Making sense of the lived body <Emphasis Type="Italic">and</Emphasis> the lived world: meaning and presence in Husserl,Derrida and Noë

I argue that Husserl’s transcendental account of the role of the lived body in sense-making is a precursor to Alva Noë’s recent work on the enactive, embodied mind, specifically his notion of “sensorimotor knowledge” as a form of embodied sense-making that avoids representationalism and intellectualism. Derrida’s deconstructive account of meaning—developed largely through a critique of Husserl—relies on the claim that meaning is structured through the complication of the “interiority” of consciousness by an “outside,” and thus might be thought to lend itself to theories of mind such as Noë’s that emphasize the ways in which sense-making occurs outside the head. But while Derrida’s notion of “contamination” rightly points to an indeterminateness of meaning in an outside, extended, concrete lived world, he ultimately reduces meaning to a structure of signification. This casts indeterminateness in terms of absence, ignoring the presence of non-linguistic phenomena of embodied sense-making central to both the contemporary enactivist program and to the later Husserl, who is able to account for the indeterminateness of meaning in lived experience through his distinction between sense (Sinn) and more exact linguistic meaning (Bedeutung). Husserl’s transcendental theory of meaning also allows for a substantive contribution to sense-making from the side of the perceived object—an aspect missing from Noë’s account. Thus, in contrast to Derrida and to Noë, Husserl accounts for sense-making in terms of both the lived body and the lived world.     

Art’s False “Ease”: Form,Meaning and a Problematic Pedagogy

This paper argues that in foregoing the questions that emerge from the dialectical relationship between form and meaning, an intrinsic fallacy mistakes the relationship between the arts and education for a simplistic mechanism of signification—a false “ease”—where empty forms are supposedly given meaning by ethical and aesthetic givens as if the pedagogy of art were analogous to an empty room that was (or still needs to be) inhabited. Art’s false “ease” presents a tautology that presumes the relationship between the arts and learning on assumptions that force a false equivalence between (a) the perception of implicit causes that constitute a number of externalised artistic attributes (such as creative, critical, and intuitive forms of thinking and making) by which the arts are instrumentalised, and (b) a number of desired effects that are seen as being equal to the relative value that an arts subject (or discipline) commands in a perceived relationship with the world in terms of its use and therefore function. To counter this distortion this paper makes a case for a pedagogical aesthetics that would unlearn—and thereby exit—the educationalist tautology of art’s false ease. While politically this would mean that the arts are recognized in their ability to think and act outside the traditional notion of schooling as a walled polis, philosophically this represents a challenge to move arts education away from the “spatial” concepts by which dialectical narratives, such as those of form and content, have been hitherto assumed as constructivist signifiers.     

Believable Visions of the Good: an Exploration of the Role of Pastoral Counselors in Promoting Resilience

Although adjustment after trauma is often positively associated with meaning, some studies challenge this connection (Bonanno, Memory, 21(1), 150–156, 2013; Silver and Updegraff 2013). In this article we elaborate on the relation between existential meaning and resilience. First, we conceptualize existential meaning—searching for and finding meaning in life—in terms of “orienting in moral space”, using the philosophical ideas of Taylor (1989), the psychological meaning-making model of Park (Psychological Bulletin, 136(2), 257–301, 2010), and existential theory. We argue that orienting systems in moral space are “believable visions of the good”. We then search recent literature on resilience—in particular literature in which the connection with meaning is challenged—for indications of a connection with existential meaning. We conclude that resilience necessarily comprises a “moral dimension” that is an adaptive process of (eventually) finding meaning in life. Finally, we discuss implications for the role that pastoral counselors, as professionals in the domain of existential meaning, may play in promoting resilience in organizations where employees regularly face existential issues like violence, suffering, and death.     

An Elegy,a Love Song,and a Lullaby

In the course of the past decade, I have found himself looking as much to poets and the experience of reading poetry as to the work of other analysts in my ongoing effort to become a psychoanalyst. Both the poet and the psychoanalyst are individuals whose life's work is that of making “raid[s] [on] the inarticulate” (Eliot, 1940, p. 128) in their effort to delve as deeply as possible into what it is to be human and to render that experience in the medium of language. To this end, I offer a reading of Seamus Heaney's (1987) “Clearances,” an elegy Heaney wrote for his mother soon after her death. I explore the ways in which the experience of mourning—whether in a poem or in an analytic experience—is not simply “conveyed” (as if illuminating something already there) but created in the very act of writing/saying the poem or of bringing feelings to life in words in an analytic session.

