Information integration in an area judgment task: effect of aids on children's perceptual judgments

This study was designed to examine the cognitive processes involved in perceptual judgments of area with the methodology and concepts of Anderson's (1981) information integration theory. The Area = Height + Width rule, which Anderson and Cuneo (1978) showed to be operant in children's judgments, can in fact cover two different processes. Children may make a height judgment and then a length judgment and apply an additive integration operation to both. Alternatively, children may base themselves on the figure outline and estimate total length directly as a function of the distance scanned. Similarly, the multiplicatory integration pattern can result either from applying a multiplicatory operation to separate estimates or from visual exploration of the area bounded by the figure. In the present experiment, the characteristics of the areas of the test figures were modified (perimeter marking, rows of Xs covering the area, etc.) to elicit additive or multiplicatory integration patterns as a function of condition. The findings demonstrate that the second interpretation of both rules is more likely.     

Integration of Mitigation,Intention, and Outcome Damage Information,by Students and Circuit Court Judges1

This article examines the problem of how undergraduate students and State Circuit Court Judges combine three specific components of information (pertaining to mitigation, intention, and seriousness of outcome damage) to make a net evaluative judgment of blame. The problem is considered within the framework and philosophy of Anderson's information integration and functional measurement theory. In three experiments, two levels each of the three information components identified were factorially crossed for two independent cases: self-defense under provocation, and altruistic defense of another. Target stimuli consisted of 100-word scenarios each embodying one factorial treatment combination. Experiment 1 used an independent group and Experiment 2 a repeated measures design. Experiment 3 replicated the second experiment using Judges as subjects. It was found that students integrated mitigation, intention, and outcome damage information by an adding process, and that the results concerning these three independent variables were essentially similar for both types of design. The most striking differences between Judges' and students' judgments centered on the differential use of mitigation information. Judges showed a far broader range of nonadditive, simple interaction effects between mitigation and both outcome damage and type of case. These results presumably reflect the primary concerns and responsibilities of the Judiciary. Questions of mitigation may thus complicate the otherwise straightforward additive integration of information in the intent-damage paradigm, and in judgments of seriousness.     

Against One Form of Judgment-Determinism

Taking 'rationalized judgments' to be those formed by inference from other judgments, I argue against 'Extreme Determinism': the thesis that theoretical rationalization just is a kind of predetermination of 'conclusion-judgments' by 'premise-judgments'. The argument rests upon two key lemmas: firstly, that a deliberator - in this case, his/her assent to some proposition - to be predetermined (I call this the 'Openness Requirement'): secondly, that a subject's logical insight into his/her premise-judgments must enter into the explanation of any judgment s/he forms that is rationalized by those judgments. My contention is that, given the Openness Requirement, no version of Extreme Determinsim can allow for the role played by logical insight in the rationalization of judgment. I end by indicating briefly how this result might figure in a wider argument against any form of determinism about rationalized judgment, and by explaining why I have focused specifically upon rebutting a deterministic view of theoretical as opposed to 'practical' rationalization.     

相似性判断和差异性判断的不对称性及其机制探索

本文阐述了相似性判断和差异性判断不对称性的相关研究。首先介绍了不对称性的发展及理论解释。其次,根据事件相关电位的研究结果,阐述了图-词信息的双编码模型对相似性判断的影响。接着分析和介绍了相似性判断的双编码过程及其时间进程。最后,作者提出有待深入研究的几个问题：（1）差异性策略在分类和推理中的应用;（2）相似性双编码过程的实证研究及其应用;（3）从发展认知神经科学的角度探讨不对称的认知神经机制。     

Attention et jugement temporel

The role of attention in human’s duration judgment processes is analyzed. Empirical evidences which indicate that a dissociation exists between prospective and retrospective duration judgments are presented. Attention is directly involved in prospective duration judgments processes. Attentional-based models, which can explain prospective duration judgments are presented together with empirical evidences which validate the general attentional model on the levels of both regular cognitive processes and high level executive-control processes. Waiting is presented as a natural situation during which prospective duration judgment processes are evoked. The attentional model is used for explaining why a duration spent waiting seems to pass slowly, in contrast to a situation to which one is interested in a book or a movie and in which time flies fast.     

