Hume's Unified Theory of Mental Representation

On its face, Hume's account of mental representation involves at least two elements. On the one hand, Hume often seems to write as though the representational properties of an idea are fixed solely by what it is a copy or image of. But, on the other, Hume's treatment of abstract ideas (and other similar cases) makes it clear that the representational properties of a Humean idea sometimes depend, not just on what it is copied from, but also on the manner in which the mind associates it with other ideas. Past interpretations of Hume have tended to focus on one of these elements of his account to the neglect of the other. But no interpretation of this sort is likely to capture the role that both copying and association play within Hume's discussion. In what follows, I argue that the most plausible way of understanding Hume's discussion involves attributing to him a unified account of mental representation in which both of these elements play a central role. I close by discussing the manner in which reading Hume in this way would alter our understanding of the relationship between Hume's thought and contemporary philosophy of mind.     

Recent Scholarship on Aquinas

Books reviewed in this article:
John Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics
John I. Jenkins, C.S.C., Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas
John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas     

Recent Scholarship on Aquinas

Books reviewed in this article: John Bowlin, Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics John I. Jenkins, C.S.C., Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas     

关于数学应用题心理表征策略的新理论

本文主要阐述了数学应用题心理表征中的两种策略一直接转换策略和问题模型策略,介绍了两种策略的认知过程,并对两种策略的区分方法进行了探讨,最后总结说明了研究数学心理表征在理论和实践中的意义。     

Hume's Utilitarian Theory of Right Action

A theory of right action is implicit in Hume's delineation of the virtues. It gives qualified priority to 'rules of justice' as Hume's remarks on 'that species of utility which attends this virtue' require. It is a useful actual-rule, not an ideal possible-rule, purely utilitarian theory that discounts rules of justice in 'extraordinary cases', has a problem when rules conflict, and invites the question 'Why not hark directly to the supreme law of utility in every case?'. It does not reflect contractarian considerations of mutuality of interests evident in Hume's texts, which while sometimes relevant to what is reasonable, are in his view never also relevant to what is moral.     

Hume's Theory of Pity and Malice

This article describes, and proposes a solution to, an interpretive conundrum at the heart of Hume's theory of the passions. Hume tells us explicitly that pity and malice are indirect passions. But there is strong textual evidence suggesting that Hume takes pity and malice to be direct passions. Indeed, some of this evidence points to (1) the identification of pity with a kind of grief and malice with a kind of joy, while the rest of the evidence points to (2) the identification of pity and malice with different combinations of desire and aversion. Here, I argue that option (1) is the one that Hume would have chosen upon careful reflection.     

Objective Similarity and Mental Representation

The claim that similarity plays a role in representation has been philosophically discredited. Psychologists, however, routinely analyse the success of mental representations for guiding behaviour in terms of a similarity between representation and the world. I provide a foundation for this practice by developing a philosophically responsible account of the relationship between similarity and representation in natural systems. I analyse similarity in terms of the existence of a suitable homomorphism between two structures. The key insight is that by restricting attention to only those homomorphisms induced by causal processes, we can solve two philosophical problems with a single assumption. First, causal structure provides an adequate source for the bias required to ensure the similarity relation is non-trivial; second, it provides an adequate source for the directionality required to move from similarity to representation. I defend this account against objections by Goodman and van Fraassen and demonstrate that it is indeed the account of similarity's role in representation assumed by psychological practice.     

The Mental Representation of Human Action

Various theories of moral cognition posit that moral intuitions can be understood as the output of a computational process performed over structured mental representations of human action. We propose that action plan diagrams—“act trees”—can be a useful tool for theorists to succinctly and clearly present their hypotheses about the information contained in these representations. We then develop a methodology for using a series of linguistic probes to test the theories embodied in the act trees. In Study 1, we validate the method by testing a specific hypothesis (diagrammed by act trees) about how subjects are representing two classic moral dilemmas and finding that the data support the hypothesis. In Studies 2–4, we explore possible explanations for discrete and surprising findings that our hypothesis did not predict. In Study 5, we apply the method to a less well‐studied case and show how new experiments generated by our method can be used to settle debates about how actions are mentally represented. In Study 6, we argue that our method captures the mental representation of human action better than an alternative approach. A brief conclusion suggests that act trees can be profitably used in various fields interested in complex representations of human action, including law, philosophy, psychology, linguistics, neuroscience, computer science, robotics, and artificial intelligence.     

The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory

In this article I argue that vanity, the desire for and delight in the favorable opinion of others, plays a fundamental role in Hume's account of moral motivation. Hume says that vanity and virtue are inseparable, though he does not explicitly say how or why this should be. I argue that Hume's account of sympathy can explain this alliance. In resting moral sentiment on sympathy, Hume gives a fundamental role to vanity as it becomes either a mediating motive to virtue or else strengthens the otherwise weak motive of moral sentiment.     

