if discursive psychology is inadequate when it comes to theorizing ‘pre‐discursive’ forms of racism, then any attempts to develop an anti‐racist strategy from such a basis will presumably exhibit the same limitations. Suggesting a rapprochement of discursive and psychoanalytic modes of analysis, I argue that Kristeva's theory of abjection provides a means of understanding racism as both historically/socially constructed and as existing at powerfully embodied, visceral and subliminal dimensions of subjectivity. Kristeva's theory of abjection provides us with an account of a ‘pre‐discursive’ (that is, a bodily, affective, pre‐symbolic) racism, a form of racism that ‘comes before words’, and that is routed through the logics of the body and its anxieties of distinction, separation and survival. This theory enables us, moreover, to join together the expulsive reactions of a racism of the body to both the personal racism of the ego and the broader discursive racisms of the prevailing social order. Moreover, it directs our attention to the fact that discourses of racism are always locked into a relationship with ‘pre‐discursive’ processes which condition and augment every discursive action, which escape the codifications of discourse and which drive the urgency of its attempts at containment. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Three Ideological Traditions and the Psychology of Religion

This commentary on Heimbrock's essay on psychoanalytic understandings of religion notes that Freud thought religion was of inestimable worth to individual and collective development. Although psychoanalytic views of religion can never be irrefutably correct, they refute rationalistic reductions of religion. It should also be noted that, although psychoanalysis tended to emphasize unhealthy religion, there is a need for contemporary psychoanalysts to investigate healthy religion. Applications of these ideas to the South African situation are considered.     

Nina Coltart and the border of Bethlehem

Nina Coltart's freedom in addressing delicate areas such as spirituality and Buddhism within a psychoanalytic framework has opened borders between different psychoanalytic communities. This paper sets out to identify a deep‐rooted philosophical tension that runs through several aspects of Coltart's work starting from her ‘Slouching towards Bethlehem … or, thinking the unthinkable in psychoanalysis’. In exploring this central topic in depth psychology, of the distinction between thinkable and unthinkable contents, the author argues that it is not a fundamental distinction in Coltart's work but is rather a particular example of a more fundamental structural dichotomy which pervades her approach and which manifests in several different guises. It is the breadth and sincerity of Coltart's writings which make this a useful exercise, not only for understanding the structure of her work but also in illuminating some structural tensions which permeate depth‐psychological pursuits in general.     

Thalamic fear

This paper suggests that some neuroscience concepts particularly concerned with brain pathways in trauma and fear, as well as the neurobiology of emotion, provide an additional vertex to the psychoanalytic understanding of patients' material. The role of the body has been neglected in psychoanalytic thought and formulations in favour of purely ‘mental’ experience. The paper attempts to show how neuro-psychoanalytic understanding, which is conveyed to patients through interpretation, can increase their depth of understanding. Different types of memory are delineated and the paper describes a simplified schema of emotional processing, drawing on Damasio's distinction between emotion as an instinctual body based experience and its mental representation as feeling. Clinical examples are used to illustrate the usefulness of the distinction. The concept of emotional regulation is discussed as well as showing how its failure is associated with the appearance of persecutory superego structures.     

Basic‐Know And Super‐Know

Sometimes a proposition is ‘opaque’ to an agent: (s)he doesn't know it, but (s)he does know something about how coming to know it should affect his or her credence function. It is tempting to assume that a rational agent's credence function coheres in a certain way with his or her knowledge of these opaque propositions, and I call this the ‘Opaque Proposition Principle’. The principle is compelling but demonstrably false. I explain this incongruity by showing that the principle is ambiguous: the term ‘know’ as it appears in the principle can be interpreted in two different ways, as either basic‐know or super‐know. I use this distinction to construct a plausible version of the principle, and then to similarly construct plausible versions of the Reflection Principle and the Sure‐Thing Principle.     

