The Problem of Modernism and Critical Refusal: Bradley and Lamarque on Form/Content Unity

In this article I revisit A. C. Bradley's account of form/content unity through the lens of both Peter Kivy's and Peter Lamarque's recent work on Bradley's lecture “Poetry for Poetry's Sake.” I argue that Lamarque gives a superior account of Bradley's argument. However, Lamarque claims that form/content unity should be understood as an imposition applied by the reader to poetry. Working with the counterexample of modernist poetry, I throw doubt on both this claim and some associated presuppositions found in Lamarque's account. Modernist poetry appears to intermittently fail to exhibit form/content unity; its unique value also appears bound up with this intermittent failure. However—against the moderates, like Kivy and Kelly Dean Jolley, who this counterexample may seem to support—I claim Lamarque is nonetheless correct that form/content unity is intrinsic in response to poetic value. I argue form/content unity should be seen as a demand, which poems (like modernist poetry) can intentionally frustrate.     

Some comments on the future of analytical psychology

We… have to follow the difficult way of our own experiences, produce our own reactions, and assimilate our own sufferings and realizations. Only then will the truth that we bring to manifestation be… our own flesh and blood… We cannot borrow God… Divinity must descend… into the matter of our own existence and participate in this peculiar life-process. —Heinrich Zimmer, Philosophies of India

The goal of Eastern religious practice is the same as that of Western mysticism: the shifting of the centre of gravity from the ego to the self. —C.G. Jung, Collected Works, Vol. II     

Clinical Discussions

Abstract

According to its stated aims the International Forum of Psychoanalysis will especially promote presentations of clinical material and discussions of psychoanalytic methods and transactions. In order to live up to our objective we wish to introduce a special section devoted to this field, starting with this issue. It is our hope that the section will become a forum for a more lively exchange of experiences, observations and ideas than what is usually found in psychoanalytic journals. We therefore renew our call for papers suitable for the kind of discussion presented below. The question of confidentiality has, of course, to be carefully solved.     

A goal model of catharsis

Although research in social psychology has repeatedly refuted the idea that aggression reduces subsequent aggression (e.g., Bushman, 2002), we suggest a more fine-grained analysis of catharsis. We will present and discuss a social-cognitive goal model of cathartic effects in aggression that predicts under which conditions aggression increases or reduces subsequent aggression. The model assumes that the accessibility of aggression-related constructs is a function of goal fulfilment: Prior to goal fulfilment constructs related to the goal are highly accessible in order to facilitate goal fulfilment. However, after goal fulfilment this heightened accessibility loses its functionality and aggressive constructs are consequently inhibited. In the present article we will review empirical work testing this model. Moreover, we will extend this model to the effects of violent computer games. Finally we will discuss theoretical challenges and applied relevance of our model for intervention strategies aimed at reducing aggression.     

Studying employee well-being: moving forward

In this article, we attempt to integrate the commentaries to our position paper on intra-individual models of employee well-being (EWB; Ilies, R., Aw, S. S. Y., & Pluut, H. (2015). Intraindividual models of employee well-being: What have we learned and where do we go from here? European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, Advance online publication) of Bakker (2015. Towards a multilevel approach of employee well-being. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, Advance online publication) and Cropanzano and Dasborough (2015. Dynamic models of well-being: Implications of affective events theory for expanding current views on personality and climate. European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology, Advance online publication) with our original suggestions into a discussion and a set of recommendations aimed at moving theory and research on EWB forward. We hope that this effort, along with our position paper and the two commentaries, will lead to the development of a more comprehensive model of EWB and will stimulate new and interesting research on the topic.     

Investigating how ostracizing others affects one’s self-concept

Abstract

Social relationships are connected with an individual’s self-concept, so events that influence one’s relationships subsequently influence one’s self-concept. Ostracism, being excluded and ignored, is an aversive experience involving both a target (the one being ostracized) and source (the one ostracizing). We will discuss previous limitations of source paradigms and how we addressed them when developing our paradigms. We will also highlight current source research, from a co-edited special issue, and how this research is relevant to an individuals’ self-concept. Lastly, we will suggest how cognitive dissonance work can ground source research within a larger theoretical framework and inspire future research. We consider how one’s self-concept influences cognitive dissonance related to knowingly harming others through ostracism.     

