Learning to Understand Descartes

Books reviewed in this article:
Janet Broughton, Descartes's Method of Doubt
Joseph Almog, Who Am I? Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem     

"我思":从笛卡儿到萨特

Cogito, as the first principle of Descartes’ metaphysical system, initiated the modern philosophy of consciousness, becoming both the source and subject of modern Western philosophical discourse. The philosophies of Maine de Biran, Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and others developed by answering the following questions? Is consciousness substantial or not? Does consciousness require the guarantee of a transcendental subject? Is Cogito epistemological or ontological? Am I a being-for-myself or a being-for-others? Outlining the developmental history of the idea of Cogito from Descartes to Sartre is important for totally comprehending the evolution and development of Western philosophy.     

Descartes,Scientia and Pure Enquiry

In Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry, Bernard Williams supplies an interpretation of Descartes's Meditations in which the meditator's clean sweep of initial beliefs is justified by a stance that abrogates all practical pressures: the stance of pure enquiry. Otherwise, Williams explains, it would not be reasonable to set many of the initial beliefs aside. Nowhere, however, does Descartes assert that his approach is in this sense ‘pure’. It would of course be preferable if the meditator's rejection of all the initial beliefs did not require an abrogation of the conditions that govern everyday belief-formation and assessment. I supply a reading that accomplishes this. The key to this reading is recognition that Descartes is a thinker of his time, a time when the pre-modern worldview was being systematically rejected. I show, in this regard, that when Descartes characterizes a belief as ‘uncertain’, this has the implication that the belief is false. And, certainly, the rational policy, without need for any special stance, is to reject falsehoods.     

Descartes,skepticism, and Husserl's hermeneutic practice

In the preceding pages, Husserl's objections to the content of Descartes'Meditations on First Philosophy have been reconstructed over the line ofargument in that work. The tone of his interpretation moved from ambivalence to outfight rejection. Husserl's ambivalence manifested itself intwo of the three meditations to which he pays significant attention. We sawthe much heralded methodological strategy of the First Meditation, uponclose examination, is not endorsed by Husserl, that he finds reason toprotest against the content of each individual skeptical argument and seesthere in general a subjectivistic doctrine of consciousness already at work.Nevertheless, Husserl clearly wanted to preserve the essential intent of theCartesian method of doubt if not its letter, namely, the move toward callinginto question naive presuppositions about the world, raising the possibilityof its non-existence, thereby resuscitating sheer wonder about the world,and rendering it problematic in its relation to subjectivity. Historically, thisstrategy has precedent in the ancient Greek sophists, who, however unintentionally, Husserl claims were the first to manifest a transcendental im-pulse. Moving into the Second Meditation and the so-called discovery ofthe ego cogito, we found a stronger ambivalence on Husserl's part. Whileapplauding Descartes for uncovering the truth that lay hidden at the basis ofskepticism, the subsequent interpretation of the ego as soul and substantialentity clouds this inchoative insight into pure transcendental subjectivity.By the Third Meditation Husserl's ambivalence moved to out right rejection. There are a number of reasons why: the circularity of Descartes'theological theory of evidence (Hua VII, 341); the epistemologicalcommitment to a subjectivistic theory of consciousness; hisScheinprobleme (Hua VII, 73) along with the assumption of an objectivein-itself forever remote from intuition; the ontological commitment to twofinite substances; and the attempt to deductively redress the cognitiveschism created by these commitments through appeal to the principle ofcausality and the goodness of God. All these gave Husserl decisive occa-sion to take leave of the Cartesian path of meditation.A further reason why Husserl's meditations consistently break off in theThird Meditation is suggested by noticing the textual moment whereHusserl's silence begins. It is that moment where Descartes dips into theScholastic tradition for the concepts of objective and formal reality in orderto prove the existence of God. The problem, I suggest, is that here Des-cartes insufferably compromises his radicalness. More specifically, with theconcepts of objective and formal reality Descartes installs on the metaphysi-cal level the distinction between image and original already operative allalong in the earlier Meditations. Now, through the concepts of objective andformal reality, the image(effect)/original(cause) distinction is given ex-planatory power and raised to a truth so evident as to be beyond the reach ofmethodic doubt. The fact that this distinction is employed to deduce theexistence of God is not so much the phenomenological offense as themetaphysical naivete of positing a formal reality, an in itself, to account forthe very matters in question.Thus, one source of Husserl's objections to the Meditations has to dowith the traditional, metaphysical apparatus with which Descartes carriesout his project. A second source, the negative side of his ambivalence, hasto do with Descartes' engagement with classical anti-metaphysics, specifically with the skeptical reduction to the I think and the sense of theproblem posed out of that reduction.It was the case with Descartes that he did not grasp the deepest sense ofthe problems of a new and radically grounded philosophy, or what isessentially the same, the sense of rooting transcendental cognitive andscientific grounding in the ego cogito. That however has its basis in thefact that he was not a good apprentice of skepticism. (Hua VII, 64)Descartes missed the opportunity to deepen the task posed by skepticismprecisely because he fell prey to the skeptical formulation of what it meansto know. The task which Descartes thus took up and posed out of theskeptical reduction was the challenge of evidence for something beyond themerely subjective. Given such subjeetivistic premises, this evidence canonly be mediate and thus take the form of an indirect proof.For Descartes pure subjectivity does not become the field of egologicalresearch which had to form the fundament for an apodictically evidentfounding philosophy, rather it became a mere 'Archimedian point' fromwhich a secure deduction of the world lost in the method of skepticismcan be reclaimed. His problem is that of ancient skepticism concerningthe existence and knowability of the objective world, a world whichallegedly is recognized perceptually and scientifically in subjectivity.(Hua VII, 342)Husserl's objections to the content of the Meditations are objections to thespecific manner in which the transcendental impulse works itself out. Butclearly these objections are not enough to turn Husserl away from theguiding idea and style of the Meditations. Even if the Cartesian way intophenomenology proved less compelling than he once hoped, theMeditations held an allure for Husserl which apparently never lost itspower, right to the very end.     

