“Enacted” auditory images are ambiguous; “pure” auditory images are not

Previous research indicates that visual images are inherently unambiguous. The present study extends this argument to auditory imagery. In Experiment 1, subjects were able to reinterpret an imaged ambiguous auditory figure, but covert subvocalization apparently aided this reinterpretation. When subvocalization was blocked, reinterpretations were eliminated. Experiments 2 and 3 generalize this finding to different procedures and stimuli. Experiment 4 explores further the role of subvocalization, by showing that the likelihood of reinterpreting an imaged stimulus is directly proportional to the degree of enactment allowed. We argue that subvocalization or enactment provides an internal stimulus that is subject to reinterpretation. Without enactment, the “pure” auditory image is as unambiguous as a visual image. Thus, in both visual and auditory modalities, images come into being as representations and so are inherently meaningful.     

When the “Stakes” are Communicative

Stakeholders seek to have their “stakes” met by organizations. Organizations assess those requests and sometimes grant stakes to stakeholders. This study examines this critical function of organizations by investigating the stakeholder communication of 66 nonprofit organizations undergoing change. Implementers' self‐reports of frequency, timing, approaches, and topics of communication with 10 stakeholder groups were examined. Results indicate that implementers generally follow a quid pro quo “matching rule” wherein stakeholders' resource importance serves as the basis on which they are awarded communicative attention. However, observance of this rule was not predictive of implementers' assessments of successful change outcomes. Further, results also show that “internal” stakeholders receive the most and earliest communication, compared to stakeholders external to the organization or near the organization's boundary, and that “information dissemination” is the most prevalent communicative approach taken.     

Selective copying of the majority suggests children are broadly “optimal‐” rather than “over‐” imitators

Human children, in contrast to other species, are frequently cast as prolific “over‐imitators”. However, previous studies of “over‐imitation” have overlooked many important real‐world social dynamics, and may thus provide an inaccurate account of this seemingly puzzling and potentially maladaptive phenomenon. Here we investigate this topic using a cultural evolutionary approach, focusing particularly on the key adaptive learning strategy of majority‐biased copying. Most “over‐imitation” research has been conducted using consistent demonstrations to the observer, but we systematically varied the frequency of demonstrators that 4‐ to 6‐year‐old children observed performing a causally irrelevant action. Children who “over‐imitate” inflexibly should copy the majority regardless of whether the majority solution omits or includes a causally irrelevant action. However, we found that children calibrated their tendency to acquire the majority behavior, such that copying did not extend to majorities that performed irrelevant actions. These results are consistent with a highly functional, adaptive integration of social and causal information, rather than explanations implying unselective copying or causal misunderstanding. This suggests that our species might be better characterized as broadly “optimal‐” rather than “over‐” imitators.     

The Aggregated Extremes Effect: Not All Routes to “Balanced” Bundles are Equally Appealing

Prior research establishes that consumers are averse to extreme options, but what does a “moderate” option look like in the context of choices among bundles of items, such as investment portfolios or product assortment packs? We propose that for bundles, two paths to creating risk and reward balance exist: a “bundle‐of‐pure‐moderation” with all moderate‐risk–moderate‐reward (moderate RR) components and a “bundle‐of‐extremes,” composed of equal numbers of extreme high‐risk–high‐reward (high RR) and low‐risk–low‐reward (low RR) components. We show that consumers have stronger preference for the balanced bundle when composed of a bundle‐of‐extremes rather than a bundle‐of‐pure‐moderation, even when equated on expected value, a phenomenon we term “the aggregated extremes effect.” This effect occurs across different choice set configurations and across multiple domains. Additionally, this effect is eliminated among consumers who view the high RR and low RR components as incompatible, as this undermines the perceived attractiveness of the bundle‐of‐extremes. Finally, this effect is also eliminated by exposing consumers to a depiction of potential outcomes, such that consumers can better perceive the risk reduction upside of a bundle‐of‐pure‐moderation.     

