Hare Krishna and Sanatan Dharm in Britain: The Campaign for Bhaktivedanta Manor

Bhaktivedanta Manor, the main centre for ISKCON (the ‘Hare Krishna movement') in Britain, has been under threat of closure for over ten years. The centre—which is a place of pilgrimage for many thousands of Indian Hindus in Britain—is considered by its local authority to be used inappropriately, since it does not have the required planning permission to be a place of public worship. In their view, Bhaktivedanta Manor should be used only as a theological college. ISKCON have challenged this position, and through a series of legal and political battles have tried to prevent the local authority from taking enforcement action. The campaign against closure by ISKCON demonstrates the large support this ‘new’ religion has among the Hindu population of Britain, and indeed has played an important part in developing the relationship between Hindus and the Hare Krishna movement. But the campaign also demonstrates a key point about the role of religious freedom within British law, as the series of legal challenges by ISKCON have highlighted how the right to religious worship is subject to other factors, such as planning regulations.     

Women and the Tablighi Jamacat

Little has been written on theTablighi Jamacat (TJ), probably the largest Islamic movement in the world today and within the existing limited corpus of writings on the TJ, almost no mention has been made of the involvement of women in it. This paper begins with a brief background of the emergence of Islamic reformist efforts in South Asia from the nineteenth century onwards that saw Muslim women as playing an important role in the ‘protection’ and ‘preservation’ of Islam in the wake of Muslim political decline in the region. The particular efforts in this regard of Maulana Muhammad Ilyas, founder of the TJ, are noted. The paper then goes on to discuss the TJ's programme for women's involvement in the work of the movement. This is followed by a discussion of notions of ideal Muslim femininity as spelled out in tracts and books written bytablighi elders. In concluding, we look at what implications the efforts of TJ activity might have for the status of Muslim women generally.     

Being,belonging, and borders: Scandinavian creation theology as political theology

Desire for life and protecting lives has come to the fore during the pandemic. Borders have been closed to stop the spread of Covid‐19. The virus does not respect borders, yet physical distance is crucial. Three things have become clear. One is the level of uncertainty about which measures are most efficient. The other is that the neo‐liberal philosophy with “just in time” deliveries on a global market has made everyone vulnerable and invited national protectionism rather than collaboration. A third insight is that the lack of borders between wild and tame animals and human beings is connected to the emergence of the virus itself, where rain forests are exploited for short sighted profit. In the midst of this, a cry for Being, for Life, and Human Flourishing, can be heard as an underlying drumbeat. In relation to this I ponder Being in relation to Belonging and to Borders. I first describe a political landscape where neo‐nationalist, and neo‐atheist, claims for belonging, have emerged all over the world, and hence emphasized strong borders between different people, but not for capital. Secondly, I draw on resources from Scandinavian Creation Theology, especially Grundtvig, Aulén, and Wingren to paint a planetary vision with porous borders, beyond patriarchy, populism, and protectionism. In the long run there is no opting out of the planetary vulnerability. I launch the term eschatological creation theology for a creation theology that allows creation to be inspired by the Kin‐dom to come with righteousness and life in abundance.     

A more dangerous enemy? Philo’s “confession” and Hume’s soft atheism

While Hume has often been held to have been an agnostic or atheist, several contemporary scholars have argued that Hume was a theist. These interpretations depend chiefly on several passages in which Hume allegedly confesses to theism. In this paper, I argue against this position by giving a threshold characterization of theism and using it to show that Hume does not confess. His most important “confession” does not cross this threshold and the ones that do are often expressive rather than assertive. I then argue that Hume is best interpreted as an atheist. Instead of interpreting Hume as a proto-logical positivist and arguing on the basis of Hume’s theories of meaning and method, I show that textually he appears to align himself with atheism, that his arguments in the Dialogues on Natural Religion support atheism, and that this position is most consistent with Hume’s naturalism. But, I hold that his atheism is “soft” and therefore distinct from that of his peers like Baron d’Holbach—while Hume really does reject theism, he neither embraces a dogmatically materialist position nor takes up a purely polemical stance towards theism. I conclude by suggesting several ways in which Hume’s atheistic philosophy of religion is relevant to contemporary discussions.     

