On Freedom’s Mystery

Philosophia - This paper argues that Peter van Inwagen’s argument for the mysteriousness of metaphysical freedom does not establish its conclusion. Van Inwagen’s argument involves the...     

China''''s Policy on Freedom of Religious Belief

Intheworldtoday,religiousmotivated,related,factorsarecausingsomecountriesandregionsintoturmoilandgivingrisetoregionalstrife.Thisunfortunatesituationhasdrawntheattentionoftheinternationalcommunity.Inordertofindwaystoresolutiontheseproblems,wemustnotonlydrawlessonsfromtheseconflicts,butalsodrawontheexperiencesofourlong-standingexampleofpeacefulcoexistenceamongreligiousbelievers.China,attheothersideofthePacific,hasneverexperiencedlarge-scalereligiousconflict.Thisisaremarkablesituation.Ifyouhavea…     

Does Freedom of Speech Include Hate Speech?

I take it that liberal justice recognises special protections against the restriction of speech and expression; this is what I call the Free Speech Principle. I ask if this Principle includes speech acts which might broadly be termed ‘hate speech’, where ‘includes’ is sensitive to the distinction between coverage and protection, and between speech that is regulable and speech that should be regulated. I suggest that ‘hate speech’ is too broad a designation to be usefully analysed as a single category, since it includes many different kinds of speech acts, each of which involves very different kinds of free speech interests, and may cause very different kinds of harm. I therefore propose to disaggregate hate speech into various categories which are analysed in turn. I distinguish four main categories of hate speech, namely (1) targeted vilification, (2) diffuse vilification, (3) organised political advocacy for exclusionary and/or eliminationist policies, and (4) other assertions of fact or value which constitute an adverse judgment on an identifiable racial or religious group. Reviewing these categories in the light of the justifications for the Free Speech Principle, I will argue that category (1) is uncovered by the Principle, categories (2) and (3) are covered but unprotected, and that category (4) is protected speech.     

Freedom,emotion, and self‐subsistence

A set of basic static predicates, ‘in itself, ‘existing through itself, ‘free’, and others are taken to be (at least) extensionally equivalent, and some consequences are drawn in Parts A and ? of the paper. Part C introduces adequate causation and adequate conceiving as extensionally equivalent. The dynamism or activism of Spinoza is reflected in the reconstruction by equating action with causing, passion (passive emotion) with being caused. The relation between conceiving (understanding) and causing is narrowed down by introducing grasping (λαμβ?νω) as a basic epistemological term. Part D, ‘The road to freedom through active emotion’, introduces a system of grading with respect to the distinctions introduced in the foregoing, including ‘being in itself, ‘freedom’, etc. Active emotions are seen to represent transitions to a higher degree of freedom, the stronger and more active ones being the more conducive to rapid increase in degree of freedom. Elementary parts of the calculus of predicates are used in order to facilitate the survey of conceptual relations and to prove some theorems.     

Growth to Freedom or Support for Life?

This article reviews the recent contributions of Amartya Sen and John McMurtry to theory of international development and social justice. The author argues that both fail to give an adequate account of the current transformation of collective life and the provision of collective goods. Without such an analysis, theories of justice are incomplete. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Freedom – the abyssal ground of Freudian psychoanalysis

Freedom is an a priori condition for the way in which Freudian psychoanalysis thematizes the development, the structure and the dynamics of our psychic life; the human psyche is essentially constituted by freedom. What this really means is that psychoanalysis lacks a foundation or ground – both as a psychological science and as a kind of clinical treatment. Freedom is the abyssal ground of psychoanalysis.     

What is so Good about Moral Freedom?

Many Christian philosophers believe that it is a great good that human beings are free to choose between good and evil, so good indeed that God is justified in putting up with a great many evil choices for the sake of it. But many of the same Christian philosophers also believe that God is essentially good – good in every possible world. Unlike his sinful human creatures, God cannot choose between good and evil. In that sense, he is not 'morallyFree'. It is not easy to see how to fit these two theses into a single coherent package. If moral freedom is such a great good in human beings, why is it not a grave defect in God that he lacks it? And if the lack of moral freedom does not detract in any way from God's greatness, would it not have been better for us not to have it? I develop, but ultimately reject, what I take to be the most initially promising strategy for resolving this dilemma.     

