Memorability judgments for high- and low-frequency words

Five experiments were conducted in order to examine subjects’ judgments of the memorability of high- (HF) and low-frequency (LF) words in the context of a recognition memory task. In Experiment 1, the subjects were provided study/test experience with a list of HF and LF words prior to making memorability judgments for a new list of HF and LF items. The findings were consistent with previous evidence (Greene & Thapar, 1994; Wixted, 1992) suggesting that subjects are not explicitly aware of the greater recognition memorability of LF words. Experiments 2–5 embedded the memorability judgment task within the recognition test itself. In these experiments, the subjects consistently gave higher memorability ratings to LF items. The contrast between the pattern of results found when the subjects made their judgments at the time of list presentation (Experiment 1) and that when they made their judgments during the recognition test (Experiments 2–5) is consistent with recent evidence that even seemingly highly related metamnemonic judgments (e.g., ease of learning judgments vs. judgments of learning for the same items) may be based on very different factors if they occur at different points in the study/test cycle. The present findings are also consistent with the possibility that very rapid retrieval of memorability information for HF and LF words may affect recognition decisions and may contribute to the recognition memory word frequency effect.     

Ambiguity in perception and experimentation

Bruno and Cutting (1988) varied four monocular cues to perceived depth in a factorial design. Subjects judged the distance between test objects. Given main effects in the analysis of variance, the authors concluded that the perceivers integrated the four different sources of information, as opposed to simply selecting a single source. Given no interactions in the analysis of variance, the authors concluded that the integration process was additive rather than multiplicative. The ambiguity inherent in Bruno and Cutting's experiments and analyses is discussed. As presented, their results did not provide evidence for integration of depth cues or evidence for additivity, independence, and parallel processing of the cues. An additional analysis of the distribution of the rating judgments given by their subjects, however, provides some evidence for integration of the cues. The fuzzy logical model of perception (FLMP) is extended to describe perceptual recognition of depth. The model assumes independence of the cues during feature evaluation and a nonadditive integration process in which the least ambiguous cues have the greatest impact on the judgment. The FLMP is contrasted with a model assuming additivity of the cues. Because both models describe the results equally well, it remains for future researchers to provide definitive tests between the models.     

When experts are influential: Comparisons with respect to success and consistency in judgment tasks

The effects of experts' judgment behavior on the utilization of expert guidance were investigated in four experiments. In all experiments the subjects received written information about the judgments performed by two independent experts concerning a fictitious medical task. The experts' judgment behavior varied with respect to success (i.e. competency), complexity of judgment rule and consistency. The tasks varied with respect to task predictability and complexity of judgment rule. The results indicated that consistent judgment behavior on part of experts is an important premise for proper utilization of expert guidance. Inconsistency on part of experts may induce underestimation of the judgmental competence expressed by the judge, i.e. influence tended to be inappropriately low.     

Testing between the TRACE model and the fuzzy logical model of speech perception

The TRACE model of speech perception (McClelland & Elman, 1986) is contrasted with a fuzzy logical model of perception (FLMP) (Oden & Massaro, 1978). The central question is how the models account for the influence of multiple sources of information on perceptual judgment. Although the two models can make somewhat similar predictions, the assumptions underlying the models are fundamentally different. The TRACE model is built around the concept of interactive activation, whereas the FLMP is structured in terms of the integration of independent sources of information. The models are tested against test results of an experiment involving the independent manipulation of bottom-up and top-down sources of information. Using a signal detection framework, sensitivity and bias measures of performance can be computed. The TRACE model predicts that top-down influences from the word level influence sensitivity at the phoneme level, whereas the FLMP does not. The empirical results of a study involving the influence of phonological context and segmental information on the perceptual recognition of a speech segment are best described without any assumed changes in sensitivity. To date, not only is a mechanism of interactive activation not necessary to describe speech perception, it is shown to be wrong when instantiated in the TRACE model.     

Walter the banker: the conjunction fallacy reconsidered

In a famous experiment by Tversky and Kahneman (Psychol Rev 90:293–315, 1983), featuring Linda the bank teller, the participants assign a higher probability to a conjunction of propositions than to one of the conjuncts, thereby seemingly committing a probabilistic fallacy. In this paper, we discuss a slightly different example featuring someone named Walter, who also happens to work at a bank, and argue that, in this example, it is rational to assign a higher probability to the conjunction of suitably chosen propositions than to one of the conjuncts. By pointing out the similarities between Tversky and Kahneman’s experiment and our example, we argue that the participants in the experiment may assign probabilities to the propositions in question in such a way that it is also rational for them to give the conjunction a higher probability than one of the conjuncts.     

The Effects of Task Characteristics on Covariation Assessment: The Impact of Accountability and Judgment Frame

The impact of personal accountability and judgment frame on strategies for assessing covariation between two binary variables was examined in two experiments. Using a task designed to discriminate between the use of four different strategies varying in degree of sophistication it was found that subjects accountable to an audience with unknown views displayed use of more complex strategies than subjects who were not accountable. In addition, contrary to a recent attribution model (Cheng & Novick, 1992), subjects were less likely to use the conditional probability rule when the judgment question was framed in terms of causality rather than covariation, and covariation judgments did not always parallel causality judgments.     