Perceived Morality and Antiatheist Prejudice: A Replication and Extension

Recent evidence suggests that, although moral distrust drives antiatheist prejudice, certain types of morality are central: Perceived atheist moral capacity for caring and compassion appears to be central, whereas perceived atheist moral capacity for fairness, in-group loyalty, deferential respect, or purity/decency is not (Simpson & Rios, 2017). Here, we extend this research. First, we conceptually replicated experimental effects: Manipulating the perception that atheists strongly versus weakly value morality affects antiatheist prejudice much more strongly if the type of morality relates to caring/compassion rather than purity/sanctity (N = 162; U.S. Christian theists recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk). This finding was particularly strong among White participants. Second, we provide evidence for cross-national replication of correlational findings among Australian undergraduate theists (N = 85; recruited from the University of Melbourne) as well as evidence to suggest that the type of perceived morality that predicts prejudice differs according to the social group in question. Specifically, only perceived atheist concern for caring/compassion reliably predicted antiatheist prejudice, whereas perceived Jewish concern caring/compassion and in-group loyalty predicted anti-Jewish prejudice. Results reinforce existing evidence that increasing perceptions of atheist benevolence will help reduce antiatheist prejudice and provide novel support for social-functionalist theories of prejudice.     

From the Ethic of Hospitality to Affective Hospitality: Ethical,Political and Pedagogical Implications of Theorizing Hospitality Through the Lens of Affect Theory

The point of departure of this article is that hospitality in education has not been theorized in terms of emotion and affect, partly because its law(s) have been discussed in ways that have not paid much attention to the role of emotion and affect. The analysis broadens our understanding of the ethics and politics of hospitality by considering it as a spatial and affective relational practice. In particular, concepts from affect theory such as the notion of affective atmospheres and atmospheric walls are discussed to highlight the notion of affective hospitality. It is argued that a greater awareness of the micro-politics of hospitality in its everyday enactment in various educational settings can show educators how specific practices of hospitality work to produce affective spaces in which the socio-historical context of privilege may be interrupted. The paper concludes with a discussion of the ethical, political and pedagogical implications of affective hospitality.

     

Burden of the Third Rome: The threat of Russian orthodox fundamentalism and Muslim eurasia

For contemporary Muslim public opinion, anxious to comprehend the revival of Orthodoxy and nostalgia for starina (old times), the growing radical Orthodox fundamentalism seems to indicate the return of anti‐Islamic Pan‐Slavism. The Neo‐Soviet National Liberals and National Communists are both opposed to the self‐determination of Muslims in Tatarstan, Boshkirstan, Chechnya, Crimea and Daghestan. They are also hostile to the Islamic revival ( al‐sahwa al‐islamiyya) in Central Asian Turkestan and Tajikistan. Their misconception of Islam is shaped by the long tradition of Russian messianism which is rejuvenated after every cyclical decline of Russian political authority. The success of Russian messianic nationalism lies neither in its selective historiosophy nor in its dialectic politics, but in the charismatic reasoning of the old geopolitical threats to the existence of Russians, demonized as the Islamic reconquest of Idel‐Ural (Musulmanskiye dvizheny na Volgu) initiated by the restoration of Pan‐Turkic Islamistan and the Muslim Commonwealth in Central Asia. Like other Russian philosophies of the past, modern Russian nationalism draws on a host of European thinkers and their ideas, but its context is governed by the fundamental notion of ‘Holy Mother Russia’ (Sviataya Matushka Rassieya) and its Byzantine paradigm of ‘the True Holy Church of Constantinople’. Influenced by the militant anti‐Islamic and anti‐Western traditions of the Eastern Orthodox Church, modem All‐Russian nationalism has become a new and dangerous chimera of economically and politically frustrated Russians. Revitalized Russian Orthodox fundamentalism is a real threat to the newly emancipated Islamic East, because the fall of Communist atheist tyranny did not eliminate the old threat of Russian Orthodox hegemony in the Russian Federation, Central Asia and the Caucasian independent republics. Invasion, occupation and military interventions in the Chechen Republic of Itchek‐eria, Azerbaijan and Tadjikistan, as well as the prospect of armed rebellions by the Russian separatist minorities in Kazakhstan, Daghestan, Ingushetia, Crimea and Tatarstan, explicitly demonstrate the nature of All‐Russian hegemonism at the end of the post‐postmodernist age. The geopolitical and cultural continuity of the Tsarist‐Soviet empire, regardless of the political and economic regime in Moscow, still determines Russian Islamophobia and animates an obsession with ‘national security’ among the rulers of the Kremlin, who attempt to improve Russia's strategic status by a re‐annexation of the so‐called ‘near abroad’ ( blizhnee zarubezhye) countries into the Russian‐dominated confederation of Independent States.     