Equality: Putting the Theory into Action

We outline our central reasons for pursuing the project of equality studies and some of the thinking we have done within an equality studies framework. We try to show that a multi-dimensional conceptual framework, applied to a set of key social contexts and articulating the concerns of subordinate social groups, can be a fruitful way of putting the idea of equality into practice. Finally, we address some central questions about how to bring about egalitarian social change. Editors’ note. John Baker et al’s article below condenses the key themes and arguments of their book, Equality: From Theory to Action. In the next issue of Res Publica, four writers will respond to these arguments, and there will be a reply from the book’s authors. We are grateful to Jurgen De Wispelaere for organising the original workshop on which the article and replies are based, and for his work in putting together this symposium.     

Modelling the History of Ideas

We propose a new method for the history of ideas that has none of the shortcomings so often ascribed to this approach. We call this method the model approach to the history of ideas. We argue that any adequately developed and implementable method to trace (dis)continuities in the history of human thought, or concept drift, will require that historians use explicit interpretive conceptual frameworks. We call these frameworks models. We argue that models enhance the comprehensibility of historical texts, and provide historians of ideas with a method that, unlike existing approaches, is susceptible neither to common holistic criticisms nor to Skinner's objections that the history of ideas yields arbitrary and biased reconstructions. To illustrate our proposal, we discuss the so-called Classical Model of Science and draw upon work in computer science and cognitive psychology.     

Spinoza’s Critique of Humility in the Ethics

In the Ethics Spinoza denies that humility is a virtue on the grounds that it arises from a reflection on our lack of power, rather than a rational understanding of our power (Part IV, Proposition 53, Demonstration). He suggests that humility, to the extent that it involves a consideration of our weakness, indicates a lack of self‐understanding. However, in a brief remark in the same demonstration he also allows that conceiving our lack of power can be conducive to self‐understanding and an increase in power, on the condition that we “conceive [it] because [we] understand [intelligit ] something more powerful than [ourselves].” Unfortunately, Spinoza does not flesh out this remark, nor does he specify the name of the affect that arises from thus conceiving our weakness. Commentators have not been much help in this regard either. What does it mean, in the Spinozistic framework, to conceive our weakness because we understand something more powerful than ourselves? And what exactly is the difference between this instance of conceiving our lack of power and the one that is involved in humility? This paper will examine the nature of this difference by analyzing its metaphysical and epistemological underpinnings, as well as its ethical implications within Spinoza’s Ethics . In doing so, it will highlight the ethical importance and epistemological conditions of recognizing our weakness in the Spinozistic universe. Abraham Wolf takes Spinoza’s denial of humility’s virtue in the Ethics to imply that “the rational man should think of what he can do, not of what he cannot do.” While I agree with Wolf’s remark, my reading in this paper will show that as the rational person thinks of her power and what she can do, she never loses sight of her ineliminable weakness as a finite mode.     

Hildegard of Bingen and her vision of the feminine

Abstract

This new vision of mind-body healing continues The Eternal Quest, which introduced this issue of Psychological Perspectives. In this survey of quotations we will trace the rise of current ideas about the role of our hourly (ultradian) and daily (circadian) rhythms of activity and rest, creativity and depression, rejuvenation and illness. These quotations suggest that we are in an exciting period of convergence in which the traditional practices of yoga, meditation, and psychotherapy are intersecting current research at the molecular-genetic level. We will end this survey with some suggestions about the practical application of this new “Yoga of the West.”     