Self‐Consciousness,Normativity and Abysmal Freedom

This article critically examines Christine Korsgaard's claim in her Tanner Lectures to find in self‐consciousness itself the norms that would answer our need for practical reasons, insofar as that need is constituted through our capacity for reflection. It shows that the way in which Korsgaard sees “the need for a reason” as arising out of self‐consciousness implies a dilemma: on the one hand, we want as the ultimate source of our reasons an authority of which we cannot coherently demand legitimation in turn; on the other, our freedom demands that nothing count for us as a reason except insofar as it is in turn endorsed in reflection. Relying on resources drawn from the tradition of reflection, this paper argues that Korsgaard's attempt to resolve this tension is unsuccessful and appeals, in response to this failure, to faith in the authority of our reasons in the absence of foundational justification of them.     

Transsexuals in Sport–Fairness and Freedom,Regulation and Law

The question of if, and under what conditions transsexuals should be allowed to participate in sports in their acquired sex is becoming increasingly relevant partly because the number of transsexuals is increasing partly because many countries now provide mechanisms for achieving legal recognition as belonging to the new acquired sex. This paper develops (1) an analysis of the justification for maintaining sex segregation in some sports and (2) an account of the rights of transsexuals to be recognised in their new sex. On the basis of these two analyses it critically evaluates two set of rules for the participation of transsexuals in elite sports: the UK guidelines issued in pursuance of the Gender Recognition Act 2004 and the International Olympic Committee's guidelines. It is argued that these guidelines are conflicting and that a modified set of criteria is more justifiable.     

Does the Kantian state dominate?: Freedom and majoritarian rule

Recently, scholars have criticized what they call the “Kantian-Republican” thesis of freedom as non-domination. The main complaint is that domination is unavoidable. This concern can be separated into the problem of state domination, which suggests that the state's intervening powers necessarily dominate its citizens, and the problem of majority domination, which suggests that the People necessarily dominate individual citizen as a result of the potential to form dominating majorities.     

Ex Nihilo or Tabula Rasa? God's Grace between Freedom and Fidelity

John Barclay’s magnum opus on grace genuinely moves the discussion forward by describing grace as unconditioned but not unconditional. This essay explores the notion of unconditioned grace as the gift given regardless of worth, disregarding any social and symbolic capital in the process. Taking Romans 9–11 as its case study, this essay argues that the deepest root of Paul’s confidence is God’s fidelity to the people God loved and chose, not God’s repeated movements of creative incongruous grace. Paul knows that in Israel’s case its symbolic capital is also spiritual in pointing towards Israel’s history with God. Far from disregarding this capital and its ethnic component, Paul professes God’s abiding faithfulness to the biological descendants of the patriarchs (Rom. 11:28). In his wrestling to hold God’s astonishing freedom and enduring fidelity together Paul sketches out his gospel of radical sin and grace, where both Jews and Gentiles are equally failing (Rom. 11:32) but met and restored precisely at the point of death and destruction.     

Religious Freedom,Free Speech and Equality: Conflict or Cohesion?

There have recently been a number of high profile political incidents, and legal cases, that raise questions about hate speech. At the same time, the tensions, and perceived conflicts, between religion and sexuality have become controversial topics. This paper considers the relationship between religious freedom, free speech and equality through an analysis of recent case law in Great Britain, Canada and the United States. The paper starts with a discussion of how conflicts between these values arise in areas such as hate speech and explores the differences between the European and US approach to this issue. In Council of Europe member states there is an increasing use of the criminal law to regulate hate speech. This paper argues that criminalisation of hate speech poses a distinct risk to the values of free speech and proposes alternative non-legal responses such as a greater use of cultural policy. The paper also explores a range of cases where the religion and sexual orientation conflict has arisen in areas such as the workplace. An analysis of these cases suggests that although there is no perfect resolution of this issue, it is possible to develop a set of principles that encourage a balance between the values of religious freedom, free speech and equality even in difficult situations where there is a conflict between religion and sexuality. The paper concludes with some practical recommendations for managing the tensions or conflicts between religious freedom, free speech and equality in liberal democracies.     