Phenomenology of the trickster archetype,U.S. electoral politics and the Black Lives Matter movement

This paper examines the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement in cultural, historical and relational contexts at the intersection of the U.S. Civil Rights movement, U.S. Civil Rights legislation, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and reforms thereto in the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision of Shelby County v Holder, 570 U.S.529 (2013). The intergenerational relations between the BLM movement and these ongoing movements for civil and human rights is underscored. In the wake of protests about the sadistic murder of George Floyd, an unarmed African American man, by a Caucasian police officer, the BLM movement has been mischaracterized as an affront to law and order by the Trump-led U.S. administration. The mischaracterization was a re-election campaign effort designed to ignite ‘white fear’, ‘white rage’ and to defend police brutality and systemic racism. Analytical psychology and the phenomenology of the trickster archetype, as amplified from the African-centric perspective in the Yoruba deity Esu-Elegba, are employed to interrogate partisan obstructionist behaviours that assault multicultural democracy in both contemporary U.S. electoral politics and the political economy. The paper concludes with a brief note on the social activism of Fair Fight Georgia and the integration of its agenda into the BLM movement.     

REVIEWS

This article identifies a previously ignored social movement that existed in London during 1827–1831. The Jewish rights movement, as it will be called here, actually involved a coalition of Jews and Christians. During the movement’s initial phase, London Jews, led by Moses E. Levy (an activist from the United States), joined in solidarity with their oppressed brethren in Russia: their public protests against tsarist policies drew a broad response from the national and international press. This unparalleled movement influenced national political agendas and major legislative reforms, and resulted in striking changes within the Anglo‐Jewish community. By utilising the modern social movement framework as an essential tool to reconstruct this long‐forgotten collective effort, the Jewish rights movement has emerged as a notable chapter in the development of modern Jewish political identity.

“At the present moment, the eyes of England, of Europe, and of a great part of the civilized world seem to be directed toward us, and… men are looking with something approaching anxiety for the result of the Public Meetings of the Jewish Nation that have been called (the first time for many centuries)” (Levy Jewish Community).     

Governing Through the Dao: A Non-Anarchistic Interpretation of the <Emphasis Type="Italic">Laozi</Emphasis>

Within the literature, Daoist political philosophy has often been linked with anarchism. While some extended arguments have been offered in favor of this conclusion, I take this position to be tenuous and predicated on an assumption that coercive authority cannot be applied through wuwei. Focusing on the Laozi as the fundamental political text of classical Daoism, I lay out a general account of why one ought to be skeptical of classifying it as anarchistic. Keeping this skepticism in mind and recognizing the importance of wuwei in arguments for the anarchist conclusion, I provide a non-anarchistic interpretation of wuwei as a political technique that is consistent with the text of the Laozi. Having presented a plausible alternative to the anarchist understanding of wuwei, I close my discussion with a brief sketch of a positive account of the political theory of the Laozi.     

Religious homophobia: The experiences of a sample of lesbian,gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Ireland

This paper presents the findings of an interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA) of the experiences of religious homophobia among a sample of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) people in Ireland. In-depth interviews were conducted with 10 LGBT-identified people in Dublin (age range early 20s to 50s; six male and four female), of whom five identified as religious and five as atheist. IPA generated the overarching theme of Religious Homophobia which was experienced and responded to differently by religious and atheist participants. Findings were that, while participants lived in an increasingly pluralistic Irish society, the negative dividend of religious homophobia created intrapsychic tension for participants and led some to abandon religion altogether. Nevertheless the experiences of participants point to the changing nature of Irish society which is characterised by increased diversity, openness and respect for minority rights including LGBT rights.     

