Perceptual-cognitive universals as reflections of the world

The universality, invariance, and elegance of principles governing the universe may be reflected in principles of the minds that have evolved in that universe--provided that the mental principles are formulated with respect to the abstract spaces appropriate for the representation of biologically significant objects and their properties. (1) Positions and motions of objects conserve their shapes in the geometrically fullest and simplest way when represented as points and connecting geodesic paths in the six-dimensional manifold jointly determined by the Euclidean group of three-dimensional space and the symmetry group of each object. (2) Colors of objects attain constancy when represented as points in a three-dimensional vector space in which each variation in natural illumination is canceled by application of its inverse from the three-dimensional linear group of terrestrial transformations of the invariant solar source. (3) Kinds of objects support optimal generalization and categorization when represented, in an evolutionarily-shaped space of possible objects, as connected regions with associated weights determined by Bayesian revision of maximum-entropy priors.     

On the system of representations in a group situation

Relations between the representations of group members with respect to different elements in the group set-up: The task, the others, the self and the group as a whole are analyzed from data collected in four experiments. Results show that the interrelations between these representations in the subjects' cognitive universe are determined by a combination of three separate principles which deal respectively with: 1) the degree of generality, complexity or semantic ‘globality’ of each element of the situation in the subjects' representation thereof; 2) the functional importance (particularly in determining behaviours in the situation) of each representation, as well as its centrality within the subjects' representational system. The functional importance and centrality of a given representation seem to be directly related in turn to the perceived normative character of the represented objects in terms of the group's objectives; 3) a process of social comparison between the self and others, according to which each group member tends to perceive himself as being more in harmony than the others with the norms and requirements of the situation as he perceives them. The discussion deals with the generality of the above results.     

Monotone spline transformations for dimension reduction

Consider a set of data consisting of measurements ofn objects with respect top variables displayed in ann ×p matrix. A monotone transformation of the values in each column, represented as a linear combination of integrated basis splines, is assumed determined by a linear combination of a new set of values characterizing each row object. Two different models are used: one, an Eckart-Young decomposition model, and the other, a multivariate normal model. Examples for artificial and real data are presented. The results indicate that both methods are helpful in choosing dimensionality and that the Eckart-Young model is also helpful in displaying the relationships among the objects and the variables. Also, results suggest that the resulting transformations are themselves illuminating.     

We infer light in space

In studies of lightness and color constancy, the terms lightness and brightness refer to the qualia corresponding to perceived surface reflectance and perceived luminance, respectively. However, what has rarely been considered is the fact that the volume of space containing surfaces appears neither empty, void, nor black, but filled with light. Helmholtz (1866/1962) came closest to describing this phenomenon when discussing inferred illumination, but previous theoretical treatments have fallen short by restricting their considerations to the surfaces of objects. The present work is among the first to explore how we infer the light present in empty space. It concludes with several research examples supporting the theory that humans can infer the differential levels and chromaticities of illumination in three-dimensional space.     

Segregation by color and stereoscopic depth in three-dimensional visual space

Two experiments were conducted to investigate how color and stereoscopic depth information are used to segregate objects for visual search in three-dimensional (3-D) visual space. Eight observers were asked to indicate the alphanumeric category (letter or digit) of the target which had its unique color and unique depth plane. In Experiment 1, distractors sharing a common depth plane or a common color appeared in spatial contiguity in thexy plane. The results suggest that visual search for the target involves examination of kernels formed by homogeneous items sharing the same color and depth. In Experiment 2, thexy contiguity of distractors sharing a common color or a common depth plane was varied. The results showed that when target-distractor distinction becomes more difficult on one dimension, the other dimension becomes more important in performing visual search, as indicated by a larger effect on search time. This suggests that observers can make optimal use of the information available. Finally, color had a larger effect on search time than did stereoscopic depth. Overall, the results support models of visual processing which maintain that perceptual segregation and selective attention are determined by similarity among objects in 3-D visual space on both spatial and nonspatial stimulus dimensions.     

Ecobiopsychology

The latest scientific discoveries acknowledge that the universe, from the atom to the galaxies, is a system behaving as a whole where each single set composing it seems informed by the global state of the system. In-formation can be exemplified as a “software” governing the “hardware” that is composed of the objects of the universe. This in formation comes from an Akashic Field or archetypal field that can breed each single form as well as the relevant states of consciousness. Ecobiopsychology, through the study of vital analogies and symbols, supports reflective consciousness to have access to the archetypal field studying the relation between the aspects of matter (infrared) and those referred to the psyche (ultraviolet). With this perspective the human's reflective consciousness field can gradually expand until becoming accessible to the reality of the Unus Mundus, represented by the coherence of the single structures of the universe and their own embedded state of implicit consciousness.     