心境对未来事件发生概率判断的影响

本研究采用短影片人为诱发心境的方法,用正性和负性两种情绪事件作为刺激材料,在控制人格变量的前提下,探讨了大学生在不同心境下对未来事件发生概率的判断中是否存在心境一致性效应。结果表明：（1）愉悦心境会增加做出积极判断的倾向,悲伤心境会增加做出消极判断的倾向;（2）无论是在愉悦心境还是在悲伤心境中,被试在对未来事件发生概率的判断上不存在性别差异。结果支持心境对未来事件发生概率判断有所影响,即诱发的心境与未来事件的效价存在一致性效应。     

Probability judgment in hierarchical learning: a conflict between predictiveness and coherence

Why are people's judgments incoherent under probability formats? Research in an associative learning paradigm suggests that after structured learning participants give judgments based on predictiveness rather than normative probability. This is because people's learning mechanisms attune to statistical contingencies in the environment, and they use these learned associations as a basis for subsequent probability judgments. We introduced a hierarchical structure into a simulated medical diagnosis task, setting up a conflict between predictiveness and coherence. Thus, a target symptom was more predictive of a subordinate disease than of its superordinate category, even though the latter included the former. Under a probability format participants tended to violate coherence and make ratings in line with predictiveness; under a frequency format they were more normative. These results are difficult to explain within a unitary model of inference, whether associative or frequency-based. In the light of this, and other findings in the judgment and learning literature, a dual-component model is proposed.     

Linda versus World Cup: Conjunctive Probabilities in Three-event Fictional and Real-life Predictions

Conjunction errors in probability judgments have been explained in terms of representatives, non-normative combination procedures, and linguistic, conversational, or conceptual misunderstandings. In two studies, a three-event variant of the classical Linda scenario (Tversky and Kahneman, 1983) was contrasted with estimates of Norway’s chances in three coming World Cup soccer matches. Conjunction errors occurred even in the latter, real-life prediction task, but much less frequently than in the fictional Linda case. Magnitude of the conjunction effect was found to be dependent upon type of constituent (fictional versus dispositional), unequal versus equal probabilities of constituent events, prediction of positive versus negative outcomes, and, for real-life predictions only, umber of constitutent events. Fictional probability ratings were close to but lower than representativenss ratings, giving evidence for a representativeness and adjustment-for-uncertainty strategy, whereas probabilities of real-life events were given a causal model interpretation.     

Recency judgments as a function of word frequency: A framing effect and frequency misattributions

The effects of word frequency on judgments of recency of item presentation were examined in two experiments. Subjects in Experiment 1 were presented two mixed lists of high- and low-frequency words followed by a list assignment task for recognized items. It was found that subjects were biased toward assigning low-frequency words to the more recently presented list. Subjects in Experiment 2 were presented a single mixed list of high- and low-frequency words followed by either a relative recency of presentation judgment task or a relative primacy of presentation judgment task. Each word pair on the tests contained one high-frequency word and one low-frequency word. It was found that, for the recency judgment task, subjects were biased to select the low-frequency item as having been presented more recently. However, on the parallel primacy judgment task, there were no effects of word frequency; moreover, overall accuracy levels were higher with primacy than with recency instructions. We interpret the effects of word frequency on recency judgments in Experiments 1 and 2 in terms of a misattribution of frequency-related differences in recollection-based recognition. The finding that recency and primacy instructions produced different patterns of results provides further evidence (Flexser & Bower, 1974) for an effect on performance of the way in which the temporal judgment task was framed.     

Influence of multiple categories on the prediction of unknown properties

Knowing an item's category helps us predict its unknown properties. Previous studies suggest that when asked to evaluate the probability of an unknown property, people tend to consider only an item's most likely category, ignoring alternative categories. In the present study, property prediction took the form of either a probability rating or a speeded binary-choice judgment. In keeping with past findings, the subjects ignored alternative categories in their probability ratings. However, their binary-choice judgments were influenced by alternative categories. This novel finding suggests that the way in which category knowledge is used in prediction depends critically on the form of the prediction.     

A quantum theoretical explanation for probability judgment errors

A quantum probability model is introduced and used to explain human probability judgment errors including the conjunction and disjunction fallacies, averaging effects, unpacking effects, and order effects on inference. On the one hand, quantum theory is similar to other categorization and memory models of cognition in that it relies on vector spaces defined by features and similarities between vectors to determine probability judgments. On the other hand, quantum probability theory is a generalization of Bayesian probability theory because it is based on a set of (von Neumann) axioms that relax some of the classic (Kolmogorov) axioms. The quantum model is compared and contrasted with other competing explanations for these judgment errors, including the anchoring and adjustment model for probability judgments. In the quantum model, a new fundamental concept in cognition is advanced--the compatibility versus incompatibility of questions and the effect this can have on the sequential order of judgments. We conclude that quantum information-processing principles provide a viable and promising new way to understand human judgment and reasoning.     

