Rationality of belief or: why savage’s axioms are neither necessary nor sufficient for rationality

Economic theory reduces the concept of rationality to internal consistency. As far as beliefs are concerned, rationality is equated with having a prior belief over a ??Grand State Space??, describing all possible sources of uncertainties. We argue that this notion is too weak in some senses and too strong in others. It is too weak because it does not distinguish between rational and irrational beliefs. Relatedly, the Bayesian approach, when applied to the Grand State Space, is inherently incapable of describing the formation of prior beliefs. On the other hand, this notion of rationality is too strong because there are many situations in which there is not sufficient information for an individual to generate a Bayesian prior. It follows that the Bayesian approach is neither sufficient not necessary for the rationality of beliefs.     

Belief’s minimal rationality

Philosophical Studies - Many of our beliefs behave irrationally: this is hardly news to anyone. Although beliefs’ irrational tendencies need to be taken into account, this paper argues that...     

Aspects of motivation: reflections on Roy Baumeister’s essay

Reflecting on Roy Baumeister’s guidelines for a general theory of motivation, we relate his ideas to our own perspectives and interests. In those terms we consider, among others, the role of motivation in cognitive processes, the emergence of motives from basic needs, the mental representation of motives in memory, and the issue of free will. Roy’s paper compellingly demonstrates the indispensability of motivation to psychological phenomena writ large, and it aptly identifies critical junctures where further motivational research is needed.     

Difference and presence: Derrida and Husserl’s phenomenology of language,time, history,and scientific rationality

Continental Philosophy Review - This article seeks to reconstruct and critically extend Jacques Derrida’s critique of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology. Derrida’s...     

Some reflections on potential abuses of psychology’s knowledge and practices

This article identifies ten implicit and explicit assumptions of Western psychology that are rooted within its cultural history, traditions, and values. Unfortunately, these assumptions have informed and dominated the knowledge and practice of psychology across the world because of historic, cultural, political, and economic reasons. It is now clear, however, that the indiscriminate acceptance and application of Western psychological knowledge and practices constitutes a serious abuse for non-Western people and for ethnic/racial minorities in Western nations. This abuse is often transmitted and exacerbated via the training of international and ethnic minority students who learn to accept Western psychology as universal. In a global community in which all our lives have become interdependent, it is essential Western psychology be re-considered as a “cultural construction” with all the ethnocentric limitations this implies. As a counter, efforts must be made to acknowledge, develop, and transmit the diverse indigenous/national psychologies from across the world.     

Preadolescents’ Voices: A consideration of British and Canadian children’s reflections on religion,spirituality, and their sense of self

Drawing on research in Canada and the UK, this article considers how preadolescents' narratives can further our understanding of their spirituality and sense of self. Exposing the problems of identifying a 'preadolescent', this article reflects on how these often unheard voices might inform future research and education issues such as the role of teacher, pedagogy and curriculum. As well as offering two different international perspectives, this article is also boldly interdisciplinary: thus bringing to light a diverse range of concerns and themes that arise from a context which combines anthropological and psychological approaches.     

Papineau’s Theoretical Rationality and the Anthropological Difference

A common view in philosophy is that the way human beings reason is not only gradually better, but that our way of reasoning is fundamentally distinctive. Findings in the psychology of reasoning challenge the traditional view according to which human beings reason in accordance with the laws of logic and probability theory, but rather suggest that human reasoning consists in the application of domain specific rules of thumb similar to those that we ascribe to some intelligent non-human animals as well. However, this view on human reasoning is unable to explain human accomplishments like technological innovations or scientific progress. David Papineau offers a theory of human theoretical rationality that is consistent with the psychological view on human reasoning but that can also explain how humans sometimes are able to transcend the limitations of their biologically quick and dirty modes of thought and thereby reach a high level of accuracy. Papineau claims that the abilities that constitute theoretical rationality are unique to the human species and thus, that human reasoning is fundamentally distinctive after all. In this paper I am going to discuss to what extent these abilities in fact are unique to our species and whether this theoretical rationality can be called an anthropological difference.     

