Emotional processes in risky and multiattribute health decisions

Objective: Here, we develop an integrative account of the roles of emotion in decision-making. In Part I, we illustrate how emotional inputs into decisions may rely on physiological signals from emotions experienced while making the decision, and we review evidence suggesting that the failure to represent the emotional meaning of options can often reduce decision quality. We propose that health-related decrements in the ability to generate emotional reactions lead people to inaccurately represent emotional responses and compromise decisions, particularly about risk. Part II explores complex decisions in which choice options involve trade-offs between positive and negative attributes. We first review evidence showing that difficult trade-off decisions generate negative affect and physiological arousal. Next, we propose that medical decision-making will be linked to short- and long-term stress and health outcomes.

Conclusion: In sum, this article proposes and reviews initial evidence supporting the effective use and management of emotional inputs as important to both clinical and non-clinical populations. Our approach will contribute to the understanding of patient-centred emotional decision-making and will inform medical decision aids.     

Solving probabilistic and statistical problems: a matter of information structure and question form

Is the human mind inherently unable to reason probabilistically, or is it able to do so only when problems tap into a module for reasoning about natural frequencies? We suggest an alternative possibility: naive individuals are able to reason probabilistically when they can rely on a representation of subsets of chances or frequencies. We predicted that naive individuals solve conditional probability problems if they can infer conditional probabilities from the subset relations in their representation of the problems, and if the question put to them makes it easy to consider the appropriate subsets. The results of seven studies corroborated these predictions: when the form of the question and the structure of the problem were framed so as to activate intuitive principles based on subset relations, naive individuals solved problems, whether they were stated in terms of probabilities or frequencies. Otherwise, they failed with both sorts of information. The results contravene the frequentist hypothesis and the evolutionary account of probabilistic reasoning.     

How to turn a hawk into a dove and vice versa: Interactions between emotions and goals in a give-some dilemma game

The present study investigated emotional influences on behavior in a one-shot, simultaneous, give-some dilemma game. In accordance with functional perspectives on the role of discrete emotions, we found fear to reduce, and guilt to increase levels of cooperation. Moreover, we showed individual differences in the effect of induced emotional states. Specifically, results indicated that inducing fear reduced cooperation only for individuals with a pro-social value orientation, and that guilt induction increased cooperation only for individuals with a pro-self value orientation. We also established that both social value orientations could be adequately described in terms of differences in chronically accessible goals (as assessed by value-importance ratings). These results, therefore, seem to support our hypothesis that individual differences in the behavioral consequences of induced emotional states are related to variation in chronic accessibility of general goals associated with a particular emotional state.     

Defining and Distinguishing Sexual and Emotional Infidelity

Researchers studying interpersonal relationships often distinguish between “sexual infidelity” and “emotional infidelity.” Yet, it remains largely unclear whether and how individuals actually conceptualize these constructs in their own lives, and how men and women vary, if at all, in their definitions and understanding of different types of infidelity. The current research used a mixed-methodology approach to explore the epistemological nature of sexual infidelity and emotional infidelity. In Study 1, 379 participants provided open-ended definitions of what they believe constitutes sexual infidelity and emotional infidelity. In Study 2, responses were then coded by a different group of outside raters to examine overall themes in the definitions provided and how prototypical these definitions were for each type of infidelity. Results identified and examined the definitions with the highest mean ratings in terms of how well they represented emotional infidelity or sexual infidelity. Overall, both men and women had more consistency in their definitions of what constituted sexual infidelity than on what constituted emotional infidelity, suggesting that emotional infidelity is a more vague and complex concept than sexual infidelity. Additionally, when asked to define sexual and emotional infidelity, many participants focused on specific behaviors (including deception), but when asked to consider the types of infidelity as distinct from each other, participants focused on feelings. By exploring how individuals actually define these constructs, these data provide a more accurate and rich depiction of how individuals define acts of infidelity than currently exists in the relationship literature.     

先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响

研究考察了先前情绪和过度自信对灾难事件后继风险决策的影响。结果发现：(1)先前情绪的主效应显著, 积极情绪比消极情绪的个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求;过度自信的主效应显著, 高过度自信比低过度自信个体在灾后风险决策时更加倾向于风险寻求。(2)先前情绪和过度自信水平交互影响灾难事件后继风险决策。高过度自信者在积极情绪状态下比在消极情绪状态下更倾向于风险寻求; 消极情绪状态下过度自信水平不同的个体之间没有显著差异。     

Positive emotional context eliminates the framing effect in decision-making

Dual-process theories have suggested that emotion plays a key role in the framing effect in decision-making. However, little is known about the potential impact of a specific positive or negative emotional context on this bias. We investigated this question with adult participants using an emotional priming paradigm. First, participants were presented with positive or negative affective pictures (i.e., pleasant vs. unpleasant photographs). Afterward, participants had to perform a financial decision-making task that was unrelated to the pictures previously presented. The results revealed that the presentation framed in terms of gain or loss no longer affected subjects' decision-making following specific exposure to emotionally pleasant pictures. Interestingly, a positive emotional context did not globally influence risk-taking behavior but specifically decreased the risk propensity in the loss frame. This finding confirmed that a positive emotional context can reduce loss aversion, and it strongly reinforced the dual-process view that the framing effect stems from an affective heuristic belonging to intuitive System 1. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).     

愤怒和恐惧情绪对个体危机决策的影响

危机情景下个体和群体的决策行为已经成为学术界关注的焦点。为探讨愤怒和恐惧情绪对个体危机决策的影响,本研究采用实验和问卷调查相结合的方法,通过观看电影片段的方式有效地诱发了愤怒和恐惧两种情绪,在问卷调查的基础上编制危机决策情景进行研究,结果发现：（1）恐惧情绪状态下,被试的危机决策时间显著长于其在愤怒情绪状态下的危机决策时间,且情绪变量和性别变量在危机决策时间上存在显著的交互作用;（2）恐惧情绪状态下,女性被试的危机决策时间显著长于其在愤怒情绪状态下的危机决策时间,并且也显著地长于男性被试的危机决策时间。同时,男性被试对其危机决策的满意程度显著地高于女性被试,且情绪变量和性别变量在危机决策自信程度指标上存在显著的交互作用;（3）随着方案数量的增加,尤其当方案数量为4时,被试的危机决策时间较其他两种情况显著增长。     

Communal and agentic behaviour in response to facial emotion expressions

Facial emotions are important for human communication. Unfortunately, traditional facial emotion recognition tasks do not inform about how respondents might behave towards others expressing certain emotions. Approach‐avoidance tasks do measure behaviour, but only on one dimension. In this study 81 participants completed a novel Facial Emotion Response Task. Images displaying individuals with emotional expressions were presented in random order. Participants simultaneously indicated how communal (quarrelsome vs. agreeable) and how agentic (dominant vs. submissive) they would be in response to each expression. We found that participants responded differently to happy, angry, fearful, and sad expressions in terms of both dimensions of behaviour. Higher levels of negative affect were associated with less agreeable responses specifically towards happy and sad expressions. The Facial Emotion Response Task might complement existing facial emotion recognition and approach‐avoidance tasks.     

Approach and avoidance as action effects

Numerous studies use arm movements (arm flexion and extension) to investigate the interaction between emotional stimuli and approach/avoidance behaviour. In many experiments, however, these arm movements are ambiguous. Arm flexion can be interpreted either as pulling (approach) or as withdrawing (avoidance). On the contrary, arm extension can be interpreted as reaching (approach) or as pushing (avoidance). This ambiguity can be resolved by regarding approach and avoidance as flexible action plans that are represented in terms of their effects. Approach actions reduce the distance between a stimulus and the self, whereas avoidance actions increase that distance. In this view, action effects are an integral part of the representation of an action. As a result, a neutral action can become an approach or avoidance reaction if it repeatedly results in decreasing or increasing the distance to a valenced stimulus. This hypothesis was tested in the current study. Participants responded to positive and negative words using key-presses. These “neutral” responses (not involving arm flexion or extension) were consistently followed by a stimulus movement toward or away from the participant. Responses to emotional words were faster when the response's effect was congruent with stimulus valence, suggesting that approach/avoidance actions are indeed defined in terms of their outcomes.     

What if I am the one? Measuring individual differences in emotional sensitivity to probability and emotional reactivity to possibility

Current theories of risk perception point to the powerful role of emotion and the neglect of probabilistic information in the face of risk, but these tendencies differ across individuals. We propose a method for measuring individuals' emotional sensitivity to probability to assess how feelings about probabilities, rather than the probabilities themselves, influence decisions. Participants gave affective ratings (worry or excitement) to 14 risky events, each with a specified probability ranging from 1 in 10 to 1 in 10,000,000. For each participant, we regressed these emotional responses against item probabilities, estimating a slope (the degree to which emotional responses change with probability) and an intercept (the emotional reaction to an event with a fixed probability). These two parameters were treated as individual difference scores and included in models predicting reactions to several health risk scenarios. Both emotional sensitivity to probability (slope) and emotional reactivity to possibility (intercept) significantly predicted responses to these scenarios, above and beyond the predictive power of other well‐established individual difference measures.     

The role of emotion in decision-making: evidence from neurological patients with orbitofrontal damage

Most theories of choice assume that decisions derive from an assessment of the future outcomes of various options and alternatives through some type of cost-benefit analyses. The influence of emotions on decision-making is largely ignored. The studies of decision-making in neurological patients who can no longer process emotional information normally suggest that people make judgments not only by evaluating the consequences and their probability of occurring, but also and even sometimes primarily at a gut or emotional level. Lesions of the ventromedial (which includes the orbitofrontal) sector of the prefrontal cortex interfere with the normal processing of "somatic" or emotional signals, while sparing most basic cognitive functions. Such damage leads to impairments in the decision-making process, which seriously compromise the quality of decisions in daily life. The aim of this paper is to review evidence in support of "The Somatic Marker Hypothesis," which provides a systems-level neuroanatomical and cognitive framework for decision-making and suggests that the process of decision-making depends in many important ways on neural substrates that regulate homeostasis, emotion, and feeling. The implications of this theoretical framework for the normal and abnormal development of the orbitofrontal cortex are also discussed.     

情绪对延迟折扣的影响：现状、机制与展望

延迟折扣研究领域日益重视情绪的影响作用。本文基于三类研究取向对情绪与延迟折扣关系研究进行了回顾。情绪效价和唤醒度均影响延迟折扣,但是研究结果并不一致;具体情绪类型不同,其对延迟折扣影响也存在差异。除此之外,本文就情绪信息理论、情绪动机维度理论和评估倾向理论如何解释延迟折扣进行了详细阐述。未来的研究需要进一步深入考察情绪影响延迟折扣的认知神经机制,从而为延迟折扣的负性情绪效应的干预提供可靠的科学依据。     

认知需求和认知闭合需求对风险决策中外语效应的影响

外语效应指相比于母语背景,个体在外语背景下风险决策偏差会降低。针对影响外语效应的因素研究大多聚焦于外部因素和与个体外语水平相关的因素,少有研究探讨认知风格的作用。本研究通过524名成人被试,探索认知需求和认知闭合需求对外语效应的影响。结果表明:(1)风险决策中存在外语效应,相比于母语背景,外语背景下框架效应被削弱,且个体更偏向风险寻求。(2)对于认知需求和认知闭合需求都高或都低的个体,语言类型会影响风险决策,在母语环境下倾向于风险规避,在外语环境下倾向于风险寻求;而对于认知需求和认知闭合需求高低不一致的个体,语言类型对其风险决策倾向的影响不显著。本研究为认知风格如何综合影响风险决策提供了进一步的证据。     

共情可控?以自上而下视角考察共情的可调节性

以往研究表明共情的特点包括自动化与情境依赖性。但是, 有关共情的理论模型与潜在神经机制仍存有争议。为更好地适应现实需求, 研究重点从共情的结构和功能角度逐渐向塑造和调节共情发展。近年来, 有研究者提出自上而下的心理过程与共情调节有关, 特别是共情的目标表征形式, 以及目标的价值权衡。因此, 考虑到共情的目标导向性对于共情的内部构建与外部表现形式的影响, 建议未来研究考虑从自上而下视角考察共情的可调节性。     