Visual discrimination of rotated 3D objects in Malawi cichlids (Pseudotropheus sp.): a first indication for form constancy in fishes

Fish move in a three-dimensional environment in which it is important to discriminate between stimuli varying in colour, size, and shape. It is also advantageous to be able to recognize the same structures or individuals when presented from different angles, such as back to front or front to side. This study assessed visual discrimination abilities of rotated three-dimensional objects in eight individuals of Pseudotropheus sp. using various plastic animal models. All models were displayed in two choice experiments. After successful training, fish were presented in a range of transfer tests with objects rotated in the same plane and in space by 45° and 90° to the side or to the front. In one experiment, models were additionally rotated by 180°, i.e., shown back to front. Fish showed quick associative learning and with only one exception successfully solved and finished all experimental tasks. These results provide first evidence for form constancy in this species and in fish in general. Furthermore, Pseudotropheus seemed to be able to categorize stimuli; a range of turtle and frog models were recognized independently of colour and minor shape variations. Form constancy and categorization abilities may be important for behaviours such as foraging, recognition of predators, and conspecifics as well as for orienting within habitats or territories.     

The optimal number of alternatives at a choice point with travel time considered

The problem of optimal design is considered for tasks that can be represented as n choice points with a_i alternatives per choice point. Examples are mazes or multiple choice tests. Some fixed time t′ elapses between choice points, say traveling from one to the other or reading a question, and additional time t is spent considering each alternative at the choice point. For fixed total time, the goal is to find the optimum number of choice points and the optimum number of alternatives at each choice point. In general, the longer the time spent between choice points, the greater the optimum number of alternatives at each point.     

Pseudocontingencies derived from categorically organized memory representations

Pseudocontingencies (PCs) allow for inferences about the contingency between two variables X and Y when the conditions for genuine contingency assessment are not met. Even when joint observations X _i and Y _i about the same reference objects i are not available or are detached in time or space, the correlation r(X _i ,Y _i ) is readily inferred from base rates. Inferred correlations are positive (negative) if X and Y base rates are skewed in the same (different) directions. Such PC inferences afford useful proxies for actually existing contingencies. While previous studies have focused on PCs due to environmental base rates, the present research highlights memory organization as a natural source of PC effects. When information about two attributes X and Y is represented in a hierarchically organized categorical memory code, as category-wise base rates p(X) and p(Y), the reconstruction of item-level information from category base rates will naturally produce PC effects. Three experiments support this contention. When the yes base rates of two respondents in four questionnaire subscales (categories) were correlated, recalled and predicted item-level responses were correlated in the same direction, even when the original responses to specific items within categories were correlated in the opposite direction.     

Preview benefit in speaking occurs regardless of preview timing

Speakers access information from objects they will name but have not looked at yet, indexed by preview benefit—faster processing of the target when a preview object previously occupying its location was related rather than unrelated to the target. This suggests that speakers distribute attention over multiple objects, but it does not reveal the time course of the processing of a current and a to-be-named object. Is the preview benefit a consequence of attention shifting to the next-to-be-named object shortly before the eyes move to that location, or does the benefit reflect a more unconstrained deployment of attention to upcoming objects? Using the multiple-object naming paradigm with a gaze-contingent display change manipulation, we addressed this issue by manipulating the latency of the onset of the preview (SOA) and whether the preview represented the same concept as (but a different visual token of) the target or an unrelated concept. The results revealed that the preview benefit was robust, regardless of the latency of the preview onset or the latency of the saccade to the target (the lag between preview offset and fixation on the target). Together, these data suggest that preview benefit is not restricted to the time during an attention shift preceding an eye movement, and that speakers are able to take advantage of information from nonfoveal objects whenever such objects are visually available.     

A nonmetric variety of linear factor analysis

The numbers in each column of ann ×m matrix of multivariate data are interpreted as giving the measured values of alln of the objects studied on one ofm different variables. Except for random error, the rank order of the numbers in such a column is assumed to be determined by a linear rule of combination of latent quantities characterizing each row object with respect to a small number of underlying factors. An approximation to the linear structure assumed to underlie the ordinal properties of the data is obtained by iterative adjustment to minimize an index of over-all departure from monotonicity. The method is “nonmetric” in that the obtained structure in invariant under monotone transformations of the data within each column. Except in certain degenerate cases, the structure is nevertheless determined essentially up to an affine transformation. Tests show (a) that, when the assumed monotone relationships are strictly linear, the recovered structure tends closely to approximate that obtained by standard (metric) factor analysis but (b) that, when these relationships are severely nonlinear, the nonmetric method avoids the inherent tendency of the metric method to yield additional, spurious factors. From the practical standpoint, however, the usefulness of the nonmetric method is limited by its greater computational cost, vulnerability to degeneracy, and sensitivity to error variance.     

