Are You Really Happy? Children’s Understanding of Real vs. Pretend Emotions

This paper studies children’s capacity to understand that the emotions displayed in pretend play contexts do not necessarily correspond to internal emotions, and that pretend emotions may create false beliefs in an observer. A new approach is taken by asking children about pretend emotions in terms of pretence-reality instead of appearance-reality. A total of 37 four-year-olds and 33 six-year-olds were asked to participate in tasks where they had to pretend an emotion or where they were told stories in which the protagonists pretended an emotion. In each task children were asked: a) if the pretend emotion was real or just pretended and b) if an observer would think that the emotional expression was real or just pretended. Results showed that four-year-olds are capable of understanding that pretend emotions are not necessarily real. Overall, six-year-olds performed better than younger children. Furthermore, both age groups showed difficulty in understanding that pretend emotions might unintentionally mislead an observer. Results are discussed in relation to previous research on children’s ability to understand pretend play and the emotional appearance-reality distinction.     

儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响

为考察儿童内疚情绪对其亲社会行为的影响,本研究采用现场实验的方法探讨了小学5年级学生内疚情绪与其亲社会行为的关系。结果显示：（1）内疚情绪能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高,难过情绪不能促进儿童亲社会行为水平的提高;（2）当儿童将注意力集中于自己对团体造成的不良影响,产生内疚情绪,但如果其将注意力集中于自己的不良结果时,则产生难过情绪。结论：儿童的消极情绪是否能促进其亲社会行为水平的提高,取决于其将注意力集中于自己还是他人。     

5～9岁儿童内疚情绪理解的特点

选取87名5、7、9岁儿童探讨儿童对违规行为的道德评价对其内疚情绪理解的影响。以期揭示儿童在同伴条件下,对内疚情绪的理解特点。结果发现(1)5～9岁的儿童对违规行为都给出了消极的道德评价,他们已经具备了产生内疚情绪的认知能力,但尚不能进行道德情感推理,即不认为违规者会产生内疚情绪。(2)三个年龄段的儿童大部分对于内疚情绪还不能很好地理解,他们更多地是从行为产生有利于违规者的结果来理解违规者的情绪。     

Effects of anger, guilt, and envy on moral hypocrisy

In the current article the authors examined the impact of specific emotions on moral hypocrisy, the tendency among people to judge others more severely than they judge themselves. In two studies, they found that (a) anger increased moral hypocrisy, (b) guilt eliminated moral hypocrisy, and (c) envy reversed moral hypocrisy. In particular, these findings were observed in two domains. In Study 1, participants responded to moral dilemmas describing unethical behavior and rated how acceptable it would be if others engaged in the unethical behavior, or alternatively, if they themselves engaged in the unethical behavior. In Study 2, participants were asked how much they would like to donate to research on cancer, or alternatively, how much they think others should donate. The results demonstrate that specific emotions influence moral decision making, even when real money is at stake, and that emotions of the same valence have opposing effects on moral judgment.     

The Role of Basic, Self-Conscious and Self-Conscious Evaluative Emotions in Children’s Memory and Understanding of Emotion

In past research, emotion has been classified as basic, self-conscious or self-conscious evaluative, with each type of emotion being progressively more difficult for children to understand (Lewis, M. (2000a). In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland-Jones (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (2nd ed., pp. 265–280), New York, NY: The Guilford Press). Although researchers have examined children’s understanding of individual emotions (e.g., guilt), researchers have not assessed children’s understanding and memory for emotions based on this classification. In the present research, 6-, 8- and 10-year-old children’s memory and understanding of basic, self-conscious and self-conscious evaluative emotions were examined. Although a memory advantage was found for emotions, this effect was less so for the younger children and less so for non-basic emotions. In fact, 6-year-old children and, to a lesser extent 8-year-old children, were more likely than older children to recall self-conscious and self-conscious evaluative emotions with basic emotion labels, and were more likely to explain them using basic emotion labels. Overall, negative emotions (e.g., mad, guilt) were better recalled than positive emotions (e.g., happy, pride), regardless of type of emotion. Gender differences were found as girls were more likely to remember emotion than boys, especially when the emotion action was specifically labeled and a female character experienced it. Proportions of this research were presented at the biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development (2005), Atlanta, Georgia and the meeting of the Cognitive Development Society (2005), San Diego, CA.     

