Even better than the real thing: Alternative outcome bias affects decision judgements and decision regret

Three experiments demonstrated that decisions resulting in considerable amounts of profit, but missed alternative outcomes of greater profits, were rated lower in quality and produced more regret than did decisions that returned lesser (or equal) amounts of profit but either did not miss or missed only slightly better alternatives. These effects were mediated by upward counterfactuals and moderated by participants’ orientation to the decision context. That decision evaluations were affected by the availability and magnitude of alternative outcomes rather than the positivity of actual outcomes is counter to the outcome bias effect—a bias in which decisions are rated more positively when they led to more positive outcomes (despite a priori probabilities associated with the decision outcomes). Experiment 3 demonstrated that these effects represent a bias that occurs even when it is clear that the process by which decisions were made followed rational decision processes. This research suggests that when alternative worlds are even better than the desirable outcomes experienced, affect and cognition may be more strongly linked to the magnitude of alternative realities than to obtained outcomes.     

Deflationism and the Normativity of Truth

This paper argues, in response to Huw Price, that deflationism has theresources to account for the normativity of truth. The discussioncenters on a principle of hyper-objective assertibility, that one isincorrect to assert that p if not-p. If this principle doesnt statea fact about truth, it neednt be explained by deflationists. If itdoes, it can be explained.     

Leave Truth Alone: On Deflationism and Contextualism

Abstract: According to deflationism, grasp of the concept of truth consists in nothing more than a disposition to accept a priori (non‐paradoxical) instances of the schema: (DS) It is true that p if and only if p. According to contextualism, the same expression with the same meaning might, on different occasions of use, express different propositions bearing different truth‐conditions (where this does not result from indexicality and the like). On this view, what is expressed in an utterance depends in a non‐negligible way on the circumstances. Charles Travis claims that contextualism shows that ‘deflationism is a mistake’, that truth is a more substantive notion than deflationism allows. In this paper, I examine Travis's arguments in support of this ‘inflationary’ claim and argue that they are unsuccessful.     

Proust nose best: Odors are better cues of autobiographical memory

The Proust phenomenon is an enduring piece of folk wisdom that asserts that odors are particularly powerful autobiographical memory cues. We provide a more formal exposition of this phenomenon and test it in two experiments, using a novel double-cuing methodology designed to negate less interesting explanations. In both studies, recall of an autobiographical event was initially cued by a verbal label (an odor name) for a fixed period, following which a second, extended recall attempt was cued by the same verbal label, the relevant odor, an irrelevant odor, or a visual cue. The focus of Experiment 1 was participants' ratings of the emotional quality of their autobiographical memories. In Experiment 2, content analysis was employed to determine the quantity of information in participants' recollections. Results revealed that odor-cued autobiographical memories were reliably different in terms of qualitative ratings and reliably superior in the amount of detail yielded. Moreover, visual cues and incongruent olfactory cues appeared to have a detrimental effect on the amount of detail recalled. These results support the proposal that odors are especially effective as reminders of past experience.     

Groups perform better than the best individuals on Letters-to-Numbers problems

Eighty-two four-person cooperative groups and 328 independent individuals solved a random coding of the letters A–J to the numbers 0–9. On each trial the group or individual proposed an equation in letters (e.g., A + D=?), received the answer in letters (e.g., A + D=B), proposed one specific mapping (e.g., A=3), received the answer (e.g., True, A=3), and proposed the full mapping of the 10 letters to the 10 numbers. As predicted, the groups had fewer trials to solution, proposed more complex equations, and identified more letters per equation than each of the best, second-best, third-best, and fourth-best individuals. We interpret the group superiority as due to the highly intellective nature of Letters-to-Numbers problems, which entail demonstrable recognition of correct answers, demonstrable rejection of erroneous answers, and multiple insights into effective collective information processing strategies.     

