Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Divided attention at retrieval disrupts knowing but not remembering

The view that remember and know responses can be explained within a dual-process framework has recently been questioned (e.g., Gardiner, Konstantinou, Karayianni, & Gregg, 2005). The aims of the present study were to investigate further discrepancies between remember/know (R/K) studies and dual-process models of recognition memory. In two experiments participants were required to make old/new and R/K decisions under full and divided attention conditions. Experiment 1 used a two-step R/K procedure and showed that attention during retrieval reduced overall recognition performance. Experiment 2 used a one-step R/K procedure and showed that dividing attention at retrieval only affected know responses, suggesting that knowing but not remembering relies on controlled retrieval processes. These findings and findings from recent research provide evidence that is inconsistent with the dual-process explanation for R/K research.     

Adults' memories of childhood: affect, knowing, and remembering

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.     

Adults' memories of childhood: Affect,knowing, and remembering

Adult questionnaire respondents reported, for each of a number of events, if they had experienced that event during childhood and, if so, if they remembered the experience or merely knew it had happened. Respondents also rated the emotion of each event and judged whether they would remember more about each reportedly experienced event if they spent more time trying to do so. Study 1 respondents were 96 undergraduates, whereas Study 2 tested 93 community members ranging widely in age. Respondents often reported no recollections of reportedly experienced events. Reportedly experienced events rated as emotional were more often recollected than those rated as neutral, and those rated as positive were more often recollected than those rated as negative. Predicted ability to remember more was related to current memory. Claims of remembering reportedly experienced events increased with age, but predicted ability to remember more about them declined with age.     

The role of decision processes in remembering and knowing

Participants in recognition memory studies are now often asked to partition recognized items into ones that are accompanied by some recollective experience (those they remember) and ones that are not so accompanied (but which they know were previously encountered). Rather than detecting separate memory systems, such attempts to distinguish between remembering and knowing are better understood as a division of positive recognition responses into those that lie above a second decision criterion (remember) and those that do not (know). As such, the amount of memory associated with knowing is strongly dependent on the placement of the decision criteria. A meta-analysis of published data and a simple experiment tested predictions from the decision process analysis of remember/know responses.     

Processing speed, executive function, and age differences in remembering and knowing.

A group of young (n = 52, M = 23.27 years) and old (n = 52, M = 68.62 years) adults studied two lists of semantically unrelated nouns. For one list a time of 2 s was allowed for encoding, and for the other, 5 s. A recognition test followed where participants classified their responses according to Gardiner's (1988) remember-know procedure. Age differences for remembering and knowing were minimal in the faster 2-s encoding condition. However, in the longer 5-s encoding condition, younger persons produced significantly more remember responses, and older adults a greater number of know responses. This dissociation suggests that in the longer encoding condition, younger adults utilized a greater level of elaborative rehearsal governed by executive processes, whereas older persons employed maintenance rehearsal involving short-term memory. Statistical control procedures, however, found that independent measures of processing speed accounted for age differences in remembering and knowing and that independent measures of executive control had little influence. The findings are discussed in the light of contrasting theoretical accounts of recollective experience in old age.     

Transferring voice effects in recognition memory from remembering to knowing

In five experiments, we investigated the effects of voice congruency (same vs. different voices at study and at test) on remembering and knowing in recognition memory. With low- and medium-frequency three- or four-syllable words, a voice congruency effect occurred only in remembering. With nonwords, voice congruency effects occurred both in remembering and in knowing. With nonwords and divided attention at study, the voice congruency effect transferred almost completely from remembering to knowing. By showing a transfer of effects from remembering to knowing as encoding became more impoverished, these findings support a distinctiveness/fluency account of remembering and knowing as well as the theory that remembering and knowing indicate retrieval of events from episodic and semantic memory systems, respectively.     

Context effects on remembering and knowing: the expectancy heuristic

Three experiments are reported examining the effect of context on remember-know judgments. In Experiments 1 and 2, medium-frequency words were intermixed with high-frequency or low-frequency words at study or at test, respectively. Remember responses were greater for medium-frequency targets when they were studied or tested among high-frequency, as compared with low-frequency, words. The authors proposed a decision-based mechanism called "the expectancy heuristic" to explain why remember responses were more likely when items were studied or tested in the context of words that were relatively less distinct. According to the expectancy heuristic, when items on a recognition test exceed an expected level of memorability they will be given a remember judgment but when they do not, but are still more familiar than new words, they will be given a know judgment. Experiment 3, which varied expectancies about the strength of tested targets, demonstrated the use of the expectancy heuristic, indicating that it operates by selectively influencing the remember criterion rather than by influencing recollection of studied items.     

On dreams,imaginative knowing and not knowing: Appearance,identity, and shame

The American Journal of Psychoanalysis - This paper explores the relation of concepts of the unconscious to notions of the imagination, and both to the dynamics of shame. In this discussion dreams...     

Emotional valence influences the neural correlates associated with remembering and knowing

In the present study, we examined whether emotional valence modulates the neural processes that are engaged during the encoding of information that is later vividly remembered versus that which is only known to be familiar. Participants underwent an fMRI scan while viewing positive, negative, and neutral stimuli. Later, recognized items were labeled as either remembered or known. Negative items that were later vividly remembered recruited temporo-occipital regions associated with sensory processing more than did positive or neutral items that were vividly remembered. The encoding of positive information later known recruited the cingulate gyrus and bilateral frontal and parietal areas—regions associated with episodic and semantic retrieval and self-referential processing—more than did the encoding of negative or neutral items that were later known. These results suggest that memories for negative items may be vividly recollected due to increased sensory processing during encoding, whereas enhanced gist-based processing of positive information may lead to increased feelings of familiarity.     