I begin by presenting a brief biographical account of Heaney not to “explain” his poetry in analytic terms but to allow the reader to create a more imaginative, more human reading of the poem as he or she enters into the conversation between the life of the man and the life of the poetry. Then I discuss the ways in which “Clearances” comes to life as a variety of coexisting forms of love that together shape an experience of grief.     

Begin with a Text: Teaching the Poetics of Medicine

This paper suggests that the purpose of humanities teaching within medical education should be primarily to teach and promote the informed, attentive, critical, and precise reading of the multiple texts that constitute medicine as a discursive field—in short, a poetics of medicine. This claim is illustrated by reconsidering Margaret Edson’s play Wit, not as it is often used in medical education, as a cautionary tale about unprofessional behavior or as a way to inculcate “humanistic skills,” but as an analysis of the relationships between texts and feelings—or cognition and emotion, or science and art. This reading is illustrated by comparing the poetics of Wit with those of two other texts representing ovarian cancer: a scientific paper in Oncology and a clinical case conference in JAMA.     

<Emphasis Type="Italic">Tian</Emphasis> as Cosmos in Z<Emphasis Type="SmallCaps">hu</Emphasis> Xi’s Neo-Confucianism

Tian 天 is central to the metaphysics, cosmology, and ethics of the 800-year-long Chinese philosophical tradition we call “Neo-Confucianism,” but there is considerable confusion over what tian means—confusion which is exacerbated by its standard translation into English as “Heaven.” This essay analyzes the meaning of tian in the works of the most influential Neo-Confucian, Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200), presents a coherent interpretation that unifies the disparate aspects of the term’s meaning, and argues that “cosmos” does an excellent job of capturing this meaning and therefore should be adopted as our translation of tian.     

On Tacit Knowledge for Philosophy of Education

This article offers a detailed reading Gascoigne and Thornton’s book Tacit Knowledge (2013), which aims to account for the tacitness of tacit knowledge (TK) while preserving its status as knowledge proper. I take issue with their characterization and rejection of the existential-phenomenological Background—which they presuppose even as they dismiss—and their claim that TK can be articulated “from within”—which betrays a residual Cartesianism, the result of their elision of conceptuality and propositionality. Knowledgeable acts instantiate capacities which we might know we have and of which we can be aware, but which are not propositionally structured at their “core”. Nevertheless, propositionality is necessary to what Robert Brandom calls, in Making It Explicit (1994) and Articulating Reasons (2000), “explicitation”, which notion also presupposes a tacit dimension, which is, simply, the embodied person (the knower), without which no conception of knowledge can get any purchase. On my view, there is no knowledgeable act that can be understood as such separately from the notion of skilled corporeal performance. The account I offer cannot make sense of so-called “knowledge-based” education, as opposed to systems and styles which supposedly privilege “contentless” skills over and above “knowledge”, because on the phenomenological and inferentialist lines I endorse, neither the concepts “knowledge” nor “skill” has any purchase or meaning without the other.     

In Defense of Ambivalence and Alienation

In this paper, I argue against certain dogmas about ambivalence and alienation. Authors such as Harry Frankfurt and Christine Korsgaard demand a unity of persons that excludes ambivalence. Other philosophers such as David Velleman have criticized this demand as overblown, yet these critics, too, demand a personal unity that excludes an extreme form of ambivalence (“radical ambivalence”). I defend radical ambivalence by arguing that, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be radically ambivalent. Certain dogmas about alienation are even more entrenched. Allen Wood’s entry on “alienation” in the Oxford Companion to Philosophy begins as follows: “A psychological or social evil, characterized by one or another type of harmful separation, disruption or fragmentation, which sunders things that belong together.” I think that it is not true that self-alienation is necessarily “harmful.” I argue that radical ambivalence is a form of self-alienation. Thus, because faithfulness to oneself sometimes requires radical ambivalence, to be true to oneself, one sometimes needs to be alienated from oneself.     

Misers or lovers? How a reflection on Christian mysticism caused a shift in Jacques Lacan’s object theory

In his sixth seminar, Desire and Its Interpretation (1956–1957), Lacan patiently elaborates his theory of the ‘phantasm’ ($?a), in which the object of desire (object small a) is ascribed a constitutive role in the architecture of the libidinal subject. In that seminar, Lacan shows his fascination for an aphorism of the twentieth century Christian mystic Simone Weil in her assertion: “to ascertain exactly what the miser whose treasure was stolen lost: thus we would learn much.” This is why, in his theory, Lacan conceptualizes the object of desire as the unconsumed treasure—and, in that sense, the “nothing”—on which the miser’s desire is focused. But the more Lacan develops his new object theory, the more he realizes how close it is to Christian mysticism in locating the ultimate object of desire in God, in a sevenfold “nothing” (to quote the famous last step in the ascent of the Mount Carmel as described by John of the Cross). An analysis of Shakespeare’s Hamlet allows Lacan to escape the Christian logic and to rearticulate the object of desire in an ‘unchristian’ tragic grammar. When he replaces the miser by the lover as paradigm of the subject’s relation to its object of desire, he substitutes a strictly Greek kind of love—eros, not agape—for the miser’s relationship to his treasure. Even when, in the late Lacan, “love” becomes a proper concept, its structure remains deeply “tragic.”     

