When My Object Becomes Me: The Mere Ownership of an Object Elevates Domain‐Specific Self‐Efficacy

Past research on the mere ownership effect has shown that when people own an object, they perceive the owned objects more favorably than the comparable non‐owned objects. The present research extends this idea, showing that when people own an object functional to the self, they perceive an increase in their self‐efficacy. Three studies were conducted to demonstrate this new form of the mere ownership effect. In Study 1, participants reported an increase in their knowledge level by the mere ownership of reading materials (a reading package in Study 1a, and lecture notes in Study 1b). In Study 2, participants reported an increase in their resilience to sleepiness by merely owning a piece of chocolate that purportedly had a sleepiness‐combating function. In Study 3, participants who merely owned a flower essence that is claimed to boost creativity reported having higher creativity efficacy. The findings provided insights on how associations with objects alter one's self‐perception.     

Developing cognitions about race: White 5‐ to 10‐year‐olds' perceptions of hardship and pain

White American adults assume that Blacks feel less pain than do Whites, but only if they believe that Blacks have faced greater economic hardship than Whites. The current study investigates when in development children first recognize racial group differences in economic hardship and examines whether perceptions of hardship inform children's racial bias in pain perception. Five‐ to 10‐year‐olds (N = 178) guessed which of two items (low versus high value) belonged to a Black and a White child and rated the amount of pain a Black and a White child would feel in 10 painful situations. By age 5, White American children attributed lower‐value possessions to Blacks than Whites, indicating a recognition of racial group differences in economic hardship. The results also replicated the emergence of a racial bias in pain perception between 5 and 10. However, unlike adults', children's perceptions of hardship do not account for racial bias in pain perception.     

Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense.     

Learning Visual Units After Brief Experience in 10‐Month‐Old Infants

How does perceptual learning take place early in life? Traditionally, researchers have focused on how infants make use of information within displays to organize it, but recently, increasing attention has been paid to the question of how infants perceive objects differently depending upon their recent interactions with the objects. This experiment investigates 10‐month‐old infants' use of brief prior experiences with objects to visually organize a display consisting of multiple geometrically shaped three‐dimensional blocks created for this study. After a brief exposure to a multipart portion of the display, each infant was shown two test events, one of which preserved the unit the infant had seen and the other of which broke that unit. Overall, infants looked longer at the event that broke the unit they had seen prior to testing than the event that preserved that unit, suggesting that infants made use of the brief prior experience to (a) form a cohesive unit of the multipart portion of the display they saw prior to test and (b) segregate this unit from the rest of the test display. This suggests that infants made inferences about novel parts of the test display based on limited exposure to a subset of the test display. Like adults, infants learn features of the three‐dimensional world through their experiences in it.     

Illusory contour figures are perceived as occluding surfaces by 8‐month‐old infants

Infants have been demonstrated to be able to perceive illusory contours in Kanizsa figures. This study tested whether they also perceive these illusory figures as having the properties of real objects, such as depth and capability of occluding other objects. Eight‐ and five‐month‐old infants were presented with scenes that included a Kanizsa square and further depth cues provided by the deletion and accretion pattern of a moving duck. The 8‐month‐old infants looked significantly longer at the scene when the two types of occlusion cues were inconsistent than when they were consistent with each other, which provides evidence that they interpreted the Kanizsa square as a depth cue. In contrast, 5‐month‐olds did not show this difference. This finding demonstrates that 8‐month‐olds perceive the figure formed by the illusory contours as having properties of a real object that can act as an occluder.     

Language‐specific stress perception by 9‐month‐old French and Spanish infants

During the first year of life, infants begin to have difficulties perceiving non‐native vowel and consonant contrasts, thus adapting their perception to the phonetic categories of the target language. In this paper, we examine the perception of a non‐segmental feature, i.e. stress. Previous research with adults has shown that speakers of French (a language with fixed stress) have great difficulties in perceiving stress contrasts ( Dupoux, Pallier, Sebastián & Mehler, 1997 ), whereas speakers of Spanish (a language with lexically contrastive stress) perceive these contrasts as accurately as segmental contrasts. We show that language‐specific differences in the perception of stress likewise arise during the first year of life. Specifically, 9‐month‐old Spanish infants successfully distinguish between stress‐initial and stress‐final pseudo‐words, while French infants of this age show no sign of discrimination. In a second experiment using multiple tokens of a single pseudo‐word, French infants of the same age successfully discriminate between the two stress patterns, showing that they are able to perceive the acoustic correlates of stress. Their failure to discriminate stress patterns in the first experiment thus reflects an inability to process stress at an abstract, phonological level.     