Reason and Rationality in Eze’s On Reason

abstract

The title of Emmanuel Eze’s fmal, posthumously published book uses the words “reason” and “rationality” in a maimer that might suggest they are interchangeable. I would like to suggest that we not Reat them as the same, but rather tease out a difference in emphasis and reference between the two. In African philosophy, the problem of reason is really two separate problems, the first of which I will call the “problem of reason” (that is, the question of whether there are diverse forms of reason or only one universal form) and the second the “problem of rationality” (that is, the question of whether everyone has the capacity to deploy reason past what mimicry or programming makes possible). Both of these problems are addressed by Eze’s schema for forms of reason. He identifies several forms, but focuses on “ordinary reason”, which allows all the other forms to operate. Ordinary reason also makes rationality possible, that is, the culturally specific yet emergent way of navigating forms of reason. Reason is necessarily diverse, because its multiple forms are deployed differently by different rationalities.     

Coordinating mathematical concepts with the demands of authority: children’s reasoning about conventional and second-order logical rules

Arithmetic algorithms include two types of rules: conventional rules that may be changed by authority, and may legitimately vary from one classroom or country to another (e.g. putting the sum below, rather than above, the numbers added) and logical rules that involve the logic of the algorithm. Changes in the logical rules produce incorrect answers. Hence these rules are not legitimately alterable by authority. Second-order logical rules depend on the particular conventions of the symbol system used (e.g. the rule for carrying in place-value addition). Given the symbol system used, these rules are not legitimately alterable by authority. However, as a result of their dependence on the symbol system, children may have difficulty distinguishing second-order logical rules from conventional rules. Ninety-eight children in grades 2 through 5 were interviewed about the correctness of answers obtained using alternatives to standard conventional and second-order logical rules, and about the legitimacy of authorities to change the rules. Half the children across this age range treated second-order logical rules as somewhat like conventions, judging that an answer resulting from an alternative to a second-order logical rule is correct if sanctioned by authority. With increasing age children increasingly limited the jurisdiction of authority over second-order logical rules.     

The secular and the sacred: reflections on Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age

Charles Taylor’s A Secular Age represents a remarkable achievement. Taylor insists in a reasoned way that the sacred continues to have an important and legitimate role, and challenges assumptions, whether based on Weberian or Durkheimian understandings of religion in society, that faith no longer has a place. In doing this, he distinguishes among different aspects of the secularisation thesis. In this article I assert that there is a coherence to Taylor’s body of work, including A Secular Age, and I trace certain themes, such as a concern with notions of the self, that run through his work. I also identify in Taylor’s argument links to the thought of thinkers like Blondel, Gilson, Maritain and Marcel, and to the notion of an apologetics of hope.     

Moral reasoning,moral decision-making,and empathy in Korsakoff’s syndrome

Korsakoff’s syndrome (KS) is a neuropsychiatric disorder, caused by a vitamin B1 deficiency. Although it is known that patients with KS display diminished theory of mind functioning and frequently exhibit marked antisocial interactions little attention has so far focused on the integrity of moral decision-making abilities, moral reasoning, and empathy. In an experimental cross-sectional design, 20 patients diagnosed with KS, and twenty age-, education-, and gender-equivalent healthy participants performed tests assessing moral decision-making, moral reasoning maturity, empathy, and executive functioning. Participants were administered the Moral Behaviour Inventory (MBI) for everyday moral dilemmas, and ten cartoons of abstract moral dilemmas. Responses were scored according to the Kohlberg stages of moral reasoning. Empathy and executive functioning were assessed with the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI) and the Frontal Assessment Battery (FAB). In contrast to frontal traumatic brain injury patients, KS patients did not display a utilitarian bias, suggesting preserved moral decision-making abilities. Of interest, KS patients had significantly lower levels of moral reasoning maturity on everyday moral dilemmas, and abstract moral dilemmas. In patients, empathy was moderately related to the level of moral maturity on both tasks, while executive functioning was not. In conclusion, KS patients have preserved moral decision-making abilities, but their moral reasoning abilities are poorer in everyday and abstract situations. Lower moral reasoning abilities and lower levels of empathy together may be responsible for adverse social functioning in KS.     

One’s own reasoning

Abstract

Responding to Cappelen and Dever’s claim that there is no distinctive role for perspectivality in epistemology, I argue that facts about the outcomes of one’s own reasoning processes may have a different evidential significance than facts about the outcomes of others’.     

Ockham’s razor and reasoning about information flow

What is the minimal algebraic structure to reason about information flow? Do we really need the full power of Boolean algebras with co-closure and de Morgan dual operators? How much can we weaken and still be able to reason about multi-agent scenarios in a tidy compositional way? This paper provides some answers.     

