Can bare dispositions explain categorical regularities?

One of the traditional desiderata for a metaphysical theory of laws of nature is that it be able to explain natural regularities. Some philosophers have postulated governing laws to fill this explanatory role. Recently, however, many have attempted to explain natural regularities without appealing to governing laws. Suppose that some fundamental properties are bare dispositions. In virtue of their dispositional nature, these properties must be (or are likely to be) distributed in regular patterns. Thus it would appear that an ontology including bare dispositions can dispense with governing laws of nature. I believe that there is a problem with this line of reasoning. In this essay, I’ll argue that governing laws are indispensable for the explanation of a special sort of natural regularity: those holding among categorical properties (or, as I’ll call them, categorical regularities). This has the potential to be a serious objection to the denial of governing laws, since there may be good reasons to believe that observed regularities are categorical regularities.     

Realism, Functionalism and the Conditional Analysis of Dispositions

The analysis of disposition concepts in terms of conditionals has recently been challenged by C.B. Martin's electro-fink examples, by means of which Martin tries to refute the project of a conditional analysis of dispositions in general, and to defend thereby a realistic account of dispositions. In replying to Martin, D. Lewis has presented a new and complex conditional analysis not subject to Martin's counter-examples. However, according to Lewis' analysis, dispositions are second-order properties and thus not efficacious. I argue that dispositions are efficacious properties, and therefore deserve a different analysis, in terms of counterfactual conditionals; this is not subject to Martin's counter-examples. I show that my analysis is not anti-realistic. On the contrary, my conceptual analysis of dispositions does not imply any ontological reduction that would deprive dispositions of their status as real properties of things.     

Unfinkable dispositions

This paper develops two ideas with respect to dispositional properties: (1) Adapting a suggestion of Sungho Choi, it appears the conceptual distinction between dispositional and categorical properties can be drawn in terms of susceptibility to finks and antidotes. Dispositional, but not categorical properties, are not susceptible to intrinsic finks, nor are they remediable by intrinsic antidotes. (2) If correct, this suggests the possibility that some dispositions—those which lack any causal basis—may be insusceptible to any fink or antidote. Since finks and antidotes are a major obstacle to a conditional analysis of dispositions, these dispositions that are unfinkable may be successfully analysed by the conditional analysis of dispositions. This result is of importance for those who think that the fundamental properties might be dispositions which lack any distinct causal basis, because it suggests that these properties, if they exist, can be analysed by simple conditionals and that they will not be subject to ceteris paribus laws.     

Are Dispositions Reducible?

The traditional analysis of dispositions as conditionals is subject to in-superable difficulties. Recently David Lewis has offered a new, reformed analysis intended to meet objections to the old accounts while remaining reductionist about causal powers. I argue that it succeeds in meeting only some of the objections to its predecessors. For the reductionist programme to succeed, more is needed than the correct analysis of dispositions. If dispositional properties are to be reduced, then the world must contain a reduction base. Prima facie this is not the case: the dispositions of medium-sized objects are only reducible to dispositional properties of the structural parts of the objects. The physically ultimate constituents of matter, sub-atomic particles, are simple, and have no properties that could serve as the grounding of their dispositions. Reductionists make three major responses to this argument, which I evaluate. I conclude that the world does not contain anything to which dispositions could be reduced.     

Intrinsic Finks and Dispositional/Categorical Distinction

The central theme of this paper is the dispositional/categorical distinction that has been one of the top agendas in contemporary metaphysics. I will first develop from my semantic account of dispositions what I think the correct formulation of the dispositional/categorical distinction in terms of counterfactual conditionals. It will be argued that my formulation does not have the shortcomings that have plagued previously proposed ones. Then I will turn my attention to one of its consequences, the thesis that dispositional properties are not susceptible to intrinsic finks. This thesis was first advanced by me and has ever since stirred up a big controversy, endorsed by some philosophers like Handfield, Bird, and Cohen but rejected by others like Clarke and Fara. Against this background, I will remedy my defense of the impossibility of intrinsically finkable dispositions and then refute some of apparently powerful criticisms of it. And so the upshot is that it is much more reasonable to hold on to the thesis that dispositions are intrinsically unfinkable. This will have the effect of putting the dispositional/categorical distinction on firmer and more secure ground.     