Cognitive processes involved in blame and blame-like judgments and in forgiveness and forgiveness-like judgments

Experiment 1 compared the cognitive processes involved in blame and forgiveness judgments under identical experimental conditions. Experiment 2 was a replication of Experiment 1 with 4 judgment scales: willingness to prosecute, willingness to avenge, resentment level, and willingness to make up. Participants were presented with 32 scenarios in which a doctor made a medical error. These situations contained 5 items: the degree of proximity with the doctor (e.g., a family doctor known since childhood), the degree of negligence, the severity of consequences, apologies or contrition, and cancellation of consequences. Functional cognitive analysis grouped judgments into 2 categories: blame-like judgments (blame, prosecution, and revenge) and forgiveness-like judgments (resentment, forgiveness, and reconciliation). Blame-like judgments were characterized by additive integration rules, with negligence followed by apologies as the 2 main cues. Forgiveness-like judgments were characterized by an interactive integration rule, with apologies followed by negligence as the 2 main cues.     

Human Figure Drawings as Predictors of Admission to a Psychiatric Hospital

Blind predictions were made as to admission or non-admission as an overall rating and as to degree of pathology in eight areas of personality, based only on human figure drawings. These drawings were obtained from a sample of 105 individuals presenting for psychiatric hospital admission. The judgments were all in the predicted direction and significant for admission-non-admission, impulsivity, and severity of pathology. Cues utilized in the successful judgments were categorized as structural or content and scaled by degree of pathology. Structural cues predominated. We conclude that HFD's are a useful screening device for clinical judgment of degree of psychopathology. The basis of such judgments can be specified in terms of structural deviations rather than from symbolic content.     

Information integration in multiple cue judgment: a division of labor hypothesis

There is considerable evidence that judgment is constrained to additive integration of information. The authors propose an explanation of why serial and additive cognitive integration can produce accurate multiple cue judgment both in additive and non-additive environments in terms of an adaptive division of labor between multiple representations. It is hypothesized that, whereas the additive, independent linear effect of each cue can be explicitly abstracted and integrated by a serial, additive judgment process, a variety of sophisticated task properties, like non-additive cue combination, non-linear relations, and inter-cue correlation, are carried implicitly by exemplar memory. Three experiments investigating the effect of additive versus non-additive cue combination verify the predicted shift in cognitive representations as a function of the underlying combination rule.     

Note on the rationality of rule-based versus exemplar-based processing in human judgment

This paper reports a study of the relationship between rule- versus exemplar-based processing and criteria for rationality of judgment. Participants made probability judgments in a classification task devised by S. W. Allen and L. R. Brooks (1991). In the exemplar condition, the miscalibration was accounted for by stochastic components of the judgment with a format-dependence effect, implying simultaneous over- and underconfidence depending on the response scale. In the rule condition, there was an overconfidence bias not accounted for by the stochastic components of judgment. In both conditions the participants were additive on average and reasonably transitive, but the larger stochastic component in the exemplar condition produced somewhat larger absolute deviations. The results suggest that exemplar processes are unbiased but more perturbed by stochastic components, while rule-based processes may be more prone to bias.     

Aggregating Sets of Judgments: Two Impossibility Results Compared1

The ``doctrinal paradox'' or ``discursive dilemma'' shows that propositionwise majority voting over the judgments held by multiple individuals on some interconnected propositions can lead to inconsistent collective judgments on these propositions. List and Pettit (2002) have proved that this paradox illustrates a more general impossibility theorem showing that there exists no aggregation procedure that generally produces consistent collective judgments and satisfies certain minimal conditions. Although the paradox and the theorem concern the aggregation of judgments rather than preferences, they invite comparison with two established results on the aggregation of preferences: the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's impossibility theorem. We may ask whether the new impossibility theorem is a special case of Arrow's theorem, or whether there are interesting disanalogies between the two results. In this paper, we compare the two theorems, and show that they are not straightforward corollaries of each other. We further suggest that, while the framework of preference aggregation can be mapped into the framework of judgment aggregation, there exists no obvious reverse mapping. Finally, we address one particular minimal condition that is used in both theorems – an independence condition – and suggest that this condition points towards a unifying property underlying both impossibility results.     

