Facilitation in the abstract selection task: The effects of attentional and instructional factors

The present study examined performance on Wason's four-card abstract selection task. Baseline performance is very poor, usually less than 10% correct; and this task has a long record of resistance to facilitation. It was hypothesized that the two primary sources of difficulty are selective encoding of the problem information and the lack of satisfactory analytic processing. Three experiments were conducted to test this hypothesis. In Experiment 1, performance was improved by explicating the implication rule. The majority of subjects, however, still failed to make the correct selection. Subjects were required in Experiment 2 to provide reasons for their selection or non-selection of each of the cards. This response procedure, paired with an explicated rule, led to further improvements in performance (over 50% correct selections). In Experiment 3, the influence of the type of selection instruction (true-false vs. violation) was examined. Paired with an explicated rule and the reasons response format, violation instructions led to one of the highest correct selection rates ever observed for any version of the selection task: over 80% correct. Because of the importance of this result, it was replicated twice. The results of these three experiments are discussed in terms of Johnson-Laird and Byrne's mental models theory and Evans's two-stage model of reasoning.     

Insight without awareness: On the interaction of verbalization, instruction and practice in a simulated process control task

Four experiments in which subjects learned to control two versions of a complex simulated process control task show that verbalizable knowledge of procedures used to perform these tasks is very limited and is acquired late in learning. Individual learning curves associated with these tasks showed sudden improvements in performance, which were not accompanied by a similar increase in verbalizable knowledge. It was also found that verbal instructions consisting of exemplar memorization, strategies for rule induction, simple heuristics, and experts' instructions were all effective in enhancing novice subjects' performance. A theoretical framework is proposed in which subjects draw on two separate but interacting knowledge structures to perform these tasks. One knowledge structure is based on memory for past experiences (close analogies), and the other is based on one's current mental model of the task. Implicit sets of competing rules that control response selection are derived from both sources of knowledge. It is suggested that dissociations between task performance and verbalizing occur because memory-based processing tends to have more control over response selection because of its greater specificity, whereas a mental model tends to be the preferred mode for verbal reporting because of its greater accessibility.     

Maintaining readiness for mental rotation interferes with perceptual processes in children but with response selection in adults

Previous work revealed that mental rotation is not purely inserted into a same-different discrimination task. Instead, response time (RT) is slowed to upright stimuli in blocks containing rotated stimuli compared to RT to the same upright stimuli in pure upright blocks. This interference effect is a result of maintaining readiness for mental rotation. In two experiments we investigated previous evidence that these costs depend upon distinct sub-processes for children and for adults. In Experiment 1, the maintaining costs turned out to be independent of the visual quality of the stimulus for adults but not so for children. Experiment 2 revealed that the maintaining costs were greatly reduced for adults when they performed mental rotation as a go-no-go task, but not so for children. Taken together, both experiments provide evidence that whereas perceptual processes seem to be important for school-age children to maintain readiness for mental rotation, response selection is relevant for adults.     

The Essential Child. Susan Gelman. New York: Oxford University Press. 2003. 392 pages, $49.95 (US), cloth or paper.

To evaluate the claim that correct performance on unexpected transfer false-belief tasks specifically involves mental-state understanding, two experiments were carried out with children with autism, intellectual disabilities, and typical development. In both experiments, children were given a standard unexpected transfer false-belief task and a mental-state-free, mechanical analogue task in which participants had to predict the destination of a train based on true or false signal information. In both experiments, performance on the mechanical task was found to correlate with that on the false-belief task for all groups of children. Logistic regression showed that performance on the mechanical analogue significantly predicted performance on the false-belief task even after accounting for the effects of verbal mental age. The findings are discussed in relation to possible common mechanisms underlying correct performance on the two tasks.     

Working memory and syllogistic reasoning

The purpose of this study was to examine the relation between working memory span and syllogistic reasoning performance. In addition, performance for the reasoning task was compared to predictions made by mental model theory and the probability heuristics model. According to mental model theory, syllogisms that require the use of more mental models are more difficult. According to the probability heuristics model difficulty is related to the number of probabilistic heuristics that must be applied, or (for invalid syllogisms) inconsistencies between the derived and correct conclusion. The predictions of these theories were examined across two experiments. In general, people with larger working memory capacities reasoned better. Also, the responses made by people with larger capacities were more likely to correspond to the predictions made by both mental model theory and the probability heuristics model. Relations between working memory span and performance were also consistent with both theories.     