Finkish Dispositions

Many years ago, C.B. Martin drew our attention to the possibility of 'finkish' dispositions: dispositions which, if put to the test would not be manifested, but rather would disappear. Thus if x if finkishly disposed to give response r to stimulus s , it is not so that if x were subjected to stimulus r , x would give response z ; so finkish dispositions afford a counter-example to the simplest conditional analysis of dispositions. Martin went on to suggest that finkish dispositions required a theory of primitive causal powers; there, I think, he was mistaken. All that they require is an improved conditional analysis, and this improved analysis can be built upon whatever treatments of properties and of laws we may favour on other grounds.     

A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief

This paper describes and defends in detail a novel account of belief, an account inspired by Ryle's dispositional characterization of belief, but emphasizing irreducibly phenomenal and cognitive dispositions as well as behavioral dispositions. Potential externalist and functionalist objections are considered, as well as concerns motivated by the inevitably ceteris paribus nature of the relevant dispositional attributions. It is argued that a dispositional account of belief is particularly well-suited to handle what might be called "in-between" cases of believing—cases in which it is neither quite right to describe a person as having a particular belief nor quite right to describe her as lacking it.     

Static And Dynamic Dispositions

When it comes to scientific explanation, our parsimonious tendencies mean that we focus almost exclusively on those dispositions whose manifestations result in some sort of change – changes in properties, locations, velocities and so on. Following this tendency, our notion of causation is one that is inherently dynamic, as if the maintenance of the status quo were merely a given. Contrary to this position, I argue that a complete concept of causation must also account for dispositions whose manifestations involve no changes at all, and that a causal theory that fails to include these ‘static’ dispositions alongside the dynamic ones renders static occurrences miraculous.     

Condorcet and communitarianism: Boghossian’s fallacious inference

This paper defends the communitarian account of meaning against Boghossian’s (Wittgensteinian) arguments. Boghossian argues that whilst such an account might be able to accommodate the infinitary characteristic of meaning, it cannot account for its normativity: he claims that, since the dispositions of a group must mirror those of its members, the former cannot be used to evaluate the latter. However, as this paper aims to make clear, this reasoning is fallacious. Modelling the issue with four (justifiable) assumptions, it shows that Condorcet’s ‘Jury Theorem’ can be used to prove that the dispositions of the majority of the members of a group can differ from those of any individual member in a way that makes it possible to use communal dispositions as a standard with which individual dispositions can be assessed. Moreover, the argument of the paper is also shown to have general implications for the use of formal methods in the explanation of the nature of certain fallacious inferences.     

Dispositions and Antidotes

C.B. Martin has shown that the simple conditional analysis of disposition concepts (x is disposed at time t to give response r to stimulus s) is in error. This is due to finkish dispositions which are caused to disappear by the stimulus s. David Lewis has proposed an improved analysis which takes account of finkish dispositions by requiring that the appropriate causal basis remains for a sufficiently long time. I argue that Lewis' analysis also fails, because of the existence of antidotes. An antidote to a disposition interferes with its normal operation so that the stimulus does not bring about the usual response. I consider several possible defences of Lewis' analysis and a plausible repair, but find these unsatisfactory. I conclude by suggesting that an analysis of disposition concepts is not available because an unavoidable indexical element (e.g., reference to normal circumstances) is present in explanations of these concepts. In this regard they may be thought of as akin to theoretical or natural kind concepts.     

Laws of Nature Don't Have Ceteris Paribus Clauses,They Are Ceteris Paribus Clauses

Laws of nature are properly (if controversially) conceived as abstract entities playing a governing role in the physical universe. Dispositionalists typically hold that laws of nature are not real, or at least are not fundamental, and that regularities in the physical universe are grounded in the causal powers of objects. By contrast, I argue that dispositionalism implies nomic realism: since at least some dispositions have ceteris paribus clauses incorporating uninstantiated universals, and these ceteris paribus clauses help to determine their dispositions' ranges of manifestation, there are indeed abstracta which play a governing role in the physical universe. After addressing several objections (including the objection that such ‘laws’ lack sufficient independence/externality from the dispositions to count as genuinely governing), I go on to consider some broader implications of this conclusion for other debates in metaphysics and the philosophy of science. ¹      

Dispositions of the Will

According to Aquinas (1888–1906), the virtue of justice is a habit, that is to say, a stable disposition of the will. Many commentators have found this claim to be puzzling, since it is difficult to see what this might entail, beyond a simple tendency to choose and act in accordance with precepts of justice. However, this objection does not take account of the fact that for Aquinas, the will is the principle of human freedom, and as such, it is expressed through, but not limited to a capacity for particular choices and actions. It therefore needs stable dispositions, towards characteristic aims, in order to function effectively. This paper sets out a case for the cogency of Aquinas’s overall account of the will and its dispositions, by way of an examination of familiar expressions of human freedom which cannot be reduced to a series of individual choices and acts. It then turns to a closer examination of Aquinas’ analysis of the will, arguing that Aquinas’ claims about the orientation of the will towards some overarching and comprehensive good can fruitfully be understood in terms of this expansive conception of human freedom.     