Socio-Cultural Learning as a 'Transcendental Fact': Habermas's Postmetaphysical Perspective

In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false judgment. However, in this paper I argue that Leibniz can distinguish between a perception and a judgment in their semantic aspect. The sense in which a perception turns out to be false (or true) for Leibniz is different from the sense in which a judgment turns out to be false (or true). This is because, while a perception, understood in Leibniz's terms, lacks truth-conditions, a judgment, in being representational, has such conditions. Thus while a perception remains true always, a judgment can be false. Pointing to the equivocal use of 'false' in (a) and (c) above, I conclude that (c) does not follow from (a) and (b).     

The role of control processes and structural constraints in models of memory and social judgment

Six experiments examining a recent model of memory and social judgment are reported. In particular, the theoretical concept of a Work Space is examined in terms of both its structural properties and a variety of control processes that govern its operation. In Experiment 1, subjects were given information about a stimulus person and told that they would later be asked to recall it as well as possible. The length of the actual delay before recall and the length of the anticipated delay were factorially varied. Under short delay conditions, subjects anticipating a short delay recalled more of the information than those anticipating a long delay. The reverse was true under actual long delay conditions. Other results suggest that the anticipated length of the delay has an effect on processes related to both encoding and storage/retrieval. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that, relative to no delay conditions, a long actual delay or a long anticipated delay produces polarization in social judgments. Both of these results are predicted by the model. Experiments 4–6 examine the effect of interpolated cognitive activity on memory and social judgment. As predicted by the model, relatively complicated cognitive activity leads to lower levels of recall and a greater polarization of judgments than less complicated intervening cognitive activity. It is argued that all of these results can be accounted for by the concept of a Work Space as a temporary repository devoted to the current information processing activities of the subject. It is thought that such a concept must be kept theoretically distinct from long-term memory. Implications of the results for models of memory and social judgment are discussed.     

Individual and group modelling of aesthetic judgment strategies

Individual differences in aesthetic judgments were investigated by comparing quantitative group and individual performance models of the judgment processes. Aesthetic judgments of beauty over novel, formal, graphic patterns were collected from 34 non‐artist college students using a two‐step ranking‐rating procedure. Their judgment processes were individually modelled using Judgment Analysis. The participants showed noted individual differences. Certain features of the stimulus material, which were considered to contribute to the picture's beauty by one participant, were used in an opposing fashion by another. A group model was derived based on the average ratings of the patterns' beauty. It was concluded that the group model was not an adequate representation of the present data, whereas the data revealed systematic judgment processes at the individual subject level.     

Momentary and integrative response strategies in causal judgment

Associative models of causal learning predict recency effects. Judgments at the end of a trial series should be strongly biased by recently presented information. Prior research, however, presents a contrasting picture of human performance. López, Shanks, Almaraz, and Fernández (1998) observed recency, whereas Dennis and Ahn (2001) found the opposite, primacy. Here we replicate both of these effects and provide an explanation for this paradox. Four experiments show that the effect of trial order on judgments is a function of judgment frequency, where incremental judgments lead to recency while single final judgments abolish recency and lead instead to integration of information across trials (i.e., primacy). These results challenge almost all existing accounts of causal judgment. We propose a modified associative account in which participants can base their causal judgments either on current associative strength (momentary strategy) or on the cumulative change in associative strength since the previous judgment (integrative strategy).     

