Think, blink or sleep on it? The impact of modes of thought on complex decision making

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of "unconscious thought" for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage "unconscious thought processes"). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made "unconsciously", but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving "online judgement" rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to "stop thinking" about complex decisions.     

The merits of unconscious thought in creativity

Research has yielded weak empirical support for the idea that creative solutions may be discovered through unconscious thought, despite anecdotes to this effect. To understand this gap, we examined the effect of unconscious thought on two outcomes of a remote-association test (RAT): implicit accessibility and conscious reporting of answers. In Experiment 1, which used very difficult RAT items, a short period of unconscious thought (i.e., participants were distracted while holding the goal of solving the RAT items) increased the accessibility of RAT answers, but did not increase the number of correct answers compared with an equal duration of conscious thought or mere distraction. In Experiment 2, which used moderately difficult RAT items, unconscious thought led to a similar level of accessibility, but fewer correct answers, compared with conscious thought. These findings confirm and extend unconscious-thought theory by demonstrating that processes that increase the mental activation of correct solutions do not necessarily lead them into consciousness.     

The speed of metacognition: Taking time to get to know one’s structural knowledge

The time course of different metacognitive experiences of knowledge was investigated using artificial grammar learning. Experiment 1 revealed that when participants are aware of the basis of their judgments (conscious structural knowledge) decisions are made most rapidly, followed by decisions made with conscious judgment but without conscious knowledge of underlying structure (unconscious structural knowledge), and guess responses (unconscious judgment knowledge) were made most slowly, even when controlling for differences in confidence and accuracy. In experiment 2, short response deadlines decreased the accuracy of unconscious but not conscious structural knowledge. Conversely, the deadline decreased the proportion of conscious structural knowledge in favour of guessing. Unconscious structural knowledge can be applied rapidly but becomes more reliable with additional metacognitive processing time whereas conscious structural knowledge is an all-or-nothing response that cannot always be applied rapidly. These dissociations corroborate quite separate theories of recognition (dual-process) and metacognition (higher order thought and cross-order integration).     

Selection of Decision Strategies After Conscious and Unconscious Thought

It is commonly assumed that the use of simple, non‐compensatory strategies is especially pronounced in memory‐based decisions, where information costs are high. At the same time, there is evidence that in memory‐based decisions, a compensatory processing of attributes is facilitated when the processing occurs unconsciously rather than consciously. We applied a strategy classification approach—developed in research on non‐compensatory heuristics—to test two key tenets of unconscious thought theory: the capacity principle and the weighting principle. Participants memorized attribute information about cars and were subsequently either directed to or diverted from thinking consciously about their preferences between the cars (conscious versus unconscious thought). Then, participants indicated in pair‐wise choices which car they would prefer and were classified (based on their choices) as using either one of two compensatory strategies (equal weight or weighted additive) or a non‐compensatory strategy (lexicographic heuristic). In line with the capacity principle, the number of participants best described by a compensatory strategy (the equal‐weight strategy) tended to be higher after unconscious thought than after conscious thought, whereas the number of participants best described by the lexicographic heuristic tended to be lower. Inconsistent with the weighting principle, participants in the unconscious thought condition were better described by the equal‐weight strategy than by the weighted‐additive strategy. In Experiment 2, in which participants were not instructed to form an impression while learning the attribute information, the use of the equal‐weight strategy was not more prevalent after unconscious thought. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

On the benefits of thinking unconsciously: Unconscious thought can increase post-choice satisfaction

This work compares conscious thought and unconscious thought in relation to quality of choice. Earlier work [Dijksterhuis, A. (2004). Think different: The merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 87, 586-598] has shown that people make better choices after engaging in unconscious thought (i.e., unconscious activity during a period of distraction) rather than in conscious thought. However, the evidence was obtained for choices between hypothetical alternatives with quality of choice operationalized normatively. As quality of decision is essentially subjective, in the current experiment participants chose between real objects with quality operationalized as post-choice satisfaction. In a paradigm based on work by Wilson and colleagues [Wilson, T. D., Lisle, D., Schooler, J. W., Hodges, S. D., Klaaren, K. J., & LaFleur, S. J. (1993). Introspecting about reasons can reduce post-choice satisfaction. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19, 331-339], participants were briefly presented with five art posters, and chose one either (a) immediately, (b) after thorough conscious thinking about each poster, or (c) after a period of distraction. Participants took their favorite poster home and were phoned 3-5 weeks later. As hypothesized, unconscious thinkers were more satisfied with their choice than participants in the other two conditions.     

