共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
Eric Brown 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(1):79-89
I reject the traditional picture of philosophical withdrawal in the Hellenistic Age by showing how both Epicureans and Stoics
oppose, in different ways, the Platonic and Aristotelian assumption that contemplative activity is the greatest good for a
human being. Chrysippus the Stoic agrees with Plato and Aristotle that the greatest good for a human being is virtuous activity,
but he denies that contemplation exercises virtue. Epicurus more thoroughly rejects the assumption that the greatest good
for a human being is virtuous activity. He maintains that the greatest good for a human being is the tranquility that virtuous
activity always and contemplative activity sometimes brings about.
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Eric BrownEmail: |
2.
Roger Crisp 《Ethical Theory and Moral Practice》2008,11(3):233-246
This paper is a discussion of the emotion of compassion or pity, and the corresponding virtue. It begins by placing the emotion
of compassion in the moral conceptual landscape, and then moves to reject the currently dominant view, a version of Aristotelianism
developed by Martha Nussbaum, in favour of a non-cognitive conception of compassion as a feeling. An alternative neo-Aristotelian
account is then outlined. The relation of the virtue of compassion to other virtues is plotted, and some doubts sown about
its practical significance.
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Roger CrispEmail: |
3.
Aaron Stalnaker 《The Journal of religious ethics》2010,38(3):404-428
This essay explores the interrelation of skills and virtues. I first trace one line of analysis from Aristotle to Alasdair MacIntyre, which argues that there is a categorical difference between skills and virtues, in their ends and intrinsic character. This familiar distinction is fine in certain respects but still importantly misleading. Virtue in general, and also some particular virtues such as ritual propriety and practical wisdom, are not just exercised in practical contexts, but are in fact partially constituted by the mastery of certain skills. This has implications for moral psychology, specifically how we might understand the acquisition of virtue, as well as its very nature. To try to make this claim plausible I analyze two case studies from early Confucianism: treatment of ritual propriety as a cardinal virtue, and Mencius's less carefully integrated treatment of excellence at moral discernment. I conclude by revisiting the question of the relations between skill and virtue, and exploring a few of the difficulties implied by my account of early Confucian ethics. 相似文献
4.
Stephen Kershnar 《Philosophia》2006,34(2):159-168
Thomas Hurka has put forth a powerful account of virtue. The account rests on a specification of intrinsically good mental states and then explains what unifies them. On his account, virtue and desert also share the same structure. His theory of virtue has some difficulties that threaten the structure that unifies it. First, Hurka's account cannot provide a principled account of virtue and vice when they are constituted by attitudes toward things are not intrinsically good (e.g., nonexistent state of affairs). Second, Hurka's account does not have room for an important factor in determining the degree to which an attitude is virtuous or vicious: agent-relative goods. Hurka is thus faced with a abandoning the basic structure that makes his theory attractive or adopting counterintuitive positions.
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Stephen KershnarEmail: |
5.
James A. Marcum 《Theoretical medicine and bioethics》2009,30(3):249-265
Today, modern Western medicine is facing a quality-of-care crisis that is undermining the patient–physician relationship.
In this paper, a notion of the epistemically virtuous clinician is proposed in terms of both the reliabilist and responsibilist
versions of virtue epistemology, in order to help address this crisis. To that end, a clinical case study from the literature
is first reconstructed. The reliabilist intellectual virtues, including the perceptual and conceptual virtues, are then discussed
and applied to the case study. Next, a similar method is employed to examine the responsibilist intellectual virtues, including
curiosity, courage, honesty, and humility, and to apply them to the case study. To round out the discussion, the love of knowledge
and both theoretical and practical wisdom are explored and applied to the case study. The paper concludes with a brief discussion
of how the notion of an epistemically virtuous clinician addresses the quality-of-care crisis, in terms of the connection
between ethical and intellectual virtues, and of the notion’s implications for medical education.
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James A. MarcumEmail: |
6.
John Lemos 《Philosophia》2007,35(1):43-62
This article compares the views of Foot and Aristotle on virtues and flourishing. It is argued that the view put forward in
Philippa Foot’s recent book, Natural Goodness, suffers from a certain sort of vagueness and it is open to other criticisms which the Aristotelian view can avoid. Foot’s
views have been subjected to criticism in the recent literature by David Copp and David Sobel. These criticisms are given
consideration in the article and it is argued that the more traditional Aristotelian view advocated by the author will have
the means to answer some of these criticisms whereas Foot’s view will not.
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John LemosEmail: |
7.
