A Psychometric Evaluation of the Revised Parental Emotion Regulation Inventory

Despite significant research on parental emotion, parents’ regulation of their own emotions during discipline encounters is an understudied topic. Progress in this area of inquiry would be enhanced by the development of valid measures of emotion regulation. The present article describes an evaluation of such a measure, the revised Parental Emotion Regulation Inventory (PERI2). Mothers of 2-year-old children (N?=?232) completed the PERI2, additional questionnaire measures, and a parent-child observation during home visits. The present findings support the factorial and concurrent validity of the PERI2’s suppression (e.g., concealing negative emotion), capitulation (e.g., giving into aversive child behavior to reduce negative emotion) and escape (e.g., walking away mid discipline encounter to reduce negative emotion) factors. Suppression, capitulation, and escape were distinct but interrelated emotion regulatory behaviors that were associated with such factors as harsh parenting, lax discipline, parental maladjustment, and child physical aggression. In contrast, the psychometric adequacy of the reappraisal factor (e.g., thinking differently about the child’s behavior to reduce negative emotion) was not supported. The results support the future use of the PERI2, minus the reappraisal factor’s items.     

Emotion effects during reading: Influence of an emotion target word on eye movements and processing

Recently, Scott, O'Donnell and Sereno reported that words of high valence and arousal are processed with greater ease than neutral words during sentence reading. However, this study unsystematically intermixed emotion (label a state of mind, e.g., terrified or happy) and emotion-laden words (refer to a concept that is associated with an emotional state, e.g., debt or marriage). We compared the eye-movement record while participants read sentences that contained a neutral target word (e.g., chair) or an emotion word (no emotion-laden words were included). Readers were able to process both positive (e.g., happy) and negative emotion words (e.g., distressed) faster than neutral words. This was true across a wide range of early (e.g., first fixation durations) and late (e.g., total times on the post-target region) measures. Additional analyses revealed that State Trait Anxiety Inventory scores interacted with the emotion effect and that the emotion effect was not due to arousal alone.     

Positive emotion impedes emotional but not cognitive conflict processing

Cognitive control enables successful goal-directed behavior by resolving a conflict between opposing action tendencies, while emotional control arises as a consequence of emotional conflict processing such as in irony. While negative emotion facilitates both cognitive and emotional conflict processing, it is unclear how emotional conflict processing is affected by positive emotion (e.g., humor). In 2 EEG experiments, we investigated the role of positive audiovisual target stimuli in cognitive and emotional conflict processing. Participants categorized either spoken vowels (cognitive task) or their emotional valence (emotional task) and ignored the visual stimulus dimension. Behaviorally, a positive target showed no influence on cognitive conflict processing, but impeded emotional conflict processing. In the emotional task, response time conflict costs were higher for positive than for neutral targets. In the EEG, we observed an interaction of emotion by congruence in the P200 and N200 ERP components in emotional but not in cognitive conflict processing. In the emotional conflict task, the P200 and N200 conflict effect was larger for emotional than neutral targets. Thus, our results show that emotion affects conflict processing differently as a function of conflict type and emotional valence. This suggests that there are conflict- and valence-specific mechanisms modulating executive control.     

Intuition, Affect, and Peculiar Beliefs

Research with college students has found that intuitive thinking (e.g., using hunches to ascribe meaning to experiences) and positive affect interactively predict ideas of reference and odd/magical beliefs. We investigated whether these results would generalize to a diverse community sample of adults that included individuals with elevated levels of peculiar perceptions and beliefs. We measured positive and negative affect and intuitive thinking through questionnaires, and peculiar beliefs (i.e., ideas of reference and odd/magical beliefs) through structured clinical interviews. We found that peculiar beliefs were associated with intuitive thinking and negative affect, but not positive affect. Furthermore, in no instance did the interaction of affect and intuitive thinking predict peculiar beliefs. These results suggest that there are important differences in the factors that contribute to peculiar beliefs between college students and clinically meaningful samples.     

Executive control attenuates emotional effects-For high reappraisers only?

Irrelevant emotional information influences adaptive behavior. Previous results demonstrated that executive control may help reduce such influence. The current research studied the relationship between the tendency to use emotion regulation strategies (e.g., reappraisal and suppression) and the ability of executive control to reduce emotional interference. Our results demonstrate that negative stimuli disrupt performance in congruent flanker trials, regardless of individual tendencies to use reappraisal or suppression. In contrast, negative stimuli did not disrupt performance in incongruent trials in people who report frequent use of reappraisal. This pattern appeared both when a negative stimulus appeared before and after the flanker target and was not modulated by suppression level. We suggest that people who tend to use reappraisal have improved ability of executive control to reduce emotional effects. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

Magical thinking and memory: distinctiveness effect for tv commercials with magical content