How accurate is size and distance perception for very far terrestrial objects? Function and causality

This study investigated absolute estimation of size and distance for natural and artificial objects at viewing distances of 1.1–15.3 km (Experiments 1 and 2) and 0.4–5.0 m (Experiment 3). The main results were that, regardless of distance range, size and distance estimates (S′ andD′) were related to objective size and distance (S andD), respectively, by a power function with an exponent of unity, but great individual differences in exponent were obtained for the far objects. The ratioS′/D′ was reasonably represented byS′/D′ =Kθ ⁿ andS′/D′ = tan(aθ +b), rather thanS′/D′ = tan θ, where θ is the visual angle. Partial correlations were obtained to examine whether (1) apparent size is determined by taking apparent distance into account or (2) both apparent size and apparent distance are determined directly by external stimuli. The combined data for the far objects and the data for the close objects showed that there were high correlations betweenS andS′ and betweenD andD′ and a low correlation betweenD′ andS′. The data of Experiment 2 showed that bothD′ andS′ were highly correlated withS D, and θ, and there was a high positive correlation betweenD′ andS′. It was suggested that the direct-perception model is valid under some situations, but the taking-into-account model is not supported in any set of data.     

Detecting conjunctions of color and form in parallel

Researchers have proposed that graphical efficacy may be determined, in part, by the nature of the perceptual interactions that exist between attributes used to create graphical displays. One extreme type of interaction isintegrality, in which two or more physical dimensions are represented as a single psychological dimension in the observer. An alternative type of interaction isconfigurality, in which a global emergent dimension is availableto the observer in addition to the component attributes. Thirteen stimulus sets, each composed of attributes commonly used in the design of graphs, were submitted to the performance-based diagnostics of integrality and configurality. Analyses suggest a continuum of configurality among the present stimulus sets, with little evidence for integral graphical attributes. The configural pattern of results was more common when two identical dimensions were paired (homogeneous stimuli) than when two different dimensions were paired (heterogeneous stimuli). However, there was no evidence that pairs of dimensions belonging to a single object (object integration) were any more configural than dimensions belonging to different objects. Object integration was, however, consistently related to inefficient performance in tasks requiring the filtering of one of two component dimensions.     

The real deal: What judgments of really reveal about how people think about artifacts

It is widely assumed that artifacts fall into distinct kinds. These kinds are generally identified by appeal to words—chair versus stool versus bowl versus vase, and so on. But contextual and cross-linguistic variation in what artifacts are grouped together by name raise questions about whether artifacts indeed do fall into fixed kinds. Can judgments of what artifacts really are reveal a true kind membership, distinct from what the objects are called in communicative contexts? In two experiments, we examined what drives judgments of what an artifact really is and what these judgments can tell us about how people think about artifacts. In both experiments, we found that people failed to treat artifacts as having a definitive kind membership in their judgments of what the artifacts really were. Instead, really judgments reflected the typicality of objects with respect to the things normally called by the queried name. If these judgments are taken as direct evidence about the existence of artifact kinds, the outcome argues against such kinds. Alternatively, really judgments themselves may be fundamentally linguistic in nature, and so unable to tap into underlying kind memberships. In either case, if such kinds exist, they remain to be found. A more likely reality may be that intuitions about the existence of artifact kinds reflect the partial clustering of objects in similarity space, plus the fact that each language provides names for some constellations of objects in that space.     

Young infants’ reasoning about physical events involving inert and self-propelled objects

The present research examined whether 5- to 6.5-month-old infants would hold different expectations about various physical events involving a box after receiving evidence that it was either inert or self-propelled. Infants were surprised if the inert but not the self-propelled box: reversed direction spontaneously (Experiment 1); remained stationary when hit or pulled (Experiments 3 and 3A); remained stable when released in midair or with inadequate support from a platform (Experiment 4); or disappeared when briefly hidden by one of two adjacent screens (the second screen provided the self-propelled box with an alternative hiding place; Experiment 5). On the other hand, infants were surprised if the inert or the self-propelled box appeared to pass through an obstacle (Experiment 2) or disappeared when briefly hidden by a single screen (Experiment 5). The present results indicate that infants as young as 5 months of age distinguish between inert and self-propelled objects and hold different expectations for physical events involving these objects, even when incidental differences between the objects are controlled. These findings are consistent with the proposal by Gelman, R. (1990). First principles organize attention to and learning about relevant data: Number and the animate–inanimate distinction as examples. Cognitive Science, 14, 79–106, Leslie, A. M. (1994). ToMM, ToBY, and Agency: Core architecture and domain specificity. In L. A. Hirschfeld & S. A. Gelman (Eds.), Mapping the mind: Domain specificity in cognition and culture (pp. 119–148). New York: Cambridge University Press, and others that infants endow self-propelled objects with an internal source of energy. Possible links between infants’ concepts of self-propelled object, agent, and animal are also discussed.     

