Theory-based categorization under speeded conditions

It is widely accepted that similarity influences rapid categorization, whereas theories can influence only more leisurely category judgments. In contrast, we argue that it is not the type of knowledge used that determines categorization speed, but rather the complexity of the categorization processes. In two experiments, participants learned four categories of items, each consisting of three causally related features. Participants gave more weight to cause features than to effect features, even under speeded response conditions. Furthermore, the time required to make judgments was equivalent, regardless of whether participants were using causal knowledge or base-rate information. We argue that both causal knowledge and base-rate information, once precompiled during learning, can be used at roughly the same speeds during categorization, thus demonstrating an important parallel between these two types of knowledge.     

The role of background knowledge in speeded perceptual categorization

We examined the time-course of the influence of background knowledge on perceptual categorization by manipulating the meaningfulness of labels associated with categories and by manipulating the amount of time provided to subjects for making a categorization decision. Extending a paradigm originally reported by Wisniewski and Medin (1994) (Cog. Sci. 18 (1994) 221), subjects learned two categories of children's drawings that were given either meaningless labels (drawings by children from 'group 1' or 'group 2') or meaningful labels (drawings by 'creative' or 'non-creative' children); the meaningfulness of the label had a significant effect on how new drawings were classified. In addition, half of the subjects were provided unlimited time to respond, while the other half of the subjects were forced to respond quickly; speeded response conditions had a relatively large effect on categorization decisions by subjects given the meaningless labels but had relatively little effect on categorization decisions by subjects given the meaningful labels. These results suggest that some forms of background knowledge can show an influence at relatively early stages in the time-course of a categorization decision.     

A crossed random effects diffusion model for speeded semantic categorization decisions

Choice reaction times (RTs) are often used as a proxy measure of typicality in semantic categorization studies. However, other item properties have been linked to choice RTs as well. We apply a tailored process model of choice RT to a speeded semantic categorization task in order to deconfound different sources of variability in RT. Our model is based on a diffusion model of choice RT, extended to include crossed random effects (of items and participants). This model retains the interesting process interpretation of the diffusion model’s parameters, but it can be applied to choice RTs even in the case where there are few or no repeated measurements of each participant-item combination. Different aspects of the response process are then linked to different types of item properties. A typicality measure turns out to predict the rate of information uptake, while a lexicographic measure predicts the stimulus encoding time. Accessibility measures cannot reliably predict any component of the decision process.     

A neurobiological theory of automaticity in perceptual categorization

A biologically detailed computational model is described of how categorization judgments become automatic in tasks that depend on procedural learning. The model assumes 2 neural pathways from sensory association cortex to the premotor area that mediates response selection. A longer and slower path projects to the premotor area via the striatum, globus pallidus, and thalamus. A faster, purely cortical path projects directly to the premotor area. The model assumes that the subcortical path has greater neural plasticity because of a dopamine-mediated learning signal from the substantia nigra. In contrast, the cortical-cortical path learns more slowly via (dopamine independent) Hebbian learning. Because of its greater plasticity, early performance is dominated by the subcortical path, but the development of automaticity is characterized by a transfer of control to the faster cortical-cortical projection. The model, called SPEED (Subcortical Pathways Enable Expertise Development), includes differential equations that describe activation in the relevant brain areas and difference equations that describe the 2- and 3-factor learning. A variety of simulations are described, showing that the model accounts for some classic single-cell recording and behavioral results.     

A causal-model theory of conceptual representation and categorization

This article presents a theory of categorization that accounts for the effects of causal knowledge that relates the features of categories. According to causal-model theory, people explicitly represent the probabilistic causal mechanisms that link category features and classify objects by evaluating whether they were likely to have been generated by those mechanisms. In 3 experiments, participants were taught causal knowledge that related the features of a novel category. Causal-model theory provided a good quantitative account of the effect of this knowledge on the importance of both individual features and interfeature correlations to classification. By enabling precise model fits and interpretable parameter estimates, causal-model theory helps place the theory-based approach to conceptual representation on equal footing with the well-known similarity-based approaches.     

