康德与福柯:启蒙与现代性之争

自1784年康德在<柏林月刊>提出并回答什么是启蒙的问题之后,200年来,西方哲学就一直以不同的方式直接或间接地面对启蒙问题,甚至福柯断言:现代哲学,这正是试图对两个世纪以前如此冒失地提出的那个问题(启蒙问题,笔者注)做出回答的哲学[1].然而,福柯更深刻地感受到的是对启蒙的疑惑:所谓‘启蒙'的事件究竟是什么?它至少在某方面决定了我们是什么,我们想的是什么以及我们所做的是什么[2],进而引发了福柯对探寻现代性是否构成启蒙的继续和发展或是否应当从中看到对于18世纪的基本原则的断裂或背离[3]的诉求,公开了当代挥之不去的启蒙与现代性之间的哲学争论.     

启蒙的吊诡与启蒙的反思——以中国现代思想中的启蒙反思论说为中心

17-18世纪兴起于西欧北美的启蒙运动,是人类发展史上一座划时代的里程碑.启蒙思想家接续在欧洲中世纪社会内部所萌蘖的文艺复兴、宗教改革以及实验科学等异端思潮,进一步高扬理性、人权、自由、平等、民主、法治、科学、进步等价值理念,对禁锢人们头脑的神学教条和束缚人们身心的王权制度进行了深刻批判乃至猛烈抨击,在观念领域发生了极大的祛蔽作用和解放效应.     

价值观与启蒙的反思

启蒙时代发明的概念系统是现代欧洲文化的主要遗产.19世纪启蒙的世界观普遍性很大;20世纪上半期,启蒙理论已经失去了原来的力量,但是仍在西方人意识里占有重要地位.在一定的方面上,目前是后现代主义的时代;后现代主义者企图全面反思前一段历史的一切世界观体系.     

反思启蒙与理解宗教

启蒙运动主要是指发生在西方18世纪的思想和社会运动,其宗旨是批判基督教中的保守和专制思想,反对教会政教合一的残酷政制.如伏尔泰所鼓吹的自然神论、狄德罗所宣扬的怀疑主义以及休谟所坚持的不可知论的经验主义等,对于基督教传统的神学独断论确实具有摧枯拉朽的作用.     

Kant,teleology, and evolution

This essay examines Kant's idea of organic teleology. The first two sections are devoted to Kant's analysis and justification of teleological conceptions in biology. Both the idea of teleology and Kant's anti-reductionism are derived from basic elements of his critical treatment of the human intellect. The third section discusses the limitations Kant places on accounts of origins in the life world. It is argued that the limitations Kant places on accounts of the origins of species do not follow from his idea of teleology. The final section briefly outlines the fate of the Kantian formulation of teleology in the nineteenth century.     

Self-consciousness,self-determination,and imagination in Kant

I argue for a basically Sartrean approach to the idea that one's self-concept, and any form of knowledge of oneself as an individual subject, presupposes concepts and knowledge about other things. The necessity stems from a pre-conceptual structure which assures that original self-consciousness is identical with one's consciousness of objects themselves. It is not a distinct accomplishment merely dependent on the latter. The analysis extends the matter/form distinction to concepts. It also requires a distinction between two notions of consciousness: one relates to the employment of already formed concepts, the other to the structures of imaginative apprehension that help to constitute (empirical) concepts from the start. We need to see that (1) so far as objects are only conceptualized appearances, the material through which we apprehend them must be reflected in that apprehension itself; (2) the corresponding material consists of a manifold of pre-conceptually active anticipations and retentions concerning the course of one's own experience. The resultant structure imposes an orientation on the world of appearances that does not derive from a concept of oneself as an individual in it, but that nevertheless provides the only possible basis for such a concept. One's self-concept, at least as empirical subject, is simply that ofwhatever subject is indicated, in an appropriate way, by that orientation.     