Infinity in Ontology and Mind

Two fundamental categories of any ontology are the category of objects and the category of universals. We discuss the question whether either of these categories can be infinite or not. In the category of objects, the subcategory of physical objects is examined within the context of different cosmological theories regarding the different kinds of fundamental objects in the universe. Abstract objects are discussed in terms of sets and the intensional objects of conceptual realism. The category of universals is discussed in terms of the three major theories of universals: nominalism, realism, and conceptualism. The finitude of mind pertains only to conceptualism. We consider the question of whether or not this finitude precludes impredicative concept formation. An explication of potential infinity, especially as applied to concepts and expressions, is given. We also briefly discuss a logic of plural objects, or groups of single objects (individuals), which is based on Bertrand Russell’s (1903, The principles of mathematics, 2nd edn. (1938). Norton & Co, NY) notion of a class as many. The universal class as many does not exist in this logic if there are two or more single objects; but the issue is undecided if there is just one individual. We note that adding plural objects (groups) to an ontology with a countable infinity of individuals (single objects) does not generate an uncountable infinity of classes as many.

Object representations are biased toward each other through statistical learning

The visual system is remarkably efficient at extracting regularities from the environment through statistical learning. While such extraction has extensive consequences on cognition, it is unclear how statistical learning shapes the representations of the individual objects that comprise the regularities. Here we examine how statistical learning alters object representations. In three experiments, participants were exposed to either random arrays containing objects in a random order, or structured arrays containing object pairs where two objects appeared next to each other in fixed spatial or temporal configurations. After exposure, one object in each pair was briefly presented and participants judged the location or the orientation of the object without seeing the other object in the pair. We found that when an object reliably appeared next to another object in space, it was judged as being closer to the other object in space even though the other object was never presented (Experiments 1 and 2). Likewise, when an object reliably preceded another object in time, its orientation was biased toward the orientation of the other object even though the other object was never presented (Experiment 3). These results demonstrated that statistical learning fundamentally shapes how individual objects are represented in visual memory, by biasing the representation of one object toward its co-occurring partner. Importantly, participants in all experiments were not explicitly aware of the regularities. Thus, the bias in object representations was implicit. The current study reveals a novel impact of statistical learning on object representation: spatially co-occurring objects are represented as being closer in space, and temporally co-occurring objects are represented as having more similar features.     

Perceptual adaptation to structure-from-motion depends on the size of adaptor and probe objects,but not on the similarity of their shapes

Perceptual adaptation destabilizes the phenomenal appearance of multistable visual displays. Prolonged dominance of a perceptual state fatigues the associated neural population, lowering the likelihood of renewed perception of the same appearance (Nawrot & Blake in Perception & Psychophysics, 49, 230–44, 1991). Here, we used a selective adaptation paradigm to investigate perceptual adaptation for the illusory rotation of ambiguous structure-from-motion (SFM) displays. Specifically, we generated SFM objects with different three-dimensional shapes and presented them in random order, separating successive objects by brief blank periods, which included a mask. To assess the specificity of perceptual adaptation to the shape of SFM objects, we established the probability that a perceived direction of rotation persisted between successive objects of similar or dissimilar shape. We found that the strength of negative aftereffects depended on the volume, but not the shape, of adaptor and probe objects. More voluminous objects were both more effective as adaptor objects and more sensitive as probe objects. Surprisingly, we found these volume effects to be completely independent, since any relationship between two shapes (such as overlap between volumes, similarity of shape, or similarity of velocity profiles) failed to modulate the negative aftereffect. This pattern of results was the opposite of that observed for sensory memory of SFM objects, which reflects similarity between objects, but not volume of individual objects (Pastukhov et al. in Attention, Perception & Psychophysics, 75, 1215–1229, 2013). The disparate specificities of perceptual adaptation and sensory memory for identical SFM objects suggest that the two aftereffects engage distinct neural representations, consistent with recent brain imaging results (Schwiedrzik et al. in Cerebral Cortex, 2012).     

The relation between hierarchical and euclidean models for psychological distances

In one well-known model for psychological distances, objects such as stimuli are placed in a hierarchy of clusters like a phylogenetic tree; in another common model, objects are represented as points in a multidimensional Euclidean space. These models are shown theoretically to be mutually exclusive and exhaustive in the following sense. The distances among a set ofn objects will be strictly monotonically related either to the distances in a hierarchical clustering system, or else to the distances in a Euclidean space of less thann — 1 dimensions, but not to both. Consequently, a lower bound on the number of Euclidean dimensions necessary to represent a set of objects is one less than the size of the largest subset of objects whose distances satisfy the ultrametric inequality, which characterizes the hierarchical model.This work was supported in part by Grant GB-13588X from the National Science Foundation. I would like to thank L. M. Kelly and A. A. J. Marley for their helpful comments and suggestions.