The aim of this study was to examine whether memorizing advertised products of television advertisements with magical effects (i.e., talking animals, inanimate objects which turn into humans, objects that appear from thin air or instantly turn into other objects) is easier than memorizing products of advertisements without such effects, by testing immediate and delayed retention. Adolescents and adults viewed two films containing television advertisements and were asked to recall and recognize the films' characters, events, and advertised products. Film 1 included magical effects, but Film 2 did not. On a free-recall test, no differences in the number of items recalled were noted for the two films. On the immediate recognition test, adolescents, but not adults, showed significantly better recognition for the magical than the nonmagical film. When this test was repeated two weeks later, results were reversed: adults, but not adolescents, recognized a significantly larger number of items from the magical film than the nonmagical one. These results are interpreted to accentuate the role of magical thinking in cognitive processes.     

When Sadness Comes Alive,Will It Be Less Painful? The Effects of Anthropomorphic Thinking on Sadness Regulation and Consumption

Prior consumer research has studied the impact of anthropomorphism on product perception and evaluation. This research explores how anthropomorphic thinking influences people's experience of emotions and subsequent consumption behavior. Based on research on emotion regulation and the psychological process of detachment, we show that individuals instructed to anthropomorphize sadness (i.e., think of sadness as a person) report less experienced sadness afterward (Studies 1 and 2A). The same result is observed for its opposite, happiness, such that anthropomorphic thinking dilutes happiness (Study 2B). We argue that this reduction of emotion occurs because anthropomorphic thinking increases the perceived distance between the self and the anthropomorphized emotion, thereby creating a feeling of detachment. Evidence for a detachment process is found via measurement (Studies 3 and 4) and a theory‐guided moderation, with the effect lessening when sadness is seen as a dependent (vs. independent) person (Study 3). These findings have implications for consumer behavior. When sadness is ameliorated by anthropomorphic thinking, people tend to display better self‐control in subsequent consumption, as manifested by a greater likelihood of choosing a healthier or more practical product (Studies 4 and 5).     

Performance costs when emotion tunes inappropriate cognitive abilities: implications for mental resources and behavior

Emotion tunes cognition, such that approach-motivated positive states promote verbal cognition, whereas withdrawal-motivated negative states promote spatial cognition (Gray, 2001). The current research examined whether self-control resources become depleted and influence subsequent behavior when emotion tunes an inappropriate cognitive tendency. In 2 experiments, either an approach-motivated positive state or a withdrawal-motivated negative state was induced, and then participants completed a verbal or a spatial working memory task creating conditions of emotion-cognition alignment (e.g., approach/verbal) or misalignment (e.g., approach/spatial). A control condition was also included. To examine behavioral costs due to depleted self-control resources, participants completed either a Stroop task (Stroop, 1935; Experiment 1) or a Black/White implicit association test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998; Experiment 2). Participants in the misalignment conditions performed worse on the Stroop task, and they were worse at controlling their implicit attitude biases on the IAT. Thus, when emotion tunes inappropriate cognitive tendencies for one's current environment, self-control resources become depleted, impairing behavioral control.     

Essentialist Beliefs About Bodily Transplants in the United States and India

Psychological essentialism is the belief that some internal, unseen essence or force determines the common outward appearances and behaviors of category members. We investigated whether reasoning about transplants of bodily elements showed evidence of essentialist thinking. Both Americans and Indians endorsed the possibility of transplants conferring donors' personality, behavior, and luck on recipients, consistent with essentialism. Respondents also endorsed essentialist effects even when denying that transplants would change a recipient's category membership (e.g., predicting that a recipient of a pig's heart would act more pig‐like but denying that the recipient would become a pig). This finding runs counter to predictions from the strongest version of the “minimalist” position (Strevens,2000), an alternative to essentialism. Finally, studies asking about a broader range of donor‐to‐recipient transfers indicated that Indians essentialized more types of transfers than Americans, but neither sample essentialized monetary transfer. This suggests that results from bodily transplant conditions reflect genuine essentialism rather than broader magical thinking.     

Differences in preschool children's conceptual strategies when thinking about animate entities and artifacts.

Two-, 3-, and 4-year-old children viewed 10 stimulus sets. Each set contained a sample picture (e.g., a dog), a basic-level taxonomic match (e.g., another dog), a thematic match (e.g., a bone), and an irrelevant match (e.g., a pen). The children were asked to choose a match that "goes with" each sample. Sample pictures were either animate entities or artifacts. The children's choice behavior indicated that a shift occurs between 3 and 4 years of age from a taxonomic bias to a thematic bias and that, at both ages, animate sample stimuli enhance the children's tendency to adopt thematic conceptual strategies. These data are consistent with recent suggestions that thematic thinking presupposes basic-level taxonomic thinking during early conceptual development and that this developmental progression occurs more rapidly in some domains of knowledge than in others.     