Toward a unified theory of decision criterion learning in perceptual categorization

Optimal decision criterion placement maximizes expected reward and requires sensitivity to the category base rates (prior probabilities) and payoffs (costs and benefits of incorrect and correct responding). When base rates are unequal, human decision criterion is nearly optimal, but when payoffs are unequal, suboptimal decision criterion placement is observed, even when the optimal decision criterion is identical in both cases. A series of studies are reviewed that examine the generality of this finding, and a unified theory of decision criterion learning is described (Maddox & Dodd, 2001). The theory assumes that two critical mechanisms operate in decision criterion learning. One mechanism involves competition between reward and accuracy maximization: The observer attempts to maximize reward, as instructed, but also places some importance on accuracy maximization. The second mechanism involves a flat-maxima hypothesis that assumes that the observer's estimate of the reward-maximizing decision criterion is determined from the steepness of the objective reward function that relates expected reward to decision criterion placement. Experiments used to develop and test the theory require each observer to complete a large number of trials and to participate in all conditions of the experiment. This provides maximal control over the reinforcement history of the observer and allows a focus on individual behavioral profiles. The theory is applied to decision criterion learning problems that examine category discriminability, payoff matrix multiplication and addition effects, the optimal classifier's independence assumption, and different types of trial-by-trial feedback. In every case the theory provides a good account of the data, and, most important, provides useful insights into the psychological processes involved in decision criterion learning.     

The reliability of speeded tests

Some methods are presented for estimating the reliability of a partially speeded test without the use of a parallel form. The effect of these formulas on some test data is illustrated. Whenever an odd-even reliability is computed it is probably desirable to use one of the formulas noted in Section 2 of this paper in addition to the usual Spearman-Brown correction. Since the formulas given here involve the mean and the standard deviation of the “number unattempted score,” a method is given in Section 4 for computing this mean and standard deviation from item analysis data. If the item analysis data are available, this method will save considerable time as compared with rescoring answer sheets.     

How causal knowledge affects classification: A generative theory of categorization

Several theories have been proposed regarding how causal relations among features of objects affect how those objects are classified. The assumptions of these theories were tested in 3 experiments that manipulated the causal knowledge associated with novel categories. There were 3 results. The 1st was a multiple cause effect in which a feature's importance increases with its number of causes. The 2nd was a coherence effect in which good category members are those whose features jointly corroborate the category's causal knowledge. These 2 effects can be accounted for by assuming that good category members are those likely to be generated by a category's causal laws. The 3rd result was a primary cause effect, in which primary causes are more important to category membership. This effect can also be explained by a generative account with an additional assumption: that categories often are perceived to have hidden generative causes.     

Simulating naturalistic demands for speeded judgment

Responses to speeded judgment (e.g., “shoot/don’t shoot”) situations in naturalistic environments are influenced by many variables and psychological processes. We describe a custom-built simulator with head- and eye-tracking capabilities for basic and applied research on speeded decision making. The system allows the user to project life-sized, time-coded, videotaped, or computer-animated scenarios on a screen to collect reaction-time, shot-accuracy, and eye-movement data. An initial experiment is also reported to demonstrate the utility of the system for studying factors that affect speeded judgment under naturalistic situations.     

An exemplar-retrieval model of speeded same--different judgments

R. M. Nosofsky and T. J. Palmeri's (1997) exemplar-based random-walk (EBRW) model of speeded classification is extended to account for speeded same--different judgments among integral-dimension stimuli. According to the model, an important component process of same--different judgments is that people store individual examples of experienced same and different pairs of objects in memory. These exemplar pairs are retrieved from memory on the basis of how similar they are to a currently presented pair of objects. The retrieved pairs drive a random-walk process for making same--different decisions. The EBRW predicts correctly that same responses are faster for objects lying in isolated than in dense regions of similarity space. The model also predicts correctly effects of same-identity versus same-category instructions and is sensitive to observers' past experiences with specific same and different pairs of objects.     

Working memory effects in speeded RSVP tasks

The present paper examines the effects of memory contents and memory load in rapid serial visual presentation (RSVP) speeded tasks, trying to explain previous inconsistent results. We used a one target (Experiment 1) and a two-target (Experiment 2) RSVP task with a concurrent memory load of one or four items, in a dual-task paradigm. A relation between material in working memory and the target in the RSVP impaired the identification of the target. In Experiments 3 and 4, the single task was to determine whether any information in memory matched the target in the RSVP, while varying the memory load. A match was detected faster than a non-match, although only when there was some distance between targets in the RSVP (Experiment 4). The results suggest that memory contents automatically capture attention, slowing processing when the memory contents are irrelevant to the task, and speeding processing when they are relevant.     

