Mind and World: From Soft Naturalism to Anti-naturalism

Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research - This paper seeks to move from soft naturalism to anti-naturalism with regard to the understanding of mind and the world. John McDowell has...     

Questioning the Presumption of Naturalism in the Social Sciences: A Case Study

An important consensus has occurred across the social sciences: The best philosophy for guiding knowledge advancement omits any substantive reference to an active transcendent being. This philosophy of naturalism is so prevalent that social science disciplines renowned for examining research philosophies, such as anthropology, overlook naturalism. This article describes an anthropological case in point: E. E. Evans-Pritchard’s study of the Azande people. Evans-Pritchard is noted for his thoughtful and thorough cultural studies, and the Azande are noted for their unorthodox, non-naturalistic beliefs. We describe the interaction of this anthropologist and culture and find that he presumes a reified naturalism, which dramatically affects his understanding and treatment of this non-naturalistic culture. We then proffer several lessons and implications for pastoral psychology and psychotherapy that follow from our case study.     

Liberal Naturalism: The Curious Case of Hegel

Abstract

My aim in this paper is to defend the claim that the absolute idealism of Hegel is a liberal naturalist position against Sebastian Gardner’s claim that it is not genuinely naturalistic, and also to defend the position of ‘liberal naturalism’ from Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for it to occupy. By ‘liberal naturalism’, I mean a doctrine which is a non-reductive form of philosophical naturalism. Like Fred Beiser, I take the thesis of liberal naturalism to find support in the idealism of Hegel. I begin by first explaining what philosophical naturalism amounts to. I then move on to show, using Finn Spicer’s and Alison Stone’s understandings of philosophical naturalism, how there is a stronger form of philosophical naturalism but also how there is a weaker form as well. Having established the distinction between stronger and weaker variants of philosophical naturalism, I discuss Sebastian Gardner’s recent objections to treating absolute idealism as a genuinely naturalist position. I argue that Gardner is incorrect to claim that absolute idealism is not a genuinely naturalist position on both historical and interpretive grounds, where to do so I bring in features of Hegel’s idealism to show that Hegel was committed to liberal naturalism. In the next section of the paper, I address Ram Neta’s charge that there is no logical space for liberal naturalism. To counter this claim, I offer an Hegelian diagnosis of Neta’s charge and argue that Neta’s concern about the possibility of liberal naturalism is illegitimately motivated.     

Naturalism: A Critical Analysis

Book Information Naturalism: A Critical Analysis. Edited by William Lane Craig and J.P. Moreland. Routledge. London. 2000. Pp. xv + 286. £60.00.     

A Challenge to Brink's Metaphysical Egoism

Those who subscribe to aprudential conception of practical reason do not believe that there is a conflict between other-regarding and self-regarding norms as the former are held to be founded on the latter. Moral conduct, they maintain, is always rationally justifiable. The reasons we should fulfil the demands of other-regarding norms are the same as those we have for fulfilling self-regarding norms. David Brink has put forth an interesting and novel account of this approach to practical reason which he calls‘metaphysical egoism’. Metaphysical egoism requires that we modify our pre-theoretical understandings of self-interest on metaphysical grounds. I critically assess Brink’s argument and claim that metaphysical egoism does not adequately function as a motive or guide for action. It is susceptible to many of the same problems which strategic egoism faces. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Lost at Sea: A New Route to Metaphysical Skepticism

Global metaphysical skepticism is the view that we have no knowledge of any substantive metaphysical thesis. Various reasons have been provided in support of global metaphysical skepticism. I provide a new one. The reason, very roughly, is this. Metaphysical theses come together as packages. Such packages are very different from each other. Because the packages are so different, we cannot know of any one of the packages that it isn't true. And because we cannot know of any one of them that it isn't true, we cannot know any substantive metaphysical thesis at all. My paper makes this argument much more precise and defends each of the premises in detail.     

进化,从自然主义到自由主义

生物进化体现了生物世界从简单到复杂,从低级到高级的普遍现象,整个进化史可以人类社会出现的界划发为自然状态的进化和人类智慧,意志指导下逐渐展开的人工进化或自由进化,人类的进步必须要和自然环境和谐发展科学必将吸取系统论,理性论和人文精神而成为人类迈向自由地的有力武器。     

From Natural to Formal Language: A Case for Logical Pluralism

Topoi - I argue for a version of logical pluralism based on the plurality of legitimate formalizations of the logical vocabulary. In particular, I argue that the apparent rivalry between classical...     

From Masturbation to Homosexuality: A Case of Displaced Moral Disapproval

I argue that the decline in moral disapproval of masturbation in the American religious culture over the last half-century is directly responsible for increased moral disapproval of homosexuality. Moral disapproval previously directed toward masturbators is being redirected instead toward homosexuals. Since masturbation has been practiced by the overwhelming majority of individuals who self-identify with the American religious culture, while homosexual acts have been engaged in by a significantly smaller number of individuals who self-identify with this culture, the displacement of moral disapproval from masturbatory behavior to homosexual behavior leads to the stigmatization of those who engage in homosexual behavior, and an attitude of moral superiority and personal condescension inevitably follows. Nineteenth and twentieth century writings on the perils and evils of masturbation are cited in support of this argument.     

Metaphysical Systematics: A Lesson from Whitehead

Despite its lack of influence in analytical philosophy, and independently of its content as a process philosophy, Whitehead's system in Process and Reality affords a valuable lesson on how to pursue revisionary systematic metaphysics. This paper argues the case generally for metaphysical revision and system, describes the structure of Whitehead's categorial scheme, endorses his idea of an ultimate which is not an entity, and outlines an alternative, “digital” ultimate or basis composed of several analytical factors. [I]n the absence of a well-defined categoreal scheme of entities, issuing in a satisfactory metaphysical system, every premise in a philosophical argument is under suspicion. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

A Dogma of Naturalism

One of the major historical effects of Quine's attacks upon the analytic‐ synthetic distinction has been to popularise the belief that philosophy is continuous with science. Currently, most philosophers believe that such continuity is an inevitable consequence of naturalism. This article argues that though Quine's semantic holism does imply that there is no sharp distinction between truths discoverable by scientific investigation and truths discoverable by philosophical investigation, it also implies that there is a perfectly sharp and natural distinction between natural science and naturalistic philosophy.     

Scientific Peer Review: A Case Study From Local And Global Analyses.

The dialog between Staddon (2001, 2004) and Baum (2004) raises general questions about the nature of scientific peer review. Their dialog displays effects on peer review of differences of opinion about the relative merits of local and global analyses. Baum (1995, 1997, 2001, 2002) favors global analyses as a paradigm different, newer, and better than the local, dynamic, real‐time approach that plays a significant role in Staddon (2001). According to the Kuhnian perspective (Kuhn, 1996) Baum advocates, we can better understand his review of Staddon (2001) by considering the implications for it of his commitment to the idea that a global analysis is a superior scientific paradigm. This commentary examines some characteristics of local and global analyses, as well as some of their possible implications for peer review in the context of a reviewer's belief in the Kuhnian idea of incommensurability: According to this idea, a reviewer who either is, or who believes he is, from one paradigm is unlikely, for better or worse, to understand or perhaps even tolerate work from a different paradigm. It is recommended that a process be developed to encourage “truth in peer reviewing” to reduce possible conflicts of interest embedded in the current conception of scientific peer review.