Two‐year‐olds are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility

Data from three experiments provide the first evidence that children, at least as young as age two, are vigilant of others’ non‐verbal cues to credibility, and flexibly use these cues to facilitate learning. Experiment 1 revealed that 2‐ and 3‐year‐olds prefer to learn about objects from someone who appears, through non‐verbal cues, to be confident in performing actions on those objects than from someone who appears uncertain when performing actions on those objects. Experiment 2 revealed that when 2‐year‐olds observe only one model perform a single action, either confidently or unconfidently, they do not use the model’s level of confidence in this single instance to influence their learning. Experiment 3 revealed that 2‐year‐olds will use a single model’s level of confidence to guide their learning if they have observed that the model has a history of being either consistently confident or consistently uncertain. These findings reveal that young children selectively alter their learning based on others’ non‐verbal cues of credibility, and underscore the importance of an early sensitivity to socio‐cognitive cues for human learning and development.     

Essentialist theory of ‘hybrids’: From animal kinds to ethnic categories and race

This article presents a theory of the perception of hybrids, resulting from cross‐breeding natural animals that pertain to different species and of children parented by couples with a mixed ethnic or racial background. The theory states that natural living beings, including humans, are perceived as possessing a deeply ingrained characteristic that is called ‘essence’ or ‘blood’ or ‘genes’ in everyday discourse and that uniquely determines their category membership. If, by whatever means, the genes or essences of two animals of different species are combined in a hybrid, the two incompatible essences collapse, leaving the hybrid in a state of non‐identity and non‐belonging. People despise this state and reject the hybrid (Study 1). This devaluation effect holds with cross‐kind hybrids and with hybrids that arise from genetically combining animals from incompatible habitats across three cultures: Austria, India and Japan (Study 2). In the social world, groups and ethnic or racial categories frequently are essentialized in an analogue way. When people with an essentialist mindset judge ethnically or racially mixed offspring, they perceive a collapse of ethnic or racial essence and, consequently, denigrate these children, as compared to children from ‘pure’ in‐group or out‐group parents (Study 3). The findings are discussed in terms of the widespread ‘yuck factor’ against genetically modified animals, in terms of the cultural concepts of monstrosity and of racism and prejudice.     

Leading organizational change in the ‘new’ South Africa

This paper reports on a two‐pronged qualitative research study that used leaders’ life stories and the case research method to understand the leadership of change in 14 South African organizations. We describe how leaders led the changes required to balance the imperatives emanating from South Africa's socio‐political changes and return the country to the international business arena, as well as the challenges created by years of inequality and neglect of the socio‐economic development of the majority of its population. We found that the leaders’ life stories played a significant role in how they perceived and responded to the change situation. Four themes summarizing the actions of the leaders – namely, their efforts to embrace change, to provide hope, to connect change to African values and culture, and to champion diversity – are described. The results of the study suggest that leaders’ life stories can be an important source of information about how they perceive, interpret, and respond to change.     

Being Watched by Anthropomorphized Objects Affects Charitable Donation in Religious People

This study assessed the effect of bottom‐up visual cues—the cues of being watched—from anthropomorphized (face‐like) everyday objects on religious people's prosocial behavior. As religious people are more likely than less‐religious people to perceive faces in everyday objects and as perception of face‐like objects promotes prosociality, it was expected that religious people would become more prosocial when they perceived face‐like objects. To test the hypothesis, the study replicated a past finding in a Japanese sample in which religious people tended to perceive a face in everyday objects. Next, results showed that the decision to donate in religious people (compared to less‐religious people) was increased when a face‐like object was displayed with charitable appeals. This effect was not observed with a non‐face‐like object. The current study indicates that interaction with the surrounding environment plays an important role in motivating prosocial behavior among religious people.     