No interpretation without representation: the role of domain-specific representations and inferences in the Wason selection task

The Wason selection task is a tool used to study reasoning about conditional rules. Performance on this task changes systematically when one varies its content, and these content effects have been used to argue that the human cognitive architecture contains a number of domain-specific representation and inference systems, such as social contract algorithms and hazard management systems. Recently, however, Sperber, Cara & Girotto (Sperber, D., Cara, F., & Girotto, V. (1995). Relevance theory explains the selection task. Cognition, 57, 31-95) have proposed that relevance theory can explain performance on the selection task - including all content effects - without invoking inference systems that are content-specialized. Herein, we show that relevance theory alone cannot explain a variety of content effects - effects that were predicted in advance and are parsimoniously explained by theories that invoke domain-specific algorithms for representing and making inferences about (i) social contracts and (ii) reducing risk in hazardous situations. Moreover, although Sperber et al. (1995) were able to use relevance theory to produce some new content effects in other domains, they conducted no experiments involving social exchanges or precautions, and so were unable to determine which - content-specialized algorithms or relevance effects - dominate reasoning when the two conflict. When experiments, reported herein, are constructed so that the different theories predict divergent outcomes, the results support the predictions of social contract theory and hazard management theory, indicating that these inference systems override content-general relevance factors. The fact that social contract and hazard management algorithms provide better explanations for performance in their respective domains does not mean that the content-general logical procedures posited by relevance theory do not exist, or that relevance effects never occur. It does mean, however, that one needs a principled way of explaining which effects will dominate when a set of inputs activate more than one reasoning system. We propose the principle of pre-emptive specificity - that the human cognitive architecture should be designed so that more specialized inference systems pre-empt more general ones whenever the stimuli centrally fit the input conditions of the more specialized system. This principle follows from evolutionary and computational considerations that are common to both relevance theory and the ecological rationality approach.     

抽象材料选择任务的表象表征视角

为了探讨在选择任务中表象表征存在的可能性以及抽象材料选择任务困难的原因,该研究设定了材料的内容、规则以及证明规则的要求均完全相同,只是在呈现方式上形象性不同的两种抽象选择任务;然后把两种不同的选择任务分别对数量大致相当的大学生进行了测试。结果发现,不采用类似卡片这种形象性很强的材料呈现方式显著的提高了人们在抽象选择任务中的正确率。实验结果支持了选择任务中表象表征的存在及其为选择任务困难原因之一的观点。     

Rephrasing between Disjunctives and Conditionals: Mental Models and the Effects of Thematic Content

Two experiments are reported thatinvestigate whether the logical equivalence of conditionals and disjunctives is paralleled by a psychological equivalence. In these experiments, subjects rephrased from one form into the other. Experiment 1 demonstrated strong effects of familiarity and causality of rule content. Similar findings were found in Experiment 2 with a different conditional rule syntax. An account of the experiments is given in terms of mental models theory: In this account, task performance can be seen to depend upon the extent to which the model sets used by subjects to generate rephrasings are complete, task content being the most important factor affecting model set completion. A 'Minimal Completion' strategy is proposed to operate in the absence of thematic content. The experiments also falsify the long-held assumption that conditionals with negative antecedents are always interpreted as their disjunctive equivalents. This raises doubts about the mental models explanation for matching bias in conditional reasoning.     

Reasoning about Conditional Promises and Warnings: Darwinian Algorithms, Mental Models, Relevance Judgements or Pragmatic Schemas?

It is proposed that reasoning about social contracts, such as conditional promises and warnings, is under the control of a compound schema made of two pragmatic schemas (Cheng & Holyoak, 1985), expressing an obligation and a permission. Two experiments were run using thematic versions of the Wason selection task in which the rule and the core of the scenario were kept constant and the point of view of the actor (e.g. promisor or promisee) was varied. The results supported the predictions (including the occurrence of a correct pattern of response that consists of all four cards) and falsified predictions derived from Cosmides' (1989) theory of social exchange. The mental models theory and Evans' two-stage theory of reasoning are also discussed in the light of the present results.     

Goal-directed access to mental objects in working memory: The role of task-specific feature retrieval

In the present study, we examined the hypothesis of task-specific access to mental objects from verbal working memory. It is currently assumed that a mental object is brought into the focus of attention in working memory by a process of object selection, which provides this object for any upcoming mental operation (Oberauer, 2002). We argue that this view must be extended, since the selection of information for processing is always guided by current intentions and task goals. In our experiments, it was required that two kinds of comparison tasks be executed on digits selected from a set of three digits held in working memory. The tasks differed in regard to the object features the comparison was based on. Access to a new mental object (object switch) took consistently longer on the semantic comparison task than on the recognition task. This difference is not attributable to object selection difficulty and cannot be fully accounted for by task difficulty or differences in rehearsal processes. The results support our assumptions that (1) mental objects are selected for a given specific task and, so, are accessed with their specific task-relevant object features; (2) verbal mental objects outside the focus of attention are usually not maintained at a full feature level but are refreshed phonologically by subvocal rehearsal; and (3) if more than phonological information is required, access to mental objects involves feature retrieval processes in addition to object selection.     