Ricoeur and the pre-political

We argue that Paul Ricoeur’s work on narrative and alienation provides a largely untapped, though potentially fruitful way of re-thinking the question of political agency within the context of globalization. We argue that the political agency of many around the world has been placed in an exceedingly fragile position due to the rapid pace of globalization, the movement of multi-national corporations from their previous national headquarters, etc. We use Ricoeur’s work to argue that the alienation of globalization is not something that can be simply overcome either in a unified world-state or a retreat to protectionist nationalism, because institutional mediation—and consequently alienation—is in some sense constitutive of all politics: the world of political representation operates by its own set of rules, which are at least partially disconnected from the represented world. Using the work of Mouffe, a radical democratic theorist, we then flesh out an ideal of agonistic citizenship (which recognizes both the need for and the inevitability of discursive struggle in politics) in a number of overlapping communities of interest, rather than tying political participation solely to the sovereign government of my state. The state will remain important, but because globalization has disenfranchised so many from their participation in “local” modes of self-governance (tied to the state in which they live), we have a responsibility to re-envision what political participation means outside the traditional context of the state. Rather than merely citizens of a particular state, we need to begin thinking of ourselves politically—and then acting—as “citizens” of Green Peace, Human Rights Watch, Doctors Without Borders, or whatever other supra-local concrete universals or communities of interest to which we belong, investing the time and energy there that we might previously have invested solely in our state’s government. (By implication, we must also ensure that these organizations work in transparent democratic ways themselves.) We believe that by re-plotting our narratives of political engagement in this way, we can positively respond to the alienation created by globalization, while avoiding both the extremes of “McWorld” (hyperglobalism) and “Jihad” (complete skepticism towards, or war against globalization) that Benjamin Barber and David Held have recently described.

Communion and Liberation: a Catholic movement in a multilevel governance perspective

In this article we focus on how changes in political structure influence religion. Communion and Liberation (CL) is widely known in Italy as a very important Catholic movement whose political power has been significantly increasing in the last 15 years. It is an example of a movement deeply rooted at the local level, where its activities range from grassroots meetings to business activities and service provision. In the sociological literature, CL has been studied either by focusing on its political ideology, or as a religious movement. Introducing a specific focus on the political system allows us to highlight the close relationships between the recent changes in the Italian political system and the reasons for the local success of CL. Indeed, it has been a process of mutual adaptation and influence. The political success of a Catholic movement in a Western democracy is relevant to understanding the changing role of religion in the political arena. Christian movements can play a role of substitution for traditional political movements in countries where traditional parties have become particularly weak and not capable of inspiring enthusiasm among citizens. But the story of CL in Lombardy suggests also that something is changing in the relationship between national and local politics. CL is able to play on different territorial horizons by using local, regional and national political spheres to promote its policies, mainly in the welfare sector. This is an important signal of a capacity both to adapt to a changing political system and to influence these changes. In this paper we focus on the relationships between CL and Italian politics in the Second Republic (1993 to the present day) by analysing CL representation of its political role as well as by pointing out the political opportunity structure in which its success has taken place.     

Motivating political preferences: Concerns with promotion and prevention as predictors of public policy attitudes

Motivation is an important component of many political decision making theories. However, different definitions of motivation have led to different conclusions as to how influential motivation is on political attitudes. When motivation has been defined in terms of personal interest, its predictive value has been questioned (Sears and Funk in Advances in experimental social psychology, vol 24. Academic Press, New York, pp. 1–91, 1991); however, other motivational variables like Schwartz’ (Advances in experimental social psychology, vol 25, Academic Press, New York, pp. 1–65, 1992) values have been found to be strong predictors of such attitudes. This article investigates the influence of another type of motivational variable. Specifically, two studies examined how chronic concerns with fundamental needs for security (i.e., prevention) and growth (i.e., promotion) relate to public policy attitudes. In samples of both college students and nationally representative US households and across a variety of policy areas, stronger prevention concerns predicted support for government intervention to maintain public and personal safety, whereas stronger promotion concerns predicted support for government intervention to ensure opportunities for growth and enrichment.     

Trust and Involvement as Higher-Order Factors of General Attitudes Towards Politics. Testing a Structural Model Across 26 Democracies

Interindividual differences in how people think and feel about politics have been investigated for decades. However, the great number of attitudinal concepts that has been developed to describe these differences is likely to distract from their conceptual overlap and dimensional structure. In addition, not much is known about the cross-cultural invariance of their interrelation. We propose that attitudes towards politics can be structured by two broad higher-order factors, a factor of general political involvement and a factor of general political trust. In two studies (N₁ = 767; N₂ = 29,018), including representative samples from 26 democracies, we first conduct several confirmatory factor analyses (CFA) to show that the higher-order model is a well-fitting and parsimonious alternative to a baseline model without higher-order factors in most samples. Second, we present evidence from multigroup CFA that the overall patterns of factor loadings are the same across all 26 countries. We interpret this structural equivalence across different democracies as support for the assumption that general political involvement and general political trust reflect basic orientations towards politics that are based on (1) demands of democratic political systems and (2) universal principles in human trait structure.     

