The Non‐Identity of Appearances and Things in Themselves

According to the ‘One Object’ reading of Kant's transcendental idealism, the distinction between the appearance and the thing in itself is not a distinction between two objects, but between two ways of considering one and the same object. On the ‘Metaphysical’ version of the One Object reading, it is a distinction between two kinds of properties possessed by one and the same object. Consequently, the Metaphysical One Object view holds that a given appearance, an empirical object, is numerically identical to the thing in itself that appears as that object. I raise various indiscernibility arguments against that view; because an appearance has different spatiotemporal and modal properties than a thing in itself, no appearance can be identical to a thing in itself. I point out that these arguments are similar to arguments against Monism, the view that material objects are numerically identical to the matter of which they are made. I outline some strategies Monists have developed to respond to these indiscernibility arguments and then develop parallel responses on behalf of the Metaphysical One Object view. However, I then raise another indiscernibility argument, to which, I argue, the Metaphysical One Object view cannot respond, even using the resources I have developed thus far. I develop a modified version of the Metaphysical One Object view that can respond to this new indiscernibility argument, but, I argue, this modified version of the One Object view is only a terminological variant of the Two Object view. When the Metaphysical One Object view is fully thought through it becomes the Two Object view. I conclude that Kantian appearances are not numerically identical to the things in themselves that appear to us.     

Postphenomenological Method and Technological Things Themselves

Human Studies - We live in a world where it is impossible to exist without, and beyond, technologies. Despite this omnipresence, we tend to overlook their influence on us. The vigorously developing...     

A Phenomenology of Emotional Trauma: Around and About the Things Themselves

This paper seeks to provide a noetic analysis of emotional trauma. It highlights three essential features of trauma, as well as one non-essential feature, and attempts to make sense of them phenomenologically. The first essential feature of trauma that the paper considers is the disbelief that pervades traumatic experience. When traumatized, we cannot believe that the traumatic event has taken place. This is because we will, not for the event not to have happened??we cannot will something that is in the past??but to believe that it did not happen so as to shield ourselves from our painful emotional response to it. The second essential feature of trauma is our inability to distinctly categorially intuit the central state of affairs around which our trauma revolves. The traumatic situation is literally unthinkable by us, for it is incongruent with both our expectations regarding the subject of the trauma and our horizon of sense more generally. The third essential feature of trauma is the temporal disorientation that it brings about. Such disorientation arises from our prolonged and single-minded attention to an increasingly complex categorial object: the traumatic situation. Finally, the paper considers a non-essential feature of trauma, namely, how traumatic experience can motivate phenomenological and scientific reactions.     

Kant on the Inapplicability of the Categories to Things in Themselves

This paper addresses the question of what we can legitimately say about things in themselves in Kant's critical doctrine. Many Kant scholars believe that Kant allows that things in themselves can be characterized through the unschematized or ‘pure’ concepts of our understanding such as ‘substance’ or ‘causality’. However, I show that on Kant's view things in themselves do not conform to the unschematized categories (given their standard discursive meaning): the pure categories, like space and time, are merely subjective forms of finite, discursive cognition. I then examine what this interpretation might entail for central aspects of Kant's system such as his doctrine of noumenal freedom.     

小儿支气管哮喘和胃食管返流关系的哲学思考

支气管哮喘是当今世界上最常见的气道慢性炎症性疾病,运用哲学的观点认识小儿支气管哮喘与胃食管返流之间的关系,对于支气管哮喘合并胃食管返流的临床治疗非常重要.     

The Limits of Experience and Explanation: F. A. Lange and Ernst Mach on Things in Themselves

In the middle of the nineteenth century, advances in experimental psychology and the physiology of the sense organs inspired so-called ‘Back to Kant’ Neo-Kantians to articulate robustly psychologistic visions of Kantian epistemology. But their accounts of the thing in itself were fraught with deep tension: they wanted to conceive of things in themselves as the causes of our sensations, while their own accounts of causal inference ruled that claim out. This paper diagnoses the source of that problem in views of one Neo-Kantan, F. A. Lange, and argues that it is solved only by Ernst Mach. No less than Lange and other Neo-Kantians, Mach was inspired to develop a psychologistic account of the foundations of knowledge, but his account also includes a coherent denial of things in themselves’ existence. Finally, this paper uses this account of Lange and Mach on things in themselves to illuminate Mach's relation to a certain strain of the Neo-Kantian philosophy of his own time: his views constitute a more fully coherent version of the psychologistic theory of knowledge Back to Kant figures tried to articulate.     

Causation as a Philosophical Relation in Hume

By giving the proper emphasis to both radical skepticism and naturalism as two independent standpoints in Hume, I wish to propose a more satisfactory account of some of the more puzzling Humean claims on causation. I place these claims alternatively in either the philosophical standpoint of the radical skeptic or in the standpoint of everyday and scientific beliefs. I characterize Hume's radical skeptical standpoint in relation to Hume's perceptual model of the traditional theory of ideas, and I argue that Hume's radical skeptical argument concerning our causal inferences is inextricably linked to his skeptical argument concerning our idea of a necessary connection between cause and effect. I discuss Hume's naturalistic account of the origin of our idea of necessity and offer a new reading of Hume's two "definitions" of cause. I argue along the way against central aspects of two opposing styles of interpretation—Norman Kemp Smith's and Annette Baier's, on the one hand, and Robert Fogelin's, on the other—that in my view do not appreciate the mutual autonomy of radical skepticism and naturalism in Hume.     