“PURE” VERSUS “PRACTICAL” EPISTEMIC JUSTIFICATION

Abstract: In this article I distinguish a type of justification that is “epistemic” in pertaining to the grounds of one's belief, and “practical” in its connection to what act(s) one may undertake, based on that belief. Such justification, on the proposed account, depends mainly on the proportioning of “inner epistemic virtue” to the “outer risks” implied by one's act. The resulting conception strikes a balance between the unduly moralistic conception of William Clifford and contemporary naturalist virtue theories.     

The Evolving “D” in “BASIC ID”

The multimodal counseling model is based on the notion that a client's concerns can be dealt with most successfully when the counselor or therapist treats several aspects of a client's functioning. The multimodal model uses the acronym BASIC ID to identify the areas of client functioning that frequently need to be treated. These areas include behavior, affect, sensation, imagery, cognition, interpersonal relations, and drugs. The D mode, which represents drugs, is a misunderstood aspect of the BASIC ID partly because it does not seem to parallel other aspects of the model. Over the past few years the D mode has been expanded to include more than drugs, in particular, to include diet and other physiological factors. This article describes the evolution of the D mode and attempts to show the importance of a physiological dimension to the multimodal counseling approach.     

“SECOND-GUESSING”

Messages received from other social actors cannot always be taken at face value. When people have reason to question such messages, it is hypothesized that they engage in a cognitive process called “second-guessing,” wherein they reevaluate the literal interpretation of the message to determine its veridicality. Should they determine that it is not veridical, they generate an alternative, potentially more plausible interpretation. We assessed the frequency and importance of situations that might provoke reinterpretation of messages. Such situations were seen as occurring frequently and were of some importance. Social actors revealed sophisticated knowledge concerning the strengths and weaknesses of information obtained about people or events outside their direct experience. They also claimed to be able to “debias”such information, winnowing a “correct” interpretation from one judged to be “incorrect.” Preliminary data suggest that naive social actors are quite good at delecting scientifically documented sources of bias and making reasonable adjustments in their judgments to correct for those biases when plausibly present.     

ECONOMY OF “INVISIBLE DEBT” AND ETHICS OF “RADICAL HOSPITALITY”: Toward a Paradigm Change of Hospitality from “Gift” to “Forgiveness”

The purpose of this paper is to reconstruct a Christian theology of “hospitality” through a critical reading of Jacques Derrida and Friedrich Nietzsche as well as through an in‐depth biblical and theological reflection on the ethics of hospitality. Out of this reconstructive investigation, I propose a new Christian ethics of hospitality as a radical kind. As a new paradigm, this radical hospitality is distinguished from other types in that it is no longer conceived on the model of “gift”. The new Christian ethics of hospitality is rather reconstructed on the model of “forgiveness” by critically appropriating the concept of “invisible debt” that lies between the hosting citizens and the migrants in the senses of “you owe us your presence” and “I owe you my security and success.” While the hospitality of the gift defines the relationship between the hosting citizens and the migrants as givers and givees, the new paradigm of hospitality identifies this relationship as between creditors and debtors. In this regard, a new Christian hospitality called for unto citizens of the hosting society is a radical kind that challenges them to transcend the creditor‐debtor consciousness.     

THE “NEGATIVE” AND “POSITIVE” ARGUMENTS OF MORAL MODERATES

According to Shelly Kagan, “ordinary” or “moderate” moralists must establish the existence of “options.” Kagan considers a “negative” and a “positive” argument, which he regards as the most promising means by which moral moderates might establish their position. He offers objections to both, and he concludes that the moderate position is indefensible. I argue that Kagan fails in his attempt to discredit the negative argument. I also argue that the positive argument is so implausible that Kagan's elaborate criticism of it is unnecessary. The positive argument is interesting nevertheless, because of why it cannot serve the moderate's purposes.