Think different: the merits of unconscious thought in preference development and decision making

The role of unconscious and conscious thought in decision making was investigated in 5 experiments. Because of the low processing capacity of consciousness, conscious thought was hypothesized to be maladaptive when making complex decisions. Conversely, unconscious thought was expected to be highly effective. In Experiments 1-3, participants were presented with a complex decision problem in which they had to choose between various alternatives, each with multiple attributes. Some participants had to make a decision immediately after being presented with the options. In the conscious thought condition, participants could think about the decision for a few minutes. In the unconscious thought condition, participants were distracted for a few minutes and then indicated their decision. Throughout the experiments, unconscious thinkers made the best decisions. Additional evidence obtained in Experiments 4 and 5 suggests that unconscious thought leads to clearer, more polarized, and more integrated representations in memory.     

Four empirical tests of Unconscious Thought Theory

According to Unconscious Thought Theory, people make better decisions after unconscious than after conscious thought (Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006a). Unconscious Thought Theory yields four specific predictions. First, an exact replication of Dijksterhuis et al. (2006a) study should indicate that unconscious decisions are superior to conscious decisions. Second, decisions should improve with duration of conscious thought. Third, unconscious decisions should be superior to conscious decisions, even if unconscious decisions are deliberated while having access to information. Fourth, unconscious decisions should be based on a weighting strategy. We report results of four studies, featuring 480 participants, that yield no evidence in favor of these predictions. Therefore our findings cast doubt on Unconscious Thought Theory and its advice to base decisions on unconscious thought. The results of our studies suggest that it is better to base decisions on conscious thought while having access to information.     

Bias or equality? Unconscious thought equally integrates temporally scattered information

In previous experiments on unconscious thought, information was presented to participants in one continuous session; however, in daily life, information is delivered in a temporally partitioned way. We examined whether unconscious thought could equally integrate temporally scattered information when making overall evaluations. When presenting participants with information in two temporally partitioned sessions, participants’ overall evaluation was based on neither the information in the first session (Experiment 1) nor that in the second session (Experiment 2); instead, information in both sessions were equally integrated to reach a final judgment. Conscious thought, however, overemphasized information in the second session. Experiments 3 and 4 further ruled out possible influencing factors including differences in the distributions of positive/negative attributes in the first and second sessions and on-line judgment. These findings suggested that unconscious thought can integrate information from a wider range of periods during an evaluation, while conscious thought cannot.     

The influence of expertise and of physical complexity on visual short-term memory consolidation

This paper examines controversial claims about the merit of “unconscious thought” for making complex decisions. In four experiments, participants were presented with complex decisions and were asked to choose the best option immediately, after a period of conscious deliberation, or after a period of distraction (said to encourage “unconscious thought processes”). In all experiments the majority of participants chose the option predicted by their own subjective attribute weighting scores, regardless of the mode of thought employed. There was little evidence for the superiority of choices made “unconsciously”, but some evidence that conscious deliberation can lead to better choices. The final experiment suggested that the task is best conceptualized as one involving “online judgement” rather than one in which decisions are made after periods of deliberation or distraction. The results suggest that we should be cautious in accepting the advice to “stop thinking” about complex decisions.     

Where creativity resides: the generative power of unconscious thought

In three experiments, the relation between different modes of thought and the generation of "creative" and original ideas was investigated. Participants were asked to generate items according to a specific instruction (e.g., generate place names starting with an "A"). They either did so immediately after receiving the instruction, or after a few minutes of conscious thought, or after a few minutes of distraction during which "unconscious thought" was hypothesized to take place. Throughout the experiments, the items participants listed under "unconscious thought" conditions were more original. It was concluded that whereas conscious thought may be focused and convergent, unconscious thought may be more associative and divergent.     