The Moral Foreign-Language Effect

Many have argued that moral judgment is driven by one of two types of processes. Rationalists argue that reasoned processes are the source of moral judgments, whereas sentimentalists argue that emotional processes are. We provide evidence that both positions are mistaken; there are multiple mental processes involved in moral judgment, and it is possible to manipulate which process is engaged when considering moral dilemmas by presenting them in a non-native language. The Foreign-Language Effect (FLE) is the activation of systematic reasoning processes by thinking in a foreign language. We demonstrate that the FLE extends to moral judgment. This indicates that different types of processes can lead to the formation of differing moral judgments. One implication of the FLE is that it raises the possibility that moral judgments can be made more systematic, and that the type of processing used to form them might be relevant to normative and applied ethics.     

Differential activation of judgments in employee well‐being

To complement environment‐centred perspectives on employee well‐being, which primarily examine the characteristics of external stimuli, a two‐component framework is presented of cognitive processes in responding to those stimuli. First, it is argued that the experience of well‐being derives in part from up to eight kinds of judgment, which operate on an environmental input. These judgments include comparisons with other people, alternative situations and other times, and assessments against three personal reference points: significance for self, relevant self‐efficacy, and novelty or familiarity. The framework's second component sets out situational and personal factors that may differentially promote activation of the judgments. Evidence is reviewed for each judgment's role in well‐being and for the proposed activation contingencies, and a research agenda is presented.     

Biased decision‐making: developing an understanding of how positive and negative relationships may skew judgments

The current experiment examines if and when children consider the possibility of relationships skewing judgments when evaluating judgments in different contexts. Eighty‐seven 6‐year‐olds, 8‐year‐olds, 10‐year‐olds, and adults heard stories about judges who made decisions matching or mismatching possible relationship biases (e.g. a judge choosing a friend or an enemy as the winner) in contests with objective or subjective criteria. While even 6‐year‐olds distinguished between subjective and objective contests, neither children nor adults focused on the objectivity of the contest criteria when evaluating a judge's claims. Instead, by age 8, if not earlier, children focused on relationships, trusting judgments that mismatched someone's relationship biases and discounting judgments that matched someone's relationship biases. The findings also suggested that children are better at recognizing that a judgment may have been biased than predicting that one will be, and that they may understand that negative relationships may skew judgments before positive ones.     

Non-communicated judgements of,versus feedback on,students’ essays: Is feedback inflation larger for students with a migration background?

When providing feedback, teachers are concerned not only with the simple transmission of information, but also with motivational and interpersonal dynamics. To mitigate these concerns, teachers may inflate feedback by reducing negative or increasing positive content. The resulting difference between initial judgments and feedback may be even more drastic for ethnic minority students: In non-communicated judgments, negative stereotypes may result in more negative judgments, whereas in feedback, concerns about being or appearing prejudiced may inflate feedback towards ethnic minority students. These hypotheses were tested in a sample of 132 German teacher students in a 2 (between subjects: feedback vs. non-communicated judgment)?×?2 (within subjects: target student's migration background: Turkish vs. none) design in which participants read supposed student essays and provided their written impressions to the research team or the supposed student. Findings revealed that teacher students’ feedback was more positive than their non-communicated judgments on a multitude of dimensions. Contrary to expectations, these effects were not stronger when the student had a Turkish migration background. Instead, teacher students rated the essay of the student with a Turkish migration background more favorably both in the judgment and feedback conditions. Our results suggest that teachers adapt their initial judgments when giving feedback to account for interpersonal or motivational dynamics. Moreover, ethnic minority students may be especially likely to receive overly positive feedback. While the motivational/interpersonal dynamics may warrant some inflation in feedback, negative consequences of overly positive feedback, for which ethnic minority students may be especially vulnerable, are discussed.

     

Situational and Individual Influences on Judgments of Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment1

The current research examines the judgment processes of third-party evaluators of sexual harassment situations. Four situational variables were hypothesized to influence ratings of situation appropriateness and judgments of sexual harassment. The evaluator's gender and personality also were hypothesized to influence both ratings. Participants were 73 male and 51 female undergraduate students. Results indicated that behavior severity and victim response significantly influenced ratings. The frequency of the behavior influenced appropriateness ratings, but interacted with behavior severity for harassment judgments. The effects of the gender of the evaluator were mediated by the evaluator's level of tolerance for harassment. The effects of the power relationship and rater personality were not significant.