A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism

According to a doctrine that I call “Cartesianism”, knowledge – at least the sort of knowledge that inquirers possess – requires having a reason for belief that is reflectively accessible as such. I show that Cartesianism, in conjunction with some plausible and widely accepted principles, entails the negation of a popular version of Fallibilism. I then defend the resulting Cartesian Infallibilist position against popular objections. My conclusion is that if Cartesianism is true, then Descartes was right about this much: for S to know that p, S must have reasons for believing that p which are such that S can know, by reflection alone, that she has those reasons, and that she could not possibly have those reasons if p is not true. Where Descartes went wrong was in thinking that our ordinary, fallible, non‐theologically grounded sources of belief (e.g., perception, memory, testimony), cannot provide us with such reasons.     

A New Defence of Williams's Reasons-Internalism

Williams's classic 1980 article ‘Internal and External Reasons’ has attracted much criticism, but, in my view, has never been properly refuted. I wish to describe and defend Williams's account against three powerful criticisms by Michael Smith, John McDowell and Tim Scanlon. In addition, I draw certain implications from Williams's account – implications with which Williams would not necessarily agree – about the nature and the role of the personal in ethics. Williams's insight, that a reason (including a moral reason) must find purchase in an agent's ‘subjective motivational set’ if it is to function as a reason at all, undermines a central assumption of many moral philosophers, realists and non‐cognitivists alike: that there exists a singular objective realm of moral facts and moral reasons supervening on the situation before the agent. According to this assumption, if two people facing that situation disagree about whether one of them has reason to Φ, then at least one of them must be mistaken. I reject this assumption and defend Williams's account, while pointing at ways in which the account might be developed. While the internalism‐externalism debate itself is well‐worn, there is still something new and important that can be gleaned from it.     

A New Defence of the Modal Existence Requirement

In this paper, I defend the claim that an object can have a property only if it exists from two arguments, both of which turn on how to understand Plantinga’s notion of the α-transform of a property. For comments and discussion, thanks to David Sanson and three anonymous referees. For funding in the form of a Standard Research Grant (410-2004-0702), thanks to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (SSHRC).     

The Importance of Cartesian Triangles: A New Look at Descartes's Ontological Argument

In this paper, I argue that commentators have missed a significant clue given by Descartes in coming to understand his 'ontological' proof for the existence of God. In both the analytic and synthetic presentations of the proof throughout his writings, Descartes notes that the proof works 'in the same way' as a particular geometrical proof. I explore the significance of such a parallel, and conclude that Descartes could not have intended readers to think that the argument consists of some kind of intuition. I argue that for Descartes the attribute of existence is a 'second-order' attribute that is demonstrated to belong to the idea of God on the basis of 'first-order' attributes. The proof, properly understood, is in fact a demonstration. Having brought to light the geometrical parallels between the ontological and geometrical proofs, we have new evidence to resolve the 'intuition versus demonstration' controversy that has characterized much of the discussion of Descartes's ontological argument.     

Selling Citizenship: A Defence

Many people think that citizenship should not be for sale. On their view, it is morally wrong for states to sell citizenship to foreigners. In this article, I challenge this view. I argue that it is in principle permissible for states to sell citizenship. I contend that, if states can permissibly deny foreigners access to citizenship in some cases, then states can permissibly give foreigners the option of buying citizenship in these cases. Furthermore, I defend the permissibility of selling citizenship against the objections that selling citizenship values citizenship in the wrong way, corrupts civic norms, and unfairly discriminates against poor foreigners. I conclude by noting that, although selling citizenship is not intrinsically wrong, it could still be wrong for states to sell citizenship in practice. If existent immigration restrictions are unjust, then it may be impermissible for states to sell citizenship in the real world.     

Moral Realism: A Defence

Book Information Moral Realism: A Defence. Moral Realism: A Defence Russ Shafer-Landau, Oxford : Clarendon Press, 2003, x + 322, £35 (cloth) By Russ Shafer-Landau. Clarendon Press. Oxford. Pp. x + 322. £35 (cloth:),     

萨特存在主义的人学:在笛卡尔式视野中

萨特的存在主义是在笛卡尔视角中的世俗存在主义。在此基础上建立起来的人道集笛卡尔传统和存在主义的人道主义理念于一身。人的在世,从提问开始。提问产生虚无和否定,人是对自己采取否定的态度存在,是自为的存在。     

Thinking Without Global Generalisations: A Cognitive Defence of Moral Particularism1

In their article entitled “Ethical Particularism and Patterns”, Frank Jackson, Philip Pettit, and Michael Smith (JPS henceforth) argue that moral particularism is a cognitively implausible theory since it appears to entail the view that one might have a skill that is not grounded in an ability to recognise and represent natural patterns in the world. This charge echoes the complaints of computational theorists of cognition against their embodied cognition counterparts, namely that, theories of cognition that eschew talk of mental representation are implausible qua theories of cognition. In both debates, the cognitive role of generalisation is central to the discussion; however, contrary to the received wisdom, I want to suggest that the dispute is not between generalisation or mental representation on the one hand and no generalisation or mental representation on the other, but rather between what I will call global and local generalisation. Using the dialogue between JPS and Dancy (our paradigm particularist) to frame this discussion, I show that by replacing Dancy's connectionist model for particularist reasoning with a case‐based one, we not only vindicate his response to JPS, but we also gain insight into how it is the global/local distinction rather than the generalisation/no generalisation distinction that divides the two views.     