Cognitive style modulates conscious but not unconscious thought: Comparing the deliberation-without-attention effect in analytics and wholists

Unconscious thought theory (UTT) suggests that conscious thinking is less effective in complex decision-making than unconscious thinking. However, little research has taken individual differences (e.g., cognitive style) into account. Using an adapted UTT paradigm, the present study compared the performances of individuals with a wholist or an analytic cognitive style in both conscious and unconscious thought conditions. After viewing information regarding four hypothetical phones, participants in the conscious thought condition deliberated for three minutes before rating the phones, while participants in the unconscious thought condition were distracted with a 2-back task for three minutes before rating. The results showed that wholists were equally good at differentiating good and bad phones after conscious or unconscious thought, whereas analytics performed well only when thinking unconsciously. The modulation effect of cognitive style appeared only in conscious thought. Implications for UTT and the understanding of cognitive style are discussed.     

Implicit and explicit memory without awareness

Summary Three experiments are reported which investigate the conscious status of subjects during an implicit-memory test. In all experiments the subjects either named each visually presented target item or generated each item from an anagram in a first phase of incidental learning. In a second phase, they were either given a visual word-stem completion task as an implicit-memory test or given a recognition task (Experiment 1), or a cued-recall task (Experiments 2 and 3) as explicit-memory tests. Finally, in a third phase the subjects were required to make decisions about the input status (i. e., they had to decide whether the item was present in the first phase) as well as about the output status of information (i. e., they had to decide whether the item had been completed, recognized or recalled in the second phase). A generation effect (i. e., generated items were remembered better than named items) was evident in the recognition and recall data, but only for items whose recognition or recall was accompanied by conscious recollection of their previous occurrence in the study list. Judgments about the input status were more precise, given that items had been consciously recognized or recalled rather than completed. The same pattern of findings was observed for judgments about the output status. The results are interpreted as evidence that subjects in implicit-memory tests are less aware of the fact that some of their productions are relevant to prior experiences. In addition, they are less aware of the fact that they are retrieving information from their memories. However, the same state of nonawareness may be present in explicit-memory tests, as was revealed by the performance of subjects on those items whose recognition or recall was not accompanied by conscious recollection.     

North is up(hill): Route planning heuristics in real-world environments

Navigators use both external cues and internal heuristics to help them plan efficient routes through environments. In six experiments, we discover and seek the origin of a novel heuristic that causes participants to preferentially choose southern rather than northern routes during map-based route planning. Experiment 1 demonstrates that participants who are tasked to choose between two equal-length routes, one going generally north and one south, show reliable decision preferences toward the southern option. Experiment 2 demonstrates that participants produce a southern preference only when instructed to adopt egocentric rather than allocentric perspectives during route planning. In Experiments 3-5, we examined participants’ judgments of route characteristics and found that judgments of route length and preferences for upper relative to lower path options do not contribute to the southern route preference. Rather, the southern route preference appears to be a result of misperceptions of increased elevation to the north (i.e., north is up). Experiment 6 further supports this finding by demonstrating that participants provide greater time estimates for north- than for equivalent south-going routes when planning travel between U.S. cities. Results are discussed with regard to predicting wayfinding behavior, the mental simulation of action, and theories of spatial cognition and navigation.     

Effects of processing fluency on comparative performance judgments

Research has shown that performance predictions are biased by the impact of processing fluency. However, existing data are inconclusive with regard to comparative judgments of performance. In five experiments, participants in an easy condition gave more favorable comparative judgments than participants in a difficult condition. Participants judged their performance more favorably if they named colors of non-color words rather than non-matching color words (Experiment 1), if they had to generate six words of a category rather than 12 words (Experiment 2), if they had to run in place for 15 s rather than 2 min (Experiment 3), but the latter result holds only true if participants were not active in sports (Experiment 4). When 67% of the items in a recognition test were old words, participants thought that their recognition performance was better than when 33% of the items were old words, although recognition performance did not differ between groups (Experiment 5). We discuss this result in the light of recent theories about effects of processing fluency on judgments.     