Loving and angry? Happy and sad? Understanding and reporting of mixed emotions in mother–child relationships by 6‐ to 12‐year‐olds

The Evaluative Space Model of emotions allows for the coactivation of positive‐appetitive and negative‐avoidant systems, but few studies have examined mixed emotions in child development. Existing research suggests children's understanding of opposite valence emotion combinations emerges by approximately 11 years of age. However, it is not yet clear whether various opposite valence combinations are understood at different ages, nor whether children can understand them in others before they have experienced such mixed emotions themselves. Semi‐structured interviews with 97 children investigated whether they regarded six combinations of opposite valence mixed emotions as possible, could provide reasons for them, and report their own experience of each in the context of mother–child relationships. Both understanding that such combinations are possible and ability to provide reasons for them increased after age 6 and up to age 11, but were still incomplete in 12‐year‐olds. Understanding of different opposite valence combinations developed at different rates. At each age, fewer children who showed understanding of these combinations in others reported having had a similar experience themselves. The findings suggest a need to systematically examine a range of mixed emotions in order to develop a comprehensive theory of the development of mixed emotion understanding. They also suggest extending research into adolescence.     

Children’s coding of human action: cognitive factors influencing imitaation in 3‐year‐old

We used imitation as a tool for investigating how young children code action. The study was designed to examine the errors children make in re‐enacting manual gestures they see. Thirty‐two 3‐year‐old children served as subjects. Each child was shown 24 gestures, generated by systematically crossing four factors: visual monitoring, spatial endpoint, movement path, and number of hands. The results showed no difference as a function of whether the children could visually monitor their own responses. Interestingly, children made significantly more errors when the adult's action terminated on a body part than they did when the same movement terminated near the body part. There were also significantly more errors when the demonstrated act involved crossing midline than when it did not, and more errors when it involved one hand rather than two hands. Our hypothesis is that human acts are coded in terms of goals. The goals are hierarchically organized, and because young children have difficulty simultaneously integrating multiple goals into one act they often re‐enact the goals that are ranked higher, which leads to the errors observed. We argue that imitation is an active reconstruction of perceived events and taps cognitive processing. We suggest that the goal‐based imitation in 3‐year‐olds is a natural developmental outgrowth of the perceptual–motor mapping and goal‐directed coding of human acts found in infancy.     

Workers' self‐objectification and tendencies to conform to others

Recent research showed that workers' self‐objectification—their self‐perception as objects rather than human beings—leads to detrimental intrapersonal consequences. In the present research, we explored whether this phenomenon may also affect interpersonal relations, by increasing workers' tendencies to conform. In a correlational study, Italian workers who perceived their work as more objectifying self‐objectified more—self‐attributed less human mental states and self‐perceive as more instrument‐like than human‐like—and, in turn, were more inclined to conform with others. The second study experimentally confirmed this pattern, showing that British workers who recalled an objectifying (vs. a non‐objectifying) work experience self‐objectified more. Self‐perception as instrument‐like was associated, in turn, with an increased tendency to adapt to others' opinions. The implications for organizational and social psychology are discussed.     

Children extend both words and non‐verbal actions to novel exemplars

Markson and Bloom (1997) found that some learning processes involved in children's acquisition of a new word are also involved in their acquisition of a new fact. They argued that these findings provided evidence against a domain‐specific system for word learning. However, Waxman and Booth (2000) found that whereas children quite readily extend newly learned words to novel exemplars within a category, they do not do this with newly learned facts. They therefore argued that because children did not extend some facts in a principled way, word learning and fact learning may result from different domain‐specific processes. In the current study, we argue that facts are a poor comparison in this argument since facts vary in whether they are tied to particular individuals. A more appropriate comparison is a conventional non‐verbal action on an object –‘what we do with things like this’– since they are routinely generalized categorically to new objects. Our study shows that 2¹/₂‐year‐old children extend novel non‐verbal actions to new objects in the same way that they extend novel words to new objects. The findings provide support for the view that word learning represents a unique configuration of more general learning processes.     