A Warrior's Stance: Commentary on Paper by Terry Marks-Tarlow

This commentary highlights specific aspects of a psychoanalytic complexity perspective in considering and discussing Terry Marks-Tarlow's article, “Merging and Emerging: A Nonlinear Portrait of Intersubjectivity During Psychotherapy.” The advantages of a complexity theory sensibility reside in the areas of (a) providing a robust theoretical framework for understanding the sources and phenomenology of complex emotional life and (b) understanding the clinical implications of thinking through a complexity theory lens. The latter involves examining the attitudes that emanate from such a revolutionary perspective and their impact on the therapeutic relationship and on therapeutic action and change. Special emphasis is placed on the distinction between two vital dimensions of psychoanalytic discourse: the phenomenological and the explanatory. This distinction is used as a lens through which the author considers the essential themes of understanding the complexity of the multiple sources of personal lived experience and their concomitant meanings, personal situtatedness (or “thrownness”), emotional responsibility, and personal freedom.     

Kant,wittgenstein and the limits of logic

This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein on logic and mathematics.     

HAVING KNOW‐HOW: INTELLECT,ACTION, AND RECENT WORK ON RYLE'S DISTINCTION BETWEEN KNOWLEDGE‐HOW AND KNOWLEDGE‐THAT

Stanley and Williamson reject Ryle's knowing‐how/knowing‐that distinction charging that it obstructs our understanding of human action. Incorrectly interpreting the distinction to imply that knowledge‐how is non‐propositional, they object that Ryle's argument for it is unsound and linguistic theory contradicts it. I show that they (and their interlocutors) misconstrue the distinction and Ryle's argument. Consequently, their objections fail. On my reading, Ryle's distinction pertains to, not knowledge, but an explanatory gap between explicit and implicit content, and his argument for it is sound. I defend the distinction's necessity in explaining human action and show that it propels a fruitful explanatory program.     

BEING DRIVEN MAD: TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING BORDERLINE AND OTHER DISTURBED STATES OF MIND THROUGH THE USE OF THE COUNTER‐TRANSFERENCE

In this paper material is presented from supervision groups run for nurses and other mental health professionals. The patients presented to the group came from different mental health settings with a diagnosis that included borderline features and/or other disturbed states of mind. All of the patients described caused strong counter‐transference feelings of sympathy, confusion, anger, hopelessness and guilt. Although these views were not expressed in formal ward rounds or recorded in clinical notes, evidence of their influence could be seen in the staff's attitude toward these patients. In supervision groups staff would either say that the patients were victims of mistreatment or they adopted a rather moralistic tone saying, ‘the patient is attention‐seeking’, ‘manipulative’ or ‘not mentally ill’. Psychoanalytic supervision which puts the transference and counter‐transference relationship at the centre of practice can help staff to think about their feelings and digest them in a way that makes use of them as evidence rather than discarding them as purely subjective. It also helps to reduce the toxic effects of the patient's projections upon the clinician's mind and this in turn helps to reduce retaliatory or manic clinical decisions. In this paper I argue that staff teams need time to reflect on their practice in handovers and clinical meetings and that psychoanalytic supervision can offer a particularly valuable clinical perspective on patients with Borderline features. This sort of support should be seen as an essential part of the work of nurses and other mental health professionals rather than an unaffordable luxury.     

Creating and Redirecting Threats

In the third volume of On What Matters, Derek Parfit argued that the distinction between imposing a newly created threat on someone and making what threatens some people instead threaten someone else has no genuine moral significance. This article's central thesis is that although there is much to learn from Parfit's arguments, they are ultimately unsuccessful at establishing that the redirected versus newly created threats distinction is morally irrelevant. In particular, I show that my Causal Sequences Principle specifies this distinction in such a way that it is immune to Parfit's objections against the Redirection Principle. It follows that any moral theory that can provide a sound rationale for the Causal Sequences Principle can solve the trolley problem.     

