Foundations of educational psychology: Howard Gardner's neoclassical psyche

This article is a theoretical examination of the implications of Howard Gardner's work in developmental and educational psychology (1983, 1993, 1999a, 1999b) for the structure of the psyche. The author accepts as axiomatic, in the context of this article, Gardner's educational manifesto (1999a) that all students should be taught disciplinary understandings of truth, beauty, and goodness. Rational inferences are then made indicating that the psyche that Gardner intends to educate and help develop is in the form of a neoclassical psyche and that it is structured by the capacities to know truth, to love beauty, and to will goodness.     

Why Does the Risen Christ Have Scars? Why God did not immediately create the Eschaton: Goodness,Truth and Beauty

Abstract: A consideration of God's providential activity suggests that there is room for co‐operating human activity. This is particularly so with acts that might be considered ethically neutral, and so undetermined by God, which category will, eschatalogically, include all human acts. A consideration of the classical transcendentals suggests that, whilst truth and goodness may coincide, beauty is something separate, so the ethically neutral acts of human beings can be considered as contributing to the world's eschatological beauty.     

Mark Sacks Lecture 2013: Spinoza on Goodness and Beauty and the Prophet and the Artist

Some critics have claimed that Spinoza's philosophy has nothing to offer aesthetics. I argue that within his conception of an ars vivendi one can discern a nascent theory of art (ars). I bring the figure of the prophet in relation to that of the artist and, alongside a consideration of Spinoza's views on goodness and beauty, show that the special talent of the artist should be understood in terms of the entirely natural expression of the conatus.     

Inwardizing Rilke's dog of ‘divine inseeing’ into itself

The article explores a text of the poet R.M. Rilke in the manner of Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority (PDI). PDI, developed mainly in the writings of Wolfgang Giegerich, refers to the ‘speculative turn’ within analytical psychology. The speculative turn involves an interpretative stance that strictly adheres to Jung's seminal insight into psychology's lack of an empirically‐objective, Archimedean vantage‐point outside of or beyond the psyche. The paper aims to demonstrate that, for all its beauty, the account of interiority that is celebrated in the passage from Rilke is self‐contradictory. This is due to its being naively conceived as the undialectical opposite of an external viewpoint that it is unable to overcome. Whereas Rilke merely imagines interiority by means of the visual image of his getting inside a dog as one passes by, the interpretative approach taken in this article thinks interiority by reflecting Rilke's text into itself in the speculative manner that is provided for and required by Jung's insight into psychology's lack of an Archimedean vantage‐point. If we interpret the text in this way, an understanding of interiority that is truly in accord with its concept is opened up and a main aspect of psychology as the discipline of interiority is performatively demonstrated.     

Aesthetics,information and meaning

Aesthetics has been defined relative to objective and subjective values; its historical and cultural world views are referenced. The author's view of beauty as communication is also introduced, where chance and necessity, the two antithetical realities produce the informa‐tion processes of modern time. That is, “difference” is associated with chance, the irrational, the spontaneous and the individual aspect of reality as opposed to necessity, the rational, the formal, and the universal aspects of things. Information is introduced as, the origin, as well as essence, of life. It is what produces information and is the only agent which produces both matter and psyche. Order and disorder, and the laws of “opposites” are considered building blocks of identity and difference and information. Information and Communication as an interconnecting agent are also considered a bridge between Eastern and Western philosophy, i.e., in its deconstruction of the particular into a web or field of energies in the West, and in Eastern thought in its becoming one with Nirvana or Brahman, the Sufi or the Tao, the ultimate one and all. Because goodness and truth under the influence of reason and science had failed, Eastern philosophy as an alternative to Western models is recommended. It is suggested that all that is left objectively is beauty, thus reason as basic is giving way to rules of beauty. And its principles are capable of describing man's evolution and his culture, as well as his aesthetic experience, which is nothing but information processes and communication. In conclusion, design as aesthetic communication is introduced as a model to reflect the above principles.     