Predicting Soccer Matches After Unconscious and Conscious Thought as a Function of Expertise

ABSTRACT— In two experiments, we investigated the effects of expertise and mode of thought on the accuracy of people's predictions. Both experts and nonexperts predicted the results of soccer matches after conscious thought, after unconscious thought, or immediately. In Experiment 1, experts who thought unconsciously outperformed participants in all other conditions. Whereas unconscious thinkers showed a correlation between expertise and accuracy of prediction, no such relation was observed for conscious thinkers or for immediate decision makers. In Experiment 2, this general pattern was replicated. In addition, experts who thought unconsciously were better at applying diagnostic information than experts who thought consciously or who decided immediately. The results are consistent with unconscious-thought theory.     

Recollection-based prospective metamemory judgments are more accurate than those based on confidence: judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKS)

Five experiments were conducted to examine whether the nature of the information that is monitored during prospective metamemory judgments affected the relative accuracy of those judgments. We compared item-by-item judgments of learning (JOLs), which involved participants determining how confident they were that they would remember studied items, with judgments of remembering and knowing (JORKs), which involved participants determining whether studied items would later be accompanied by contextual details (i.e., remembering) or would not (i.e., knowing). JORKs were more accurate than JOLs when remember-know or confidence judgments were made at test and when cued recall was the outcome measure, but not for yes-no recognition. We conclude that the accuracy of metamemory judgments depends on the nature of the information monitored during study and test and that metamemory monitoring can be improved if participants are asked to base their judgments on contextual details rather than on confidence. These data support the contention that metamemory decisions can be based on qualitatively distinct cues, rather than an overall memory strength signal.     

The tendency of unconscious thought toward global processing style

This study explored whether unconscious thought has a tendency to process information globally. In three experiments, a Navon task was used to activate global or local processing styles. Findings showed that in the unconscious-thought groups, those performing the local Navon task presented a poorer decision-making performance when compared to those performing the global Navon task (Experiment 1); participants reported that their judgments were made based on partial attributes (Experiment 2), and evaluated a target individual mainly based on information consistent with stereotypes (Experiment 3). These results showed that when presented with distracter tasks, conscious thought activates local processing, which impairs its ability to process information globally. However, this impairment would not happen if global processing were activated instead. This study provides support to the idea that unconscious thought has a tendency to process information globally.     

知识迁移对无意识思维效应的作用

为弥补Bos等人(2008)忽视内部因素对无意识思维作用的研究缺陷,本研究从知识迁移视角提出无意识思维受内部知识与外部任务目标双重导向的观点。结果发现：(1)无意识思维知识的迁移促进了无意识思维效应;(2)在无意识思维知识与任务目标双导向下,无意识思维效应更强。基于上述研究,我们更一般地认为,无意识思维效应是内部因素(如,知识、兴趣、动机等)与外部因素(如,任务目标)共同作用的结果。     

The best of both worlds: Integrating conscious and unconscious thought best solves complex decisions

Two studies address the debate over whether conscious or unconscious mental processes best handle complex decisions. According to Unconscious Thought Theory (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006) both modes of thinking have particular advantages: conscious thought can follow strict rules, whereas unconscious thought is better suited for integrating numerous decision attributes. Because most complex decisions require both adherence to precise rules and the aggregation of information, we hypothesized that complex decisions can best be made by engaging in periods of both conscious and unconscious thought. In both studies we found that the sequential integration of conscious and unconscious thought solved complex choices better than conscious or unconscious thought alone. In Study 2 we examined whether the sequential order of the integration condition matters. In line with our prediction, we found that integration worked best when unconscious thought followed conscious thought.     

无意识思维:理论、质疑与回应

Dijksterhuis等人发现在解决复杂问题时,无意识思维的加工结果优于有意识思维,并据此提出了无意识思维理论。本文介绍了支持无意识思维理论的基本实验证据,质疑无意识思维的相关研究及对质疑的回应研究。未来研究应重点关注改进无意识思维研究范式和寻找更多影响无意识思维效应的中介变量,无意识思维加工结果如何上升到有意识层面,无意识思维的加工方式以及其在真实和高风险任务情境中的应用。