Reid, Kant and the Philosophy of Mind

I suggest a possible rehabilitation of Reid's philosophy of mind by a constructive use of Kant's criticisms of the common sense tradition. Kant offers two criticisms, explicitly claiming that common sense philosophy is ill directed methodologically, and implicitly rejecting Reid's view that there is direct epistemological access by introspection to the ontology of mind. Putting the two views together reveals a tension between epistemology and ontology, but the problem which Kant finds in Reid also infects his own system, as his weaker ontological claims are undermined to such an extent by the necessary reintroduction of self-consciousness that the justification he seeks for reason fails to be reached epistemologically. Plausible solutions to these parallel tensions imply that both Reid and Kant have a pre-systematic concept of mind, and may lead to the conclusion that Reid's method is more economical in the elaboration of an ontology for the philosophy of mind.     

Kant,wittgenstein and the limits of logic

This paper has two purposes. (1) To justify the claim that there is an important distinction underlying the saying/showing distinction of the Tractatus; the distinction which Kant characterises as that between historical and rational knowledge. (2) To argue that it is because the Tractatus accepts Frege/Russell logic as a complete representation of all thought according to laws, that what is shown cannot be recognised as knowledge. This is done by interpolating Frege's logical innovations between the views of Kant and Wittgenstein on logic and mathematics.     

启蒙反思与当代中国现代性的建构

在一定意义上,启蒙反思在今天可以说是一个全球性的话题,而之所以如此,又是与人们对于现代性的批判性反思紧密相联的.就中文字面意思而言,启蒙就是去除蒙昧,即脱离懵憧无知的状态.     

The origin of creative achievement: Spontaneity,responsibility, and individuals

Abstract

Simonton's essay raises a variety of problems and implies several directions for future inquiry. One problem concerns the need to select and focus the target so that the question of how pathologies affect originality does not apply simply to any act of making or writing, including routine processes. There is also a need to sort out the conditions under which creative persons or societies select subjects or content and how well or poorly they succeed in expressing insights about these subjects. The main problem concerns clearly distinguishing between and addressing either or both of two issues: (1) pathologies of whole societies and their creative output, or (2) the impacts of social pathologies on individuals within society. Attacking the last problem is important if we are to understand where the locus of responsibility for originality lies. It is suggested that the workings of creative activity should be studied by concentrating on how metaphors work.     

Kant,Freud, and the ethical critique of religion

This paper engages Freud’s relation to Kant, with specific reference to each theorist’s articulation of the interconnections between ethics and religion. I argue that there is in fact a constructive approach to ethics and religion in Freud’s thought, and that this approach can be better understood by examining it in relation to Kant’s formulations on these topics. Freud’s thinking about religion and ethics participates in the Enlightenment heritage, with its emphasis on autonomy and rationality, of which Kant’s model of practical reason is in many ways exemplary. At the same time, Freud advances Kantian thinking in certain important respects; his work offers a more somatically, socially, and historically grounded approach to the formation of rational and ethical capacities, and hence makes it more compatible with contemporary concerns and orientations that eschew the pitfalls of ahistorical idealist orientations.     

Kant, Quasi-Realism, and the Autonomy of Aesthetic Judgement

Aesthetic judgements are autonomous, as many other judgements are not: for the latter, but not the former, it is sometimes justifiable to change one’s mind simply because several others share a different opinion. Why is this? One answer is that claims about beauty are not assertions at all, but expressions of aesthetic response. However, to cover more than just some of the explananda, this expressivism needs combining with some analogue of cognitive command, i.e. the idea that disagreements over beuaty can occur, and when they do it is a priori that one side has infringed the norms governing aesthetic discourse. This combination can be achieved by reading Kant’s aesthetic theory in expressivist terms. The resulting view is a form of quasi‐realism about beauty. The position has its merits, but cannot ultimately explain the phenomena which motivate it. This conclusion generalises to quasi‐realism about other matters.