To Be Is to Betray: On the Place of Collective History and Freedom in Psychoanalysis

This paper explores an open frontier between psychoanalysis and critical theory, the relations between subjective experience and collective history. Its drive is a concern with the question of freedom: How might contemporary psychoanalysis help us think about freedom? How could it, as a practice, help us to be free? On the theoretical level, the paper follows the critique of psychoanalysis offered by Foucault and Adorno, particularly the latter's close reading Ferenczi in Negative Dialectics and his notion of “the spell.” I employ their critique in order to articulate the dilemma psychoanalysis faces vis-à-vis the notion of freedom in social context. I argue that, unlike traditional psychoanalytic discourse, relational psychoanalysis can address this dilemma in a generative way. I find this prospect in the readiness of relational psychoanalysis to realize the potential inherent in the psychoanalytic setting: the creation of a mutually constituted intersubjective space. I tell the story of a young woman for whom love seems impossible, and of a psychoanalytic expedition that finds her ability to love being held hostage. I suggest that what appears in one register as gender and sexual trouble appears in another as a dilemma of attachments and loyalties: my patient's ability to love is spellbound, trapped in a subjective-collective no man's land between her desire to be for herself and the unconscious demands of collective heritage. I argue that for psychoanalysis to be a practice of freedom, it must address the ways in which subjective experience answers to social forces and collective history. I question in this context the relations between freedom, guilt, and responsibility. Re-engaging Adorno, I agree that selfhood may always involve a guilty betrayal of others but argue against him that we must allow this guilt to be reconciled with living. I suggest, in conclusion, that theory is the bearer of collective responsibility.     

ANALYTIC MIND USE AND INTERPSYCHIC COMMUNICATION: DRIVING FORCE IN ANALYTIC TECHNIQUE,PATHWAY TO UNCONSCIOUS MENTAL LIFE

Developed from established psychoanalytic knowledge among different psychoanalytic cultures concerning unconscious interpsychic communication, analysts' use of their receptive mental experience—their analytic mind use, including the somatic, unconscious, and less accessible derivatives—represents a significant investigative road to patients' unconscious mental life, particularly with poorly symbolized mental states. The author expands upon this tradition, exploring what happens when patients unconsciously experience and identify with the analyst's psychic functioning. The technical implications of the analyst's “instrument” are described, including the analyst's ego regression, creation of inner space, taking mind as object, bearing uncertainty and intense affect, and self‐analysis. Brief case vignettes illustrate the structure and obstacles to this work.     

Is Iris Murdoch a Closet Existentialist? Some Trouble with Vision,Choice and Exegesis

Abstract: Richard Moran argues that Iris Murdoch is an Existentialist who pretends not to be. His support for this view will be shown to depend on his attempt to assimilate Iris Murdoch's discussion of moral ‘vision’ in the parable of the Mother in Law to Sartre's thought on ‘choice’ and ‘orientation’. Discussing both Moran's Murdoch exegesis and Sartre's Being and Nothingness, I develop the Sartrean view to which Moran hopes to assimilate Murdoch, before pointing out how Moran's assimilation fails. Murdoch's thought that when M is just and loving she sees D ‘as she really is’ cannot be accommodated on Sartre's picture. I develop this point of disagreement between Murdoch and Sartre, and argue that Murdoch has not as Moran claims made a misattribution to Sartre of an unsituated will, but has instead offered a penetrating critique of the central theme of Sartre's epistemology.     

Term Kinds and the Formality of Aristotelian Modal Logic

Recent formalizations of Aristotle's modal syllogistic have made use of an interpretative assumption with precedent in traditional commentary: That Aristotle implicitly relies on a distinction between two classes of terms. I argue that the way Rini (2011. Aristotle's Modal Proofs: Prior Analytics A8–22 in Predicate Logic, Dordrecht: Springer) employs this distinction undermines her attempt to show that Aristotle gives valid proofs of his modal syllogisms. Rini does not establish that Aristotle gives valid proofs of the arguments which she takes to best represent Aristotle's modal syllogisms, nor that Aristotle's modal syllogisms are instances of any other system of schemata that could be used to define an alternative notion of validity. On the other hand, I argue, Robert Kilwardby's ca. 1240 commentary on the Prior Analytics makes use of a term-kind distinction so as to provide truth conditions for Aristotle's necessity propositions which render Aristotle's conversion rules and first figure modal syllogisms formally valid. I reconstruct a suppositio semantics for syllogistic necessity propositions based on Kilwardby's text, and yield a consequence relation which validates key results in the assertoric, pure necessity and mixed necessity-assertoric syllogistics.