Dynamics of 1:2 Coordination: Temporal Scaling,Latent 1:1, and Bistability

The simplest interlimb multifrequency coordination of 1:2 can be performed at different speeds and in at least two different styles or modes. The effects of speed and mode (in-phase or antiphase) were evaluated in a bimanual 1:2 rhythmic task in which participants (N = 8) oscillated hand-held pendulums with identical or different uncoupled frequencies. A motion equation in relative phase that captures the asymmetries of components and task predicted the 1:2 coordination equilibria resulting from temporal scaling. According to the experimental results, both coordination modes proved to be equally stable. More detailed analyses of individual trials showed signs that the more fundamental 1:1 coordination intruded into the 1:2 coordination.     

Dynamics of 1:2 Coordination: Temporal Scaling, Latent 1:1, and Bistability

The simplest interlimb multifrequency coordination of 1:2 can be performed at different speeds and in at least two different styles or modes. The effects of speed and mode (in-phase or antiphase) were evaluated in a bimanual 1:2 rhythmic task in which participants (N = 8) oscillated hand-held pendulums with identical or different uncoupled frequencies. A motion equation in relative phase that captures the asymmetries of components and task predicted the 1:2 coordination equilibria resulting from temporal scaling. According to the experimental results, both coordination modes proved to be equally stable. More detailed analyses of individual trials showed signs that the more fundamental 1:1 coordination intruded into the 1:2 coordination.     

A priori physicalism, lonely ghosts and Cartesian doubt

A zombie is a physical duplicates of a human being which lacks consciousness. A ghost is a phenomenal duplicate of a human being whose nature is exhausted by consciousness. Discussion of zombie arguments, that is anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of zombies, is familiar in the philosophy of mind literature, whilst ghostly arguments, that is, anti-physicalist arguments which appeal to the conceivability of ghosts, are somewhat neglected. In this paper I argue that ghostly arguments have a number of dialectical advantages over zombie arguments. I go onto explain how the conceivability of ghosts is inconsistent with two kinds of a priori physicalism: analytic functionalism and the Australian physicalism of Armstrong and Lewis.     

Argumentation, the Visual, and the Possibility of Refutation: An Exploration

Taking the possibility of visual argumentation seriously, this essay explores how refutation might proceed. We posit three ways in which images can refute and be refuted in a mixed-media environment: (1) dissection, in which an image is broken down discursively; (2) substitution, in which one image is replaced within a larger visual frame by a different image; and (3) transformation, in which an image is recontextualized in a new visual frame. These strategies are illustrated in an analysis of three American documentary films on abortion.     

时限性自我调节理论:健康行为研究的一种新取向

时限性自我调节理论是在“意图-行为”模型基础上,强调时间、行为优势和自我调节能力对健康行为共同影响的新理论.该理论认为一致性观念和时限性效价影响行为意图,行为优势和自我调节能力调节“意图-行为”联系的强度或直接影响行为.与其他健康行为模型的主要区别在于加入了影响行为的自我调节能力和时间因素.未来研究应进一步明确针对健康行为的干预措施,给予行为优势合理的定位.     

Taking consciousness seriously: A defense of Cartesian dualism

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Temporal Binding,Causation, and Agency: Developing a New Theoretical Framework

In temporal binding, the temporal interval between one event and another, occurring some time later, is subjectively compressed. We discuss two ways in which temporal binding has been conceptualized. In studies showing temporal binding between a voluntary action and its causal consequences, such binding is typically interpreted as providing a measure of an implicit or pre-reflective “sense of agency.” However, temporal binding has also been observed in contexts not involving voluntary action, but only the passive observation of a cause–effect sequence. In those contexts, it has been interpreted as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. These two views need not be in conflict with one another, if one thinks of them as concerning two separate mechanisms through which temporal binding can occur. In this paper, we explore an alternative possibility: that there is a unitary way of explaining temporal binding both within and outside the context of voluntary action as a top-down effect on perception reflecting a belief in causality. Any such explanation needs to account for ways in which agency, and factors connected with agency, has been shown to affect the strength of temporal binding. We show that principles of causal inference and causal selection already familiar from the literature on causal learning have the potential to explain why the strength of people's causal beliefs can be affected by the extent to which they are themselves actively involved in bringing about events, thus in turn affecting binding.     

Grounding Rights in Social Practices: A Defence

This paper defends a social practiceconception of moral rights possession againstwhat many of its critics take to be a decisiveobjection, namely that such a conceptionprevents us from using moral rights forcritical purposes.