II Spatial metaphors and somatic communication: the embodiment of multigenerational experiences of helplessness and futility in an obese patient

This paper explores the analysis of an obese woman who came to experience her flesh as a bodying forth of personal and multigenerational family and cultural experiences of helplessness. The paper discusses the ideas and images that formed the basis of how I engaged with these themes as they presented countertransferentially. My thesis is that clinical approaches which draw on spatial metaphors for the psyche offer valuable tools for working with people whose inner world expresses itself somatically because such metaphors can be used to engage simultaneously with the personal, cultural, and ancestral dimensions of these unconscious communications. The paper builds on Jung's view of the psyche as comprised of pockets of inner otherness (complexes), on Redfearn's image of psyche as landscape‐like and on Samuels’ thinking on embodied countertransference and on the political psyche. It also draws on Butler's work on the body as a social phenomenon and on the theme of being a helpless non‐person or nobody as explored in Tom Stoppard's play Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead which retells Shakespeare's Hamlet from the perspective of two of the play's ‘bit’ characters.     

A Minimalist Theory of Truth

This article, after briefly discussing Alfred Tarski's influential theory of truth, turns to a more recent theory of truth, a deflationary, or minimalist, theory. One of the chief elements of a deflationary, or minimalist, theory of truth is that it replaces the question of what truth is with the question of what “true” does. After setting out the central features of the minimalist theory of truth, the article explains the motivation for opting for such a position. In addition, it provides some reasons for thinking that such a theory of truth is “minimal” or “deflationary” in the way that contemporary truth theorists have claimed it to be.     

The arc of the rope swing: humour,poetry, and spirituality in Charlotte’s Web by E. B. White

This essay analyzes the classic American children’s novel, Charlotte’s Web, by E.B. White, which tells of a sophisticated spider’s rescue of a piglet who is being prepared for slaughter. The ‘arc of the rope swing' refers to a rope swing enjoyed by children in the novel; it is also a metaphor for the way White holds opposing forces in tension. Most noteworthy is the tension between poetic language and humour in the novel; White uses both to convey a sense of ultimate goodness and trust-in-being. Poetic language sets a contemplative tone (‘poetic pauses’) and conveys spiritual themes, including delight, wonder at the beauty of the natural world, ‘divine discontent’ (yearning), memento mori, sorrow and hope. In contrast, White’s ‘gracious humour’ is fast-paced and entertaining; it keeps the novel from being too preachy or solemn. His humour includes 1) wordplay (including the juxtaposition of incongruous words and images; dramatic irony; and puns ), 2) comedic characters (Wilbur as lovable buffoon, Charlotte as incisive wisdom figure) and 3) satire (scorn for human gullibility, arrogance and poor treatment of animals). White sharply satirises human arrogance and demonstrates the value of humility (embodied in Charlotte and Wilbur). The article also contains brief summaries of Charlotte's Web and of White's biography, and it concludes with a substantial set of “talking points” for discussing the novel’s spiritual themes with children.     

Von Wright and Wittgenstein on (the Varieties of) Goodness and Family Resemblance: A Constructive Rejoinder to Klagge (2018)

James C. Klagge (2018) readings of G. H. von Wright's and Wittgenstein's views concerning goodness and family resemblance are criticised and new interpretations are provided: Pace Klagge, (i) von Wright's arguments against goodness as a family-resemblance concept do not concern cases of goodness but the interrelations between the conceptual varieties of goodness; (ii) Wittgenstein did not endorse a ‘constitutivist account of goodness’ in his 1933 lectures; and (iii) Wittgenstein did not come close to Stevenson's emotivism in his Philosophical Investigations. Rather, Wittgenstein's later remarks on goodness may be read as ‘objects of comparison’ (PI §130), implying no strong theoretical commitments.     

Truth is not (Very) Intrinsically Valuable

We might suppose it is not only instrumentally valuable for beliefs to be true, but that it is intrinsically valuable – truth makes a non‐derivative, positive contribution to a belief's overall value. Some intrinsic goods are better than others, though, and this article considers the question of how good truth is, compared to other intrinsic goods. I argue that truth is the worst of all intrinsic goods; every other intrinsic good is better than it. I also suggest the best explanation for truth's inferiority is that it is not really an intrinsic good at all. It is intrinsically neutral.     