Does causal action facilitate causal perception in infants younger than 6 months of age?

Previous research has established that infants are unable to perceive causality until 6¼ months of age. The current experiments examined whether infants’ ability to engage in causal action could facilitate causal perception prior to this age. In Experiment 1, 4½‐month‐olds were randomly assigned to engage in causal action experience via Velcro sticky mittens or not engage in causal action because they wore non‐sticky mittens. Both groups were then tested in the visual habituation paradigm to assess their causal perception. Infants who engaged in causal action – but not those without this causal action experience – perceived the habituation events as causal. Experiment 2 used a similar design to establish that 4½‐month‐olds are unable to generalize their own causal action to causality observed in dissimilar objects. These data are the first to demonstrate that infants under 6 months of age can perceive causality, and have implications for the mechanisms underlying the development of causal perception.     

Two‐year‐olds’ understanding of self‐symbols

This study investigated 48 2.5‐year‐olds’ ability to map from their own body to a two‐dimensional self‐representation and also examined relations between parents’ talk about body representations and their children's understanding of self‐symbols. Children participated in two dual‐representation tasks in which they were asked to match body parts between a symbol and its referent. In one task, they used a self‐symbol and in the other they used a symbol for a doll. Participants were also read a book about body parts by a parent. As a group, children found the self‐symbol task more difficult than the doll‐task; however, those whose parents explicitly pointed out the relation between their children's bodies and the symbols in the book performed better on the self‐symbol task. The findings demonstrate that 2‐year‐old children have difficulty comprehending a self‐symbol, even when it is two‐dimensional and approximately the same size as them, and suggest that parents’ talk about self‐symbols may facilitate their understanding.     

The role of gaze direction and mutual exclusivity in guiding 24‐month‐olds' word mappings

In these studies, we examined how a default assumption about word meaning, the mutual exclusivity assumption and an intentional cue, gaze direction, interacted to guide 24‐month‐olds' object‐word mappings. In Expt 1, when the experimenter's gaze was consistent with the mutual exclusivity assumption, novel word mappings were facilitated. When the experimenter's eye‐gaze was in conflict with the mutual exclusivity cue, children demonstrated a tendency to rely on the mutual exclusivity assumption rather than follow the experimenter's gaze to map the label to the object. In Expt 2, children relied on the experimenter's gaze direction to successfully map both a first label to a novel object and a second label to a familiar object. Moreover, infants mapped second labels to familiar objects to the same degree that they mapped first labels to novel objects. These findings are discussed with regard to children's use of convergent and divergent cues in indirect word mapping contexts.     

In‐court versus out‐of‐court testimonies: Children's experiences and adults' assessments

The study examined the effects of different presentation modes on child witnesses' experiences and adults' perception and assessments of the same witnesses. Child witnesses (N = 108) were interviewed about an event that they had either experienced or imagined. Adult mock jurors (N = 240) watched the children's testimonies live, via two‐way closed‐circuit television (CCTV), or via a pre‐recorded video. The results showed that the live observers perceived the children in more positive terms than did the two‐way CCTV observers, who in turn perceived the children in more positive terms than did the video observers. Briefly, it seems as the more proximal the presentation mode, the more positive the observers' perception. Somewhat in contrast to these results, a significantly smaller proportion of the children who testified on video stated that they were nervous, compared to the children who testified live or via two‐way CCTV. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Preschool children's eye‐movements during pictorial recall

We investigated eye‐movements during preschool children's pictorial recall of seen objects. Thirteen 3‐ to 4‐year‐old children completed a perceptual encoding and a pictorial recall task. First, they were exposed to 16 pictorial objects, which were positioned in one of four distinct areas on the computer screen. Subsequently, they had to recall these pictorial objects from memory in order to respond to specific questions about visual details. We found that children spent more time fixating the areas in which the pictorial objects were previously displayed. We conclude that as early as age 3–4 years old, children show specific eye‐movements when they recall pictorial contents of previously seen objects.