Young children’s analogical reasoning across cultures: Similarities and differences

A cross-cultural comparison between U.S. and Hong Kong preschoolers examined factors responsible for young children’s analogical reasoning errors. On a scene analogy task, both groups had adequate prerequisite knowledge of the key relations, were the same age, and showed similar baseline performance, yet Chinese children outperformed U.S. children on more relationally complex problems. Children from both groups were highly susceptible to choosing a perceptual or semantic distractor during reasoning when one was present. Taken together, these similarities and differences suggest that (a) cultural differences can facilitate better knowledge representations by allowing more efficient processing of relationally complex problems and (b) inhibitory control is an important factor in explaining the development of children’s analogical reasoning.     

Affective attunement and the experience of the numinous: reflections on Rudolf Otto’s Das Heilige

In this article, Rudolf Otto’s seminal work, Das Heilige, is explored in the German original and in relation to his other writings, his debts to Lutheranism, German romanticism and neo-Kantianism, and the rich context of Marburg in the interwar period. The article stresses Otto’s own attested religious experiences and his profound influence among leading ‘religionists’ of the later twentieth century such as Jung, Tillich, Eliade, and Corbin.     

The culture of justice: reflections on punishment in Dostoevsky’s The Idiot

The article investigates Dostoevsky’s juridical discourse and demonstrates that the apologist of the Russian soul had a genuinely European mind. In his novel The Idiot in particular, in which the death penalty and imprisonment are explored, Dostoevsky unmasks—more radically even than Victor Hugo—the supposedly civilised and lenient forms of modern criminal justice. Dostoevsky’s criticism is ahead of its time; his arguments resemble those subsequently put forward by Foucault. A comparison with Anatoly Pristavkin’s report on post-Communist crime and jurisdiction underscores the topicality of these reflections.     

Editors’ introduction: social dynamics and collective rationality

We provide a brief introduction to this special issue on social dynamics and collective rationality, and summarize the gist of the papers collected therein.     

Human reasoning: Deduction rules or mental models, or both?

A good deal of energy is currently being expended into discovering the fundamental machinery underlying deductive reasoning. Is it based upon mental models (arrays) or deduction rules (propositions)? The appeal of finding a “grand unified theory” of reasoning is obvious, but the likelihood of achieving this must also be considered.

This paper discusses the use of experimental psychology in attempts to discover the processes associated with the fundamental reasoning mechanism. One particular problem is that individuals can use different strategies to solve reasoning problems. The consequences of this are assessed in relation to: (1) the assumptions underlying the experiments, (2) the choice of tasks and task presentations intended to enable the fundamental reasoning processes to be viewed directly, and (3) the power status of the theories and the nature of the evidence required to show that either theory is superior. Under close scrutiny the debate appears to be unresolvable by using empirical techniques. However, although the main conclusions are negative, it is suggested that approaches that directly investigate individual differences are likely to be useful alternatives.     

They’ve lost control: reflections on skill

In this paper, I submit that it is the controlled part of skilled action, that is, that part of an action that accounts for the exact, nuanced ways in which a skilled performer modifies, adjusts and guides her performance for which an adequate, philosophical theory of skill must account. I will argue that neither Jason Stanley nor Hubert Dreyfus have an adequate account of control. Further, and perhaps surprisingly, I will argue that both Stanley and Dreyfus relinquish an account of control for precisely the same reason: each reduce control to a passive, mechanistic, automatic process, which then prevents them from producing a substantive account of how controlled processes can be characterized by seemingly intelligent features and integrated with personal-level states. I will end by introducing three different kinds of control, which are constitutive of skilled action: strategic control, selective, top–down, automatic attention, and motor control. It will become clear that Dreyfus cannot account for any of these three kinds of control while Stanley has difficulty tackling the two latter kinds.     

Development of intuitive rules: Evaluating the application of the dual-system framework to understanding children’s intuitive reasoning

Theories of adult reasoning propose that reasoning consists of two functionally distinct systems that operate under entirely different mechanisms. This theoretical framework has been used to account for a wide range of phenomena, which now encompasses developmental research on reasoning and problem solving. We begin this review by contrasting three main dual-system theories of adult reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) with a well-established developmental account that also incorporates a dual-system framework (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). We use developmental studies of the formation and application of intuitive rules in science and mathematics to evaluate the claims that these theories make. Overall, the evidence reviewed suggests that what is crucial to understanding how children reason is the saliency of the features that are presented within a task. By highlighting the importance of saliency as a way of understanding reasoning, we aim to provide clarity concerning the benefits and limitations of adopting a dual-system framework to account for evidence from developmental studies of intuitive reasoning.