Is Dispositional Causation Just Mutual Manifestation?

Dispositional properties are often referred to as ‘causal powers’, but what does dispositional causation amount to? Any viable theory must account for two fundamental aspects of the metaphysics of causation – the causal complexity and context sensitivity of causal interactions. The theory of mutual manifestations attempts to do so by locating the complexity and context sensitivity within the nature of dispositions themselves. But is this theory an acceptable first step towards a viable theory of dispositional causation? This paper argues that the reconceptualization that the theory entails comes at too high a price, and is an unnecessary step in the wrong direction: these two central aspects concerning the metaphysics of causation can and should be accounted for in a dispositional account of causation without it.     

How Reasoning Aims at Truth

Many hold that theoretical reasoning aims at truth. In this paper, I ask what it is for reasoning to be thus aim‐directed. Standard answers to this question explain reasoning's aim‐directedness in terms of intentions, dispositions, or rule‐following. I argue that, while these views contain important insights, they are not satisfactory. As an alternative, I introduce and defend a novel account: reasoning aims at truth in virtue of being the exercise of a distinctive kind of cognitive power, one that, unlike ordinary dispositions, is capable of fully explaining its own exercises. I argue that this account is able to avoid the difficulties plaguing standard accounts of the relevant sort of mental teleology.     

Investigating global effects in visual occlusion: from a partly occluded square to the back of a tree-trunk.

'Classic' occlusion examples, such as a square partly occluded by a rectangle, have given rise to so-called local and global accounts of amodal completion. Without denying the influence of local configurations, I take the position that, in the long run, any theory of amodal completion should account for global properties. After a brief review of local and global accounts, two extensions of the stimulus domain are proposed to further illustrate the necessity of global accounts. The first is the domain of so-called fuzzy regularities, i.e., regularities which are not based on metrical identities. It is argued and demonstrated that observers are even susceptible to these fuzzy regularities and that they complete partly occluded shapes accordingly. The second extension is towards 3D object completion. Theories of object representation that describe intrinsic regularities of objects appear to be most suitable to predict relative preferences of alternative object completions. Consequently, fuzzy object completions, such as the completion of the back of a tree-trunk, can be explained better by global constraints.     

The Structure of Character

In this paper, I defend a local account of character traits that posits traits like close-friend-honesty and good-mood-compassion. John Doris also defends local character traits, but his local character traits are indistinguishable from mere behavioral dispositions, they are not necessary for the purpose which allegedly justifies them, and their justification is only contingent, depending upon the prevailing empirical situation. The account of local traits I defend posits local traits that are traits of character rather than behavioral dispositions, local traits that are necessary to satisfy one of their central purposes, and local traits whose justification is dependent upon theoretical rather than empirical considerations.     

Primitivism and the Analogy between Colors and Values

The analogy between colors and values is strongly interlinked with the idea that these properties are by nature dispositions or response‐dependent properties. Indeed, that colors are essentially visible, and values are inherently motivational, cries out for a dispositional or a response‐dependent account. Recently, Primitivism has challenged the viability of the dispositional account of colors, taking the apple, for instance, to be “gloriously, perfectly, and primitively red.” Unsurprisingly, the attack on the dispositional account of colors has found a moral analogue in the view that values are sui generis irreducibly primitive properties. The question this article addresses is whether given Primitivism the analogy between colors and values is preserved; or in other words, whether Primitivism breaks the bond between the dispositional account and the analogy between colors and values.     

The Conditional Analysis of Dispositions and the Intrinsic Dispositions Thesis

The idea that dispositions are an intrinsic matter has been popular among contemporary philosophers of dispositions. In this paper I will first state this idea as exactly as possible. I will then examine whether it poses any threat to the two current versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions, namely, the simple and reformed conditional analysis of dispositions. The upshot is that the intrinsic nature of dispositions, when properly understood, doesn't spell trouble for either of the two versions of the conditional analysis of dispositions. Along the way, I will propose an extensionally correct and practically useful criterion for identifying nomically intrinsic dispositions and criticize one objection raised by Lewis against the simple conditional analysis of dispositions.