Positive and negative remember judgments and ROCs in the plurals paradigm: Evidence for alternative decision strategies

Using old-new ratings and remember-know judgments we explored the plurals paradigm, in which studied words must be distinguished from plurality-changed lures. The paradigm allowed us to investigate negative remembering—that is, the remembering of a plural-altered study item; capacity for this judgment was found to be poorer than or equivalent to the conventional positive remembering. A response-bias manipulation affected positive but not negative remembering. The ratings were used to construct ROC curves and test the prediction of the most common dual-process theory of recognition memory (Yonelinas, 2001) that the amount of recollection can be independently estimated from ROC curves and from remember judgments. By fitting the individual data with pure signal detection theory (SDT) models and dual-process models that combined SDT and high-threshold components (HTSDT), we identified two types of subjects. For those who were better described by HTSDT, the predicted convergence of remember-know and ROC measures was observed. For those who were better described by SDT, the ROC intercept could not predict the remember rate. The data are consistent with the idea that all subjects rely on the same representation but base their decisions on different partitions of a decision space.     

Cognitive processing of multidimensional stimuli in schizophrenia: formal modeling of judgment speed and content

This article presents a formal, mathematical account of relations between response times on simple cognitive tasks and content of complex judgments involving multiple stimulus dimensions for people with schizophrenia. Changes in multidimensional judgments were viewed as the result of interference from increased stages of encoding with respect to the individual dimensions. Information on dimensional properties encoded earlier in a judgment trial was considered to be more susceptible to loss over the rest of the trial, because of a larger number of encoding stages applied to the remaining dimensional properties. Model predictions were tested with samples of paranoid and nonparanoid schizophrenic participants and controls. Unidimensional encoding speed was assessed by reaction times in an explicit similarity ratings task, and multidimensional judgment content was assessed by the relative importance of different stimulus dimensions to participants' ratings in an implicit similarity ratings task. Results support validity of the model.     

On the nature of the conjunction fallacy

In a seminal work, Tversky and Kahneman showed that in some contexts people tend to believe that a conjunction of events (e.g., Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement) is more likely to occur than one of the conjuncts (e.g., Linda is a bank teller). This belief violates the conjunction rule in probability theory. Tversky and Kahneman called this phenomenon the “conjunction fallacy”. Since the discovery of the phenomenon in 1983, researchers in psychology and philosophy have engaged in important controversies around the conjunction fallacy. The goal of this paper is to explore the most important of these controversies, namely, the controversy about the nature of the conjunction fallacy. Is the conjunction fallacy mainly due to a misunderstanding of the problem by participants (misunderstanding hypothesis) or is it mainly due to a genuine reasoning bias (reasoning bias hypothesis)? A substantial portion of research on the topic has been directed to test the misunderstanding hypothesis. I review this literature and argue that a stronger case can be made against the misunderstanding hypothesis. Thus, I indirectly provide support for the reasoning bias hypothesis.     

Confidence in judgments based on incomplete information: An investigation using both hypothetical and real gambles

This study assessed how confidence in judgments is affected by the need to make inferences about missing information. Subjects indicated their likelihood of taking each of a series of gambles based on both probability and payoff information or only one of these sources of information. They also rated their confidence in each likelihood judgment. Subjects in the Explicit Inference condition were asked to explicitly estimate the values of missing information before making their responses while subjects in the Implicit Inference condition were not. The manner in which probability information was framed was also manipulated. Experiment 1 employed hypothetical gambles and Experiment 2 employed gambles with real money. Expressed likelihood of taking gambles was higher when probability was phrased in terms of '% chance of winning' rather than '% chance of losing', but this difference was somewhat less with real gambles than with hypothetical gambles. Confidence ratings in each experiment were actually higher on incomplete information trials than on complete information trials in the Explicit Inference condition. Results were related to the general issue of confidence in judgments.     

Predicting similarity and categorization from identification.

In this article, the relation between the identification, similarity judgment, and categorization of multidimensional perceptual stimuli is studied. The theoretical analysis focused on general recognition theory (GRT), which is a multidimensional generalization of signal detection theory. In one application, 2 Ss first identified a set of confusable stimuli and then made judgments of their pairwise similarity. The second application was to Nosofsky's (1985b, 1986) identification-categorization experiment. In both applications, a GRT model accounted for the identification data better than Luce's (1963) biased-choice model. The identification results were then used to predict performance in the similarity judgment and categorization conditions. The GRT identification model accurately predicted the similarity judgments under the assumption that Ss allocated attention to the 2 stimulus dimensions differently in the 2 tasks. The categorization data were predicted successfully without appealing to the notion of selective attention. Instead, a simpler GRT model that emphasized the different decision rules used in identification and categorization was adequate.