Learning From Text

A framework is presented for distinguishing between two types of mental representations formed while reading a text: The textbase is a representation built in the process of comprehension, and a situation model is built to represent the situation described in the text. Two studies are reported that explore the relative contribution of each type of representation and their interaction during problem solving. In the first, grade school children solved easy and hard arithmetic word problems of three types: change, combine, and compare. When asked to recall, reconstruction of the problems occurred and was related to solution performance. Children tended to recall problems already solved on the basis of the situation model used in solutions and not by reproducing the original textbase. In the second study, college students formed mental maps while reading two types of texts describing the layout of a town: The survey text described the town in geographical terms, and the route version presented the same information as a series of instructions for driving through the town. A dichotomy was seen between remembering the text and learning from it; the former was dependent on text coherence, and the latter depended on the formation of a situation model. Implications for instruction are discussed in terms of clarifying goals for the use of texts and distinguishing between instruction aimed toward recall and instruction aimed toward learning.     

Learning From Women

No abstract available for this article.     

Learning Words Via Reading: Contextual Diversity,Spacing, and Retrieval Effects in Adults

We examined whether variations in contextual diversity, spacing, and retrieval practice influenced how well adults learned new words from reading experience. Eye movements were recorded as adults read novel words embedded in sentences. In the learning phase, unfamiliar words were presented either in the same sentence repeated four times (same context) or in four different sentences (diverse context). Spacing was manipulated by presenting the sentences under distributed or non‐distributed practice. After learning, half of the participants were asked to retrieve the new words, and half had an extra exposure to the new words. Although words experienced in diverse contexts were acquired more slowly during learning, they enjoyed a greater benefit of learning at immediate posttest. Distributed practice also slowed learning, but no benefit was observed at posttest. Although participants who had an extra exposure showed the greatest learning benefit overall, learning also benefited from retrieval opportunity, when words were experienced in diverse contexts. These findings demonstrate that variation in the content and structure of the learning environment impacts on word learning via reading.     

Descartes on Hatred

This paper examines Descartes’ account of hatred. Descartes holds that individuals should not hate, because hatred separates us from goods, causes sadness, and produces vicious character traits. Although some scholars argue that hatred is necessary to protect the body, I argue that Descartes holds that hatred is not necessary to protect the body, because there are other means of protecting the body that do not involve hatred. I conclude this paper by showing the place of hatred in Descartes’ broader moral theory, especially his emphasis on the wellbeing of the soul and the virtue of generosity.     

From Sole Learning to Soul Learning

Abstract. Is it effective or even possible to teach an introductory course in religious studies that not only provides first‐year university students with the fundamental vocabulary, concepts, and critical tools of religious inquiry but also invites and stimulates the transformation of the religious imagination? In what kind of teaching and learning method could the process of personal transformation occur and how might one assess it? These are the questions that led to an experiment in teaching religion the objective of which was to prepare beginning students for the academic approach to religion and, at the same time, transmit the experience of learning as an embodied process that engages personal narrative within a community context. This essay is based on a three‐year project that has made considerable progress in meeting these goals and answering these questions. (Supplementary materials for this essay are available on the Wabash Center for Teaching and Learning in Theology and Religion web site http://www.wabashcenter.wabash.edu/journal/baldwin.html .)