On the Relation Between Philosophical Worldviews and Theories of Counseling and Development: A Comment

An alternate understanding of the role of organicism (Pepper, 1942) in contemporary developmental and constructivist thought is offered in reaction to Steenbarger's (1991) recent analysis of contextualist themes in counseling and development.     

Public Opinion and Political Philosophy: The Relation between Social-Scientific and Philosophical Analyses of Distributive Justice

This paper considers the relation between philosophical discussions of, and social-scientific research into popular beliefs about, distributive justice. The first part sets out the differences and tensions between the two perspectives, identifying considerations which tend to lead adherents of each discipline to regard the other as irrelevant to its concerns. The second discusses four reasons why social scientists might benefit from philosophy: problems in identifying inconsistency, the fact that non-justice considerations might underlie distributive judgments, the way in which different principles of justice can yield the same concrete distributive judgments, and the ambiguity of key terms. The third part distinguishes and evaluates three versions of the claim that normative theorising about justice can profit from empirical research into public opinion: that its findings are food for thought, that they amount to feasibility constraints, and that they are constitutive of normatively justified principles of justice. The view that popular opinion about justice has a strongly constitutive role to play in justifying principles of distributive justice stricto sensu is rejected, but it is argued that what the people think (and what they can reasonably be expected to come to think) on distributive matters can be an important factor for the political theorist to take into account, for reasons of legitimacy, or feasibility, or both.     

亲子关系与青少年冒险行为的关系:一个有调节的中介模型

该研究探讨了亲子关系与青少年冒险行为的关系,并提出一个有调节的中介模型,考察自控力的中介效应和不良同伴交往对该效应的调节效应。对1263名青少年采用问卷调查,研究工具包括关系网络问卷、中学生自我控制能力量表、同伴群体特征问卷、青少年冒险行为问卷。结果表明：（1）自控力在亲子关系与青少年冒险行为之间起中介作用,即亲子关系通过自控力间接影响青少年的冒险行为。（2）亲子关系通过自控力的间接效应受到不良同伴交往的调节,交往较多的不良同伴使低自控力青少年的冒险行为增多。因此,自控力在亲子关系与冒险行为之间存在中介效应,且该效应受到不良同伴交往的调节。     

The Social Model of Disability: A Philosophical Critique

abstract Emerging from the political activism of disabled people's movements and mainly theorised by the scholar Michael Oliver, the social model of disability is central to current debates in Disability Studies as well as to related perspectives on inclusive education. This article presents a philosophical critique of the social model of disability and outlines some of its theoretical problems. It argues that in conceptualising disability as unilaterally socially caused, the social model presents a partial and, to a certain extent, flawed understanding of the relation between impairment, disability and society, thus setting a framework that needs clarifications and extensions and presents limits to the achievement of its own aim of inclusion. This article concludes by suggesting that, despite its theoretical limits, the social model acts as a powerful and important reminder to face issues of inclusion as fundamental, moral issues.     

儒教与道教关系的个案分析

本文以汉代官方儒学的《春秋繁露》和道教经典《度人经》为具体个案,探讨了儒教与道教的关系,发现无论儒教和道教都具有神学特征,但二者的根本指向不同,儒教指向的是现实社会,而道教指向的是彼岸世界。     

荀子心"合"物论发微

关于荀子认识论的研究,学者通常都从主观和客观分别对待出发,认为荀子力图使主观"符合"客观,以期求得全面荀正确的认识.本文作者认为,这种看法可以说符合常识的理解,但却没有切近苟子的本意.子的认识论是心物一体的认识论,心不是"主观",物也不是"客观",他更没有提出"符合"论,也不以"客观"为认识的标准.荀子的认识论是心"合"物论,也就是心物相合不二之论.     

大学生抑郁情绪与成人依恋的关系研究

目的:考察大学生的抑郁情绪与成人依恋的关系方法采用流调中心用抑郁量表和成人依恋量表,对河南某高校随机抽取的288名大一至大四的学生进行了调查,并进行有关的统计分析。结果:大学生的抑郁情绪在性别与年级的交互作用上差异显著;大学生成人依恋的不同类型对其抑郁情绪有影响,其中,拒绝型和恐惧型的大学生在抑郁情绪上有显著差异。结论:拒绝型与恐惧型成人依恋在大学生的抑郁情绪上有显著差异,不同年级和性别之间的抑郁情绪有显著交互作用。     

Emmanuel Levinas: Thinker between Jerusalem and Athens A Philosophical Biography

Emmanuel Levinas died a few days before he would have been ninety years old, on December 25, 1995, very early on a Monday morning, in the Paris clinic of Beaujon, where he had been admitted the previous day with serious heart complications.