The emotional and cognitive effect of immersion in film viewing

This brief report presents an experiment testing the effect of immersion on emotional responses and cognitive genre categorisation of film viewers. Immersion of a film presentation was varied by presenting an animated movie either in a 3D-viewing condition (low immersive condition) or in a CAVE condition (high immersive condition, comparable to virtual reality experience). Viewers rated their emotions and categorised the movies into four basic film genres (action, drama, comedy, and non-fiction). Two distinct types of emotion were measured: Fictional World emotions (e.g., sadness) in response to the presented fictional events and Artefact emotions in response to the film as an artefact (e.g., fascination). Results showed that stronger immersion led to more intense emotions but did not influence genre categorisation. In line with expectations, both types of emotional response were intensified by high immersion. The results are explained by suggesting that highly immersive cinema has its impact on a basic dimension of emotion, namely arousal that underlies both types of emotions.     

Can the Mind Command the Body?

People naturally intuit that an agent's ethereal thoughts can cause its body to move. Per intuitive physics; however, one body can only interact with another. Are people, then, covertly puzzled by the capacity of thoughts to command the body? Experiment 1 first confirms that thoughts (e.g., thinking about a cup) are indeed perceived as ethereal—as less detectible in the body (brain), and more likely to exist in the afterlife relative to matched percepts (e.g., seeing a cup). Experiments 2–5 show that thoughts are considered less likely to cause behavior than percepts (e.g., thinking of a cup vs. seeing one). Furthermore, mind–body causation is more remarkable when its bodily consequences are salient (e.g., moving an arm vs. brain activation). Finally, epistemic causes are remarkable only when they are ascribed to mental- (e.g., “thinking”) but not to physical states (“activation”). Together, these results suggest that mind–body interactions elicit a latent dualist dissonance.     

Emotion elicitor or emotion messenger? Subliminal priming reveals two faces of facial expressions

Facial emotional expressions can serve both as emotional stimuli and as communicative signals. The research reported here was conducted to illustrate how responses to both roles of facial emotional expressions unfold over time. As an emotion elicitor, a facial emotional expression (e.g., a disgusted face) activates a response that is similar to responses to other emotional stimuli of the same valence (e.g., a dirty, nonflushed toilet). As an emotion messenger, the same facial expression (e.g., a disgusted face) serves as a communicative signal by also activating the knowledge that the sender is experiencing a specific emotion (e.g., the sender feels disgusted). By varying the duration of exposure to disgusted, fearful, angry, and neutral faces in two subliminal-priming studies, we demonstrated that responses to faces as emotion elicitors occur prior to responses to faces as emotion messengers, and that both types of responses may unfold unconsciously.     

Emotion and false memory: How goal-irrelevance can be relevant for what people remember

Elaborating on misleading information concerning emotional events can lead people to form false memories. The present experiment compared participants’ susceptibility to false memories when they elaborated on information associated with positive versus negative emotion and pregoal versus postgoal emotion. Pregoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure is anticipated but has not yet occurred (e.g., hope and fear). Postgoal emotion reflects appraisals that goal attainment or failure has already occurred (e.g., happiness and devastation). Participants watched a slideshow depicting an interaction between a couple and were asked to empathise with the protagonist's feelings of hope (positive pregoal), happiness (positive postgoal), fear (negative pregoal), or devastation (negative postgoal); in control conditions, no emotion was mentioned. Participants were then asked to reflect on details of the interaction that had occurred (true) or had not occurred (false), and that were relevant or irrelevant to the protagonist's goal. Irrespective of emotional valence, participants in the pregoal conditions were more susceptible to false memories concerning goal-irrelevant details than were participants in the other conditions. These findings support the view that pregoal emotions narrow attention to information relevant to goal pursuit, increasing susceptibility to false memories for irrelevant information.     

Memory for positive,negative and neutral events in younger and older adults: Does emotion influence binding in event memory?

When remembering an event, it is important to remember both the features of the event (e.g., a person and an action) and the connections among features (e.g., who performed which action). Emotion often enhances memory for stimulus features, but the relationship between emotion and the binding of features in memory is unclear. Younger and older adults attempted to remember events in which a person performed a negative, positive or neutral action. Memory for the action was enhanced by emotion, but emotion did not enhance the ability of participants to remember which person performed which action. Older adults were more likely than younger adults to make binding errors in which they incorrectly remembered a familiar actor performing a familiar action that had actually been performed by someone else, and this age-related associative deficit was found for both neutral and emotional actions. Emotion not only increased correct recognition of old events for older and younger adults but also increased false recognition of events in which a familiar actor performed a familiar action that had been performed by someone else. Thus, although emotion may enhance memory for the features of an event, it does not increase the accuracy of remembering who performed which action.     