Iovan Drehe 《Topoi》2016,35(2):385-394
Argumentation virtue theory is a new field in argumentation studies. As in the case of virtue ethics and virtue epistemology, the study of virtue argumentation draws its inspiration from the works of Aristotle. First, I discuss the specifics of the argumentational virtues and suggest that they have an instrumental nature, modeled on the relation between the Aristotelian intellectual virtue of ‘practical wisdom’ and the moral virtues. Then, inspired by Aristotle’s discussion of akrasia, I suggest that a theory of fallacy in argumentation virtue theory can be built upon the concept of ‘incontinence’. 相似文献
8.
Sor-hoon Tan 《Sophia》2007,46(1):99-102
Learning from Chinese Philosophies explores early Confucianism and Daoism in order to engage today’s problems. By bringing into thoughtful play Confucian ideas
of self and society and Daoist understanding of situated self, the author uses the debate between the two philosophies to
argue for her understanding of Confucian moral thinking and Daoist metaethics. According to Lai, Daoist metaethics question
dichotomous frameworks and discuss the unity of opposites enabling dynamic interplay of nonantagonistic polarities. Lai not
only rejects comparisons of Confucianism to consequentialist and deontological moral theories, but also the view that Confucian
ethics is a form of virtue ethics. Instead, she argues that the Analects is a manual for moral decision making that requires skills “to unravel and analyse the complex features of particular situations
and to pick out those which are morally relevant.” Together, Confucianism and Daoism offer views of interdependent relationality
that help to reconceptualize contemporary problems and criticize existing thinking and practices. Lai applies what she has
learned from these two Chinese philosophies in a critique of feminist care ethics. Despite a few flaws, this is a clearly
written work with stimulating interesting ideas and it lives up to the promise of demonstrating the continued relevance of
Chinese philosophies.
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Sor-hoon TanEmail: |
9.
10.
A major virtue of the Pragma-Dialectical theory of argumentation is its commitment to reasonableness and rationality as central
criteria of argumentative quality. However, the account of these key notions offered by the originators of this theory, Frans
van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, seems to us problematic in several respects. In what follows we criticize that account and
suggest an alternative, offered elsewhere, that seems to us to be both independently preferable and more in keeping with the
epistemic approach to arguments and argumentation we favor.
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John BiroEmail: |
11.
Donald Capps 《Pastoral Psychology》2009,58(2):193-206
This article endorses the contention that God suffers from a mental disorder, but challenges J. Henry Jurgens’ diagnosis of
bipolar disorder as reported in The Onion (“God diagnosed with bipolar disorder”, 2001) and proposes narcissistic personality disorder instead. It uses the diagnostic criteria for narcissistic personality disorder
from The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders—DSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, Washington, DC, 1994) and various biblical citations in support of this diagnosis. It
rejects the idea that a major personality change is reflected in the New Testament and claims that God did not experience
a major transformation of his narcissistic personality structure as described by Heinz Kohut (Forms and transformations of
narcissism, in A. P. Morrison, Ed., Essential papers on narcissism, pp. 61–87, New York University Press, New York, 1966/1986). However, it concludes that God’s creativity accounts for the stability of his narcissistic personality structure and helps
to explain his lack of empathy toward human beings.
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Donald CappsEmail: |
12.
Mark Siebel 《Philosophical Studies》2008,137(3):417-426
In part 4 of Meaning, Expression, and Thought, Davis rejects what he calls Fregean ideational theories, according to which the meaning of an expression is an idea; and
then presents his own account, which states that, e.g., the meaning of ‘Primzahl’ in German is the property of meaning prime number. Before casting doubt on the latter ontology of meanings, I come to Frege’s defence by pointing out that he was not an advocate
of the position Davis named after him because Fregean senses are not lexical meanings and Fregean thoughts are not types of
mental events.
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Mark SiebelEmail: |
13.
Liezl van Zyl 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):91-104
In this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive
affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties
respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’
and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’
One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism
or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs
to—present an account of moral obligation.
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Liezl van ZylEmail: |
14.
Shannon Vallor 《Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences》2009,8(1):1-15
Dennett’s recent defense in this journal of the heterophenomenological method and its supposed advantages over Husserlian
phenomenology is premised on his problematic account of the epistemological and ontological status of phenomenological states.
By employing Husserl’s philosophy of science to clarify the relationship between phenomenology and evidence and the implications
of this relationship for the empirical identification of ‘real’ conscious states, I argue that the naturalistic account of
consciousness Dennett hopes for could be authoritative as a science only by virtue of the very phenomenological evidences
Dennett’s method consigns to the realm of fiction. Thus heterophenomenology, qua scientific method, is incoherent.
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Shannon VallorEmail: |
15.