自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策的影响

以大学生为被试,探讨自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策的影响。采用2×2×2的混合实验设计,组内变量为自我损耗,组间变量为情绪动机方向和强度,使用双任务范式操作自我损耗,使用情绪动机图片启动被试的情绪动机,使用延迟折扣任务的指标k值测量冲动决策。结果发现,高趋近动机的k值大于低趋近动机,高回避动机的k值大于低回避动机。结果表明,自我损耗、情绪动机对冲动决策有明显影响。     

How Children with Head Injury Represent Real and Deceptive Emotion in Short Narratives

Narratives are not only about events, but also about the emotions those events elicit. Understanding a narrative involves not just the affective valence of implied emotional states, but the formation of an explicit mental representation of those states. In turn, this representation provides a mechanism that particularizes emotion and modulates its display, which then allows emotional expression to be modified according to particular contexts. This includes understanding that a character may feel an emotion but inhibit its display or even express a deceptive emotion. We studied how 59 school-aged children with head injury and 87 normally-developing age-matched controls understand real and deceptive emotions in brief narratives. Children with head injury showed less sensitivity than controls to how emotions are expressed in narratives. While they understood the real emotions in the text, and could recall what provoked the emotion and the reason for concealing it, they were less able than controls to identify deceptive emotions. Within the head injury group, factors such as an earlier age at head injury and frontal lobe contusions were associated with poor understanding of deceptive emotions. The results are discussed in terms of the distinction between emotions as felt and emotions as a cognitive framework for understanding other people's actions and mental states. We conclude that children with head injury understand emotional communication, the spontaneous externalization of real affect, but not emotive communication, the conscious, strategic modification of affective signals to influence others through deceptive facial expressions.     

Does interaction matter? Testing whether a confidence heuristic can replace interaction in collective decision-making

In a range of contexts, individuals arrive at collective decisions by sharing confidence in their judgements. This tendency to evaluate the reliability of information by the confidence with which it is expressed has been termed the ‘confidence heuristic’. We tested two ways of implementing the confidence heuristic in the context of a collective perceptual decision-making task: either directly, by opting for the judgement made with higher confidence, or indirectly, by opting for the faster judgement, exploiting an inverse correlation between confidence and reaction time. We found that the success of these heuristics depends on how similar individuals are in terms of the reliability of their judgements and, more importantly, that for dissimilar individuals such heuristics are dramatically inferior to interaction. Interaction allows individuals to alleviate, but not fully resolve, differences in the reliability of their judgements. We discuss the implications of these findings for models of confidence and collective decision-making.     

The F word: The experiential construction of flooding in England

In England, flood risk management policy constructs flooding through its physical impacts. Whilst research is starting to reveal the mental health impacts of flooding, it stops short of understanding the experience of being flooded and what this means in terms of understanding the F-word, flooding. Yet for flood communities, the emotional impacts of flooding can prevail for years, if not a lifetime.For people who have been flooded, flooding seeps into every facet of life. It removes the security and safety of home creating instead places of fear, stress, and anxiety. Within this paper we lay bare the emotional impacts of flooding, demonstrating the effect that home unmaking and the cyclical need for home remaking, has on individuals, their quality of life, and revealing the long-term emotional impact of living at risk of flooding.We finish by seeking ways to support communities living at risk of flooding, challenging current flood risk management policy, and identifying how it could be strengthened through understanding these emotional impacts. We propose supporting communities through the emotional turmoil of flooding can help provide hope and restore quality of life to those who live at risk of flooding.     

Préservation d’une image positive de soi dans un cadre de vie « à risque »

According to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1972), individual try to maintain a positive self-image. Places at which he/she is attached contribute to identity building (Proshansky et al., 1983; Twigger-Ross & Uzzell, 1996). Therefore, individual will try to maintain a positive a positive and stable image of such places. Our study is interested in what is the representation of their living area for individuals living in coastal area considered as exposed to erosion/flood risk, and attached to it. We are focused on how this representation influences their perception to coastal risk. We assume that individual attached to a place which he/she consider as “at risk” will put in place a strategy to preserve the positive image of this place and of himself/herself. Analyzing answers to a questionnaire, results demonstrate that individuals considering a place which they are attached as “at risk” mitigate the danger impact on that space. Thus, they conciliate probability of such negative event on place which they identifying themselves with positive image of this place and, by extension, of themselves.