Emotion regulation and emotional information processing: The moderating effect of emotional awareness

The aim of this study was to examine the moderating role of emotional awareness in the relationship between emotion regulation strategies and emotional information processing. A total of 120 female students regulated emotions while watching an unpleasant film. Before and after emotion induction, participants completed a set of tasks that required matching facial expressions. The results demonstrated that participants who were high in emotional awareness showed a significantly smaller increase in error responses (i.e., incorrect matches) than participants who were low in emotional awareness. However, this effect was observed only in suppression (i.e., inhibition of an emotionally expressive behavior), masking (i.e., emotion experienced with a happy expression) and control (i.e., no regulation) conditions. Among reappraisers, who were instructed to adopt a neutral attitude toward the film, regardless of whether they were high or low in emotional awareness, there was not a significant increase in error responses. This study shows that the potentially damaging impact of negative emotions on the processing of emotional information can be prevented by a high emotional awareness or with the implementation of reappraisal as an emotion regulation strategy.     

Better (or worse) for some than others: Individual differences in the positivity offset and negativity bias

People tend to respond with more positive than negative affect to mildly emotional stimuli (i.e., positivity offset) and respond more strongly to very negative than to matched positive stimuli (i.e., negativity bias). In the current study, the authors examine individual differences in the positivity offset and negativity bias and demonstrate that both are stable over time and generalize across different kinds of stimuli (e.g., pictures, sounds, words, games of chance). Furthermore, the positivity offset and negativity bias are not redundant with traditional personality measures and exhibit differential predictive validity, such that both types of measures predict behavior in meaningful ways. Implications for a comprehensive understanding of affect and emotion and their relationship to physical and mental health are discussed.     

Measuring facial identity and emotion integration using the redundancy gain paradigm

Early theories on face perception posit that invariant (i.e., identity) and changeable (i.e., expression) facial aspects are processed separately. However, many researchers have countered the hypothesis of parallel processes with findings of interactions between identity and emotion perception. The majority of tasks measuring interactions between identity and emotion employ a selective attention design, in which participants are instructed to attend to one dimension (e.g., identity) while the other dimension varies orthogonally (e.g., emotion), but is task irrelevant. Recently, a divided attention design (i.e., the redundancy gain paradigm) in which both identity and emotion are task relevant was employed to assess the interaction between identity and emotion. A redundancy gain is calculated by a drop in reaction time in trials in which a target from both dimensions is present in the stimulus face (e.g., “sad Person A”), compared with trials with only a single target present (e.g., “sad” or “Person A”). Redundancy gains are hypothesized to point to an interactive activation of both dimensions, and as such, could complement designs adopting a selective attention task. The initial aim of the current study was to reproduce the earlier findings with this paradigm on identity and emotion perception (Yankouskaya, Booth, & Humphreys, Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics, 74(8), 1692–1711, 2012), but our study failed to replicate the results. In a series of subtasks, multiple aspects of the design were manipulated separately in our goal to shed light on the factors that influence the redundancy gain effect in faces. A redundancy gain was eventually obtained after controlling for contingencies and stimulus presentation time.     

The communication of emotion during conflict in married couples

This study investigated emotion during interpersonal conflicts between mates. It addressed questions about how clearly couples express emotion (encoding), how accurately they recognize each other's emotion (decoding), and how well they distinguish between types of negative emotion. It was theorized that couples express and perceive both: (a) event-specific emotions, which are unique to particular people on particular occasions, and (b) contextual-couple emotions, which reflect the additive effect of emotions across different events and across both partners. Eighty-three married couples engaged in a series of two conflict conversations. Self-report ratings, observer ratings, and partner ratings were used to assess two types of negative emotion: hard emotion (e.g., angry or annoyed) and soft emotion (e.g., sad or hurt). Couples were reasonably accurate in encoding, decoding, and in distinguishing between types of emotion. Emotion expression was strongly associated with general levels of contextual-couple emotion summed across two conversations, whereas emotion perception was more closely tied to specific events. Hard emotion was readily perceived when it was overtly expressed, and soft emotion could sometimes be recognized even when it was not expressed clearly.     

Minority Influence

The present paper reviews social psychological research on minority influence. Minorities by proposing alternative and original ideas are often an agent of innovation and social change for societies. They create social conflict by proposing alternative propositions to the established societal perceptions. Minorities are, usually, numerically small groups that question social norms. Minorities influence people’s thinking, attitudes, and behavior by being consistent and flexible in their negotiation with majority members. Their influence is more often latent (i.e., evident on delayed, indirect, and private measures) than manifest. They affect the amount, and the quality, of cognitive processing of their messages (triggered by the different elaboration demands of the influence situation). Minority influence interacts with various situational factors such as social identity (in‐group or out‐group) and the task employed (e.g., objective or opinion) leading to different kinds of influence outcomes.