Was the Northern Ireland Conflict Religious?

This article considers the claim that the conflict in Northern Ireland was irreducibly religious. After a brief account of the history of the Northern Ireland conflict, the different arguments and counter arguments that bear on the role of religion in causing and sustaining the conflict are considered. An examination of the relationship of Islam to terrorism and the events of 9/11 provides a comparative perspective that is used both to identify similarities and differences between the situation in Ireland and elsewhere and to distinguish and discriminate between different ways in which religious sanction is given to violence. The implications of our findings are then explored with regard to our understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict and with regard to our understanding of the nature of religion more generally.     

Was Jekyll Hyde?

Many philosophers say that two or more people or thinking beings could share a single human being in a split-personality case, if only the personalities were sufficiently independent and individually well integrated. I argue that this view is incompatible with our being material things, and conclude that there could never be two or more people in a split-personality case. This refutes the view, almost universally held, that facts about mental unity and disunity determine how many people there are. I suggest that the number of human people is simply the number of appropriately endowed human animals.     

From the Editor Guest Column: Who Was Jack Shand?

Members of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion (SSSR) hail from a number of diverse disciplines, but one theme unites them all: a commitment to studying religion scientifically. While many readers of the Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion (JSSR) are quantitatively oriented, SSSR has a long history of sharing membership with fields utilizing a variety of qualitative methods, including religious studies, anthropology, and other scholarly disciplines within the humanities. As such, SSSR serves as a nexus for the sharing of different research, ideas, perspectives, and methodologies. Our guest “From the Editor” column is about a psychologist who appreciated SSSR and its multidisciplinary approach so much that he became a major benefactor to SSSR after his passing. That person was John Douglas “Jack” Shand, and this is a brief tribute to his legacy.     

Was Heidegger an Externalist?

To address the question posed in the title, I focus on Heidegger's conception of linguistic communication developed in the sections on Rede and Gerede of Being and Time. On the basis of a detailed analysis of these sections I argue that Heidegger was a social externalist but semantic internalist. To make this claim, however, I first need to clarify some key points that have led critics to assume Heidegger's commitment to social externalism automatically commits him to semantic externalism regarding concept use. I begin by explaining the independence of those positions, arguing that social externalism answers the question of whose concepts in a linguistic community are properly individuated, whereas semantic externalism makes a claim about what it takes for concepts to be properly individuated. Once these issues are distinguished, it is possible to see that Heidegger's intersubjectivist conception of language commits him to social externalism, while his conception of the ontological difference commits him to semantic internalism.     

Was bringt die Muster-Weiterbildungsordnung?

Ohne Zusammenfassung     

Was Mill a Noncognitivist?

In this paper, I examine the presumption that Mill endorses a form of metaethical noncognitivism. I argue that the evidence traditionally cited for this interpretation is not convincing and suggest that we should instead remain open to a cognitivist reading. I begin by laying out the “received view” of Mill on the status of practical norms, as given by Alan Ryan in the 1970s. I then argue that there is no firm textual evidence for this reading of Mill: his remarks on “art” and “science” do not show the metaethical commitments they have been taken to. Neither is there firm textual evidence for a cognitivist reading. However, a noncognitivist interpretation suffers from the fault of anachronism and is difficult to reconcile with the clear commitment in Utilitarianism to the possibility of evidence being given for the desirability of pleasure. A cognitivist reading would not suffer from these faults, and on that basis, I conclude that we should think further about what a cognitivist reading of Mill might amount to.     

Was Kant a nonconceptualist?

I criticize recent nonconceptualist readings of Kant’s account of perception on the grounds that the strategy of the Deduction requires that understanding be involved in the synthesis of imagination responsible for the intentionality of perceptual experience. I offer an interpretation of the role of understanding in perceptual experience as the consciousness of normativity in the association of one’s representations. This leads to a reading of Kant which is conceptualist, but in a way which accommodates considerations favoring nonconceptualism, in particular the primitive character of perceptual experience relative to thought and judgment.

Was bringt ?GRAS��?

Autonomous groups in the sense of GRAS (group analysis seminars) are groups without leaders. The small groups come together for self-experience within the framework of GRAS (Gruppenanalyse-Seminare, founded by Michael Lukas Moeller in 1977). Their members are group analysts who continue to participate in long-standing small groups on self-experience after completing their educational training as group analysts in GRAS. Participants of these groups (14 women and 11 men, average age 57.7 years) were interviewed about their experiences within GRAS and the subjective effects on their life. The interviews were evaluated in a qualitative research design. The findings show that the effects of GRAS are estimated to be extensive and very positive for private and professional life. The main modus to be in the group is experienced as retentive, acceptive and inspiring. Autonomous groups in the sense of GRAS form an important background of experience for trained group analysts themselves and continuously stimulate personal advancement and mental health.     

Was Wittgenstein an Anti-Realist?

William Child has said that Wittgenstein is an anti-realist with respect to a person's dreams, recent thoughts that he has consciously entertained and other things. I discuss Wittgenstein's comments about these matters in order to show that they do not commit him to an anti-realist view or a realist view. He wished to discredit the idea that when a person reports his dream or his thoughts, or past intentions, the person is reading off the contents of his mind or memory. Reporting what one dreamt or recently thought is not like reporting what one has just read. The language is different, and the criterion of truth is different.
The anti-realist is able to explain why the reports of thoughts, for instance, are "guaranteed" to be true (PI II, 222) by stipulating that the character and existence of the past thought is constituted by an inclination to assert that one had that past thought so the assertion could not be false. This could not be Wittgenstein's view. What does "guarantee" the truth of such an assertion is the fact that the person himself is the principle authority on what he dreamt, thought, and intended, something which "stands fast" for us.
I next consider Crispin Wright's account of Wittgenstein's ideas about intentions and point out that his assumption that person always makes a judgement as to whether his action conforms to his intention is clearly false. And he is wrong in attributing to Wittgenstein the idea that an intention does not have a determinate content prior to its author's judgement about whether the action conforms to the intention, an idea that is obscure. If this were accurate, it would be a mystery why we do anything, or, at least, why our actions ever conform to our intentions.     

Was Helmholtz a Bayesian?

Modern developments in machine vision and object recognition have generated renewed interest in the proposal for drawing inferences put forward by the Rev. Thomas Bayes (1701-1759). In this connection the epistemological studies by Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894) are often cited as laying the foundation of the currently popular move to regard perception as Bayesian inference. Helmholtz in his mature writings tried to reconcile the German idealist notions of reality-as-hypothesis with scientists' quests for the laws of nature, and espoused the view that we "attain knowledge of the lawful order in the realm of the real, but only in so far as it is represented in the tokens within the system of sensory impressions". His propositions of inferring objects from internal sensory signals by what he called 'unconscious inferences' have made Helmholtz be regarded as a proto-Bayesian. But juxtaposing Bayes's original writings, the modern formulation of Bayesian inference, and Helmholtz's views of perception reveals only a tenuous relationship.