De-idealizing Disagreement,Rethinking Relativism

Relativism is often motivated in terms of certain types of disagreement. In this paper, we survey the philosophical debates over two such types: faultless disagreement in the case of gustatory conflict, and fundamental disagreement in the case of epistemic conflict. Each of the two discussions makes use of a (largely) implicit conception of judgement: brute judgement in the case of faultless disagreement, and rule-governed judgement in the case of fundamental disagreement. We show that the prevalent accounts work with unreasonably high levels of idealization. We defend two claims. First, philosophical discussions of disagreement need to be de-idealized. Second, once a less idealized account of disagreement is available, both our conception of judgement and our understanding of relativism need to be revised. Our example is a case study in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge: Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer’s classic Leviathan and the Air-Pump (1985). This case study gives a less idealized account of disagreement that conceptualizes judgements as situated (rather than brute or rule-governed). We argue that this conception can and should be applied to cases of gustatory and epistemic disagreement. The payoff will be a reformulation of relativism in terms of rationally resolvable yet contingent disagreements.     

When Mental States Matter,When They Don't,and What That Means for Morality

Research has shown that moral judgments depend on the capacity to engage in mental state reasoning. In this article, we will first review behavioral and neural evidence for the role of mental states (e.g., people's beliefs, desires, intentions) in judgments of right and wrong. Second, we will consider cases where mental states appear at first to matter less (i.e., when people assign moral blame for accidents and when explicit information about mental states is missing). Third, we will consider cases where mental states, in fact, matter less, specifically, in cases of “purity” violations (e.g., committing incest, consuming taboo foods). We will discuss how and why mental states do not matter equivalently across the multi‐dimensional space of morality. In the fourth section of this article, we will elaborate on the possibility that norms against harmful actions and norms against “impure” actions serve distinct functions – for regulating interpersonal interactions (i.e., harm) versus for protecting the self (i.e., purity). In the fifth and final section, we will speculate on possible differences in how we represent and reason about other people's mental states versus our own beliefs and intentions. In addressing these issues, we aim to provide insight into the complex structure and distinct functions of mental state reasoning and moral cognition. We conclude that mental state reasoning allows us to make sense of other moral agents in order to understand their past actions, to predict their future behavior, and to evaluate them as potential friends or foes.     

Context is Everything (in Emotion Research)

As in many areas of psychological inquiry, context matters for how emotion is experienced, expressed, perceived, and regulated. While this may sound like a truism, emotion research does not always directly theorize, manipulate, or measure emotion with context in mind. To facilitate this process, we present a framework of contextual features that shape emotion‐related processes, and highlight several key factors that have been shown to matter in emotion research. We make four recommendations which we believe will help to better integrate context in emotion science. We argue that a deeper collective understanding, interrogation, and integration of context will propel the field forward theoretically and methodologically, and enhance researchers' ability to probe the mechanisms of human psychological experience. While our focus is on emotion research, we believe that the context framework and associated recommendations will also be useful to other fields of social psychological and personality science.     

How “rational” is “rationality”?

Abstract

By taking serious a remark once made by Paul Bernays, namely that an account of the nature of rationality should begin with concept-formation, this article sets out to uncover both the restrictive and the expansive boundaries of rationality. In order to do this some implications of the perennial philosophical problem of the “coherence of irreducibles” will be related to the acknowledgement of primitive terms and of their indefinability. Some critical remarks will be articulated in connection with an over-estimation of rationality - concerning the influence of Kant’s view of human understanding as the formal law-giver of nature (the supposedly “rational structure of the world”), and the apparently innocent (subjectivist) habit to refer to experiential entities as ‘objects’. The other side of the coin will be highlighted with reference to those kinds of knowledge transcending the limits of concept-formation - culminating in formulating the four most basic idea-statements philosophy can articulate about the universe. What is found “in-between” these (restrictive) and (expansive) boundaries of rationality will then briefly be placed within the contours of a threefold perspective on the self-insufficiency of logicality - as merely one amongst many more dimensions conditioning human life. Although the meaning of the most basic logical principles - such as the logical principles of identity, non-contradiction and sufficient reason - will surface in our analysis, exploring some of the complex issues in this respect, such as the relationship between thought and language, will not be analysed. The important role of solidarity - as the basis of critique - will be explained and related both to the role of immanent criticism in rational conversation and the importance of acknowledging what is designated as the principle of the excluded antinomy (which in an ontic sense underlies the logical principle of non-contradiction). The last section of our discussion will succinctly illuminate the proper place of the inevitable trust we ought to have in rationality - while implicitly warning against the rationalistic over-estimation of it (its degeneration into a rationalist “faith in reason”). Our intention is to enhance an awareness of the reality that rationality is embedded in and borders on givens which are not open to further “rational” exploration - givens that both condition (in a constitutive sense) and transcend the limits of conceptual knowledge. Some of the distinctions and insights operative in our analysis are explained in Strauss 2000 and 2003. Yet, most of the systematic perspectives found in this analysis of rationality are only developed in this article for the first time. Since a different study is required to discuss related problems and results found within cognitive science, it cannot be discussed within one article.     

