Coercion and pragmatic presuppositions

In Category Mistakes, Magidor proposes that sortal restrictions should be viewed as pragmatic presuppositions. This contrasts with recent linguistic theories of successfully resolved category mistakes, e.g. coercions or copredication. It has been argued that for the proper treatment of such examples, sortal restrictions should be expressed by semantic presuppositions since they need to interact with compositional semantics. I explore possible ways in which Magidor’s theory could be extended to explain examples of coercion and copredication. The outcome of the discussion is that incorporation of these facts into Magidor’s pragmatic system might be possible, but ecessitates choices that are far from trivial.     

Action explanation and its presuppositions

In debates about rationalizing action explanation causalists assume that the psychological states that explain an intentional action have both causal and rational features. I scrutinize the presuppositions of those who seek and offer rationalizing action explanations. This scrutiny shows, I argue, that where rational features play an explanatory role in these contexts, causal features play only a presuppositional role. But causal features would have to play an explanatory role if rationalizing action explanation were a species of causal explanation. Consequently, it is not a species of causal explanation.     

Children's linguistic intuitions about factive presuppositions

Third and sixth graders' understanding of factive presupposition was investigated via two tasks: One required an abstract truth value judgment of the verb complement; the other called for a more informal judgment of consistency (or contradiction) between the target sentence and the negation of its complement. When compared with corresponding adult data, the present results indicate that the development of factive presupposition continues through late childhood. A further task examined a nonlogical pragmatic variable related to factive meaning. The final task investigated whether children's judgments of overall certainty are governed by factive or pragmatic aspects of meaning. Comparisons across the four tasks indicate that factive presupposition only gradually emerges as a distinct logical component of verb meaning. It is argued that young children's initial discriminations between factive and nonfactive verbs reflect the subjective confidence conveyed by the verb rather than the logical property of factivity, but that later in acquisition, factivity acquires a status superseding that of other facets of meaning.     

Space perception and William James's metaphysical presuppositions

William James's overtly philosophical work may be more continuous with his psychological work than is sometimes thought. His Essays in Radical Empiricism can be understood as an explicit statement of the absolute presupposition that formed the basis of Jamesian psychology: that direct experience is primary and has to be taken at face value. An examination of James's theory of space perception suggests that, even in his early work, he presupposed the primacy of direct experience, and that later changes in his account of space perception can be understood as making his view more consistent with this presupposition. In his earlier view of space perception, James argued that sensations were directly experienced as spatial, though he accepted that spatial relations between sensations may be constructed by higher order thought. In his later view, however, James argued that spatial relations were just as directly experienced as sensations. The work of T. H. Green may have prompted James to recognize the full consequence of his ideas and to realize that taking experience at face value required that spatial relations be thought of as intrinsic to experience rather than the result of intellectual construction.     

Structuralism and Metaphysics

I consider different versions of a structuralist view of mathematical objects, according to which characteristic mathematical objects have no more of a 'nature' than is given by the basic relations of a structure in which they reside. My own version of such a view is non-eliminative in the sense that it does not lead to a programme for eliminating reference to mathematical objects. I reply to criticisms of non-eliminative structuralism recently advanced by Keränen and Hellman. In replying to the former, I rely on a distinction between 'basic' and 'constructed' structures. A conclusion is that ideas from the metaphysical tradition can be misleading when applied to the objects of modern mathematics.     

葛洪与玄学

玄学是魏晋时期兴起的一种影响深远的社会思潮,两晋之际玄学在理论上发展到极至,其影响开始渗入社会生活的各个方面。葛洪早年深受儒家学说熏陶,又是官方道教理论的创立者,无论是为了维护传统的儒家思想,还是出于为官方道教建立理论的需要,葛洪在主观上都反对玄学所促发的行为方式。但客观上,葛洪却不自觉地受了玄学的影响。本文力图通过分析葛洪思想中玄学的成分,来揭示玄学对当时士人的巨大影响力。     

Real Metaphysics

Book Information Real Metaphysics. Real Metaphysics Hallvard Lillehammer and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, eds., London : Routledge, 2003, VIII + 248, £65 (cloth), £19.99 (paper) Edited by Hallvard Lillehammer; and Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra. Routledge. London. Pp. VIII + 248. £65 (cloth:), £19.99 (paper:),