Social epistemology and the aim(s) of education

In Knowledge in a Social World (1999) Alvin Goldman has defended a ‘veritistic’ or truth-oriented, monistic account of the aim of education. In particular, he argued that the inculcation of true belief constitutes the ultimate goal of education, with other educational activities having only instrumental value insofar as they aid in this goal. In contrast, Harvey Siegel has defended a pluralistic alternative, on which the critical capacity for sustaining rational belief represents an independent, non-instrumental epistemic end of education. I argue that while some of Siegel's objections represent challenges to the sufficiency of Goldman's veritistic model, his alternative account fails to recognise the necessity of truth as an educational goal. This therefore commits Siegel to an unsatisfying pluralism regarding the ideal aim of education. Crucially, this disagreement hinges on two very different ways of understanding the nature of rationality: as instrumental or as epistemic. On Goldman's instrumentalist view, rationality merely involves the ordering of one's means to the end of true belief. However, Kelly (2003) has raised significant counterexamples against the instrumentalist view, and I adapt these to the case of the epistemic ends of education. I thus defend a non-pluralistic account of the ultimate end of education as involving knowledge in the ‘strong’ sense. This, I argue, overcomes the objections raised against Goldman and Siegel's accounts, and better accords with the notion of an ideal characterisation of the aim of education.     

Books received: volume 11, issue 2

According to Bolzano, an object has necessary being if, and only if, there is a conceptual truth that ascribes being to it. I (Textor, 1996, chapter 5) proposed that the notion of conceptual truth bears the explanatory weight in Bolzano's theory of necessity because, ultimately, the truth of such a proposition depends only on the nature of the concepts it contains. Rusnock (2012) argues against this interpretation and proposes, in turn, that for Bolzano necessity and contingency are tied to free choice. In this article I will provide conceptual and historical background for Bolzano's view of necessity and use it to motivate my interpretation as well as to rebut Rusnock's criticism.     

Boolos and the Metamathematics of Quine's Definitions of Logical Truth and Consequence

The paper is concerned with Quine's substitutional account of logical truth. The critique of Quine's definition tends to focus on miscellaneous odds and ends, such as problems with identity. However, in an appendix to his influential article On Second Order Logic, George Boolos offered an ingenious argument that seems to diminish Quine's account of logical truth on a deeper level. In the article he shows that Quine's substitutional account of logical truth cannot be generalized properly to the general concept of logical consequence. The purpose of this paper is threefold: first, to introduce the reader to the metamathematics of Quine's substitutional definition of logical truth; second, to make Boolos' result accessible to a broader audience by giving a detailed and self-contained presentation of his proof; and, finally, to discuss some of the possible implications and how a defender of the Quinean concepts might react to the challenge posed by Boolos' result.     

The social unconscious in persons,groups and societies,Vol 1: mainly theory; and Trauma and organizations

This paper considers the emotional life of the infant in the incubator and develops a new psychological theory which is called the ‘incubator psyche’. Theory building is advanced from three main discourses: (1) psychoanalysis, (2) neo-natal nursing and (3) psychology. A case study of Corey, a 7-year-old boy, who had been delivered prematurely, with a hole in his heart, and spent the first 6 weeks of post-natal life in an incubator, is presented to illustrate how aspects of an incubator psyche might be clinically manifest. The concept of an incubator psyche is advanced with reference to a particular kind of second-skin formation (Bick, 1968, The experience of the skin in early object relations, The International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 49, 484–486). It is proposed that the incubator psyche characterises a client's mental functioning exercised as an environmental sensibility that could be understood in terms of the total transference situation (Klein, 1952, The origins of transference, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 33, 433–438; Joseph, 1985, Transference: The total situation, International Journal of Psychoanalysis, 66, 447–454). Implications for practice are considered advocating particular attention to the setting.     

Peirce on Truth as the Predestinate Opinion

Abstract: In 1878's ‘How to Make Our Ideas Clear’, Peirce states that truth is the predestinate opinion, or that which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate. Later in his life, though, he would claim both (i) that truth is what would be believed if we could figure out the right method of inquiry and (ii) that, instead of affirming that truth is the predestinate opinion in 1878, he ought to have affirmed that truth is what would be believed if inquiry were carried sufficiently far. The aim of this paper is to provide an account of why the early Peirce endorses the claim that truth is the predestinate opinion and why the late Peirce is compelled to modify that position. I argue that Peirce's early statement that truth is the predestinate opinion is motivated by his theory that all mental action is of the nature of a valid inference and that the later modification of his view is partly motivated by his rejection of that theory.     