Deflationism and the Dependence of Truth on Reality

A common objection against deflationism is that it cannot account for the fact that truth depends on reality. Consider the question ‘On what does the truth of the proposition that snow is white depend?’ An obvious answer is that it depends on whether snow is white. Now, consider what answer, if any, a deflationist can offer. The problem is as follows. A typical deflationary analysis of truth consists of biconditionals of the form ‘The proposition that p is true iff p’. Such biconditionals tell us nothing about what the truth of the proposition that p might depend on. Therefore, it seems that a typical deflationist cannot give an answer. Since we know that an answer is available, this throws doubt over the adequacy of deflationism as an account of truth. Articulated here is a defence of deflationism against this objection. It is argued that although biconditionals of the sort mentioned do not explicitly state a dependency between truth and reality, they nevertheless convey one. The reason is that, given the context in which a deflationist invokes the biconditionals, such a dependency is implicated. A potential problem with this defence is that it leaves the deflationist still unable to give an account of what it is for truth to depend on reality. One might think that a deflationist can offer such an account by appealing to truthmaker theory but, it is argued below, truthmaker theory is unavailable to a deflationist. Instead, the deflationist should question the assumption that an account is available.     

Groups perform better than the best individuals on letters-to-numbers problems: informative equations and effective strategies

One-hundred 3-person groups and 300 individuals solved 2 letters-to-numbers problems, requiring identification of the coding of 10 letters to 10 numbers by proposing an equation in letters, receiving the answer in letters, proposing a hypothesis, and receiving feedback on the hypothesis on each trial. There were 5 instruction conditions: (a). standard, (b). use at least 3 letters on all equations, (c). use at least 4 letters on all equations, (d). number 1 known before beginning problem, and (e). number 9 known before beginning problem. The groups had fewer trials to solution, proposed more complex equations, and identified more letters per equation than the best individuals. Performance was best under instructions to use at least 4 letters and with the number 9 known.     

Can't quite commit: rumination and uncertainty

Why do some individuals persist in self-destructive rumination? Two studies investigated the relation between a ruminative response style and the reluctance to initiate instrumental behavior. In Study 1, ruminators were compared to nonruminators regarding their evaluation of a self-generated plan to revise their university housing system and, in Study 2, concerning their plan to redesign the undergraduate curriculum. In both studies, on relevant composite measures, ruminators expressed less satisfaction and confidence with regard to their plans than did nonruminators. They were also less likely to commit to the plans they generated. The findings suggest that in addition to its documented detrimental effects on thinking and problem solving, self-focused rumination may inhibit instrumental behavior by increasing uncertainty, resulting in further rumination and behavioral paralysis.     

Groups perform better than the best individuals on letters-to-numbers problems: effects of group size

Individuals and groups of 2, 3, 4, or 5 people solved 2 letters-to-numbers problems that required participants, on each trial, to identify the coding of 10 letters to 10 numbers by proposing an equation in letters, receiving the answer in letters, proposing a hypothesis, and receiving feedback on the correctness of the hypothesis. Groups of 3, 4, and 5 people proposed more complex equations and had fewer trials to solution than the best of an equivalent number of individuals. Groups of 3, 4, and 5 people had fewer trials to solution than 2-person groups but did not differ from each other. These results suggest that 3-person groups are necessary and sufficient to perform better than the best individuals on highly intellective problems.     

Deflationism about the necessary a posteriori and Twin Earth

Some necessary truths are a posteriori. That’s widely agreed and is presumed here. Their existence might appear to show that discoveries about how things are in fact—about how things actually are—can lead to discoveries about all the ways things might be, about the nature of logical space. I detail one way of resisting this conclusion for a number of examples, and the implications of Twin Earth for the issue. Central is the notion of a Cambridge discovery.

     

On the Prospects for Ontology: Deflationism,Pluralism, and Carnap's Principle of Tolerance

In this paper, I critically discuss recent work on the role that the principle of tolerance plays in Rudolf Carnap's philosophy. Specifically, I consider how two prominent interpretations of Carnap's principle of tolerance can be used to argue for Carnap's anti‐metaphysical views. I then argue that there are serious problems with these arguments, and I diagnose those problems as resulting, in part, from a tension between competing goals of Carnap's philosophical project.