Counting on working memory in arithmetic problem solving

Mental calculation is an important everyday skill involving access to well-learned procedures, problem solving, and working memory. Although there is an active literature on acquiring concepts and procedures for mental arithmetic, relatively little is known about the role of working memory in this task. This paper reports two experiments in which dual-task methodology is used to study the role of components of working memory in mental addition. In Experiment 1, mental addition of auditorily presented two-digit numbers was significantly disrupted by concurrent random letter generation and, to a lesser extent, by concurrent articulatory suppression, but was unimpaired by concurrent hand movement or by presentation of irrelevant pictures. Although the number of errors increased with two of the dual tasks, the incorrect responses tended to be quite close to the correct answer. In Experiment 2, the numbers for addition were presented visually. Here again, random generation produced the largest disruption of mental arithmetic performance, while a smaller amount of disruption was observed for articulatory suppression, hand movement, and unattended auditorily presented two-digit numbers. The overall levels of performance were better and the absolute size of the disruptive effects shown with visual presentation was very small compared with those found for auditory presentation. This pattern of results is consistent with a role for a central executive component of working memory in performing the calculations required for mental addition and in producing approximately correct answers. Visuospatial resources in working memory may also be involved in approximations. The data support the view that the subvocal rehearsal component of working memory provides a means of maintaining accuracy in mental arithmetic, and this matches a similar conclusion derived from previous work on counting. The general implications for the role of working memory in arithmetic problem solving will be discussed.     

双语水平与认知控制心智转换

研究考察双语水平对认知控制心智转换的影响。通过语言转换和任务转换实验,比较两组一语水平相同而二语水平不同的“不平衡”中英双语者（40人,平均年龄20.30岁）。结果发现高水平组在语言转换中优于低水平组,但在任务转换中两组无显著差异。说明双语水平对认知控制心智转换的影响不显著。回归分析结果表明心智转换与双语水平无关,但二语使用显著预测任务转换代价,双语转换频率显著预测任务混合代价。研究表明双语水平对认知控制心智转换的促进作用不显著,但二语使用和双语转换频率可能是双语者心智转换能力增强的重要因素。研究进一步推进了双语促进认知控制的理论,明确了双语优势的具体来源及认知控制受影响的具体层面。     

Refocusing on the Data: A Reply to Hardman

Hardman in press claims that the results of Green and Larking 1995 favour a mental rules theory account of performance in the selection task over a mental model theory account. This reply rebuts his claim.     

Item Difficulty,Discrimination, and the Confidence-Frequency Effect in a Categorical Judgment Task

Three experiments are presented to examine the role of discrimination abilities in the relationship between confidence and performance across items that vary in difficulty. The studies also test the confidence-frequency effect, predicted in the theory of probabilistic mental models (Gigerenzer, Hoffrage, & Kleinbolting, 1991), by investigating the relationship between performance estimates provided as confidence judgments and as estimates of the frequency of correct responding. The categorical judgment task involved predicting whether a handwriting sample, generated using naturalistic sampling, had been written by a female or male. The results suggest that, when outcome variability is taken into account, discrimination ability differs drastically between easy, medium, and hard items. Discriminability is greatest for easy items and decreases until it disappears for hard items. There was also evidence of a confidence-frequency effect, with mean confidence judgments showing a slight tendency toward overconfidence and frequency estimates showing a slight tendency to underestimate performance.     

Optimal data selection: Revision,review, and reevaluation

Since it first appeared, there has been much research and critical discussion on the theory of optimal data selection as an explanation of Wason’s (1966, 1968) selection task (Oaksford & Chater, 1994). In this paper, this literature is reviewed, and the theory of optimal data selection is reevaluated in its light. The information gain model is first located in the current theoretical debate in the psychology of reasoning concerning dual processes in human reasoning. A model comparison exercise is then presented that compares a revised version of the model with its theoretical competitors. Tests of the novel predictions of the model are then reviewed. This section also reviews experiments claimed not to be consistent with optimal data selection. Finally, theoretical criticisms of optimal data selection are discussed. It is argued either that the revised model accounts for them or that they do not stand up under analysis. It is concluded that some version of the optimal data selection model still provides the best account of the selection task. Consequently, the conclusion of Oaksford and Chater’s (1994) original rational analysis (Anderson, 1990), that people’s hypothesis-testing behavior on this task is rational and well adapted to the environment, still stands.     