Analysing the Good Will: Kant's Argument in the First Section of the Groundwork

This article contends that the first section of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals provides a sophisticated and valid argument, and that commentators are therefore mistaken in dismissing this section as flawed. In particular, the article undertakes to show that in this section Kant argues from a conception of the goodness of a good will to two distinctive features of moral goodness, and from these features to his ‘formula of universal law’. The article reveals the sophistication and validity of this argument by considering it in the light of a number of criticisms that are commonly levelled at the section. In conclusion, the article proposes that this interpretation of the section also has significant implications for the understanding of Kant's method, his formulas and his basic conception of the ‘moral’.     

Beauty,ugliness and the sublime

Jung and Freud had very different ideas about the nature of analysis. This paper begins by exploring how Jung's gnostic approach, with its goal of individuation, is deeply informed by Buddhist and Taoist principles. His pluralistic, relational model regards truth as subjective and co‐constructed with the patient. In contrast, Freud's secular methodology has objective truth as its goal. His classical psychoanalysis is a form of reality testing where the analyst claims to know the painful, singular, objective reality which the patient tries to evade. The theory of aesthetic development (see Piaget 1951, Baldwin 1975, Parsons 1980, Housen 1992, Harris Williams 2010) proposes that artistic appreciation is linked to human development. The paper looks at how the apperception of beauty, related to both truth and meaning, acts as an indicator and facilitator of individuation in the clinical encounter. This is illustrated by a clinical case study. Through empirical research, support is given to the argument (Bollas 1978, Meltzer 1988) that our early experience of the feminine/maternal plays a central role in developing an aesthetic capacity. The experience of the sublime in analysis is examined and portrayed as a means by which aesthetic development may be reignited and narcissistic isolation shattered.     

A revolution of the mind: some implications of George Hogenson's ‘The Baldwin Effect: a neglected influence on C.G. Jung's evolutionary thinking’ (2001)

George Hogenson's 2001 paper ‘The Baldwin Effect: a neglected influence on C.G. Jung's evolutionary thinking’ developed the radical argument that, if archetypes are emergent, they ‘do not exist in the sense that there is no place that the archetypes can be said to be’. In this paper, I show how Hogenson's thinking has been seminal to my own: it is not just archetypes but the mind itself that has no ‘place’. The mind is a dynamic system, emergent from the cultural environment of symbolic meanings to which humans are evolutionarily adapted. Drawing on the work of philosopher John Searle, I argue that symbols constitute the realities that they bring forth, including the imaginal realities of the psyche. The implications for clinical work include a rejection of structural models of the psyche in favour of the emergence of symbolic realities in the context of psychoanalysis as a distributed system of cognition.     

Looking High and Low: Modem Art's Search and Seizure of Push-up Bras,Cadillac Fins and Blow-up Bunnies

Marie-Louise von Franz's classical volume on Number and Time was a pioneering effort to explore the deep archetypal structure of the way we organize our understanding of ourselves and the world. She used dreams, myths, and ancient cultural images to illustrate how numbers provide us with important insights into the co-creative dynamics of the psyche. In this column I seek to extend von Franz's work by illustrating a new mathematical model of how psychological dynamics are manifest in a series of dreams. These are the dreams of a young woman, whom I call “Davina,” going through critical life transitions (presented in greater detail in Rossi, 1999).     

A Meaningful Intercourse: Some Thoughts about Thinking

This article traces the development of ideas about consciousness, symbolisation, thinking and affects in the works of Freud, Bion, Meltzer and Stern. Consciousness is viewed as a special quality of psychic functions and therefore related to the complexity of the world of experience, to its different dimensions as Meltzer describes them. Freud's initial idea about direct and reproductive thinking and a compulsion to associate returns in Bions development of an epistemological instinct and are referred to by Stern as an ongoing, omnipresent milieu of thoughts in which instinctual life takes place. Bion develops Freud's thinking of unpleasure, primary and secondary processes, when he formulates the difference between pain and suffering, which also makes it possible for him to develop Freud's views on symbol formation. Bion's grid describes the relation between different forms of symbols and makes it possible to understand the importance of the reverie of the mother and how a feeling of meaning unfolds, when symbol formation takes place in a process in which the individual is in contact with the underlying structure. These ideas are in its turn developed in another direction by Stern in his theories of a pre-narrative envelope. Freud's ideas about perceptual identity and thought identity as a criteria for the release of motor activity are looked upon as a criteria for truth, which returns in Bion's ideas about the relation between truth and the development of the capacity to think. Meltzer takes up this thread when he claims that truth is beauty and beauty truth.