Split identity: intransitive judgments of the identity of objects

Identity is a transitive relation, according to all standard accounts. Necessarily, if x = y and y = z, then x = z. However, people sometimes say that two objects, x and z, are the same as a third, y, even when x and z have different properties (thus, x = y and y = z, but x ≠ z). In the present experiments, participants read stories about an iceberg that breaks into two icebergs, one to the east and the other to the west. Many participants (32–54%, in baseline conditions across experiments) decided that both successors were the original iceberg, despite the different spatial locations of the successors. Experiment 1 shows that this tendency is not due to participants failing to understand both to mean both are simultaneously the original. Similarly, Experiment 2 demonstrates that the tendency is not solely due to their interpreting the question to be about properties of the icebergs rather than about the icebergs themselves. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest, instead, that participants may understand Which is the original? to mean Which, in its own right, is entitled to be the original? Emphasizing entitlement increases the number of seemingly intransitive responses, whereas emphasizing the formal properties of identity decreases them.     

Lighting position and judgments of distance of shadow-casting objects.

Participants recruited on the web performed in two experiments in which they viewed eight pictures of the same two rods in the exact same positions with shadows generated by a light source located at eight positions around the rods. In Exp. 1, participants judged how much shadows projected to the front, back, and sides of the rods facilitated the correct perception of the actual distance of the rods relative to each other. In Exp. 1 (n: 52), frontal lighting facilitated judgments more than lighting from the rear, but frontal and side lighting did not differ in facilitative effects. In Exp. 2 (n: 72), judgments of rods depicted with shadows were relative to a judgment of the rods depicted without shadows (raw scores were the value of the judgment of the shadowless rods subtracted from the value of the judgment of each of the eight sets of rods). Again, frontal lighting was more facilitative than rear lighting and frontal lighting did not differ from side lighting. However, when the average of each participant's backlighting judgments was compared with his judgment of the shadowless rods, shadows generated by backlighting were more facilitative than none.     

Monkeys perceive the orientation of objects relative to the vertical axis

Orientation processing is essential for segmenting contour from the background, which allows perception of the shape and stability of objects. However, little is known about how monkeys determine the degree and direction of orientation. In this study, to determine the reference axis for orientation perception in monkeys, post-discrimination generalization tests were conducted following discrimination training between the 67.5° and 112.5° orientations and between the 22.5° and 157.5° orientations. After discrimination training between the 67.5° and 112.5° orientations, the slope of the generalization gradient around the S⁺ orientation was broad, while the slope was steep after discrimination training between the 22.5° and 157.5° orientations. Comparing the shapes of the gradients indicated that the subjective distance between the 67.5° and 112.5° orientations was small, while the subjective distance between the 22.5° and 157.5° orientation was large. In other words, the monkeys recognized that the former and the latter distances were 45° and 135° across the vertical axis, rather than 135° and 45° across the horizontal axis, respectively. These findings indicate that the monkeys determined the degree and direction of the tilt using the vertical reference.     

Relative distance judgments of familiar and unfamiliar objects viewed under representatively natural conditions

Carlson and Tassone (1971) reported that an object of familiar size viewed at an appreciable distance is perceived to be more distant than an unfamiliar object. Six experiments were designed to examine this effect. The results indicated that the effect is not dependent on Carlson and Tassone's method for assessing perceived relative distance; it occurs at some minimum viewing distance; it is unlikely to be caused by stimulus attributes confounded with the familiar versus unfamiliar size dichotomy; appears to be specific to judgments of the familiar object itself; and it does not occur if the familiar and unfamiliar objects have a common reference target. These findings are discussed with respect to the issue of whether familiar size influences perceived distance as distinct from influencing judgments of distance.     

Two types of phenomenal instructions for size and distance judgments of objects presented on a two-dimensional plane

Demand characteristics were studied in a simple situation in which observers made size and distance estimates of stimuli presented on a two-dimensional linear perspective drawing. Half the Ss were asked questions stressing phenomenal report: The other half were asked the same questions preceded by instructions stressing the objective nature of the stimulus configuration but requesting, nonetheless, phenomenal report. Instructions resulted in a significantly greater perspective size illusion but did not affect the distance estimates. No meaningful correlations between size and distance estimates were found.     

Dividing attention between the color and the shape of objects

In many dual-task experiments, the priority observers give to each task is experimentally varied. Most experiments using this methodology have studied the effect of dividing attention between spatially distinct objects. We examined performance when attention had to be divided between stimulus attributes other than spatial location. In the first experiment, observers identified the color and the shape of a single letter. Accuracy was the same for single- and dual-task conditions, and a trialby-trial analysis revealed a strong positive correlation in the correct identification of the color and the shape. In the second experiment, color and shape judgments were separated in space, with opposite results: Dual-task performance was worse than single-task performance, and the trial-by-trial analysis indicated a strong negative correlation between tasks. The results indicated that often only one dimension was processed within a trial. The results support object and space models of attention.     

Effects of the cognitive organization of route knowledge on judgments of macrospatial distance

The effects of route segmentation were examined in a series of three experiments, Subjects in Experiment 1 divided an actual route into segments. Subjects in Experiment 2 performed corresponding proximity-judgment and distance-estimation tasks involving locations selected on the basis of the route segments identified in Experiment 1. Subjects in Experiment 3 performed a simple unidirectional distance-estimation task. Results from these experiments indicated that subjects can readily divide a route into segments and that these segments significantly bias judgments of macrospatial distance. These findings suggest a similarity between route segmentation in macrospatial cognition and categorization in other cognitive-task domains.     