The role of maltreatment experience in children's understanding of the antecedents of emotion

The ability to understand the causes and likely triggers of emotions has important consequences for children's adaptation to their social environment. Yet, little is currently known about the processes that contribute to the development of emotion understanding. To assess how well children understood the antecedents of emotional reactions in others, we presented children with a variety of emotional situations that varied in outcome and equivocality. Children were told the emotional outcome and asked to rate whether a situation was a likely cause of such an outcome. We tested the effects of maltreatment experience on children's ability to map emotions to their eliciting events and their understanding of emotion–situation pairings. The present data suggest that typically developing children are able to distinguish between common elicitors of negative and positive events. In contrast, children who develop within maltreating contexts, where emotions are extreme and inconsistent, interpret positive, equivocal, and negative events as being equally plausible causes of sadness and anger. This difference in maltreated children's reasoning about emotions suggests a critical role of experience in aiding children's mastery of the structure of interpersonal discourse.     

What is moral about guilt? Acting "prosocially" at the disadvantage of others

For centuries economists and psychologists have argued that the morality of moral emotions lies in the fact that they stimulate prosocial behavior and benefit others in a person's social environment. Many studies have shown that guilt, arguably the most exemplary moral emotion, indeed motivates prosocial behavior in dyadic social dilemma situations. When multiple persons are involved, however, the moral and prosocial nature of this emotion can be questioned. The present article shows how guilt can have beneficial effects for the victim of one's actions but also disadvantageous effects for other people in the social environment. A series of experiments, with various emotion inductions and dependent measures, all reveal that guilt motivates prosocial behavior toward the victim at the expense of others around-but not at the expense of oneself. These findings illustrate that a thorough understanding of the functioning of emotions is necessary to understand their moral nature.     

Aggressive and prosocial children's emotion attributions and moral reasoning

Aggressive and prosocial children's emotion attributions and moral reasoning were investigated. Participants were 235 kindergarten children (M=6.2 years) and 136 elementary-school children (M=7.6 years) who were selected as aggressive or prosocial based on (kindergarten) teacher ratings. The children were asked to evaluate hypothetical rule violations, attribute emotions they would feel in the role of the victimizer, and justify their responses. Compared with younger prosocial children, younger aggressive children attributed fewer negative emotions and were more likely to provide sanction-oriented justifications when evaluating rule violations negatively. Furthermore, age-, gender- and context-effects in moral development occurred. The context-effects included both effects of transgression type (i.e., prosocial morality vs. fairness) on emotion attributions and moral reasoning and the effects of the context of moral evaluation and emotion attribution on moral reasoning. Findings are discussed in terms of the role of emotion attributions and moral reasoning as antecedents of children's aggressive and prosocial behavior.     

The Relation of Emotion Knowledge to Coping in European American and Chinese Immigrant Children

Emotion knowledge contributes to emotion regulation and coping among adults, but few studies have investigated its role in children’s coping development, especially in a cross-cultural context. We examine relations between children’s emotion knowledge and coping in European American and Chinese immigrant families. One hundred and three 7- to 10-year-old children and their mothers from European American and Chinese cultural background participated in this study. Children's emotion knowledge was assessed using emotion-situation knowledge production task. This task examines their understanding of situational antecedents o discrete emotions. Children’s use of coping strategies was reported by mothers using the Children’s Coping Strategies Checklist. Results showed that Chinese immigrant children had greater emotion knowledge of fear and pride but were reported using less variety of coping strategies than European American children. The relationship between children’s knowledge of self-conscious emotions and their use of distraction coping strategies was moderated by culture, whereby knowledge of self-conscious emotions was negatively associated with the parent-reported distraction strategies only for European American children but not for Chinese immigrant children. The importance of culture in both theory and practice related to emotion knowledge and coping is discussed. Findings in this study suggest that family intervention and children’s emotion training programs may need to consider children’s cultural background.     

Individual Differences in Children's Understanding of Guilt: Links with Theory of Mind

The author examined the relation between individual differences in children's understanding of guilt and theory of mind (ToM) ability. Two hundred and eighteen 8- to 10-year-old children were asked to define what guilt is and report a personal experience in which they felt this emotion. ToM was assessed with the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (Children's version; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) and with the Strange Stories test (Happè, 1994). There were marked differences in children's understanding of guilt even after controlling for age. Moreover, high levels of understanding of guilt were associated with high levels of performance on both ToM tests. The theoretical and practical implications of these results are discussed.     