SITUATIONS THAT LEAD TO DISQUALIFICATION

Disqualification is nonstraighforward communication—messages that are ambiguous, indirect, or evasive to some degree. A previous paper defined and measured disqualification as deviations from the direct “I am saying this to you in this situation”—that is, as relative ambiguity in sender, content, receiver, or context. The present article addresses the question of what causes such messages. An interpersonal, situational theory is proposed and tested in a series of five experiments, using a forced-choice among written messages in systematically varied, hypothetical situations. Subjects chose the most disqualified messages overwhelmingly when placed in a “bind.” They did so significantly more than when in a non-bind or a merely unpleasant situation. The last two experiments defined a “bind” as an avoidance-avoidance conflict and showed that disqualified messages were chosen only in these, and not in approach-approach conflicts. The conclusion is that disqualification is not a failure of the communicator, nor even a changeworthy behavior, but a reasonable response to an impossible situation, one that permits the sender to leave the field communicationally.     

The Production of Meaning through Peer Interaction: Children and Walt Disney’s Cinderella

For many years researchers have understood that gender roles in children’s literature have the capacity to create and reinforce “meanings” of femininity and masculinity (Currie, Gend. Soc., 11: 453–477, 1997; Gledhill, Genre and gender: The case of soap opera. In S. Hall (Ed.), Representation (pp. 339–383). London: Sage, 1985; Tatar, Off with their heads!: Fairy tales and the culture of childhood. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993; Zipes, Happily ever after. New York: Routledge, 1997). The purpose of this study was to investigate children’s interpretation of a popular gendered fairy tale at the level of peer interaction. Walt Disney’s Cinderella was used in elementary school reading groups to investigate the ways that children understand messages regarding gender and the influence of peer culture on the production of meaning. The findings indicate that gender and gendered expectations were essential to the process of interpretation and the construction of meaning for the children. Gender unified the boys and girls into two distinct groups, particularly around the “girls’ book,” Cinderella. Gender was reinforced along traditional lines in the peer group, serving as a deterrent to the production of alternate interpretations to traditional messages in the text.     

Personal meaning as therapy: The roots and branches of Frankl's psychology

In recent years, Victor E. Frankl, the Viennese psychiatrist who is the founder of what has come to be known as the Third Viennese School of Psychology — Freud and Adler constituting the founders of the other two schools — has emerged as the leading proponent in psychotherapeutic circles of the centrality of the experience of “meaning” in mental health.” The goal of human life, argues Frankl, is to find meaning and order in the world for “me” personally and “us” collectively — both as an individual and a social sense of purpose and orderliness of the inner and outer environment. This paper attempts to identify—within the framework of the Jewish mystical tradition — the sources and origins of Frankl's scientific constructs in psychotherapy, and their manifestations in psychoreligious therapeutics.     

Psychometric engineering as art

The Psychometric Society is “devoted to the development of Psychology as a quantitative rational science”. Engineering is often set in contradistinction with science; art is sometimes considered different from science. Why, then, juxtapose the words in the title:psychometric, engineering, andart? Because an important aspect of quantitative psychology is problem-solving, and engineering solves problems. And an essential aspect of a good solution is beauty—hence, art. In overview and with examples, this presentation describes activities that are quantitative psychology as engineering and art—that is, as design. Extended illustrations involve systems for scoring tests in realistic contexts. Allusions are made to other examples that extend the conception of quantitative psychology as engineering and art across a wider range of psychometric activities.     