Forgetting by remembering: Stereotype inhibition through rehearsal of alternative aspects of identity

We applied previous research on retrieval-induced forgetting to the issue of stereotype inhibition. All participants learned about a target person who belonged to a stereotyped group, and then practiced retrieving a subset of the target’s characteristics. When participants practiced individuating information about the target, they showed inhibited memory for the target’s stereotypic traits. When participants practiced stereotypic information about the target, they showed inhibited memory for: (a) traits associated with another stereotyped aspect of the target’s identity; (b) individuating traits of the target; and (c) other, unpracticed traits of the target associated with the same stereotype. Stereotype belief moderated these inhibition effects; the more strongly participants believed in the stereotype, the less inhibition of stereotype-relevant traits they showed.     

When knowing becomes remembering: individual differences in susceptibility to suggestion

In two experiments, the authors explored factors that might influence a person's tendency to make source-monitoring errors about autobiographical memories. In the first experiment, undergraduates retrieved a memory from childhood (a) that was known about but not remembered, (b) that was remembered, or (c) for which they were unsure of their memory's source. After writing down the memory, experimental groups listened to a guided visualization tape and answered questions about the event--interventions designed to help them focus on details of their memory. Controls also retrieved and wrote down a memory; however, instead of visualizing the memory, they were instructed to conduct a visual search task. Results indicated that guided visualization led participants to rate known memories closer to remembered events. A second experiment examined individual difference variables that might be related to this know-to-remember shift. Results indicated that extraversion, external locus of control, a memory that conveyed fear, and overall affective content predicted this rating. The applicability of these findings to the psychotherapy process is discussed.     

Sum-difference theory of remembering and knowing: a two-dimensional signal-detection model

In the remember-know paradigm for studying recognition memory, participants distinguish items whose presentations are episodically remembered from those that are merely familiar. A one-dimensional model postulates that remember responses are just high-confidence old judgments, but a meta-analysis of 373 experiments shows that the receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves predicted by this model have the wrong slope. According to the new sum-difference Theory of remembering and knowing (STREAK), old items differ from new ones in both global and specific memory strength: The old-new judgment is based on a weighted sum of these dimensions, and the remember- know judgment is based on a weighted difference. STREAK accounts for the form of several novel kinds of ROC curves and for existing remember-know and item-recognition data.     

On the relationship between recognition speed and accuracy for words rehearsed via rote versus elaborative rehearsal

Tacit within both lay and cognitive conceptualizations of learning is the notion that those conditions of learning that foster "good" retention do so by increasing both the probability and the speed of access to the relevant information. In 3 experiments, time pressure during recognition is shown to decrease accessibility more for words learned via elaborative rehearsal than for words learned via rote rehearsal, despite the fact that elaborative rehearsal is a more efficacious learning strategy as measured by the probability of access. In Experiment 1, participants learned each word using both types of rehearsal, and the results show that access to the products of elaborative rehearsal is more compromised by time pressure than is access to the products of rote rehearsal. The results of Experiment 2, in which each word was learned via either pure rote or pure elaborative rehearsal, exhibit the same pattern. Experiment 3, in which the authors used the response-signal procedure, provides evidence that this difference in accessibility owes not to differences in the rate of access to the 2 types of traces, but rather to the higher asymptotic level of stored information for words learned via elaborative rehearsal.     

Interfering with remembering and knowing: effects of divided attention at retrieval

A Remember-Know paradigm was used to examine the cognitive resource requirements of recollection and familiarity memory processes at retrieval. Younger and older adults studied a list of words, and in a later auditory recognition test indicated whether each word was Remembered, Known, or New. Retrieval was performed under full or divided attention (DA) conditions, with either a digit task to numbers, or an animacy task to words, presented visually. Younger and older adults showed an increase in false Remember responses during both DA conditions, indicating a general effect of attention on illusory recollection. Both age groups also showed decreased accuracy in Know responses, but only during the word-based DA condition, indicating a material-specific effect on familiarity. Aging was associated with decreased accuracy in Remember, but not Know, responses, and with increased latency in distracting task responses under DA conditions. Results suggest that avoiding false recollective responses during retrieval requires attentional resources, whereas accurate familiarity responses require the reactivation of content-specific representations.     

Two routes to remembering (and another to remembering not)

In this article, the author presents evidence about 2 mechanisms of remembering that occur when target stimuli are presented in meaningful contexts. One occurs when the context has been seen previously; the other occurs when the context is new in the test. Both appear to result from the construction of expectations and evaluation of outcomes, but the former appears to depend on the formation of definite expectations, whereas the latter appears to depend on indefinite expectations. These 2 routes to remembering are affected by different factors and cause dissociated patterns of remembering. They also have differential significance for claims of clear recall versus a feeling of familiarity. The results are discussed in terms of the SCAPE framework of memory.     

Curiosity and time: from not knowing to almost knowing

How does it feel to be curious? We reasoned that there are two sides to curiosity: not knowing something (i.e. information-gap) and almost knowing something (i.e. anticipation of resolution). In three experiments, we showed that time affects the relative impact of these two components: When people did not expect to close their information-gap soon (long time-to-resolution) not knowing affected the subjective experience of curiosity more strongly than when they expected to close their information-gap quickly (short time-to-resolution). As such, people experienced less positive affect, more discomfort, and more annoyance with lack of information in a long than a short time-to-resolution situation. Moreover, when time in the long time-to-resolution setting passed, the anticipation of the resolution became stronger, positive affect increased, and discomfort and annoyance with lack of information decreased. Time is thus a key factor in the experience of curiosity.