False belief and emotion understanding in monozygotic twins,dizygotic twins and non-twin children

This study investigated the understanding of false belief and emotion in monozygotic (MZ) and same-sex dizygotic (DZ) twin pairs compared to non-twin children. Aged 3;9 to 5;1 years, the children (N=123) were administered three false belief and three emotion understanding tasks. Age, family socioeconomic status, mother's level of education and language abilities were controlled. Results showed no difference between the three groups in false belief understanding. On emotion tasks, non-twin children and DZ twins did not differ from each other, but they both performed better than MZ twins. Results are discussed in terms of the Peterson's (2000) variety hypothesis and suggest that the affective closeness experienced by MZ twins might interfere with their understanding of others’ emotions.     

The development of the experience and anticipation of regret

Although recent studies have established that children experience regret from around 6 years, we do not yet know when the ability to anticipate this emotion emerges, despite the importance of the anticipation of regret in decision-making. We examined whether children will anticipate they will feel regret if they were to find out in a box-choosing game that, had they made a different choice, they would have obtained a better prize. Experiment 1 replicated Guttentag and Ferrell's study in which children were asked what they hoped was in a non-chosen box. Even 8- to 9-year olds find this question difficult. However, when asked what might make them feel sadder, 7- to 8-year olds (but not younger children) predicted that finding the larger prize in the unchosen box would make them feel this way. In Experiments 2 and 3, children predicted how they would feel if the unchosen box contained either a larger or smaller prize, in order to examine anticipation of both regret and of relief. Although 6- to 7-year olds do experience regret when they find out they could have won a better prize, they do not correctly anticipate feeling this way. By around 8 years, the majority of children are able to anticipate both regret and relief.     

Moral Emotions,Emotion Self-Regulation,Callous-Unemotional Traits,and Problem Behavior in Children of Incarcerated Mothers

Children with incarcerated mothers are at high risk for developing problem behaviors. Fifty children (6–12 years; 62% girls) participated in summer camps, along with adult mentors. Regression analyses of child and adult measures of child’s emotion self-regulation and callous-unemotional traits, and a child measure of moral emotions, showed that poor emotion regulation, along with low levels of guilt and high levels of shame, predicted children’s externalizing behaviors, while only low levels of guilt predicted a unique subset of child characteristics called callous-unemotional traits. Children who experienced healthy guilt for misdeeds were better able to control their behavior. Adults noted the ability of children with callous/unemotional traits to manage and regulate their emotions, while poor emotion regulation was more predictive of the cluster of externalizing problems. Discussion focuses on prevention efforts aimed at teaching emotion self-regulation and the implications of the high levels of callous-unemotional traits in this population of children.     

The Relation Between Appraised Mismatch and the Duration of Negative Emotions: Evidence for Universality

Emotions are processes that unfold over time. As a consequence, a better understanding of emotions can be reached only when their time‐related characteristics can be assessed and interpreted adequately. A central aspect in this regard is the duration of emotional experience. Previous studies have shown that an emotional experience can last anywhere from a couple of seconds up to several hours or longer. In this article, we examine to what extent specific appraisals of the eliciting event may account for variability in emotion duration and to what degree appraisal–duration relations are universal or culture specific. Participants in 37 countries were asked to recollect emotional episodes of fear, anger, sadness, disgust, shame and guilt. Subsequently, they were asked to report the duration of these episodes and to answer a number of questions regarding their appraisal of the emotion‐eliciting event. Multi‐level analyses revealed that negative emotions last especially long when the eliciting event and its consequences are perceived to be incongruent with the individual's goals, values and self‐ideal, creating a mismatch. These relations are largely universal, although evidence for some limited variability across countries is found as well. Copyright © 2013 European Association of Personality Psychology     

Another Search for the “Hot” Cognitions: Appraisal, Irrational Beliefs, Attributions, and Their Relation to Emotion

One study examined the hypothesized status of appraisal and irrational beliefs relative to attributions, as proximal antecedents of emotion. In our study, which looked at 4 pairs of functional and dysfunctional negative emotions (i.e., concern/anxiety, sadness/depression, remorse/guilt, annoyance/anger), undergraduates (N = 120) reported on their attributions, appraisal, irrational beliefs, and emotions during past encounters associated with various negative events. Congruent with both Smith and Lazarus' (1993) appraisal theory and Ellis' (1994) cognitive theory of emotion, the results of this study indicate that the emotions (both functional and dysfunctional negative emotions) were more directly associated with appraisal and with irrational beliefs (dysfunctional negative emotions only) than they were with attributions. Also, irrational beliefs were strongly associated with appraisal; while demandingness (DEM) was associated more with primary appraisal, awfulizing/catastrophizing, low frustration tolerance, and global evaluation of human worth (including self-downing) were associated more with secondary appraisal. Dysfunctional emotions seem to involve primary appraisal associated with DEM while functional emotions involve primary appraisal associated with preferences. These findings lend to support the status of appraisal and irrational beliefs as the proximal cognitive antecedents of emotion and the status of irrational beliefs as a differencing factor between functional and dysfunctional emotions.     