The Significance of Shendu in the Interpretation of Classical Learning and Zhu Xi’s Misreading

According to recently excavated bamboo and silk material, the idea of du 獨 in the concept shendu 慎獨 does not refer to a spatial notion of dwelling in solitude or a solitary dwelling; rather it is the state before having made contact with external things, or the state “before feelings are aroused” (weifa 未發) of the inner heart/mind. It refers to internal thoughts and volitions, or “casting aside external sensations” (sheti 舍體). Shen 慎 should be glossed in accordance with the Erya 爾雅 (Approaching Elegance), rendering it as “sincerity” (cheng 誠). Shendu then means to “cause one’s will to be sincere” (chengqiyi 誠其意). Zheng Xuan 鄭玄, in explaining shendu as being “cautious of the actions one performs in private” (shen qi xianju suowei 慎其閒居所為), completely strayed from the original meaning as found in the bamboo-silk texts. Zhu Xi 朱熹, seeing the insufficiencies of Zheng Xuan’s interpretation of shendu, broadened the meaning of du, and in particular added a spiritual meaning to it. However, due to influence by Zheng Xuan, Zhu Xi still preserved some misreadings of the term; especially in his interpretation of shendu in the Daxue 大學 (Great Learning) and Zhongyong 中庸 (Doctrine of the Mean). Considering that the Neo-Confucian methods of cultivation embodied in the ideas of “abiding in reverence and enriching the self” (jujing hanyang 居敬涵養), and “being refined and focused” (weijing weiyi 惟精惟一) actually accorded more with the original meaning of shendu, Zhu Xi’s misreading of shendu is indirectly related to the loss of its original meaning due to the broken transmission of the ancient texts.     

Complicity in Thought and Language: Toleration of Wrong

Complicity as “toleration of wrong” is deeply rooted in Western language and narratives. It is based on assumptions about the self, our relationship to the world and personal accountability that differ from the Common Law's and moral theology's standard doctrines. How we blame others for “tolerating wrong” depends upon the moral force of public discourse and upon the meaning of censure as exhortation. Censure as blame is usually retrospective, while censure as exhortation is forward-looking and stresses moral maturity and flourishing.     

Responding to indirect speech acts

Indirect speech acts, like the request Do you know the time?, have both a literal meaning, here “I ask you whether you know the time,” and an indirect meaning “I request you to tell me the time.” In this paper I outline a model of how listeners understand such speech acts and plan responses to them. The main proposals are these. The literal meaning of indirect speech acts can be intended to be taken seriously (along with the indirect meaning) or merely pro forma. In the first case listeners are expected to respond to both meanings, as in Yes, I do—it's six, but in the second case only to the indirect meaning, as in It's six. There are at least six sources of information listeners use in judging whether the literal meaning was intended seriously or pro forma, as well as whether there was intended to be any indirect meaning. These proposals were supported in five experiments in which ordinary requests for information were made by telephone of 950 local merchants.     

On modeling the creativity and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre

The problem of modeling the creativity is shown to be entirely connected with another mysterious challenge — the “Explanatory Gap” between the concepts of “Brain” and “Mind”. We use the Natural Constructive Cognitive Architecture, with its important feature being the combination of two subsystems, for generation of new information and for its conservation. “Brain” is considered as records of the raw images of real objects (individual objective information), while “Mind” refers to individual subjective information created inside the cognitive system (symbols). We argued that creativity can be treated as “an effort to bring a piece of personal “Brain” into the “Mind” and World”. Specific thinking mode (intellectual panic or throes of creativity) is shown to enhance the creative work resulting in over-mobilization and even enriching personal deep inside (“Brain”) experience. It is simulated by chaotic jumps of the noise amplitude around abnormally high value. The nature of Aesthetic Emotions and the concept of Chef-D’oeuvre are analyzed. It is shown that they are caused by the “recognition paradox”: an object seems both, familiar but unusual. This occurs if the “Brain” does see its subtle features, while the “Mind” does not realize. Bright aesthetic emotions (goosebumps) are caused by irregular excitation of implicit associations provided by weak (“gray”) connections of the halo neurons (simulating the subconsciousness). General formula for Chef-D’oeuvre in science and art could be expressed as “condensed capacity to see the invisible, to combine the incompatible”.     

The emergence and development of tradition in reform Jewish worship, 1970–1999

It is axiomatic to note the increased amount of traditional ritual, customs, ceremonies and observances in Reform Jewish worship in the past three decades. These include hakafot, talitot, kippot and bowing the head and bending the knee during prayer. Although we may disagree about when to mark the beginning of this increase (Maurice Eisendrath, then president of the umbrella organization of Reform congregations, insisted in his 1964 autobiography, Can Faith Survive?, that he “wanted no neo-Orthodoxy in Reform today”), I argue that the end of the dignified English service with hymns such as “All the World has Come to Serve Thee” became widespread only in the 1970s, primarily because of the influence of a generation of Reform rabbis who, beginning in 1970, were required to spend a year in Jerusalem. I explore the use of the word mitzvah as a test case, noting its absence before this period, the continued discomfort with it on theological grounds (the increase in tradition was not accompanied by any return to traditional theological categories), but the comfort with it when used as an equivalent for tsedakah or tikkun olam. And I use several synagogues as case studies of the implications — better, ambivalence — about this phenomenon.