Representation of Similar Well-Learned Cognitive Procedures

Continued practice on a task is characterized by several quantitative and qualitative changes in performance. The most salient is the speed-up in the time to execute the task. To account for these effects, some models of skilled performance have proposed automatic mechanisms that merge knowlege structures associated with the task into fewer, larger structures. The present study investigated how the representation of similar cognitive procedures might interact with the success of such automatic mechanisms. In five experiments, subjects learned complex, multistep mental arithmetic procedures. These procedures included two types of knowledge thought to characterize most cognitive procedures: “component” knowledge for achieving intermediate results and “integrative” knowledge for organizing and integrating intermediate results. Subjects simultaneously practiced two procedures that had either the same component steps or the same integrative structure. Practiceeffect models supported a procedure-independent representation for common component steps. The availability of these common steps for use in a new procedure was also measured. Steps practiced in the context of two procedures were expected to show greater transfer to a new procedure than steps learned in the context of a single procedure. This did not always occur. A model using component/integrative knowledge distinction reconciled these results by proposing that integrative knowledge operated on all steps of the procedure: An integral part of the knowledge associated with achieving an intermediate result or state includes how it contributes to later task demands. These results are discussed in the context of automatic mechanisms for skill acquisition.     

Temporal delays can facilitate causal attribution: Towards a general timeframe bias in causal induction

Does reasoning occur on the Wason selection task, or are card selections determined purely on the basis of heuristic processes? To answer this question two relevance-based theories of reasoning are compared: (1) the theory of Evans (1984, 1989; Evans &; Over, 1996), which takes the heuristic viewpoint, and (2) the theory of Sperber, Cara, and Girotto (1995), which takes the reasoning viewpoint. In three experiments, the effect of removing matching cards from the selection task array is examined. It is argued that the Sperber et al. theory makes clearer predictions about the results of these manipulations, which are confirmed, and that the Evans theory can only accommodate them if it allows the operation of reasoning processes. The results are also discussed in relation to Roth's (1979) account of the selection task, mental models theory, and information gain theory.     

Mental architectures with selectively influenced but stochastically interdependent components

The way external factors influence distribution functions for the overall time required to perform a mental task (such as responding to a stimulus, or solving a problem) may be informative as to the underlying mental architecture, the hypothetical network of interconnected processes some of which are selectively influenced by some of the external factors. Under the assumption that all processes contributing to the overall performance time are stochastically independent, several basic results have been previously established. These results relate patterns of response time distribution functions produced by manipulating external factors to such questions as whether the hypothetical constituent processes in the mental architecture enter AND gates or OR gates, and whether pairs of processes are sequential or concurrent. The present study shows that all these results are also valid for stochastically interdependent component times, provided the selective dependence of these components upon external factors is understood within the framework of a recently proposed theory of selective influence. According to this theory each component is representable as a function of three arguments: the factor set selectively influencing it, a component-specific source of randomness, and a source of randomness shared by all the components.     

Universal Connectives in the Selection Task

Two experiments using Wason's selection task are reported in this paper. Their main purpose was to test the meaning of universal connectives ( always and never ) against the hypothetical conditional connective ( if ). In the first experiment, these two different kinds of connectives were used with the same content and in logically equivalent situations. Results demonstrated that universal connectives yield different patterns of responses than do hypothetical connectives. People seem to consider the situation described in the task in the same way, irrespective of the use of negations, when universal connectives are used, but not when the if... then structure is used. The second experiment extended these results to a different content, and to an abstract version of the task. An explanation in terms of mental models is provided.     

Intertrial sources of stimulus control and delayed matching-to-sample performance in humans

Two experiments compared delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) accuracy under 2 procedures in adults with mental retardation. In the trial-unique procedure, every trial in a session contained different stimuli. Thus, comparison stimuli that were correct on one trial were never incorrect on other trials in that session (or vice versa). In the 2-sample DMTS procedure, the same 2 comparison stimuli were presented on each trial, and their function changed quasi-randomly across trials conditional upon the sample stimulus. Across 2 experiments, 7 of 8 subjects showed the highest overall accuracy under the trial-unique procedure, and no subject showed consistently higher accuracy under the 2-sample procedure. Negative, exponential decay functions fit to logit p values showed that this difference was due largely to the steeper delay-mediated decline in sample control for the 2-sample procedure. Stimulus-control analyses indicated that, under the 2-sample procedure, the selection of the comparison stimulus on Trial N was often controlled by the comparison stimulus selection on Trial N-1 rather than the Trial-N sample stimulus. This source of competing stimulus control is not present in trial-unique procedures. Experiment 2 manipulated intertrial interval duration. There was a small but consistent increase in accuracy as a function of intertrial interval duration under the 2-sample procedure, but not under the trial-unique procedure.