康德与福柯:启蒙与现代性之争

自1784年康德在<柏林月刊>提出并回答什么是启蒙的问题之后,200年来,西方哲学就一直以不同的方式直接或间接地面对启蒙问题,甚至福柯断言:"现代哲学,这正是试图对两个世纪以前如此冒失地提出的那个问题(启蒙问题,笔者注)做出回答的哲学"[1].然而,福柯更深刻地感受到的是对启蒙的疑惑:"所谓‘启蒙'的事件究竟是什么?它至少在某方面决定了我们是什么,我们想的是什么以及我们所做的是什么"[2],进而引发了福柯对探寻"现代性是否构成启蒙的继续和发展或是否应当从中看到对于18世纪的基本原则的断裂或背离"[3]的诉求,公开了当代挥之不去的启蒙与现代性之间的哲学争论.     

启蒙的吊诡与启蒙的反思——以中国现代思想中的"启蒙反思"论说为中心

17-18世纪兴起于西欧北美的启蒙运动,是人类发展史上一座划时代的里程碑.启蒙思想家接续在欧洲中世纪社会内部所萌蘖的文艺复兴、宗教改革以及实验科学等异端思潮,进一步高扬理性、人权、自由、平等、民主、法治、科学、进步等价值理念,对禁锢人们头脑的神学教条和束缚人们身心的王权制度进行了深刻批判乃至猛烈抨击,在观念领域发生了极大的祛蔽作用和解放效应.     

价值观与启蒙的反思

启蒙时代发明的概念系统是现代欧洲文化的主要遗产.19世纪启蒙的世界观普遍性很大;20世纪上半期,启蒙理论已经失去了原来的力量,但是仍在西方人意识里占有重要地位.在一定的方面上,目前是后现代主义的时代;后现代主义者企图全面反思前一段历史的一切世界观体系.     

反思启蒙与理解宗教

启蒙运动主要是指发生在西方18世纪的思想和社会运动,其宗旨是批判基督教中的保守和专制思想,反对教会政教合一的残酷政制.如伏尔泰所鼓吹的自然神论、狄德罗所宣扬的怀疑主义以及休谟所坚持的不可知论的经验主义等,对于基督教传统的神学独断论确实具有摧枯拉朽的作用.     

康德、黑尔与普遍主义

康德和黑尔都是伦理学的杰出代表人物,尽管一个是规范伦理学家,一个是元伦理学家,但是双方都把目光聚集在道德的形式主义研究上,并且着力于普遍主义的落脚点.两者在理论上存在诸多不同,却依然可以发现两者在理论上的先行后继的关系.     

Phenomenology,idealism, and the legacy of Kant

Martin Heidegger closes his Winter Semester 1927–28 lectures by claiming that Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, read through the lens of Edmund Husserl’s phenomenology, confirmed the accuracy of his philosophical path culminating in Being and Time. A notable interpretation of Heidegger’s debt to Kant, advanced by William Blattner, presents Heidegger as a temporal idealist. I argue that attention to Husserl’s adaptation of Kant’s critical philosophy shows that both Husserl and Heidegger are realists. I make my case by tracing a unified philosophical problematic through three puzzling passages: the Schematism chapter of the first Critique, Husserl’s thought experiment of the destruction of the world in Ideas, and the passage in Being and Time that motivates Blattner’s idealist reading. Husserl and Heidegger give accounts, derived from Kant, of how the consciousness of time makes it possible for objects to be perceived as enduring unities, as well as ‘genealogies of logic’ that show how a priori knowledge, including ontology, is possible. These accounts are idealistic only in the sense that they concern the ideal or essential features of intentionality in virtue of which it puts us in touch with things as they are independently of the contributions of any mind of any type.     

Spontaneity and Self-Consciousness in the Groundwork and the B-Critique

ABSTRACT

According to some influential readings of the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, the view presented there of the kind of spontaneity we are conscious of through theoretical reason and the significance of such self-consciousness is irremediably at odds with the Critical theory, and thus roundly and rightly rejected in the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason. This paper argues, on the contrary, that the Groundwork can be read as articulating for the first time the account of self-consciousness and spontaneity that Kant goes on to develop in the B-Critique, especially the B-Transcendental Deduction.     

From Kant to Sade: a fragment of the history of philosophy in the Dialectic of Enlightenment

In this paper, I set out (1) to consider the extent to which Horkheimer and Adorno's account of the transition from Kant's philosophy to key features of the novels of the Marquis de Sade in the Second Excursus of their Dialectic of Enlightenment can be viewed as a fragment of the ‘history of philosophy’ and (2) to explain this account in a way that allows us to ask whether it succeeds in establishing a necessary connection between Kant's philosophy and Sade's novels. In connection with (2), a particular problem emerges. This problem concerns the role played by a non-instrumental form of reason in Horkheimer and Adorno's attempt to establish an essential connection between Kant's theoretical philosophy and Sade's novels, in which the practical implications of the theoretical employment of reason allegedly become explicit. It will be shown that, despite appearances to the contrary, an employment of reason of the relevant type is not identified by Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason.     

Kant,teleology, and evolution

This essay examines Kant's idea of organic teleology. The first two sections are devoted to Kant's analysis and justification of teleological conceptions in biology. Both the idea of teleology and Kant's anti-reductionism are derived from basic elements of his critical treatment of the human intellect. The third section discusses the limitations Kant places on accounts of origins in the life world. It is argued that the limitations Kant places on accounts of the origins of species do not follow from his idea of teleology. The final section briefly outlines the fate of the Kantian formulation of teleology in the nineteenth century.     

Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.     

启蒙反思与当代中国现代性的建构

在一定意义上,"启蒙反思"在今天可以说是一个全球性的话题,而之所以如此,又是与人们对于"现代性"的批判性反思紧密相联的. 就中文字面意思而言,"启蒙"就是"去除蒙昧",即脱离懵憧无知的状态.     

Self-consciousness,self-determination,and imagination in Kant

I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one's own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One's self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation.