How Berkeley Corrupted His Capacity to Conceive

Berkeley’s capacity to conceive of mind-independent bodies was corrupted by his theory of representation. He thought that representation of things outside the mind depended on resemblance. Since ideas can resemble nothing than ideas, and all ideas are mind dependent, he concluded that we couldn’t form ideas of mind-independent bodies. More generally, he thought that we had no inner resembling proxies for mind-independent bodies, and so we couldn’t even form a notion of such things. Because conception is a suggestible faculty, Berkeley’s arguments actually made it the case that he himself couldn’t conceive of mind-independent bodies.

Facilitation of return in voluntary orienting to visual attributes1

Abstract: The present study examined the effects of voluntary and automatic orienting after a relatively long interval in an attentional cueing paradigm. Facilitation of return was observed after the voluntary orienting to a designated color (Experiment 1) and motion direction (Experiment 2), whereas inhibition of return was observed after the automatic orienting to an abrupt stimulus onset (Experiment 1). These results suggest that the voluntary orienting to a visual attribute modulates subsequent processes differently from the automatic orienting to an abrupt onset. In the voluntary orienting to visual attributes, it would be advantageous to return attention to the previously attended location, which is a potential source of information.     

The return trip effect: Why the return trip often seems to take less time

Three studies confirm the existence of the return trip effect: The return trip often seems shorter than the initial trip, even though the distance traveled and the actual time spent traveling are identical. A pretest shows that people indeed experience a return trip effect regularly, and the effect was found on a bus trip (Study 1), a bicycle trip (Study 2), and when participants watched a video of someone else traveling (Study 3). The return trip effect also existed when another, equidistant route was taken on the return trip, showing that it is not familiarity with the route that causes this effect. Rather, it seems that a violation of expectations causes this effect.     

The morality of evolution and a return to subjectivity

Today societies display, almost uniformly, an aggressive demeanor that can hardly be covered by diplomacy; they are always prepared for war. The prophecy is repeatedly fulfilled and today we are engaged in protracted wars while fearing universal destruction. This basic attitude irremediably corrupts our consciousness and blemishes our self. The biological underpinnings of how we got to this point, psychologically, and the historical sublimations involved are explored here. The result, today, is that we live using a minimum of our human capacity at the huge cost in crucial energetic waste, while nature has started to protest. The self-feeding destructive mechanism is inordinate objectification, at the expense of our unique subjective power. Evolutionarily designed for balanced self-regulation—the sublimation of a dual instinctual disposition backed up by a dimorphic body and brain—nature warns us we have detoured from the moral blueprint and, were we to continue it will be at our own risk. We need to review our moral theories and return to our critical pre-patriarchal subjectivity, which was resourceful, dually-fed, balanced, and discriminating. That subjectivity is now largely replaced by pre-emptive, ideological cognitive modules and stereotypes that block intelligent dialogue and appear to be already modeled on a false Utopia of artificial intelligences.

     

The ego according to Klein: return to Freud and beyond

This paper explores fundamental dimensions of Melanie Klein's concept of the ego through a detailed study of the writings of Klein and her early colleagues (Paula Heimann, Susan Isaacs and Joan Riviere). The study examines three central issues: (a) the basic theoretical framework for Klein's conceptualization of the ego, and specifically how her conceptualization builds on Freud's structural and dual instinct models; (b) the processes involved in the development of the ego and its capacities (including the development from id to ego and from ego to superego); and (c) the view of the ego as an object of phantasy. Through this examination, the study demonstrates that Klein's conceptualization of the ego is firmly grounded both in Freud's formulations about the ego and in his theoretical and metapsychological approach to thinking about the ego. This counters the prevalent view that Klein was only focused on clinical understandings, unconcerned with theory and fuzzy in her abstract thinking. More specifically, it counters the view that Klein did not really have a concept of the ego in any well-structured sense of the term (Britton, 2003; Hinshelwood, 1994; Segal, 2001). The study considers the sources of these misconceived views. Finally, it argues that discarding such views allows us to appreciate better the richness of Klein's thinking, her theoretical affinities to Freud, and the role of theory in the development and justification of psychoanalysis.     

The Rorschach M response: a return to its roots

The Exner (1986) system of scoring of the Rorschach results in a human movement response (M), which is far afield from Rorschach's original intent. This divergence can easily lead to faulty interpretations of a record as there is no need for kinesthetic reactions on behalf of the subject in Exner's system. The need to return to a traditional view of the M is demonstrated through a focus on theory and the literature that illustrates Rorschach's intent. The alteration of the M results in a scoring system which, due to its differences, must come up with a separate interpretative system and not consider itself part of the Rorschach system that Rorschach envisioned.     

The return of the Sophists

The author argues against a foundational epistemology and thus sides with the Greek Sophists. He shows that the search for foundations of knowledge and truth is the outcome of a referential theory of language. He finds that Nietzsche and Saussure pioneered attacks on and substitutions for this theory. Wittgenstein, Derrida and Rorty, inter alia, continued this trend. The author discusses the criticisms and theories of these philosophers and finds that he agrees with their criticisms and many of their positive moves but that he cannot accept their social relativism because it cannot account for inter- and transcultural understanding and the regulative role of truth. He looks for a theory of language and truth which will also comply with these requirements.     

Religious Studies at Berkeley

The University of California at Berkeley has had a Group Major in Religious Studies since 1970, but there is no core faculty for the program. Efforts on the part of distinguished Berkeley faculty members over the years to create a viable department have met with no success. Now (in 1999), as a result of actions taken by the administration, the group major is in serious jeopardy.     

Religious Studies at Berkeley

The University of California at Berkeley has had a Group Major in Religious Studies since 1970, but there is no core faculty for the program. Efforts on the part of distinguished Berkeley faculty members over the years to create a viable department have met with no success. Now (in 1999), as a result of actions taken by the administration, the group major is in serious jeopardy.     

The return of the nativist

Radical Concept Nativism (RCN) is the doctrine that most of our concepts are innate. In this paper I will argue in favour of RCN by developing a speculative account of concept acquisition that has considerable nativist credentials and can be defended against the most familiar anti-nativist objections. The core idea is that we have a whole battery of hard-wired dispositions that determine how we group together objects with which we interact. In having these dispositions we are effectively committed to an implicit conceptual scheme and acquiring concepts is a matter of labelling the elements of that scheme.