Pragmatic Dogma: Understanding the Ideological Continuities in Iran's Response to the Charlie Hebdo Attacks

ABSTRACT

Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 fatwa against Salman Rushdie cemented Iran's space within Western discourses surrounding blasphemy and Islam. The fatwa has earned its place within the polarizing debate between free speech and religious tolerance, which fundamentally serves the political ambitions of those involved. This article therefore argues that, in order to understand accusations of blasphemy in Iran, one must address the political concerns in which the accusation takes place since these reveal Iran's tendency towards pragmatic dogma – the practice of meeting the needs of the state in a way that accords with its religious ideology. The responses of Iranian officials to the Charlie Hebdo killings in 2015 provide a useful case study for the analysis of this pragmatic dogma, since the Islamic Republic pursued a different approach to the Charlie Hebdo “blasphemy” from that which it had followed with Rushdie. Instead of condoning the killings, Iran's political and religious elite chose to condemn the actions of both the cartoonists and the gunmen, without outlining a punishment. The article will argue that this case demonstrates many of the continuing themes in Iran's approach to blasphemy, since the Charlie Hebdo cartoons have largely been used to reinforce the Islamic Republic's overall worldview.     

Reading and reflecting sacred texts in the presence of the other. An empirical study on the use of ‘scriptural reasoning’ in teacher education

In this article the method of Scriptural Reasoning (SR), a text-based approach to interreligious dialogue between participants of the three Abrahamic religions, was implemented for a teacher education setting at a German university. Not only students with an outspoken religious conviction but also agnostic and atheist students, preparing themselves to become teachers in public schools, were invited into the conversation. The article documents and discusses the qualitative-empirical research in which the SR meetings were embedded. The aim of the article is not to create a hermeneutical theory for SR but rather to explore how SR as a method, with its specific learning tool of text-work, can be turned into a broader didactical model which can be transferred to other learning environments and which can in the long run provide empirical evidence on successful teacher education in multi-religious and multi-worldview societies and schools.     

Applied behavior analysis and the movement to restructure schools: Compatibilities and opportunities for collaboration

The field of applied behavior analysis has devoted considerable effort to the problem of educating America's youth. In addition to developing a wide range of procedures to improve children's academic and classroom survival skills, behavioral researchers have discussed a wide range of technological characteristics that are likely to facilitate the adoption of their procedures by educational decision-makers and practitioners. A movement to restructure American schools has become highly popularized within educational, political, and public media forums over the past several years. One general characteristic of this movement is its failure to recommend the more frequent implementation of applied behavior analysis techniques to educate America's youth. A close inspection of three global models for school reform, however, reveals notable compatibilities with the focus and goals of applied behavior analysis. Applied behavior analysts can collaborate with and contribute to the school restructuring movement by pursuing the more formal and systematic analyses of characteristics essential to the adoption process.     

Feminism as Revolutionary Practice: From Justice and the Politics of Recognition to Freedom

In the 1980s extra‐parliamentary social movements and critical theories of race, class, and gender added a new sociocultural understanding of justice—recognition—to the much older socioeconomic one. The best‐known form of the struggle for recognition is the identity politics of disadvantaged groups. I argue that there is still another option to conceptualize their predicament, neglected in recent political philosophy, which understands exclusion not in terms of injustice, more particularly a lack of sociocultural recognition, but in terms of a lack of freedom. I draw my inspiration from Hannah Arendt's model of political action. Arendt diagnoses exclusion not solely as a mode of injustice, but as a lack of participation and public freedom. Consequently, she advocates a struggle for participation, political equality, and freedom as a strategy for emancipation or empowerment. Arendt could help feminists see that collective empowerment is made possible not by a shared identity (the target of poststructuralist critics) but by common action in the service of a particular worldly issue or common end. In other words, feminists would do well to appreciate the revolutionary quality and heritage of the feminist movement better, that is, its character as a set of practices of freedom.