Impairment in judgement of the moral emotion guilt following orbitofrontal cortex damage

Although neuroimaging studies have provided evidence for an association between moral emotions and the orbitofrontal cortex, studies on patients with focal lesions using experimental probes of moral emotions are scarce. Here, we addressed this topic by presenting a moral emotion judgement task to patients with focal brain damage. Four judgement tasks in a simple pairwise choice paradigm were given to 72 patients with cerebrovascular disease. These tasks consisted of a perceptual line judgement task as a control task; the objects’ preference task as a basic preference judgement task; and two types of moral emotion judgement task, an anger task and a guilt task. A multiple linear regression analysis was performed on each set of task performance scores to take into account potential confounders. Performance on the guilt emotion judgement task negatively correlated with the orbitofrontal cortex damage, but not with the other variables. Results for the other judgement tasks did not reach statistical significance. The close association between orbitofrontal cortex damage and a decrease in guilt emotion judgement consistency might suggest that the orbitofrontal cortex plays a key role in the sense of guilt, a hallmark of morality.     

Subjective impact, meaning making, and current and recalled emotions for self-defining memories

Two studies examined the impact of self-defining events on individuals (i.e., subjective impact), meaning making with regard to these events, and how subjective impact may account for the pattern of current and recalled emotions for these self-defining memories (Singer & Moffitt, 1991-1992). In Study 1, participants recalled self-defining memories, indicating how much impact the recalled events have had on them and described meaning making for these events. Subjective impact was shown to be a good marker for meaning making. Participants in Study 2 each recalled five self-defining memories, reporting their current emotions about the events, the emotions they recalled feeling at the time, and the impact the events have had on them. As expected, for negative memories, people reported less negative emotion (e.g., sadness) and more positive emotion (e.g., pride) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. For positive memories, people reported equally intense positive emotion (e.g., love) and less negative emotion (e.g., fear) compared to how they recalled feeling at the time. These patterns of current and recalled emotions were accounted for by impact ratings.     

How Children with Head Injury Represent Real and Deceptive Emotion in Short Narratives

Narratives are not only about events, but also about the emotions those events elicit. Understanding a narrative involves not just the affective valence of implied emotional states, but the formation of an explicit mental representation of those states. In turn, this representation provides a mechanism that particularizes emotion and modulates its display, which then allows emotional expression to be modified according to particular contexts. This includes understanding that a character may feel an emotion but inhibit its display or even express a deceptive emotion. We studied how 59 school-aged children with head injury and 87 normally-developing age-matched controls understand real and deceptive emotions in brief narratives. Children with head injury showed less sensitivity than controls to how emotions are expressed in narratives. While they understood the real emotions in the text, and could recall what provoked the emotion and the reason for concealing it, they were less able than controls to identify deceptive emotions. Within the head injury group, factors such as an earlier age at head injury and frontal lobe contusions were associated with poor understanding of deceptive emotions. The results are discussed in terms of the distinction between emotions as felt and emotions as a cognitive framework for understanding other people's actions and mental states. We conclude that children with head injury understand emotional communication, the spontaneous externalization of real affect, but not emotive communication, the conscious, strategic modification of affective signals to influence others through deceptive facial expressions.     

Loving and angry? Happy and sad? Understanding and reporting of mixed emotions in mother–child relationships by 6‐ to 12‐year‐olds

The Evaluative Space Model of emotions allows for the coactivation of positive‐appetitive and negative‐avoidant systems, but few studies have examined mixed emotions in child development. Existing research suggests children's understanding of opposite valence emotion combinations emerges by approximately 11 years of age. However, it is not yet clear whether various opposite valence combinations are understood at different ages, nor whether children can understand them in others before they have experienced such mixed emotions themselves. Semi‐structured interviews with 97 children investigated whether they regarded six combinations of opposite valence mixed emotions as possible, could provide reasons for them, and report their own experience of each in the context of mother–child relationships. Both understanding that such combinations are possible and ability to provide reasons for them increased after age 6 and up to age 11, but were still incomplete in 12‐year‐olds. Understanding of different opposite valence combinations developed at different rates. At each age, fewer children who showed understanding of these combinations in others reported having had a similar experience themselves. The findings suggest a need to systematically examine a range of mixed emotions in order to develop a comprehensive theory of the development of mixed emotion understanding. They also suggest extending research into adolescence.