Berkeley's pantheistic discourse

International Journal for Philosophy of Religion -     

Group Level Interpretations of Probability: New Directions

In this article, I present some new group level interpretations of probability, and champion one in particular: a consensus‐based variant where group degrees of belief are construed as agreed upon betting quotients rather than shared personal degrees of belief. One notable feature of the account is that it allows us to treat consensus between experts on some matter as being on the union of their relevant background information. In the course of the discussion, I also introduce a novel distinction between intersubjective and interobjective interpretations of probability.     

Is Berkeley's World a Divine Language?

George Berkeley (1685–1753) believed that the visible world was a series of signs that constituted a divine language through which God was speaking to us. Given the nature of language and the nature of the visual world, this paper examines to what extent the visual world could be a divine language and to what extent God could speak to us through it.     

How Berkeley's Gardener Knows His Cherry Tree

The defense of common sense in Berkeley's Three Dialogues is, first and foremost, a defense of the gardener's claim to know his cherry tree, a claim threatened by both Cartesian and Lockean philosophy. This defense depends on the esse is percipi thesis (EIP). EIP is not something the gardener believes; rather, it is a philosophical analysis of the rules he unreflectively follows in his use of the word ‘exists’. Uncovering these connections between Berkeley's epistemology and philosophy of language will clarify Berkeley's strategy for bringing his reader back to common sense and practical engagement in the ordinary affairs of life.     

Common sense and Berkeley's perception by suggestion

Abstract

Significant attention has been paid to Berkeley's account of perception; however, the interpretations of Berkeley's account of perception by suggestion are either incomplete or mistaken. In this paper I begin by examining a common interpretation of suggestion, the ‘Propositional Account’. I argue that the Propositional Account is inadequate and defend an alternative, non‐propositional, account. I then address George Pitcher's objection that Berkeley's view of sense perception forces him to adopt a ‘non‐conciliatory’ attitude towards common sense. I argue that Pitcher's charge is no longer plausible once we recognize that Berkeley endorses the non‐propositional sense of mediate perception. I close by urging that the non‐propositional interpretation of Berkeley's account of mediate perception affords a greater appreciation of Berkeley's attempt to bring a philosophical account of sense perception in line with some key principles of common sense. While Berkeley's account of perception and physical objects permits physical objects to be immediately perceived by some of the senses, they are, most often, mediately perceived. But for Berkeley this is not a challenge to common sense since common sense requires only that we perceive objects by our senses and that they are, more or less, as we perceive them. Mediate perception by suggestion is, for Berkeley, as genuine a form of perception as immediate perception, and both are compatible with Berkeley's understanding of the demands of common sense.     

The Cartesian Roots of Berkeley's Account of Sensation

On the old story about early modern philosophy, Descartes is a “rationalist” who devalues the senses, and Berkeley an “empiricist” who rejects this. Berkeley plays into this story in his Notebooks, where he writes: “in vindication of the senses effectually to confute wt Descartes saith in ye last par. of the last Med: viz. that the senses oftener inform him falsly than truely” (794). But when we turn to this “last par.,” we find Descartes maintaining that “my senses report the truth much more frequently than not” (CSM2: 61). In this paper, I draw on recent commentary to outline Descartes' positive account of sensation. I then look carefully at Berkeley's account of the same, in particular, by considering his distinction between human and divine perception and his account of the laws of nature. In so doing, I suggest that there are noteworthy parallels between Descartes' and Berkeley's accounts with respect to the function of sensation and the ways in which sensations can fulfill this function. I conclude by sketching some ways in which this understanding of Berkeley can illuminate some aspects of Berkeley scholarship.     

The Cartesian Context of Berkeley's Attack on Abstraction

Abstract: I claim that Berkeley's main argument against abstraction comes into focus only when we see Descartes as one of its targets. Berkeley does not deploy Winkler's impossibility argument but instead argues that what is impossible is inconceivable. Since Descartes conceives of extension as a determinable, and since determinables cannot exist as such, he falls within the scope of Berkeley's argument.     

Interpretations

Compiled and edited by Ralph Slater from lectures on psychoanalytic technique given by the late Karen Horney at the American Institute for Psychoanalysis during the years 1946, 1950, 1951 and 1952. Further lectures in this series will appear in subsequent issues of the Journal.     

Berkeley's Missing Argument: The Sceptical Attack on Intentionality

Berkeley argues that our ideas cannot represent external objects, because only an idea can resemble an idea. But he does not offer any argument for the claim that an idea can represent only what it resembles - a premise essential to his argument. I argue that this gap can be both historically explained and filled by examining the debates between Cartesians and sceptics in the late seventeenth century. Descartes held that representation involves two relations between an idea and its object – resemblance and causation – and that these relations are very closely linked to each other. I look at variations upon this claim in later Cartesians, especially Desgabets and Régis. I also examine the critics who attacked this claim, especially Huet, Foucher, and Du Hamel, who developed arguments similar to Berkeley's but concluded that (Cartesian) representation is simply impossible. I also argue that Malebranche, although an adherent of the Cartesian theory of intentionality, used a modified version of this argument to argue for his claim that ideas do not exist in the mind at all. These thinkers, and especially Malebranche, provide the context in which we should understand Berkeley.     

Interpretations of Messages

This research examined interpretations of messages as a function of whether they are equivocal or unequivocal, whether they protect self‐face or other‐face, and whether the perceivers of the messages are directly involved in the conversation or overhear it. The role of self‐monitoring and gender were also assessed. Results of Study 1 (N=463) revealed that equivocation is perceived as more polite but less honest and less competent than unequivocal criticism. Equivocation addressing other‐face is the most polite, and criticism of the other is the least polite. Females perceive equivocation as more polite than do males. Ego‐involvement influences perceptions independently and through its interaction with equivocation. No support was found for the role of self‐monitoring or the notion that equivocation conveys a more positive meaning than unequivocal criticism. Study 2 (N = 496) replicated the findings concerning the politeness, honesty, self‐other differences, gender differences, self‐monitoring, and meaning associated with equivocation.