See your friends close and your enemies closer: social identity and identity threat shape the representation of physical distance

Three studies demonstrated that collective identity and identity threat shape representations of the physical world. In Study 1, New York Yankees fans estimated Fenway Park, the stadium of a threatening out-group (but not Camden Yards, the stadium of a neutral out-group) to be closer than did non-Yankees fans. In Study 2, the authors manipulated identity threat among people affiliated (or not) with New York University (NYU). When Columbia University was portrayed as threatening to NYU, NYU affiliates estimated Columbia as closer than did non-affiliates, compared with when Columbia was nonthreatening. In Study 3, Americans who perceived more symbolic threats from Mexican immigration estimated Mexico City as closer. Collective identification with the in-group moderated effects of threat on distance estimations. These studies suggest that social categorization, collective identification, and identity threat work in concert to shape the representations of the physical world.     

Effect of distance instructions on size judgments

The proposition that in a reduced-cue setting subjects could use cognitive information about an object's distance to make accurate judgments of its size was tested. An improved paradigm was used to determine the effects of distance instructions per se. This paradigm also allowed independent tests of the effectiveness of cue reduction. The data indicated that cue reduction was successful and that the specific distance tendency governed size judgments when there were no distance instructions. When distance instructions were given, they produced size judgments in precisely the ratio predicted by the size-distance invariance hypothesis. However, there was a large constant error, which reflects a tendency of college students to overestimate the amount of distance signified by a verbal instruction. Hence, cognitive information in the form of verbal distance instructions has precise effects on size judgments, but the latter are not veridical, even in the absence of anchor effects from the specific distance tendency and residual perceptual cues.     

Effects of hierarchical organization on children's judgments of distance and direction

The impact of the hierarchical organization of a space on judgments of direction and distance was assessed in two studies using two-dimensional models analogous to those used by A. Stevens and P. Coupe (1978, Cognitive Psychology, 10, 422–437). In each study the models contained two stars and were divided into two parts by a curved boundary line. In the Homogeneous condition the stars were located in the same subsection. In the Congruent condition the leftmost star was in the left subsection and the rightmost star was in the right subsection. In the Incongruent condition the rightmost star was in the left subsection and the leftmost star was in the right subsection. In Experiment 1 first graders, third graders, and college students were required to remember the location of the stars. Results indicated that the first and third graders tended to use the relationship between the subsections as a clue to the relationship between the sites within them, thus extending the results of Stevens and Coupe (1978) to children. In Experiment 2 preschoolers, first, and third graders were asked to judge with the materials directly in front of them, which of the two stars was closer to a site located in one of the subsections. Results indicated that the Incongruent condition led to errors among the preschoolers and first graders but not the third graders, thus indicating that these groups tended to judge as closer the site within the same subsection even though it was really farther away. The results of both studies are discussed as indicative of a tendency among young children to impose organization on information encoded in memory and in relation to increases in metric accuracy, decentration, and efficient scanning which enable them to more accurately evaluate when such organization is and is not appropriate. Implications for behavior in large-scale environments are also discussed, with particular reference to the effect of barriers on perceptions of distance and direction.     

Salience and asymmetric judgments of physical distance

Previous research has shown that distance estimates made from memory are often asymmetric. Specifically, when A is a prominent location (a landmark) and B is not, people tend to recall a longer distance from A to B than from B to A. Results of two experiments showed that asymmetric judgments of distance are not restricted to judgments made from memory but occur also for judgments made when all relevant visual cues are still present. Furthermore, results indicated that situational salience is sufficient to produce asymmetric judgments and that distinctiveness (such as in the case of architectural landmarks) is not necessary.     

Spatial judgments in the horizontal and vertical planes from different vantage points

Todorovi? (2008 Perception 37 106-125) reported that there are systematic errors in the perception of 3-D space when viewing 2-D linear perspective drawings depending on the observer's vantage point. Because these findings were restricted to the horizontal plane, the current study was designed to determine the nature of these errors in the vertical plane. Participants viewed an image containing multiple colonnades aligned on parallel converging lines receding to a vanishing point. They were asked to judge where, in the physical room, the next column should be placed. The results support Todorovi? in that systematic deviations in the spatial judgments depended on vantage point for both the horizontal and vertical planes. However, there are also marked differences between the two planes. While judgments in both planes failed to compensate adequately for the vantage-point shift, the vertical plane induced greater distortions of the stimulus image itself within each vantage point.     

Psychological distance and judgments of causal impact

When assessing causal impact, individuals have to consider two pieces of information: the magnitude of the cause that resulted in an effect, and the magnitude of the resulting effect. In the present research, participants judged the causal impact of cause–effect relationships in which the magnitude of causes and effects varied independently. Participants mainly relied on effect magnitude, rating causal impact to be much higher when strong (vs. weak) effects emerged. When participants took cause magnitude into account (which they did, but to a lesser extent), their judgments reflected a covariation rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for strong causes generating strong effects) rather than a ratio rule (i.e., causal impact being maximal for weak causes generating strong effects). These distinct views on causal impact were moderated by psychological distance: Effect magnitude dominated judgments of proximal events, whereas cause magnitude had relatively more impact on causal judgments of distal events.