Reliability formulas for noncompleted or speeded tests

New formulas are developed to give lower bounds to the reliability of a test, whether or not all respondents attempt all items. The formulas apply in particular, then, to completed tests, pure speed tests, pure power tests, and any mixture of speed and power. For the case of completed tests, the formulas give the same answer as certain standard ones; for noncompleted tests the formulas give a correct answer where previous standard formulas are inappropriate. The formulas hold both in the sense of retest reliability and of parallel tests.This research was facilitated by an uncommitted grant-in-aid to the writer from the Behavioral Sciences Division of the Ford Foundation.     

Locus of semantic priming effects in speeded naming

The locus of semantic priming effects was examined by measuring onset and rime durations as well as response latencies of words with consistent and inconsistent pronunciations, using the postvocalic naming task. We found that the effect of a semantic prime on naming duration was localized rather than spread across the entire word; onset durations were shorter in the related condition than in the unrelated condition, but rime durations were equal in the two prime conditions. Moreover, the priming effect on onset durations was larger for words with inconsistent than for those with consistent pronunciations. These duration results cannot be accounted for by previous proposals, but they can be accounted for by models in which phonemes are activated in parallel rather than serially from left to right and in which motor programs are based on phonemes rather than syllables. Contrary to previous reports of an interaction of prime and regularity (a factor closely related to consistency) on naming latency, we found no interaction of prime and consistency on response latency. We argue that this conflict is only apparent and arises because naming latency conflates response latency and initial phoneme duration for some targets.     

Emotion-induced impairments in speeded word recognition tasks

Recent studies show that emotional stimuli impair the identification of subsequently presented, briefly flashed stimuli. In the present study, we investigated whether emotional distractors (primes) impaired target processing when presentation of the target stimulus was not impoverished. In lexical decision, animacy decision, rhyme decision, and nonword naming, targets were presented in such a manner that they were clearly visible (i.e., targets were not masked and presented until participants responded). In all tasks taboo-sexual distractors caused a slowdown in responding to the subsequent neutral target. Our results indicate that the detrimental effects of emotional distractors are not confined to paradigms in which visibility of the target is limited. Moreover, impairments were obtained even when semantic processing of stimuli was not required.     

Global inhibition and midcourse corrections in speeded aiming

When some perceptual-motor relationships are reversed, participants might adopt a global inhibition strategy that replaces all normal movements with reversed movements. In two experiments, participants practiced moving a cursor from a start position to target locations. In a perceptual-motor reversal condition, in which horizontal but not vertical movements were reversed, participants were trained to move only to certain locations. Testing involved moving to all locations under the same reversal condition. Training on a subset of locations yielded partial transfer to untrained locations. These results support a global inhibition hypothesis modified to include both midcourse corrective movements and training specificity.     

Preparation for speeded action as a psychophysiological concept

Mental preparation aids performance and induces multiple physiological changes that should inform concepts of preparation. To date, however, these changes have been interpreted as being due to a global preparatory process (e.g., attention or alertness). The authors review psychophysiological and performance investigations of preparation. Concepts of the central regulation of action offer an integrative framework for understanding the psychophysiology of preparation. If people process multiple streams of information concurrently, then preparatory processing requires a form of supervisory attention- central regulation to maintain unity of action. This concept is consistent with existing psychophysiological results and links them to current views of information processing. Conversely, psychophysiological measures may provide indices to test concepts within theories of the central regulation of action.     

Word substitution errors in a speeded picture-word task

Using a speeded-naming variant of the picture-word task, we found that word substitution errors can be elicited in the laboratory. In this variant of the task, participants often responded by saying the word instead of the picture's name. Such word substitution errors are interesting because they allow the evaluation of the relative merits of two broad classes of word production models. We obtained evidence in support of interactive models of word production. In addition, the error data presented evidence that speeded naming taps a late, name retrieval process and that picture naming is semantically mediated.