Personalizing Behavioral Interventions Through Single‐Patient (N‐of‐1) Trials

Behavioral interventions are typically studied with the use of a conventional between‐subject randomized controlled trial (RCT) design. In this design, the effect of an intervention on one group of patients is compared with the effect of a control condition on another group of patients, such that a between‐subject change is tested. A between‐subject design has an underlying assumption that there is a homogenous treatment effect for a behavioral intervention, drug, or psychotherapy and that the way the intervention operates in the study will tend to operate in the same way in many other patients. We review some of the philosophical and practical problems with the use of this design when a clinician is attempting to decide on a course of behavioral treatment aimed at within‐subject change in patients who are likely to have heterogeneous or unique responses to behavioral treatment. We also review the biases inherent in our current clinical practice model, which does not use any empirical data collection or design for testing if a treatment is useful, and also in the conventional between‐subject personalized medicine RCT designs. We propose increased use of single‐patient (also known as N‐of‐1) trials that employ within‐subject designs, in cases where treatment response is heterogeneous – as is the case for most psychological and behavioral treatments. Limitations of such designs include that they can only be used when the treatment is potentially reversible, the patient can act as their own control, and the outcome can be measured repeatedly. Increased use of within‐subject trials may address in many more instances the more clinically relevant question of how a specific patient will respond to a specific treatment and could introduce a more harmonious scientific approach into the way we treat our patients. We have incorporated a case presentation that illustrates the complexities of applying evidence drawn from these different designs to selecting and evaluating treatments for the behavioral issues commonly faced by clinicians and patients.     

Activating the Mind: Descartes' Dreams and the Awakening of the Human Animal Machine

In this essay I argue that one of the things that matters most to Descartes' account of mind is that we use our minds actively. This is because for him only an active mind is able to re‐organize its passionate experiences in such a way that a genuinely human, self‐governed life of virtue and true contentment becomes possible. To bring out this connection, I will read the Meditations against the backdrop of Descartes' correspondence with Elisabeth. This will reveal that in Descartes' writings there is a crucial connection between the conception of ourselves as dreamers and the idea that we fail to realize our true potential as self‐determined, active agents. Dreams, as Descartes conceives them, are passively received mental states that inhibit our freedom to use reason at will. To awaken here takes the form of activating our thoughts, which holds the key to freeing ourselves from the stimulus‐response patterns that Descartes takes to be at work in animal conduct. Applied to the Meditations, these insights suggest that this work engages in questions far beyond the epistemological agenda. By activating the mind, the Meditations teach us how to realize our true human potential as virtuous thinkers and passionate agents.     

The Pre-reflective Situational Self

It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to  this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world.

     

The Self as a Moral Agent: Preschoolers Behave Morally but Believe in the Freedom to Do Otherwise

Recent work suggests a strong connection between intuitions regarding our own free will and our moral behavior. We investigate the origins of this link by asking whether preschool-aged children construe their own moral actions as freely chosen. We gave children the option to make three moral/social choices (avoiding harm to another, following a rule, and following peer behavior) and then asked them to retrospect as to whether they were free to have done otherwise. When given the choice to act (either morally or immorally), children avoided harm and abided by rules, but they endorsed their freedom to have done otherwise. When choice was restricted by adult instruction, children did not endorse their free choice and indicated feeling constrained by moral obligation in their explanatory responses. These results suggest that children believe that their moral actions afford free will, but this belief is dependent on their experience of choice.