The Freedom of Thought: Patočka on Descartes and Husserl

Pato?ka highlights the central role of Cartesianism in our tradition of thinking. Yet, today, brain scientists often claim to have overcome Cartesian dualism. In this paper, I argue that the Cartesian conceptions of human nature and sensory perception remain presuppositions of brain science, where perception is largely equated with thinking. Equating perception and thinking means that thinking is a determined process, which leads to an erosion of critique. Critique, and the freedom of thought it entails, is essential to Descartes, Husserl and Pato?ka. I examine the differences, as well as the relationship, between Descartes method of doubt, Husserl’s phenomenological epochē and Pato?ka’s universalization of the epochē. I also show how Descartes’, Husserl’s and Pato?ka’s way into critique present different ways to understand self, things and the world. In conclusion, I suggest that Pato?ka presents a promising way to critique mechanistic understandings of thinking by rethinking both subject and object.     

‘Not-being-at-home’: Subject,Freedom and Transcending in Heideggerian Educational Philosophy

In my paper, by drawing on the writings Heidegger developed in the late 1920s, I wish to display what we may refer to as the thorough educational nature of Heideggerian reflection. It is my argument that the analysis of Dasein we find in the early Heidegger displays an extraordinary deep and dense reflection on selfhood and subjectivity, a reflection that is rooted in subject’s freedom and transcending. By paying attention to the interplay between these two features, I argue that in the late 1920s, while challenging the notion of an all-encompassing consciousness as the place where everything should be understood and managed, Heidegger built a conception of selfhood and subjectivity in terms of freedom, responsibility, and ongoing transformation. Such a conception, I argue, is in and of itself educational.     

Religious Belief and Freedom of Expression: Is Offensiveness Really the Issue?

An objection frequently brought against critical or satirical expressions, especially when these target religions, is that they are ‘offensive’. In this article, I indicate why the existence of diverse and conflicting beliefs gives people an incentive to formulate their complaints in the language of offence. But I also cast doubt on whether people, in saying they are offended really mean to present that as the foundation of their complaint and, if they do, whether their complaint should weigh with us. These doubts do not apply to everything we might find offensive; in particular, they do not apply to simple cases of ‘sensory offence’; but they do apply to ‘belief-based offence’. Relying on offence also implies, inequitably, that different faiths should be differently protected depending on their susceptibility to offence; and the faithful themselves should worry about the flimsiness of claims based on ‘bare knowledge’ offence. I propose a principle of respect for beliefs as a differently grounded and more plausible reason for curbing our treatment of others’ beliefs. However, that principle has a limited compass and is hemmed in by the claims of free expression. It is also less suited to dictating the content of law than to influencing our conduct within the law.     

Pleasure,Freedom and Grace: Schiller's “Completion” of Kant's Ethics∗

Sidgwick argued that utilitarianism was not rationally required because it could not be shown that a utilitarian theory of practical reason was better justified than a rival egoist theory of practical reason: there is a ‘dualism of practical reason’ between utilitarianism and egoism. In this paper, it is demonstrated that the dualism argument also applies to Kant's moral theory, the moral law. A prudential theory that is parallel to the moral law is devised, and it is argued that the moral law is no better justified than this prudential theory. So the moral law is not rationally required. It is suggested that the dualism argument is a completely general argument that ethics cannot be rationally required.     

Human Structure,Bildung and Freedom: Edith Stein’s Philosophy of Education

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - Philosophy since Nietzsche and Heidegger has been averse to essentialism and considered to be old-fashioned and outmoded in the mainstream flow...