The knowledge argument,the open question argument,and the moral problem

Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical nature could, apparently, suffer from ignorance about various aspects of conscious experience. Someone who knew everything about the world’s physical and mental nature could, apparently, suffer from moral ignorance. Does it follow that there are ways the world is, over and above the way it is physically or psychophysically? This paper defends a negative answer, based on a distinction between knowing the fact that p and knowing that p. This distinction is made intelligible by reference to criterial connections between the possession of moral or phenomenal knowledge, and the satisfaction of cognitively neutral conditions of desire and experiential history. The existence of such connections in the moral case makes for an efficient dissolution of the so-called moral problem.     

Conceptual knowledge in the interpretation of idioms

The authors examined how people determine the contextual appropriateness of idioms. In Experiment 1, idioms referring to the same temporal stage of a conceptual prototype were judged to be more similar in meaning than idioms referring to different temporal stages. In Experiment 2, idioms in a prototypical temporal sequence were more meaningful than idioms in sentences that violated the temporal sequence. In Experiment 3, idioms referring to the same stage of a conceptual prototype were differentiable on the basis of conceptual information. The conceptual coherence between idioms and contexts facilitated the processing speed of idioms in Experiment 4. Experiment 5 showed that speakers can recover the underlying conceptual metaphors that link an idiom to its figurative meaning. Experiment 6 showed that the metaphoric information reflected in the lexical makeup of idioms also determined the metaphoric appropriateness of idioms in certain contexts.     

Explanatory priority and independence: On an argument against middle knowledge

Conclusion A Molinist should not embrace the independence thesis. He also can defend the thesis that counterfactuals of freedom depend on a counterfactual act. Although such a move may seem illicit in the sense thatexplanandum andexplanans presuppose each other, I defend the view that counterfactuals of freedom are very deeply embedded in our metaphysics and we cannot therefore satisfactorily explain them with the help of other devices.     

窄记忆和宽知识——外在论和自我知识相容性问题的一个解决方案

The development of the semantic externalism in the 1970s was followed by a debate on the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. Boghossian’s memory argument is one of the most important arguments against the compatibilist view. However, some compatibilists attack Boghossian’s argument by pointing out that his understanding of memory is internalistic. Ludlow and others developed the externalist view of memory to defend the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge. However, the externalist view of memory undermines the epistemic status of memory since it gives memory a burden that is too heavy for it to carry. This paper argues that only if we take the content of memory to be narrow and take that of self-knowledge to be wide and replace Cartesian self-knowledge with contextually constrained self-knowledge, can the compatibility of externalism and self-knowledge be effectively defended.     

Conceptual knowledge attenuates viewpoint dependency in visual object recognition

Learning verbal semantic knowledge for objects has been shown to attenuate recognition costs incurred by changes in view from a learned viewpoint. Such findings were attributed to the semantic or meaningful nature of the learned verbal associations. However, recent findings demonstrate surprising benefits to visual perception after learning even noninformative verbal labels for stimuli. Here we test whether learning verbal information for novel objects, independent of its semantic nature, can facilitate a reduction in viewpoint-dependent recognition. To dissociate more general effects of verbal associations from those stemming from the semantic nature of the associations, participants learned to associate semantically meaningful (adjectives) or nonmeaningful (number codes) verbal information with novel objects. Consistent with a role of semantic representations in attenuating the viewpoint-dependent nature of object recognition, the costs incurred by a change in viewpoint were attenuated for stimuli with learned semantic associations relative to those associated with nonmeaningful verbal information. This finding is discussed in terms of its implications for understanding basic mechanisms of object perception as well as the classic viewpoint-dependent nature of object recognition.     

Grounding and the indispensability argument

There has been much discussion of the indispensability argument for the existence of mathematical objects. In this paper I reconsider the debate by using the notion of grounding, or non-causal dependence. First of all, I investigate what proponents of the indispensability argument should say about the grounding of relations between physical objects and mathematical ones. This reveals some resources which nominalists are entitled to use. Making use of these resources, I present a neglected but promising response to the indispensability argument—a liberalized version of Field’s response—and I discuss its significance. I argue that if it succeeds, it provides a new refutation of the indispensability argument; and that, even if it fails, its failure may bolster some of the fictionalist responses to the indispensability argument already under discussion. In addition, I use grounding to reply to a recent challenge to these responses.     

Lehrer and the consequence argument

The consequence argument of van Inwagen is widely regarded as the best argument for incompatibilism. Lewis??s response is praised by van Inwagen as the best compatibilist??s strategy but Lewis himself acknowledges that his strategy resembles that of Lehrer. A comparison will show that one can speak about Lehrer?CLewis strategy, although I think that Lewis??s variation is dialectically slightly stronger. The paper provides a response to some standard objections of incompatibilists to the Lehrer?CLewis reply.