Christian B. Miller 《Philosophical Studies》2009,142(2):247-275
The central virtue at issue in recent philosophical discussions of the empirical adequacy of virtue ethics has been the virtue
of compassion. Opponents of virtue ethics such as Gilbert Harman and John Doris argue that experimental results from social
psychology concerning helping behavior are best explained not by appealing to so-called ‘global’ character traits like compassion,
but rather by appealing to external situational forces or, at best, to highly individualized ‘local’ character traits. In
response, a number of philosophers have argued that virtue ethics can accommodate the empirical results in question. My own
view is that neither side of this debate is looking in the right direction. For there is an impressive array of evidence from
the social psychology literature which suggests that many people do possess one or more robust global character traits pertaining
to helping others in need. But at the same time, such traits are noticeably different from a traditional virtue like compassion.
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Christian B. MillerEmail: |
16.
Antony Aumann 《Continental Philosophy Review》2009,42(2):221-248
This paper provides an account of Kierkegaard’s central criticism of the Danish Hegelians. Contrary to recent scholarship,
it is argued that this criticism has a substantive theoretical basis and is not merely personal or ad hominem in nature. In
particular, Kierkegaard is seen as criticizing the Hegelians for endorsing an unacceptable form of intellectual elitism, one
that gives them pride of place in the realm of religion by dint of their philosophical knowledge. A problem arises, however,
because this criticism threatens to apply to Kierkegaard himself. It is shown that Kierkegaard manages to escape this problem
by virtue of the humorous aspect of his work.
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Antony AumannEmail: |
17.
John Martin Fischer 《The Journal of Ethics》2008,12(2):167-189
I seek to reply to the thoughtful and challenging papers by Helen Steward, Saul Smilansky, and John Perry. Steward argues
that agency itself requires access to alternative possibilities; I attempt to motivate my denial of this view. I believe that
her view here is no more plausible than the view (which she rejects) that it is unfair to hold someone morally responsible,
unless he has genuine access to alternative possibilities. Smilansky contends that compatibilism is morally shallow, and that
we can see this from the “ultimate perspective.” In reply, I explore the nature of “zooming” arguments, and I contend that
even from a somewhat more detached perspective, important features that distinguish us from mere animals can be discerned
(even in a causally deterministic universe). Finally, I seek to address Perry’s defense of classical compatibilism. My main
objection to his form of compatbilism is that agents must be construed as having a certain kind of “baggage”—even on his own
account.
相似文献
John Martin FischerEmail: |
18.
Commentary on the Current Status of Assessment in Rational-Emotive and Cognitive-Behavior Therapy 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
John M. Malouff 《Journal of Rational-Emotive & Cognitive-Behavior Therapy》2009,27(2):136-140
This commentary focuses on the current status of assessment in rational-emotive and cognitive-behavior therapy, in the context
of making comments about three assessment articles published in the same journal issue. The commentary describes important
characteristics of rational-emotive and cognitive-behavior assessment measures, suggests several avenues of psychometric research
on behavioral tests of distress tolerance as clinical measures, reviews psychometric and other important properties of existing
irrational belief measures, and endorses assessment related to newly proposed anger disorder diagnoses.
相似文献
John M. MalouffEmail: |
19.
Censure Theory <Emphasis Type="Italic">Still</Emphasis> Best Accounts for Punishment of the Guilty: Reply to Montague 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
T. Metz 《Philosophia》2009,37(1):113-123
In an article previously published in this journal, Phillip Montague critically surveys and rejects a handful of contemporary
attempts to explain why state punishment is morally justified. Among those targeted is one of my defences of the censure theory
of punishment, according to which state punishment is justified because the political community has a duty to express disapproval
of those guilty of injustice. My defence of censure theory supposes, per argumentum, that there is always some defeasible moral reason for the state to proportionately punish the guilty, and then demonstrates
that censure theory best entails and explains this intuition. Montague does not question the intuition, but instead argues
that three rival theories of punishment, including his societal-defence view, account for it to no worse a degree than my
censure theory. In this article I defend my initial argument, noting resources for its defence that Montague does not appreciate
and that, I maintain, provide those who believe that there is always pro tanto injustice in the state failing to proportionately punish the guilty reason to adopt censure theory over all competitors,
including Montague’s societal-defence theory.
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T. MetzEmail: |
20.
Mohsen Javadi 《Topoi》2007,26(2):247-254
There are some texts about moral sentences in the Islamic logical literature especially in the logical books of Ibn Sina that
have been interpreted in completely opposite ways. Relying on these texts, some scholars take Ibn Sina to be proposing a non-cognitive
theory of ethics and to the contrary some scholars hold that he is a proponent of a sort of moral intuitionism. Reflecting
on the alleged textual evidence in Ibn Sina’s books, I propose a middle way in the interpretation that accepts the cognitive
status of the moral sentences but at the same time rejects intuitionism.
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Mohsen JavadiEmail: |