共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 31 毫秒
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B. Muscio M.A. 《Australasian journal of philosophy》2013,91(3):153-163
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According to Conceptualism, philosophy is an independent discipline that can be pursued from the armchair because philosophy seeks truths that can be discovered purely on the basis of our understanding of expressions and the concepts they express. In his recent book, The Philosophy of Philosophy, Timothy Williamson argues that while philosophy can indeed be pursued from the armchair, we should reject any form of Conceptualism. In this paper, we show that Williamson??s arguments against Conceptualism are not successful, and we sketch a way to understand understanding that shows that there is a clear sense in which we can indeed come to know the answers to (many) philosophical questions purely on the basis of understanding. 相似文献
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Woolfolk RL 《Consciousness and cognition》2011,20(2):415-416
Experimental philosophy seeks to examine empirically various factual issues that, either explicitly or implicitly, lie at the foundations of philosophical positions. A study of this genre (Miller & Feltz, 2011) was critiqued. Questions about the study were raised and broader issues pertaining to the field of experimental philosophy were discussed. 相似文献
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Peter Godfrey-Smith 《Philosophical Studies》2012,160(1):97-113
Methods and goals in philosophy are discussed by first describing an ideal, and then looking at how the ideal might be approached. David Lewis??s work in metaphysics is critically examined and compared to analogous work by Mackie and Carnap. Some large-scale philosophical systematic work, especially in metaphysics, is best treated as model-building, in a sense of that term that draws on the philosophy of science. Models are constructed in a way that involves deliberate simplification, or other imaginative modification of reality, in order to make relationships visible or problems tractable. 相似文献
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Fuchun Peng 《Frontiers of Philosophy in China》2006,1(3):432-454
With the consideration of some issues in contemporary philosophy, this thesis attempts to analyze being, thinking and language
as philosophical subjects, and clear up the multiple meanings for each of them. It will also inquire the traditional methods
in both Chinese and Western philosophy, and those in contemporary thinking. Finally, it puts forward a theory of “the critique
without principles”. The thesis aims to explore a new way to solve the problems of contemporary philosophy by changing its
subjects and methods.
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Translated from Zhexue Yanjiu 哲学研究 (Philosophical Studies), 2005 (3) by Cheng Xuemeng 相似文献
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Manuel R. Vargas 《Philosophical Studies》2017,174(10):2499-2510
There are two standard theoretical responses to putative errors in ordinary thinking about some given target property: eliminativism or revisionism. Roughly, eliminativism is the denial that the target property exists, and revisionism is the view that the property exists, but that people tend to have false beliefs about it. Recently, Shaun Nichols has proposed a third option: discretionism. Discretionism is the idea that some terms have multiple reference conventions, so that it may be true to say with eliminativists that the property does not exist, and true to say with revisionists (and others) that the property does exist. This article explores the viability of discretionism, and argues that it faces serious difficulties. Even if the difficulties faced by discretionism can be overcome, it is unclear that discretionism secures anything beyond what is already available to standard revisionist views. The article concludes with some reflections about Nichols’ account of the bare retributive norm. 相似文献
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Experimental philosophy and philosophical intuition 总被引:4,自引:3,他引:1
Ernest Sosa 《Philosophical Studies》2007,132(1):99-107
The topic is experimental philosophy as a naturalistic movement, and its bearing on the value of intuitions in philosophy.
This paper explores first how the movement might bear on philosophy more generally, and how it might amount to something novel
and promising. Then it turns to one accomplishment repeatedly claimed for it already: namely, the discrediting of armchair
intuitions as used in philosophy.
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Ernest SosaEmail: |
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Chris Ranalli 《European Journal of Philosophy》2020,28(1):142-163
An epistemologist tells you that knowledge is more than justified true belief. You trust them and thus come to believe this on the basis of their testimony. Did you thereby come to know that this view is correct? Intuitively, there is something intellectually wrong with forming philosophical beliefs on the basis of testimony, and yet it's hard to see why philosophy should be significantly epistemically different from other areas of inquiry in a way that would fully prohibit belief by testimony. This, I argue, is the puzzle of philosophical testimony. In this paper, I explore the puzzle of philosophical testimony and its ramifications. In particular, I examine the case for pessimism about philosophical testimony—the thesis that philosophical belief on the basis of testimony is impossible or is in some way illegitimate—and I argue that it lacks adequate support. I then consider whether the source of the apparent intellectual wrongness of testimonial‐based philosophical belief is grounded in non‐epistemic norms and goals of philosophical practice itself and argue that such norms are implausible, don't conflict with testimonial‐based philosophical belief, or else are mere disciplinary norms, lacking substantial normative force that would make it wrong to form testimonial‐based philosophical belief. 相似文献