概率与事物表征

概率表达着世界的可能性。近年来研究发现, 人们倾向于在更抽象的和更核心的水平上表征低概率事件, 而倾向于在更具体和更次要的水平上表征高概率事件。相应的, 高水平表征事物会导致人们的概率估计偏低, 而低水平表征事物会导致概率估计偏高。此外, 习得的刺激间联系也会影响人们的概率估计。未来研究应注意探讨概率影响事物表征的内在原因、概率估计的动态性与多重概率估计、以及其更深层次的内部机制等问题。     

On the Mental Representation of Conditional Sentences

Four experiments are reported which attempt to externalize subjects' mental representation of conditional sentences, using novel research methods. In Experiment 1, subjects were shown arrays of coloured shapes and asked to rate the degree to which they appeared to be true of conditional statements such as 'If the figure is green then it is a triangle'. The arrays contained different distributions of the four logically possible cases in which the antecedent or consequent is true or false: TT, TF, FT, and FF. For example, a blue triangle would be FT for the conditional quoted above. In Experiments 2 to 4, subjects were able to construct their own arrays to make conditionals either true or false with any distribution of the four cases they wished to choose. The presence and absence of negative components was varied, as was the form of the conditional, being either 'if then' as above or 'only if': 'The figure is green only if it is a triangle'. The first finding was that subjects represent conditionals in fuzzy way: conditionals that include some counter-example TF cases (Experiment 1) may be rated as true, and such cases are often included when subjects construct an array to make the rule true (Experiments 2 to 4). Other findings included a strong tendency to include psychologically irrelevant FT and FF cases in constructed arrays, presumably to show that conditional statements only apply some of the time. A tendency to construct cases in line with the 'matching bias' reported on analogous tasks in the literature was found, but only in Experiment 4, where the number of symbols available to construct each case was controlled. The findings are discussed in relation to the major contemporary theories of conditional reasoning based upon inference rules and mental models, neither of which can account for all the results.     

心理表征哲学及其联结主义诠释

对心理表征问题进行自然的解释是至关重要的,但这方面的研究都是建立在有关概念和命题表征的预设的基础之上的,所以有必要弄清概念表征和命题表征的哲学解释;联结主义也对心理表征问题作了解释,根据被表征的是什么以及通过什么来表征的原则,联结主义网络主要通过四种方式对概念和命题进行表征。总的来说,联结主义对概念和命题的表征与它们的哲学解释并不是一一对应的,其方法论基础是费耶阿本德的多元方法论,即"怎么都行"。     

智力理论的最近发展

介绍了20世纪80年代以来智力理论的最近发展,主要包括:Gardner的多重智力理论,认为存在7种相互独立的智力;Anderson的智力与认知发展的理论,认为智力的个别差异和发展变化可以用不同的加工机制来说明;Sternberg的三元理论,包括成分子理论、经验子理论和背景子理论;Ceci的生物生态学理论,认为智力性成果有赖于具有丰富的并很好组织的知识基础的多重认知潜能之间的相互作用。智力的研究焦点是探索生理和环境之间复杂的相互作用。     

语言表征的神经生物学理论

神经科学家F．Pulvermüller根据Hebb的“细胞群集”学说和相关性学习原理构建的“语言表征的神经生物学理论”首次试图基于皮层功能网络来解释语音、词汇和句法在大脑皮层的表征机制,不仅能较好地描述语言活动中经典语言脑区与其它参与活动脑区的相互关系,也对语言加工的大脑功能偏侧化与整合现象作了合适的说明。本文介绍了这一理论的主要观点和研究资料,并提出了一些尚需进一步研究的问题。     

物体位置与空间关系的心理表征

外界环境中物体位置与空间关系在记忆中如何表征,一直是空间认知研究领域探讨和争论的热点问题。该文从空间表征的参照框架、朝向特异性、组织结构和存储内容四个方面,系统回顾了近年来对空间表征形成机制与内在特征的理论探讨。在此基础上,进一步讨论了当前空间表征研究中存在的生态效度问题,以及以后将虚拟环境技术引入到空间认知研究中的发展趋势     

休谟的同情原则探析

休谟认为同情是人性中强有力的原则 ,同情在表现形式上是自然的 ,而同情感的实际内容是人为的。同情是道德区别和道德判断的心理机制 ,是沟通他的心理学和伦理学的桥梁。但由于同情原则建立在抽象人性论的基础上 ,休谟调和个体情感的特殊性与道德原则的普遍性的努力不可能成功。     

抽象材料选择任务的表象表征视角

为了探讨在选择任务中表象表征存在的可能性以及抽象材料选择任务困难的原因,该研究设定了材料的内容、规则以及证明规则的要求均完全相同,只是在呈现方式上形象性不同的两种抽象选择任务;然后把两种不同的选择任务分别对数量大致相当的大学生进行了测试。结果发现,不采用类似卡片这种形象性很强的材料呈现方式显著的提高了人们在抽象选择任务中的正确率。实验结果支持了选择任务中表象表征的存在及其为选择任务困难原因之一的观点。     

数学应用题心理表征的研究现状与动态

心理表征是问题解决的关键,该文阐述了在数学应用题中心理表征的理论,探讨了心理表征的内部影响因素,最后总结了目前在应用题心理表征的研究中,心理学家们关注的一些问题.